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ABSTRACT
SOLDIERS, SPORTSMEN, AND POLITICIANS.

MILITARY SPORT IN GERMANY,

19

24-193 5.

May 1977

Michael B. Barrett, B.A., The Citadel
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor Harold J. Gordon, Jr.

This dissertation focuses on the subject of military

sport training in Germany from 1924 to 1935.

Through this

type of instruction, which paralleled basic military re-

cruit training, the Arm}/ attempted to circumvent the Ver-

sailles Treaty restrictions which prohibited a military

reserve force.

The Army Command hoped that military sport

graduates would form a reservoir of semi-trained manpower

available for military emergencies.

Military officials did

not openly sponsor military sport training; instead, they

provided indirect subsidies through other government agencies
for sport organizations, youth groups, and veterans associa-

tions which conducted military sport instruction.

Military sport training proved popular, and numerous

political organizations formed their own military sport organizations at the urging of their members.

This development

problem.
presented Defense Ministry officials with an awkward
the vast
They wanted to offer military sport instruction to
could mobilnumber of men which the political organizations

did not want any
ize, but at the same time, Army officers

political ideology to creep into this training, lest their
reservoir of semi-trained manpower become politicized and
unreliable.

Moreover, the Army insisted that its leaders

rather than those of the political parties would control
these putative reserves in the event of mobilization.

On

the other hand, although the political leaders welcomed

the discipline and experience which their political armies

would acquire through military sport training, they feared,

with justification, that the Army intended to undermine the
loyalty of their followers.

ernment from implementing, on

These fears prevented the Gova

nation-wide basis, its mili-

tary sport training program until 1932.

From its origins in 1924 to its termination in 1935,
the military sport training program provides an excellent

case study of the attitude of the Army Command and the De-

fense Ministry toward the major political parties in Germany

The Army, convinced of the value of military sport instruction, predicated its expansion and mobilization plans on the

existence of a large military sport program.

On becoming

Chancellor, Hitler not only continued the military sport

training program, but transferred it to the SA and increased

military sport activities almost

a

hundredfold.

The Army

any
Command nonetheless continued its efforts to minimize
sport instruc
political indoctrination attendant to military

tion,

fearing that the Army would become politicized.
dissertaBased on unpublished archival sources, this

tion concludes that the policy of the Army Command prior
to

1

933 aimed at undermining the loyalty of a major source

of Hitler's support, the young men in his SA.

After 1933,

leading Defense Ministry officials continued the broad

outlines of this policy by attempting to separate and isolate the extreme radicals in order to eliminate their in-

fluence on the new government.

vii

PREFACE

This dissertation focuses on the subject of military

sport in Germany from 1924 to 1935.

While at first glance

such a subject might appear to be of interest only to
specialists, the topic was the one area in which the Army,
the political parties, sport associations, and paramilitary

organizations all had a common interest.

Although the

policies of the Army Command have been examined in numerous
works for both the Weimar Republic and National Socialist
periods, very few historians, whose work is now dated, have

examined both eras to determine if any continuity exists.

Military sport, of vital interest to the Army Command during the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Hitler
Regime, and heretofore unstudied by historians, provides
us with an excellent vehicle for a case study in the atti-

tude of the Army Command toward political movements and in

particular, toward National Socialism.
At the risk of subjecting myself to the accusation
of pedantry,

I

have provided what some may consider exces-

sive documentation.
action.

Two reasons dictated this course of

material
First, with well over one-half of the source

coming from unpublished archival sources,
to expose this material to other scholars.

I

feel obligated

Second, the con-

me to
troversial nature of several of my theses requires
other historipoint out exactly where and why I differ with

viii

ans

.

Writers contemporary with the Nazi regime and those

who wrote in the immediate post-war period argued that the
German Army materially aided Hitler in his quest for political power.

In contrast, recent scholars have claimed,

for

the most part, that while the Army may have not actively

aided the Nazis, it certainly did nothing to hinder them,
and once they were in power, collaborated with the new
order.

My research concludes that the Army opposed the

Nazis prior to 1933 by trying to undermine their sources
of political support, and once the Nazis were in power,

leading Army officers attempted to separate and isolate the

extreme radicals in order to eliminate their influence on
the course of the new government.

Folk knowledge holds that a drowning person reviews

The analogy be-

his life before taking the final plunge.

tween a drowning person and the writer of a dissertation
is perhaps apt,

for there have been numerous occasions

during the preparation of this work when
ing in a sea of material.

As

I

I

felt myself sink-

submit the dissertation, the

to "review"
final plunge, so to speak, it seems appropriate

with pleasure
my life during its preparation, acknowledging
improved it.
those who assisted me and through their efforts
J. Gordon,
An immeasurable debt is owed Prof. Harold
advisor and dissertation
Jr., who was not only my faculty

of the word, the
director but who was also, in every sense
endured with exemplary
Doktorvater. He and his family have

ix

patience late-night phone calls and visits.

Prof. Marvin

Schwarz helped to tranform several rough draft chapters
into reasonable products, and he and Profs. R. H. McNeal

and Peter Fliess, the other members of my dissertation
committee, merit my gratitude.

The staffs of the various archives, institutes, and

libraries where

I

conducted my research were all very help-

ful and unfailingly courteous.

Several colleagues and

friends contributed greatly to this undertaking, offering

criticism, encouragement, and friendship.

Among these were

Mr. Gilbert E. Southern, Jr. and Dr. Philip N. Cronenwett.

Professors Henry Smith and Joseph Gundel helped render my
awkward translations into literate English without sacrificing precision or subtelty.

My typist, Mrs. Frances

Rosier, performed yeoman service in her first attempt at

typing the German language.

Without financial assistance the dissertation would
have proven impossible.

I

deeply appreciate the support

provided by the History Department of the University of
Massachusetts, the Germanistic Society of America, and the

Fulbright-Hays Commission.
The greatest debt, however, is due my family.

The

was
confidence expressed by my parents and parents-in-law

most encouraging.
endeavors,

I

To my wife, Sara, who supported all my

owe everything, and it is to her that this

work is dedicated.
j
The Citadel
i

M.B.B.
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CHAPTER

1

THE END OF THE FREIKORPS
ERA,

1924

German Army officers never reconciled themselves to
the strength limitations of the Reiehswehr, which they re-

garded as hopelessly inadequate for defending Germany's
borders.

1

The diminutive size of the Reiehswehr,

100,000

men, was hardly a matter of their choice, but rather had

been imposed upon Germany by the victorious Allies in 1919
in a vain effort to cripple Germany militarily.

Further

treaty stipulations prohibited any mobilization planning
and banned the creation of a military reserve force.

Limited by law and treaty to

wartime military

a peace and

Friedrich von Rabenau, Hans von Seeckt; Aus seinem
(Hereafter cited as
Leben, 1918-1936 Leipzig, 1931, 481.
Rabenau, Seeckt
See further the Gordon Papers, II, "letLetters from
ters from Reiehswehr officers, 1919-1926".
the following former Reiehswehr officers state that the
Reiehswehr was adequate as a police force, but that size
and equipment deficiencies rendered hopeless any resistance
against a determined foe: Generaloberst a.D. H-J v. Arnim;
Gen. d. Inf. a.D. Kurt Brennecke; Gen d. Inf a D. Theodor
Busse; Gen. d. Art a.D. Fr-W. Hauck; Generaloberst a.D. Gotthard Heinrici; Generaloberst a.D. Karl Hollidt; Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring; Gen. d Art a D. Emil Leeb; Gen.
d. Inf. a.D. Curt Liebmann; Gen. d. Inf. a.D. Walter Melzer;
Gen.d. Panzertruppe a.D. Walter Nehring; Gen .d.Flakart a.D.
Wolfgang Pichert; Gen d.Nachrichtentruppe a.D. Albert Praun;
Gen.d. Inf. a.D. Georg v Sodenstern and Generaloberst a.D.
Adolf StrauS.
,

.

)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

;

.

Articles 160, 166, and 178. Per Friedensvertrag
Zwischen Deutschland und den Allierten und Assozierten
Machten Chariot tenberg 1919, 164-172. This is a trilingual
text, with English and French (the official languages of the
Treaty) given alongside the German.
2

,

,

establishment of one hundred thousand men, the German Army

Command could only watch, with increasing despair, their
neighbors train annually more than one hundred times the

number of recruits as did Germany.
of

c_a.

7

With

a

combined total

million trained men available for mobilization,

Germany's potential foes (excluding Great Britain and the
Soviet Union) enjoyed a numerical preponderance of 70 to
one

3
J
.

The world made safe for democracy appeared no less

wicked to most Germans than the old world.

The behavior

of Poland and France following the 1914-1918 War hardly

reassured the German Defense Ministry (Reichswehr Ministry)
of their pacific intentions.

Poland's unsuccessful attempt

to exploit the confusion of the Russian Civil War was fol-

lowed by an effort to wrest Upper Silesia from Germany

before the official plebiscite, and the subsequent actions
taken by the Allies and the League of Nations confirmed
for many Germans the axiom that might makes right.

4

The

0tto GeBler, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer
Zeit Stuttgart, 1958, 203f. Former Reichswehrminster
GeBler provides the following figures:
mobilized
peace strength
recruits
™°> 000
100,000
13,000
Germany
4-5 million
786,000
240,000
France
3 million
570,000
200,000
Belgium, Poland
and Czechoslovakia
3

,

of the
In deciding the fate of Upper Silesia, 62%
rule in »
inhabitants indicated a preference for German
The disappoints
plebiscite conducted by the League in 1921.
4

)

3

military inability of Germany to prevent or even to hinder
seriously the French occupation of the Ruhr region in 1923
further underscored the need for

a

stronger military force.

5

In addition to the requirement for a stronger force

to protect the territorial integrity of the Reich, internal

unrest dictated a larger force.

On several occasions dur-

ing the first years of the Republic, police forces proved

incapable of handling revolutionaries and required military
assistance.

The revolutionaries did not present

a serious

threat to the armed forces; however, the military requirement to prepare for all contingencies resulted in the small

Reichswehr occasionally finding itself spread too thinly.

Poles promptly launched an insurrection with the tacit approval of the Polish Government. The English and French
occupation forces, bitterly divided over the results of the
plebscite, proved incapable of handling the situation. After
reviewing the vote, the League announced in October 1921 that
Poland would receive slightly under one-half of the province,
including most of the industrial areas which were indisput-See S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democ
ably German.
A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933
racy.
New York, 1946, 206ff.
,

In April 1921 the Army Command realistically acknowledged its relative impotence vis-a-vis France by orderwithdraw
ing its commanders of western military districts to
their units peacefully should the French cross the Rhine.
Harold J. Gordon, Jr., The Reichswehr and the Republic,Gordon,
(Hereafter cited as
1919-1926 Princeton, 1957, 226.
5

,

Reichswehr and Republic

.

flourA1 though the majority of the German Freikorps
several Freikorps
ished during the first six months of 1919,
were tempwhich had revolted at the prospect of disbanding
assistance during
orarily recruited by the Reichswehr for
employment in Upper
the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch, for
Gordon, ReichsSilesia, and above all, during 1923. See
6

.

)

4

With the avenue of legal expansion blocked by the Treaty
and the Allies, the Defense Ministry and the Government

believed that they had no choice but to find expedient and
perforce illegal solutions to the shortage of manpower.
The resort to such palpably forbidden activities caused
few crises of conscience: the peremptory treatment accorded

the Germans at Versailles and what Germans considered to be

subsequent Allied transgressions of the Treaty, above all
the French occupation of the Ruhr, convinced the Army Com-

mand and the Government that the French had first broken
the Treaty

7

It was only after the most penetrating soul-search-

ing that the General Staff

(

Truppenamt

)

officers accepted

the necessity of relying on the temporary assistance of

As illustrated by

non-regular paramilitary organizations.

the Upper Silesian Affair, the Army Command in most instances

had no alternative to employing irregular formations.

The

deployment of regular troops to Upper Silesia to combat

Polish insurgents would have not only denuded the German

wehr and Republic 126f., 225, 230, 232ff, 215ff; and
Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politi cs, 1918-1933,
,

Oxford, 1966 (U. of Calif, paperback, 1973), 88, 149f.,
151ff. (Citations are taken from the paperback edition,
lurid
hereafter cited as Carsten, Reichswehr.) A rather
s
description of the Ruhr revolt is given in R.G.L. Waite
P o st
The Vancruard of Nazism. The Free Corps Movement in
chapter
War Germany, 1918-1923 Cambridge, Mass., 1952,
VII. (Hereafter cited as Waite, Vanguard
,

.

Gordon, Reichswehr, 254f.

)

5

border elsewhere of security forces, but might have inaugurated an escalation of military activity with Poland culmi-

nating in war, an action certain to involve France. 8

The

deployment of irregular German formations in Upper Silesia
was not an irresponsible folly, but instead represented
the careful judgement of sober, experienced officers, for

whom the natural law of self-defense transcended

a legal-

istic adherence to the Carthaginian strictures of the

victorious Allies.
The major problem which the Army Command faced in

employing irregular forces was control; there simply was
no sure means of compelling the commanders of the paraHaving experienced

military organizations to obey orders.

difficulties with these tough-minded and resolute condottieri on several occasions, most notably during the Kapp

Putsch of 1920, the Army Command hesitated to employ nonregular forces and only committed them in the most desper-

The Allies, at the instigation of the French Government, refused to allow Germany to send a single soldier
into Upper Silesia to quell the Polish-backed insurrection.
The French made it clear that if the Germans dispatched
Army forces to Upper Silesia, they would occupy the Ruhr,
leaving the Germans the option of either abandoning Upper
Silesia or employing irregular forces. With the approval
of all the German political parties except for the Communists and the Independent Socialists, irregular troops
marched into Upper Silesia. See Gordon, Reichswehr, 226f.;
Waite, Vanguard, 227-232; and Thilo Vogelsang, Reichswehr,
(Hereafter cited
Staat unTNSD AP, Stuttgart, 1962 29-32
as Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
8

,

.

.

.

6

ate circumstances.

9

Generally speaking, the Reichswehr

employed three categories of irregular forces: free corps
(

Freikorps

)

temporary volunteers

,

"labor" commands

(

Arbeitskommandos

(

Zeitf reiwillige

)

,

and

)

The Freikorps, over which the Army exercised little,
if any authority, were usually composed of war veterans who

found civilian life tedious and unexciting, especially when
unemployed.

Not at all squeamish about using violence to

attain their ends, the men in the Freikorps generally de-

spised the Weimar Republic, preferring instead some form
of authoritarian government to which their military service

had conditioned them.

Although most Freikorps units served

loyally, several of the larger ones, when ordered to muster
out of service, rebelled against the Government.

While

major bloodshed was avoided, the distressing tendency of
these units to act independently of any authority but their
own encouraged Seeckt and his staff to find more suitable

auxilliaries

.

Nonetheless, on pressing occasions, such as

the Ruhr Revolt of 1920, the Upper Silesian Affair, and the

French invasion of 1923, the Chief of the Army Command
either used or considered using Freikorps units, albeit

with great reluctance.

Reichswehr 156ff; Gordon, Reichswehr
300, 460, 466,
126f, 217f; Rabenau, Seeckt

9 Carsten,

and Republic
and 4 75.

,

10

,

,

l0 Carsten, Reichswehr , 74 f, 149, 156f; Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republ ic, 24f, 53f, 93f; Waite, Vanguard,
54ff, 106, 136f, and 184.

1

.

7

Temporary volunteers, recruited and officered by
ostensibly discharged or retired officers, trained and were

billeted with regular Army units and were, in some fashion
or another, in the pay of the Defense Ministry.

The Army

accordingly exercised greater control over the temporary
volunteers than the Freikorps units.

Usually recruited

for a specific duration and consisting for the most part

of idealistic students, temporary volunteers normally

proved more reliable than their more volatile colleagues,
the Freikorps

1

While the employment of Freikorps and temporary
volunteers had come, for the most part, to an end by mid1920, the crisis year of 1923 compelled Army authorities

not only to employ non-regular forces, but, in Bavaria,
to reach a modus Vivendi with political paramilitary or-

ganizations.

The Army Command prepared plans to enlist

temporary volunteers, and a considerable number of "labor"
commands

(

Arbeitskommandos

gemeinschaften

)

)

and "labor" groups

(

Arbeits -

were organized by Major (Ret.) Buchrucker.

While some military training was given to these units,
most of them performed labor details for the Army.

Even

these units proved intractable; when faced with dissolution (a matter of time once the Government abandoned its

Carsten, Reichswehr 187, 222f; Gordon, Reichswehr and Republic 187f, and 156.
1l

,

,

8

policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr) they rebelled,
casting further doubt on the wisdom of relying on non-

regular forces during emergencies.^ 2
In addition, the anti-Republican and anti-demo-

cratic attitudes common to most non-regular and paramilitary organizations logically spoke against using these

formations to defend the Republic.

True, many Reichswehr

officers sympathized with the authoritarian and nationalistic political ideals of the irregular forces, but the

reliance by the Army on conservative and right-radical

irregulars merely reflected their numerical preponderance
and the inroads made by anti-military and pacifist propa-

ganda in the ranks of the Socialists and Communists.

1

3

Moreover, the Army Command appears to have had doubts

concerning the willingness of Republican paramilitary
formations to fire on the working classes.
The Ruhr Occupation and the Hitler Putsch of 1923

publicly illustrated the dangers inherent in using irregular forces, while simultaneously underscoring the necessity

of a trained military reserve force.

The uproar which fol-

Reichswehr and Republic
Carsten, Reichswehr 156-160, 168f.
12 Gordon,

,

233f, 256f;

,

Carsten in his otherwise highly critical work
See also
See his Reichswehr, 156.
concedes this point.
Waite, Vanguard 53f.
13 Even

,

9

lowed Hitler's Munich fiasco over the
political activities
of the Bavarian Reichswehr division led
to increased Allied
vigilance concerning violations of the provisions
of the

Versailles Treaty.

The Defense Ministry gladly took advan-

tage of the Putsch as an excuse to end all ties
with home
guard, non-regular, and political paramilitary
formations.

Although the Reichswehr reliance on the Freikorps,
temporary volunteers, and political paramilitary organizations had clearly been one of reluctant expediency and

was terminated in 1924, its raison d'etre still existed:
the 100,000 man limitation imposed on the size of the Army
by the Versailles Treaty.

Of equal consequence, yet not

as difficult to circumvent as the strength ceiling on the

Reichswehr, was the treaty prohibition against mobilization
planning.

In practice, planning was easily disguised and

kept secret, but no matter how brilliant or thorough the

mobilization plans, they constituted little more than staff
exercises so long as the strength and materiel limitations

remained in effect.
As early as 1921, General Staff officers began to

consider mobilization measures.
staff officers held on

15

At a meeting of senior

January 1921, General Hans von

Seeckt, the Chief of the Army Command, presented a memoran-

dum titled "Basic Concepts for the Reconstruction of our

Armed Forces", which presumed some form of conscription and
called for an arithmetic expansion of the seven Reichswehr

10

infantry divisions (to 14, then 21, etc.) until the divisions numbered sixty-three. 14

With military conscription forbidden by the Versaille
Treaty, Seeckt's plan represented wishful thinking and

preparation for a better future, a fact realized by the
General Staff and reflected in their 1924 revised mobilization schedule, which called for a more realistic field
force of only twenty-one infantry divisions.

This smaller

force also appeared to reflect Seeckt's commitment to ending the Reichswehr's reliance on non-regular forces.

Although the mobilized force would be small, it at least

would be firmly controlled by military authorities; the
new divisions, commanded by regular officers, would be
filled with volunteers.

While more realistic in its scope,

this plan did not really solve the problem.

In all prob-

ability, sufficient numbers of volunteers would present

themselves during a crisis, but without prior training, at
once illegal and difficult to conceal from the suspicious
Allies, such volunteers would prove more a burden than a
help.

The Army, in the midst of mobilization and expansion,

would simply have no time to train new recruits.

Papers/287, Joachim von Stulpnagel notes,
Rabenau reprints Seeckt's "Grundlegende Gedanken
Bl. 6.
474f.
fur den Wiederaufbau unseren Wehrmacht" in Seeckt,
14 Seeckt

15 Rabenau,

Seeckt, 474f.

11

Although there were millions of veterans from the
First World War who theoretically could be called to
service in the event of mobilization, six years had elapsed
since the end of the war, and the military skills of many
of these veterans had atrophied, necessitating retraining.

This was particularly true of officers, especially staff
officers.

Moreover, although men called to service in the

last year of the war were still young enough in 1924 for

combat duties, most other veterans were older and the

passage of each year meant that fewer would be young
enough to perform front line duties by normal standards.
The majority of potential soldiers then, who were to be
mobilized' in the event of war, and certainly those who

were to serve in the front lines, would have to come from
the post-war generation which had had no military training.

The Army Command thus faced a shrinking reservoir of trained
men whose skills were slowly deteriorating and had no prospect of legally increasing this reservoir.

The disastrous trained manpower shortage was not merely a matter for the generals.

German politicians had not

forgotten Clemenceau's dictum and defense matters, even

though reduced to a tiny scale in Germany, lost none of
their importance and were subjected to an exacting scrutiny
by the politicians.

In many respects the greatest opposition

to the Army's efforts to circumvent the Treaty came not from

the Allies but from parsimonious and doctrinaire German

6

6

12

politicians of the political Left, who tended to be anti-

military and in some cases, pacifists.
Military or military-related issues underwent an

unrelenting but often uninformed scrutiny in the Reichstag
and in the press of the various political parties.

Communists and the Majority Socialists (SPD)

,

The

ideologically

suspicious of the Army and claiming real or imagined injuries at its hands, ignored libel laws and common sense in

their often inflamatory and inaccurate polemics against the
armed forces.

The Socialists (SPD), many of whom were

pacifists, adamant that the mission of the Army was first
and foremost to protect the Weimar Republic against domestic

opponents, were convinced by their own rhetoric that the

Army continually fomented plans to overthrow any "progressive"

(i.e., Socialist)

government.

Opposed to an army of

long term service professionals, the Socialists in theory

embraced the principle of universal military service in
militia.

a

Even though conscription was highly unpopular

with large numbers of urban workers, the mainstay of the

Socialist Party, the Socialists could safely express their
rhetorical advocacy of equal and universal liability for

military service, knowing that the chances for the actual
introduction of conscription remained remote so long as the

Versailles Treaty continued in effect.

1

Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages: Stenographischen Berich te, Berlin, 1920tt., Hue (SPD), 13.
8372;
1920, vol. 333,5075? David (SPD), 7.7. 1922, vol. 356,
1

)

13

The Communists expressed an inexorable hatred for
the Reichswehr.

Taking advantage of their parliamentary

immunity from slander, Communist Reichstag deputies ex-

coriated the Army, denouncing it as the tool or reactionary, monied interests.

Using the annual Reichstag budget

debates as a forum in which to proselytize their views,
the Communists appeared more interested in execrating the

Army than in reforming it.

Appealing to sensationalism,

their often unfounded allegations served little purpose

other than to titilate the faithful, while simultaneously

alienating the Reichswehr and many patriotic Germans.

1

7

Far more discrediting to the Communist campaign to villify
the Reichswehr than their patent prevarications was the

imposition of party discipline from Moscow, which on oc-

14.3. 1922, vol. 353, 6232f; Muller (SPDSchopflin (SPD)
Franken), 30.10. 1922, vol. 353, 6247; Kunstler (SPD), 27.2.
1923, vol. 358, 9891; Schopflin (SPD), 18.3. 1921, vol. 348,
See Gustav Noske, Von
(Hereafter cited as RTV.
321 5f.
Kiel bis Kapp Berlin, 198f; Carl Severing, Mein Lebensweg;
(Hereafter
II, Koln, 1950, 111.
In, Auf und Ab der Republik
cited as Severing, Lebensweg ) Otto Braun, Von Weimar zu
(Hereafter cited as Braun,
Hitler New York, 1940, 206f.
A valuable article is Gustav Adolf CasWeimar zu Hitler
par, "Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und das deutsche Wehrproblem in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik" in Beiheft 11
(Hereof Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau October 1959, 13f.
after cited as Caspar, "SPD und Wehrproblem"
,

)

,

,

;

,

.

)

,

.

17 RTV, Hollein (KPD) , 3.6. 1921, vol. 349, 3780;
(KPD)
Kunstler "(KPD), 11.11. 1921, vol. 351 , 4966; Thomas 92
25 6
i'
14.3. 1922, vol. 353, 6255-60; Koenen (KPD),
c l
8502;
vol.
356,
1922,
12.7.
vol. 356, 8069f; Koenen, (KPD),
Koenen (KPD),
Frohlich (KPD), 23.2. 1923, vol. 358, 9845f;
Reichswehr, 364tt.
28.9. 1923, vol. 361, 11919; and Gordon,
,

'

'

)
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casion placed the Communists in league with strange bedfellows.

When, for example, reports of collaboration

between the Reichswehr and the Red Army to circumvent the

Versailles Treaty appeared from time to time in the German
press, the Communists maintained an embarrassed silence or

when confronted with damaging evidence, joined the rightist parties in issuing strident and hollow denials. 18

From the middle and opposite sectors of the political spectrum, and especially from the conservative parties,

came the strongest support for the armed forces.

The

Democratic Party, while voting in favor of the Army budget,
was critical of Reichswehr recruiting practices and sug-

gested a number of minor changes.

On the important issues,

The

however, the Democrats stood behind the Army Command.
Center, German Peoples'

(DVP)

,

and German Nationalist (DNVP)

parties all supported the Reichswehr and the policies of
the Army Command in the Reichstag and in their party presses,

although on occasion the German Nationalist newspapers at-

tacked the Defense Ministry.

1
1

Q
^

In practice, this political support proved to be a

mixed blessing.

While secretly welcoming the backing of

18 Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible

Allies: A Memoir of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941 New
(Hereafter cited as Hilger and Meyer,
York, 1933, 204f.
Incompatible Allies
,

.

19 Gordon,

Reichswehr, 395-411.
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the conservative parties
had,

(the DVP and the DNVP)

,

the Army

as an ostensibly non-partisan institution, to refrain

from seeking and acknowledging partisan endorsements.

Not

only did the Army Command have to minimize the social and

ideological affinities existing between an officer corps

tied by blood and education to conservative groups, but it
also had to cope with the natural tendency of an officer
corps maligned and abused by Socialists and Communists to

forge close ties with the party which appeared to be their

staunchest ally, the Nationalist Party.
On the other hand, Reichswehr efforts to elevate

national defense policy to the sphere of non-partisan politics, a desire shared by many intensely nationalistic and

conservative Germans, meant that conservative party leaders
did not have the opportunity of criticizing either defense*

policies or the Army itself.

With the leadership of the

rightist parties remaining for the most part mute vis-a-vis

national defense, there existed the danger of their members

becoming exposed to and identifying themselves with the
interests of the Army, which could result in a substantial

collapse of party discipline and unity should it appear
that the interests of the Army and the party diverged.
(NSDAP)
Like the Communists, the radical Nazi Party

castigated the idea of a non-partisan army.

To both, the

army served the party which was the state.

In denouncing

Nazis initially
the idea of a non-partisan Reichswehr, the

)

exercised a notable lack of restraint in their vicious and
often personal attacks against the Army Command.

A typical

article in the official Nazi newspaper concluded that General von Seeckt received his orders from the Jews and Social

Democrats. 20

While this inflammatory rhetoric and logic

(!)

found a ready and credulous audience in the fringe elements
of a society experiencing radical transformations, it was

bound to alienate the more reasonable and moderate majority
of Germans.

While Hitler went out of his way to revile and

heap invective on the "moderate majority"

(

Spiefibiirger

)

,

he

deduced in the aftermath of his "march on Berlin" that he
could not successfully oppose the Reichswehr militarily.
Such a conclusion left only the alternative of politics,
the realities of which dictated an outward change of course

toward defense politics.
As a professed revolutionary movement claiming to

oppose the entire rotten and corrupt Weimar system, the
adulatory and uncritical attitude regarding the military

leadership adopted by many Germans who were most likely to
favor Nazism presented the Party with problems of the

greatest magnitude.

Were Hitler to employ his normal

The re2Q Volkischer Beobachter, 26 September 1923.
percussions from this article precipitated a crisis between
Division)
the Army Command and the Bavarian Division (7th
military
Commander, culminating in the abrogation of special
The
prerogatives for Bavaria. See Harold J. Gordon Jr.,
(Hereafter cited
Beer Hall Putsch Princeton, 1972, 228ff.
as Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch.
,

rhetoric, denouncing the Army as the prop of a decadent and

politically bankrupt regime, the almost certain result

would be an exodus of Nazi followers to more "patriotic",
nationalist parties.

Yet a policy of open cooperation with

the Reichswehr would compromise his revolutionary stance,

render suspect his claim to oppose all vestiges of the

execrable Republic of the "November Criminals", and would
scarcely be welcomed with open arms by his supporters.

During the winter of 192 3-24, such considerations

were academic for both Hitler and the Army Command.

mediately following the debacle on the ResidenzstraBe

Im,

and

the gunfire at the Bavarian Military District (VII) Head-

quarters, neither Hitler nor the Army Command had the re-

motest idea of ever again reaching

a

modus vivendi

.

By

the spring of 1924, however, the Bohemian Corporal, dis-

playing the audacity and brilliance which would propel him
from the defendant's dock to the Reich Chancellory, transformed his trial for high treason into an indictment of
the Weimar Republic and began the first groping steps toward
a rapprochement with the Reichswehr.

morning of

9

Having learned the

November 1923 that the Army would not march

with him, Hitler attempted to insure that it would not march
against him.

His tactical course was, notwithstanding its

simplicity and directness, brilliant.

Ingeniously revers-

adopted
ing the Reichwehr's alleged apolitical position, he
an apolitical attitude toward the Army.

Avoiding the pit-

18

falls of condemnation and effusive praise with their atten-

dant loss of political support, he informed his accusers
in the Munich courtroom and all Germany that "when

that it was the Green Police

had fired

[on the

Putschists]

[Bavarian Landespolizei
,

I

learned

I

]

which

had the happy feeling that

at least it was not the Reichswehr which had besmirched itself; the Reichswehr stands as untarnished as before." 21

The shots fired on the Odeonsplatz not only crushed
the Beer Hall Putsch, they also ended the era of overt

Reichswehr collaboration with paramilitary organizations,
temporary volunteers, and Freikorps units.

At the same

time as Hitler began anew his campaign for political power,

General Staff officers began anew their efforts to augment
The experiment

Germany's inadequate military strength.

with non-regular forces had failed and the medicine had

proved almost as dangerous as the disease.

Yet the chronic

shortage of trained or semi-trained manpower still existed,
the Army officers began a spirited search for a more ame-

nable solution to the reserve force problem.

21

Quoted from Konrad Heiden, Per Fuhrer. Hitler's
Rise to Power (trans, by R. Mannheim), Boston, 1944, 2C5f.
As usual, Hitler
(Hereafter cited as Heiden, Per Fuhrer
stretched the truth. The Reichswehr did fire on a group
See Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch 347ff.
of the Putschists.
.

)

,
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CHAPTER

II

THE PEOPLE'S SPORT PROGRAM
1924-1927

A Reserve For the Reichswehr
During the spring of

19 24

Army Command staff officers

considered at length the problem of creating some reservoir
of trained or semi-trained manpower.

In January, Seeckt re-

jected a revival of the Kriimper system, which called for the

annual substitution of trained soldiers by recruits.

He

also rejected a proposal to extend the temporary volunteer

soldier

(

eitf reiwill iger) program.

1

In addition to Seeckt'

dissatisfaction with the performance and unreliability of
temporary volunteer units, the Kriimper and Zietf reiwilliger
plans were in all probability rejected because they were

violations of the Versailles Treaty which would have been
impossible to disguise or keep secret.
In March, discussion in the Defense Ministry turned
to the concept of pre-military training,

2

that is, provid-

ing some basic military instruction, such as marksmanship
or drill, prior to actual enlistment.

Pre-military train-

ing would thus shorten considerably the time required for

training recruits, and it presented an attractive alterna-

1 Seeckt

Hasse Diaries.
Ibid

Papers, 281; .General Lieber Notes on the

20

tive to the Kriimper system or volunteer units because it

could be conducted by civilians, and if carefully planned
to avoid actual military weapons training, would not con-

stitute a clear violation of the Versailles Treaty.

While insufficient evidence exists to trace the

evolution of pre-military training in the Reichswehr Ministry from March to October,

3

the Reichswehr, in October,

began its first pre-military training course which had the

euphimistic code name "Peoples' Sport"
first course commenced on

1

(

Volkssport

)

.

The

October 1924, in the village

of Wiinsdorf, south of Berlin.

4

In all likelihood Wiinsdorf

was chosen as the location for the Volkssport course because the Reichswehr Sport School was also located there
and it could provide clandestine assistance.

sport course had a distinct military mission:

The Volks"...

to

provide, at the least, a pre-trained reserve for the con-

tingency plan Border Guard."

5

Even though many of the

3

For evidence which indicates government interest in
pre-military training, see Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv,
I, MI 72449, "Bericht
(Hereafter cited as BHStA)
Miinchen
iiber die Besprechung am 5. August 1924 im Corpshaus Suevia,
Universitat Heidelberg", 21.8. 1924, Nr. 2022; and Otto
Lehmann-Russbueldt Aggression New York and London, n.d.,
21-22.
,

,

4

,

"Wehrhaf tmachung der Jugend", Bl.
Miinchen (Hereafter cited as
2; Institut fur Zeitgeschichte
Zgs. 44, Oberst i.G.a.D. Granz Gaertner, "Volkssport
IfZG)
Bl. 26-7.
zur Staats jugend"
BA, R-43 11/519,

,

,

,

R-43 11/519, Reichswehrminis ter Groener to
Reichskanzlei, 3669/30 W Id geheim, 18 October 1930, "... U
5

BA,

°

"
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course participants were former officers,

6

Volkssport

courses were not restricted to veterans, but were also to

include untrained personnel, who would be provided a modicum of training which would serve to lessen the amount of

training in the event of mobilization.

7

The mission of

creating a large, semi-trained reserve was the first con-

sideration of the Army Command in establishing Volkssport
courses

.

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) 0. Billmann led the first
courses at Wiinsdorf.

He integrated small bore marksman-

ship into the Volkssport curriculum, which also included

gymnastics, close order drill, map reading, and terrain
studies.

Twenty-five students participated in the first

fur den im Ernstfall notwendigen Grenzschutz einen wenigstens einigermassen vorgebildeten Ersatz heranzubilden
For an explanation of the Border Guard, see Chapter
Bl. 2.
-

.

IV.
6

IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur StaatsVolkssport trainees were probably from
jugend", Bl 26-29
a conservative, nationalist middle class or artisan class
background. Gordon, in Reichswehr and Republic 58, 207,
and 290-1, provides an explanation and literature review of
the reasons for the lack of working class participation in
military activities, a phenomenon encouraged by the Communist, Independent Socialist, and Majority Socialist Parties
.

.

,

7

BA, R-43 11/519,

"Wehrhaf tmachung der Jugend, Bl.

2

In this report, prepared by Oberstlt. von
Schleicher, the purpose of Volkssport was defined as "Fur
genosden jungen Ersatz, der keine militarische Ausbildung
werden,
sen hatte, muBte eine gewisse Vorarbeit geleistet
geringen Zeitraum
urn die militarische Ausbildung auf einen
ssportZu diesem Zweck wurde die Vc
zusammenzudrangen.
8 Ibid.

organisation geschaffen."
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course, most of whom were former company-grade
officers

from Silesia or Brandenburg.

The course lasted two weeks,

and at the end of the course the participants
decided to

hold an annual refresher course, not only to improve
and
refine skills, but also to share experiences arising from

teaching Volkssport courses in home town areas.

Military authorities hoped to establish

9

a

Volks-

sport school in every province, or at the least, in every

military district. 10

Upon completion of the course, Volks-

sport graduates were to teach similar courses in their home

town areas, possibly utilizing the assistance of local
veterans' groups, sport clubs, and youth groups.

9

jugend"

,

11

By

IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur StaatsBl. 26-9.

10

BA R-4 3 11/519, "Wehrhaf tmachung der Jugend" see
also Rainer Wohlfeil and Edgar Graf von Matuschka, Reichswehr
und Republik Frankfurt, 19 70, 211.
(Hereafter cited as Wohf
feil, Reichswehr und Republi kc) There were seven military
districts during this period: I (headquarters in Konigsberg)
consisted of East Prussia; II (Stettin) covered Pomerania,
Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Liibeck; III
(Berlin) included Brandenburg and Silesia; IV (Dresden) encompassed Anhalt, the Prussian Province of Saxony, and the
state of Saxony; V (Stuttgart) included both Hesses, Thuringia, Baden, and Wiirttemberg; VI (Miinster) covered Hannover,
Westphalia, Brunswick, the Rhineland, and Oldenburg; and VII
Clandestine military activi(Munich) consisted of Bavaria.
ties within Germany were conducted, for the most part, in
the eastern districts, It, II , III IV, and to a lesser exSurviving evidence limits this discussion of
tent, VII.
Volkssport activities to districts II, III, and VII. There
is no reason to assume that similar activities did not occur
in districts I and IV.
,

,

,

IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staatsjugend", Bl. 26-9; Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik
11

,

.

teaching Volkssport students, in relatively
small classes,
to serve as training cadres for further
pre-military training courses, the Army Command lessened
the chances that its
indirect ties to the Volkssport courses would

be discovered,

while simultaneously increasing the effectiveness
of the

program at a minimum cost.
The Volkssport program thus offered several advantages for the Army Command.

Youths who otherwise would not

have received any military training would be instructed in
the basic military fundamentals.

A pool of semi-trained

personnel, useful for defensive operations if integrated

with regular units, would be developed and available in
the event of mobilization.

Moreover, veterans would be

able to refresh and perfect their military skills by serving as Volkssport instructors.

The Reichswehr, especially in Military District III
(Berlin, Brandenburg and Silesia)

the Volkssport program.

1

2

,

energetically supported

Major (Ret.) Hentschel, an em-

ployee of District III, supervised the activities of the
Wiinsdorf school.

A second Volkssport school was established

in Silesia at the troop training area of Neuhammer during

1918-1945 Series B, 1925-1933, (Hereafter cited as AAA)
Gottingen, 1958, vol. I, part 2, Nr. 238, letter Wels-Muller
to GeBler, 6 December 1926, 555.
,

1

2

For an account of the financing of Volkssport in
Wehrkreis III, see Francis Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics,
(Hereafter cited as Carsten,
1918-1933, Oxford, 1964, 224.
Reichswehr and Politics)

'
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the winter of 1924-1925.
the school leader,

Captain (Ret.) von Winterfeldt,

conducted many courses with a focus on

the guerilla tactics employed by General von
Lettow-Vor-

beck in German East Africa.

These courses were popular,

especially with younger students.

Youth, sport club,
1

veterans, and political paramilitary group

(

e.g.

,

SA,

Stahlhelm) members were allowed to participate in the

Neuhammer training, but any form of political expression,
recruitment, and propaganda was forbidden. 13

The graduates of the first Wiinsdorf course met, as
planned, in July 1925 to discuss their experiences in teach
ing Volkssport courses since leaving Wiinsdorf.

All agreed

that the results had been generally positive, but several

graduates complained that the students they were now in-

structing were neither in good physical condition nor had
they any experience or particular qualifications in sports
or sport instruction.

The Wiinsdorf graduates decided to

insist that students in the future be tested for physical
fitness prior to enrollment.

A special effort would be

made to find students with considerable athletic experience

.

1

4

Two additional Volkssport schools were established

13 IfZG,
14

Zgs. 44, Gaertner,

"Erlebnis"

Bl.

,

Ibid., "Volkssport zur Staats jugend"

,

Bl.

12-16.
26-9.

5

under the aegis of Military District III in Silesia in
1925-1926.

The popularity of Volkssport necessitated a

larger facility in Silesia than Neuhammer, and Military

District III staff officers directed von Winterfeldt to
find a more suitable location.

estate

(SchloB

He chose the Braunau

Braunau) near Lowenberg in Upper Silesia. 15

A former naval officer, Corvette-Captain (Ret.) Hermann,

established a smaller school, with an enrollment of twentyfive students, at Reichenbach in Oberlausitz.

The army

cavalry division in Breslau provided some assistance to

Hermann's school.

The core of instruction at Reichenbach

consisted of Lettow-Vorbeck

1

s

guerilla tactics.

The

twenty-five students of the first course, conducted during the summer of 1925, quickly established their own

Volkssport schools in the Silesian mountains.

16

Officers of Military District II (headquarters in
Stettin) were equally active in conducting Volkssport in-

struction.

Major (Ret.) Wagner, ostensibly

a

civilian em-

ployee of the district, taught drill, marksmanship, war
games, and terrain studies at a Volkssport school in

Kreckow, near Stettin.

Captain (Ret.) Metger, also a

civilian employee of District II, assisted Wagner.

His

Ibid Bl. 31-2. No date is given for the estabIt was, in all likelihood,
lishment of the Braunau school.
1926, as Winterfeldt was busy in Neuhammer in 1925.
1

.

16 Ibid.,

Bl.

26-29.

.

further responsibilities extended to directing the Volkssport movement within the Stettin area, while Lieutenant
(Ret.)

Hermann directed the movement within the Gutenhagen

area 17

The popularity of Volkssport within the Stettin
area was so great that Wagner was forced to send prospective students to courses conducted in the countryside.

Former military officers ran Volkssport schools at "Hochburg" in Neubrandenburg and "Mierow" in Mecklenburg.

schools were financially supported by the Reichswehr.

Both
1

8

About fifteen former officers served as special
deputies for Military District II Volkssport activities.

Several were attached to various unit staffs, and eight
to ten officers operated at-large throughout the district.

These officers controlled secret weapons caches and conducted Volkssport courses.

The Reichswehr paid the sal-

aries of these "special deputies" and covered expenses

arising from Volkssport instruction.

1

^

a pre-

Bavarian Reichswehr officers established

military training program in Bavaria somewhat similar to
the Volkssport program conducted by the Reichswehr in

Military Districts II and III.

In a letter of

6

February

part 2, Nr. 238, enclosure 7 of WelsMiiller letter to GeBler, 6 December 1926, 554-555.
17AAA, B,
18 Ibid

I,

.

19 Ibid.,

556.

1925 to the Bavarian Government, the Commanding General of

the Bavarian Military District (VII), Baron Friedrich Kress

von Kressenstein, proposed that physical-military fitness

programs be instituted throughout the Bavarian school system.

Kress claimed that 80 to 90 percent of candidates for

recruitment in the Reichswehr had to be rejected as physically unfit for service, a deplorably high percentage resulting, he said, in all probability from the war and post-

war dietary deficiencies.

A mandatory physical fitness

training program integrated into the school curriculum
would, according to the Army, help to rectify the problem
of the poor physical condition of Army recruit candidates.

Kress cited the Reserve Officer Training Corps programs of
the United States and Great Britain as examples of how

military-physical training was integrated into school
curricula abroad.

Although he acknowledged that Germany

could not conduct the overt military aspects of such training, he hoped to see school and state authorities institute
a physical training program whose goal would be "... the

creation of the closest possible substitute for the defunct universal conscription." 20

Instead of founding Volkssport schools like their
counterparts in northern Germany, Bavarian Reichswehr of-

20 IfZG, MA-619,

letter of Wehrkreis VII/7 Inf. Div.,
Ia 320 pers., to Bavarian Minister-President, 6 February
"Ziel muB, m.E. sein, ... einen moglichst vollwerti1925.
gen Ersatz fur die in Wegfall gekommene Wehrpflicht zu scha
fen." Bl. 1612872.

.
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ficers left Volkssport-type activities to the
Deutscher

Notbann (German Emergency Group)
by the Bavarian Government

2

1

,

an organization sponsored

The Bavarian Reichswehr,

however, worked closely with the Notbann whose commandant

1

s

office was located in Military District VII headquarters. 22

Major General (Ret.) Franz Ritter von Epp, 23

a

notorious

Freikorps leader who was eased out of the Reichswehr on

account of his pro-racist (Volkisch) activities, commanded
the Notban n.

During 1924 the Notbann had concentrated its

energies on the training of temporary volunteers and functioned, for all intents, as a secret military reserve for
the Bavarian Government.

The Bavarian Ministry of the In-

terior and private sources paid for the cost of this train-

2 ''The

Deutscher Notbann was organized after the Beer
Hall Putsch of November 1923 as a successor to the Organisation Escherisch and the Bavarian Notpolizei.
See BHStA, I,
MI 72449, Report of the Reichskommissar fur uberwachung der
offentlichen Ordnung, I 5330/24 I, 23 June 1924; and Gordon,
Hitler and Beer Hall Putsch 599ff.
,

22 BHStA,

MI 72449, Report of the Reichskommissar
fur uberwachung der offentlichen Ordnung, I 53 30/2 4 I, 2 3

June

I,

19 24.

23

864-1947, Generalleutnant a.D. Epp had a distinguished career as a regimental commander in the First World
War and was ennobled for his services. His activity in raci'st
radical politics eventually led to his retirment in 1923,
the official reason being that no suitable post could be found
for him. Active in NSDAP circles, he joined the party in 1928
(Nr. 85457), advised Hitler on military-political relations,
and served as leader of the NSDAP Wehrpolitisches Amt from
1932 to 1935 and as Reichsstattshalter in Bavaria from 1933
1

to 1934.

29

ing. 24

By 1925 the Reichswehr phased out the temporary vol-

unteer program and the interest of the Bavarian Government
in paying for a secret reserve force had declined.

Bavarian

authorities were willing to make money available for training auxiliary police but not for training auxiliary soldiers.
Instead, the Bavarian Government urged the Notbann to take
an interest in pre-military training, 25 apparently in response

to the urging of military leaders as evidenced in the above-

mentioned letter of

6

February from General Kress.

In a meeting of Bavarian cabinet ministers and Not-

bann leaders on 24 March 1925, Bavarian Minister-President

Held urged that the Notbann undertake the preparation of
young men for military service by establishing and supervising pre-military training activities in the Bavarian
schools.

The Reichswehr, he added, agreed to this proposal.

This training, he explained, included hiking, physical conditioning, marching, field exercises, map reading, and

24 BHStA, I, MI 72449, Notes of the Staatsminister
des Innern, "Ergebnis der Besprechung am 18.6.24 NachmAfter
[ittag] iiber den "deutschen Notbann'", 19 June 1924.
July 1924, owing to pressure from the Inter-Allied Mili1
tary Control Commission, the Notbann was disbanded. This,
however, was merely a "Scheinauf losung" and orders from the
Ministry of the Interior were given orally rather than in

See ibid
writing.
ber 1924, Bl. 1-3.

.

,

Notbann Kreisleiter meeting,

19 Decem-

"Kurze Niederschrif t iiber die Besprechung
am 24. Marz 1925 iiber Notbann", 26 March 1924; Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic 260.
25 Ibid

.

,

,
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theoretical exercises.

Small bore marksmanship courses,

he noted, could be run in coordination with local shooting
clubs.

The entire program could be conducted publicly,

and Held stated that it was his opinion that it should become part of the school curriculum.

In communities which

did not have school instructors qualified to teach pre-

military training, he hoped that former army and police

non-commissioned officers would be hired to teach the premilitary training courses.

After a heated discussion and

debate, Notbann leaders agreed to Heldas proposal. 26

Minister-President Held then offered to have the
Bavarian Government assist in financing the pre-military

training program, provided the Government retained ultimate control of the program.

The Notbann

,

he added, would

have to remain a silent partner in these activities on
account of difficulties which might arise in the Bavarian

Parliament and also on account of the sensitivity with

which the military-related activities in addition to those
permitted by the Versailles Treaty were viewed abroad.

The

Notbann must not, said Held, be publicly identified or
connected with pre-military training under any circumstances,
and would, in the near future, "... make its appearance

under a different name." 27

3-4.

Financial support would come

26lbid.

,

"Ministerbesprechung am 24.3. 25", 2-3.

27 Ibid

,

"... unter einen anderen Firma Auftritt."

.

s
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from private circles to the N otbann through the Bavarian
Government, which would undertake the responsibility for

raising the necessary funds. 28

Although evidence of the Notbann'

subsequent activi-

ties is insufficient to allow any estimate of the size or

effectiveness of its pre-military training program,

29

the

Notbann pre-military training program of 1925 demonstrates
an interest and commitment to pre-military training by the

Bavarian Government on a scale potentially greater than
Volkssport in Prussia.

Notbann pre-military training and

Volkssport encompassed, in all details, identical training
activities and goals.
Army Command officers, apparently pleased with the

Volkssport and Notbann pre-military training programs,

hoped to expand them throughout Germany

.

General von

Seeckt wanted to establish a National Sport Office in 1925.
This apparently civilian institution would have integrated

28 Ibid

and "Aktenvermerk" of the meeting between
Ministry of the Interior officials and Oberstlt. a.D. Kaspar [Notbann Chief of Staff] 15 April 1925.
.

,

29 Bund Oberland, the Isengau, and the Hermannsbund
all subsequently joined the Notbann pre-military training
program, 'see ibid , "Aktenvermerk", Referat 15 and 17 of
Staatsmin. d. Innern, 23.5.25, and letter Epp, Nr. 648, to
Staatsmin. d. Innern, 27.5.25. Gordon gives the Oberland
strength in Bavaria during November 1923 at ca. 2000, a figSee
ure that by 1925 was in all probability much smaller.
his Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 94-99, 206, 440, and 449.
.

1
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the Volkssport schools in all the military districts into
the larger framework of civilian sport activities.

The

National Sport Office would have also directed the activities of the paramilitary groups into useful channels by

integrating them into the Volkssport movement.

The estab-

lishment of a secret and illegal mobilization registration

system for all youth would have been a further function of
the National Sport Office.

Seeckt failed, however, for

reasons unknown, to gain the necessary cabinet approval
for the creation of the National Sport Office. 30

Reichswehr interest in Volkssport activities had
not gone unnoticed by the political parties, especially

those of the political left.

The Socialists carefully

scrutinized the annual Reichswehr budget for any evidence
of Reichswehr association with or support for the para-

military units and they were quick to denounce such.

30 Rabenau, Seeckt

3

1

Rabenau states that these
secret mobilization measures were in part responsible for
Seeckt' s forced resignation in October 1926. For a more
complete discussion of Seeckt' s resignation, see Gordon,
Reichswehr and Republic 261-8. Volker Berghahn, in Der
Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918-1935 Dusseldorf,
1966, 58f, claims that Seeckt did establish "sport schools"
throughout Germany as part of a program, to create a secret
Berghahn utilized sources from East Germany, the
army.
Deutsches Zentralarchiv in Potsdam, to which this author
(Berghahn will hereafter be cited as
did not have access.
See also Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und
Berghahn, Stahlhelm .)
Republik 21 Of.
,

4

81.

,

,

,

26 May 1925, vol. 385,
?RTV, Schopflin (SPD)
2020-26; Hilferding (SPD), 11 February 1926, vol. 388,
5874-80;
5432; Kunstler (SPD), 3 March 1926, vol. 389,
3

,

33

The imprecise nature of the military budget hampered the
Socialists in their search for evidence because the Reichs-

wehr Law of 1921 permitted the submission of a bland document that did not list proposed expenditures in any great
detail.

32

Even had the Reichswehr budget given a complete

account of proposed spending, the political parties still

would have been unaware of what was actually being spent
and for what purposes.

The Defense Ministry, unique among

the Government ministries, did not have to either return

or account for appropriated funds that were not actually
spent for assigned purposes.

33

Thus money budgeted for

other uses could be siphoned off by officers in the Defense ministry for Volkssport and clandestine re-armament

activities without the overt knowledge of the political
parties.

In addition to funds appropriated by the Reich-

stag, the Reichswehr had its own sources of money which

further complicated Socialist-Communist efforts to ascer-

Scheidemann (SPD), 16 December 1926, vol. 391, 8577-86;
31-2, 43, 70-2.
Caspar, "SPD und Wehrproblem"
,

32 Rtv ,

Chancellor Marx,

16

December 1926, vol. 391,

8586f.
33 Braun, Weimar zu Hitler
107; PTV, Herz (SPD), 16
February 1927, vol. 392, 9021. The SPD claimed that in 1926,
operating expenses
3 3% of the Army and 40% of the Navy budget
,

could be carried over to another year, and were effectively
removed from parliamentary control. In 1927 the carry-over
in
from the 1926 Reichswehr budget was 60 million RM, and
See Caspar,
1928 RM 37 million was carried over from 1927.
"SPD und Wehrproblem", 73f.
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tain military expenditures. 34

The Socialists, cognizant of Reichswehr secret activi
ties in Prussia,

were also aware, to a degree, of the pre-

military training activities conducted by the Army and the

Elements of the Reichswehr budget were hidden in
the budgets of other Reich ministries.
In addition, the
Reichswehr had secret funds, which, for example, it used to
pay Freikorps during the Silesian -Polish insurgency and later
to finance clandestine rearmament activities in Russia. To
replenish these funds, Reichswehr officers invested money in
civilian firms. The failure of the "Phoebus" movie company,
in which the Reichswehr had invested heavily, led to public
disclosure of the secret funds and the resultant scandal in
1927-28 ended only with the resignation of Defense Minister
GeBler.
BHStA, I, MI 72449, "Ergebnis der Besprechung am
18.6.24 nachm. iiber den 'deutschen Notbann "
19 June 1924;
RTV Schopflin, (SPD)
26 May 1925, vol. 385, 2023? GeBler
(RWM)
26 May 1925, vol. 385, 2135; Scheidemann (SPD), 16
December 1926, vol. 391, 8577-80; Gordon Craig, The Politics
of the Prussian Army 1 640- 1 9 45 Oxford, 1964, 410; and for
the Navy's use of secret funds see International Military
Tribunal, T rials of the Major War Criminals Nuremberg,
1947-49, (Hereafter cited as IMT)
vol. XXIV, Dok. 156-C,
Kapitan zur See Schliisser, "Kampf der Marine gegen Versail1

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

554ff.

les",

Reichswehr procured illegal weapons in Russia
and arranged for armor and aviation training for its personnel in Russia, dating from 1921. The Socialist leadership knew of these arrangements from their onset. See
Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics 232-8; and Hans W. Gatzke,
Stresemann and the Re-Armament of Germany Baltimore, 1954,
Hilger and Meyer,
86 (Hereafter cited as Gatzke, Stressmann
Even as late as 1926 the SPD was willIncompatible Allies
See Otto Eggering to keep secret the ties with Russia.
stedt, "Protokoll" of a meeting of government and SPD officials, 1 December 1926, in "Die Reichswehr und die Regierung,
Briefe des Monats" sent in by Dr. Robert M. W. Kempner, Der
Monat 1(6), March, 1949, 103-5. (Hereafter cited as EggerSee also BA, R-43
stedt, "Protokoll", 1 December 1926).
The SPD was
15 December 1926.
1/1417, "Kabinettsprotokoll"
also well aware of secret arms caches. See Severing testimony, 21 May 1946, IMT, vol. XIV, 250-251, 255, and letter
of SPD Deputy Adolf Braun to GeBler, 29 July 1922, US
National Archives, series T-79, roll 82, 105-108.
"^^The

,

,

)

.

,

,

,

;

paramilitary groups.

Beginning in 1925, the Socialists

col'

lected evidence of illegal Reichswehr activities, in all

likelihood because of suspicions that the Reichswehr had

revived the Zeitf reiwillige units, which the Socialists
appear to have confused with Volkssport, and was training

monarchists and reactionaries who planned to overthrow the
Republic.

Efforts to prove the existence of this conspir-

acy failed and caused the Socialist government of Prussia

some embarrassment.

Undaunted by such setbacks, Prussian MinisterPresident Otto Braun presented Defense Minister GeBler with
a number of further complaints concerning illegal military

activities including Volkssport on the 29th of October
1926.

Foreign Minister Stresemann was also present at this

meeting, as the issue of army-paramilitary group collaboration was especially sensitive in light of the German effort

to have the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission in

Germany abolished.

Braun *s allegations of Reichswehr-para-

military cooperation were not denied by GeBler, who merely
shifted the blame for Defense Ministry inaction concerning

past complaints of a similar nature to the former Chief of
the Army Command, General von Seeckt.

GeBler added that

the recent retirement of Seeckt meant the inauguration of

36 Braun, Weimar zu Hitler
99-100; and Gordon Papers
testimony of Reichsminister a.D. Willhelm Sollmann.
,

°
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a

new course

.

The German request to have the Military Control

Commission disbanded was pending, 38 and Braun's complaints
doubtless increased Stresemann'

s

anxiety, as the French

appeared somewhat hesitant to abolish the Control Commission, principally owing to their concern over German
para-

military associations.

Aristide Briand, the French Foreign

Minister, used the occasion of the famous luncheon at

Thoiry of 17 September 1926 to urge Stresemann to do something about Volkssport and the paramilitary groups.

Strese-

mann's affirmative reply that day did not entirely satisfy
the French, who continuously repeated their concern over

this issue during October and November. 39

The decision to terminate the Control Commission in

Germany was not made by the League of Nations until 11 December, and although Stresemann was aware that the outcome,
in all probability, would favor Germany, he could have hardly wanted the Volkssport program to provide the French with

3 ^ AAA

168, Aufzeichnung des Reichs
ministers des Auswartigen Stresemann, 29 October 1926, 394;
and Gatzke, Streseman n, 62f.
,

B, vol.

I

(2)

,

Nr.

38

BA, R-43 1/1415, Report of Staatssekretiir Piinder and
Generalleutnant Pawelsz to Ministers Conference, 20 September
1926, Bl. 20-23; and Gatzke, Stresemann 53-6.
,

39 BA, R-43 1/1415, Piinder Report, Bl. 20-23; Ministerbesprechung, 24 September 1926, Bl. 3; AAA, B, 1(2), Nrs. 184
(6 November), 187 (9 November), and 199 (18 November); Gatzke

Stresemann, 62-7.

.
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an excuse to prolong the life of the
Control Commission. *0

Certainly after his 29 October meeting with Braun,
he was
aware that an opposition party had some evidence

of Reichs-

wehr collaboration with the paramilitary groups,
evidence

which if published could conceiveable topple the Government
and undermine all of his "fulfillment" policy.

Thus some-

time in November, Gefiler, probably at Stresemann' s insistence, ordered the Reichswehr to cease its participation in

Volkssport activities and so informed the Socialists at
1

December meeting.

a

41

The Socialists, during the

1

December meeting, again

presented further charges and evidence of illegal Reichs-

wehr activities.

The Government representatives were Chan-

cellor Wilhelm Marx, Stresemann, and GeBler; and from the

Socialist Party were former Chancellor Hermann Miiller,
party leader and former Vorwarts editor Otto Wels, Reichstag Deputies Rudolf Breitscheid and Philipp Scheidemann,
and Otto Eggerstedt, the Police President of Altona. 42

Stresemann appears to have attempted to meet reason
able French demands. For example, a veterans' group (Stahlhelm) Volkssport training booklet, which had been expressly
mentioned by Briand at Thoiry as illustrative of Reichswehrparamilitary group ties, was taken off the open market during November at the insistence of the Reich government. See
Berghahn, Stahlhelm 62; and Michael Salewski, Entwaf fnung
und Militarkrontrolle in Deutschland 1919-1927 Munchen,
1966, 353. (Hereafter cited as Salewski, Entwaf fnung
,

,

)

41 Eggerstedt,

"Protokoll"

42 Ibid.
i

,

1

December 1926, 103ff.
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Scheidemann began the Socialist attack almost apologetically; he acknowledged that what he had to say might

compromise Stresemann's foreign policy, but the French, he
claimed, were already familiar with some of this material.

Moreover, he noted, past complaints of illegal military

activities made to GeBler had resulted in little or no
satisfaction, so that it might be best to bring the issue
into the public light.

The Socialists would, he added,

give the Government one last opportunity to redress the
situation.
He then launched into a litany of complaints: em-

ployment of retired officers by the Reichswehr, ostensibly
in civilian capacities, to direct illegal recruiting efforts

for the Zeitf reiwillige

;

the activities of the Junkers Air-

craft Company in Russia; the manufacture and stockpiling of

illegal munitions in Russia; and the illegal ties between
the Reichswehr and the paramilitary groups which included

joint marksmanship training.

The last mentioned activities,

claimed Scheidemann, were funded by both the Reichswehr and
industrial circles.
Wels then repeated Scheidemann

1

s

complaints, emphasiz

ing that Reichswehr-paramilitary group relations were danger
ous, and added "... that a sharp delineation must be made

between the Reichswehr and the sport associations, for the

paramilitary groups had forged themselves into sport associa
tions in order to maintain their contacts with the Reichs-

"

39
,

wehr.

«43

Wels' complaint, interestingly, was not against

the pre-military training concept of Volkssport, but rathe

against the opportunity inherent in Volkssport, as was the
conducted, for the Reichswehr and the paramilitary groups
to meet on common ground.

He instead proposed a nation-

wide sport and gymnastic movement in which all youth could
participate, but which would be divorced from any contact

with the Reichswehr. 44
GeBler answered Scheidemann and Wels by requesting
an opportunity to ascertain the accuracy of the charges

and accompanying evidence.

He implied that some of the

blame for illegal Reichswehr activities lay with Seeckt,

with whom it had been very difficult to work and who deliberately had kept GeBler in the dark on many issues.

Things seemed to be working much smoother, he said, with
Seeckt'

s

successor, General Wilhelm Heye.

Moreover, in

respect to the allegation of Reichswehr support for the

paramilitary groups and Volkssport activities, he stated
that "... already in the last few days negotiations had

taken place [and] the Army and Navy have received direct-

43 Ibid .

"...daB eine scharfe Trennung zwischen diesen Sportverbanden und der Reichswehr bestehen
miisse, denn die vaterlandischen Verbande hatten sich jetzt
zu solchen Sportvereinigungen zusammengeschlossen, um so
die Verbindungen mit der Reichswehr auf rechterhalten zu
konnen
.

44 Ibid

,

104.

40

ives to maintain a strict neutrality." 45

Chancellor Marx then asked the Socialists to allow
the Government sufficient time to prepare a
response to

each allegation.

A future meeting would then be scheduled.

This suggestion met with general agreement, but Wels
re-

iterated the Socialist position that something visible

would shortly be required to illustrate clearly the Government's new course. 4 ^
The
ists'

1

December meeting demonstrated that the Social-

anger was directed not so much at Volkssport as at

the participation of the Army in sport activities with the

paramilitary associations/ the majority of which were
avowed enemies of the Republic.

The Socialists felt that

not only did this joint Reichswehr-paramilitary group participation border on the edge of violating the Versailles
Treaty, but also that it had a potential for the revival
of their bete noir

,

the Zeitf reiwillige

.

The Socialists

accusations concerning secret re-armament activities in
Russia seem to have been raised pro forma and were certainly answered in that fashion by GeBler.

Stresemann nonetheless must have worried that the

Ibid.,

105.

"...daJ3 daruber gerade,

Tagen Verhandlungen stattgef unden hatten, dafl
und Marine bestimmte Anweisungen bekommen habe
neutral zu handeln."
46 Ibid.,

104.

in den letzten
die Reichswehr
[

sic

]

vollig

41

Socialists might publicize their material on illegal

Reichswehr activities before the League of Nations made
its decision on the abolition of the Military Control
Com-

mission in Germany.

He therefore stalled for time; hence

Marx's request that the Government be given additional
time to study the Socialist charges and evidence.

His re-

quest would not have appeared unusual as the Government

normally ascertained the accuracy of complaints prior to
making a response. 47

After the

11

December League decision to dismantle

the Control Commission no later than

31

January 1927, the

Socialist charges no longer presented a serious threat, as
is evidenced by the perfunctory Government response to

Scheidemann

1

s

speech of 16 December in the Reichstag, dur-

ing which he made public the accusations made during the
1

December meeting.

4o

The Reichswehr may have wanted to continue clandestine ties of some sort to the Volkssport program, for the

47

Salewski, Entwaf fnung 361; and BA, R-43 1/1417,
"Kabinettsprotokoll" of 8 December 1926. GeBler explained
that he had asked the Socialists to delay their Reichstag
interpellation until Stresemann returned from Geneva, a
proposition which they accepted.
,

48 The SPD material on illegal Reichswehr activities
had been gathered by Carl Mierendorff, a former front officer turned left Socialist. Mierendorff offered the material
to SPD Reichstag Deputy and former Reichsinnenminister Wilhelm Sollmann, who promptly returned it, saying, "the man
who makes this speech will never give another in the ReichScheidemann, who wanted publicity, seized the material
stag."

42

program was not entirely terminated after GeBler told the
Socialists on

1

December that he had ordered the Army and

Navy to cease their activities with the paramilitary associations.

Instead, responsibility for the Volkssport program

was transfered to the Reich Ministry of the Interior and

only after assurances from civilian authorities that the
same level of financial support would continue.

4 9

Perhaps

the appointment of Wilhelm von Keudell of the German Nation-

alist Party as Reich Minister of the Interior in January
1927 influenced the transfer of the Volkssport program to

the Interior Ministry.

The transfer, in appearance at

least, would stress the new civilian nature of Volkssport,

while the German Nationalists could be relied upon to continue the level of financial support for the program.

Evidence indicates that Reichswehr Volkssport activities ceased on or about

1

December 1926 and that responsi-

bility for the Volkssport program was transfered to the In-

terior Ministry in January 1927.

General (Ret.) Wilhelm

and convinced a doubtful SPD Reichstag fraction to permit
him to give the speech. Sollmann was correct; it was Scheide
mann's last Reichstag speech. The speech caused an uproar;
amidst cries of treason the DNVP fraction walked out and
See Gordon Papers
the Government resigned the following day.
testimony of Reichsminister a.D. Wilhelm Sollmann. For
Scheidemann s speech, see RTV, 16 December 1926, vol. 391,
8577-86, and 8586f. for Chancellor Marx's reply.
1

49

BA, R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei
tober 1930, Bl. 2.

,

18 Oc-

Groener, 50 GeBler's successor as Defense Minister, later
wrote, without giving the exact date, that the Reichswehr

terminated its connections to the Volkssport movement at
the insistence of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of

the Interior because of potential domestic and foreign

policy complications should the direct participation of
the Army in Volkssport be exposed.

51

Although the transfer of Volkssport to the Reich

Ministry of the Interior temporarily ended both military,
and for all practical purposes, Government support, Colonel

50 1 867-1 939.

Son of a Swabian non-commissioned officer, Groener headed the General Staff Railway Section
during most of the First World War. He later commanded a
division on the Western Front and replaced Ludendorff as
First Quartermaster General in 1918. Groener was instrumental in arranging a modus Vivendi between the Army and
the new Republican Government in 1918.
Retiring from the
Army in 1919, he served as Reich Minister of Transportation
and later as Reich Defense Minister (1928-1932).
51 BA,

18
R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei
October 1930, Bl. 2. In the 29 October 1926 meeting of
Braun, GeBler, and Stresemann, Braun mentioned that Severing (then Prussian Minister of the Interior) had complained
to GeBler of Reichswehr-Sportverbande activities, as had
Braun, who had received this reply from Schleicher: "Die
Reichswehr hat die Schniif f eleien der PreuBischen Regierung
satt." AAA , B, 1(2), Nr. 168, Aufzeichnung des Reichsministers des Auswiirtigen Stresemann, 29 October 1926, 394;
and Nr. 23 8, footnote 7, letter of Chancellor Marx to Otto
Braun, 6 January 1927. Marx wrote that talks on the transfer to Volkssport activities to the Reichsinnenministerium
were still in progress and he hoped that differences would
soon be resolved, for this work (Volkssport) was essential
and had to continue. Cf. Wohlfeil, Reichsweh r und Republik, 211.
,

von Schleicher 52 of the Wehrmachtabteilung of
the Defense

Ministry never ceased trying to find support for Volkssport, or similar programs, from patriotic private and

industrial sources. 53
Despite the abrupt end of overt military participation in the Volkssport program, the experiment had been of

great value.

The quality of the training may have been

questionable, but more important, Volkssport kept alive
the concept of service to and sacrifice for the state.

It

provided a means for directing the energy of youth and the
paramilitary groups into militarily useful channels and
served as a forum for the transition of the values of the
front generation to the post-war generation.

The Reichs-

wehr accepted pre-military training as the most practical
alternative to conscription and the establishment of a

882- 19 34. A former member of the 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment, Schleicher served during World War I as a
General Staff Corps officer assigned to General Groener's
Railroad Section and became Groener's unofficial adopted
son. During most of his career in the Reichswehr, Schleicher
served as a political liaison officer and chief of staff to
Groener when he became Defense Minister. Schleicher subsequently became Defense Minister and Chancellor in 1932.
He was shot by the SS during the Blood Purge of 1934, although at whose orders has never been determined.

(Hereafter cited
NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/20; and Generalleutnant
as BA-MA)
a.D. Vincenz Miiller, Ich fand das wahre Vaterland, Nach
[East] Berlin, 1963, 287.
gelassene Memoiren
53 Bundesmilitararchiv, Freiburg,
,

,

potential reserve military force that was possible under
the limitations of the Versailles Treaty.

The transfer of

Volkssport to the Reich Ministry of the Interior did not
lessen military interest in pre-military training.

Reichs-

wehr officers kept abreast of the civilian military sport
(

Wehrsport

)

movement that developed after 1927 and they

were ready to re-introduce pre-military training when the
circumstances were propitious.

.

CHAPTER

III

A CONSCIOUS GERMAN SPIRIT
THE MILITARY SPORT MOVEMENT,
1927 to 1932

Although the transfer of Volkssport activities from
the Defense Ministry to the Reich Ministry of the Interior

resulted in the loss of most government subvention for

Volkssport groups, the military sport

(

Wehrsport

movement

)

not only survived after 1927 but gained momentum.

1

Various

paramilitary associations, student groups, sport clubs, and
work-groups took over the Volkssport facilities or created
new ones, and conducted military sport training for their
members.

It was unlikely that ties between the Reichswehr

and military sport groups were ever completely severed;

many military sport instructors and leaders were former
officers who maintained their friendships with comrades
still on active service and leading Reichswehr officers

were aware of currents within the military sport movement.

the training
The term Wehrsport (defensive sport)
content of which was identical to Volkssport came into usage
and gradually superseded Volkssport after 1927. See IfZG,
Bl. 32.
Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staats jugend"
Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, military sport
will be used to describe training activities associated with
Volkssport Gelandesport (terrain sport), and Wehrsport
1

,
,

,

.

,

example, see the Truppenamt directives concerning Wehrsport in BA-MA, RH-8/v896, CHL TA 251/31g.K. "Z",
"Z", T2IIIA,
T2IIIA, 20 March 1931; CHL TA 784/31g.K.
24 July 1 931
2 For

, ,

Even though Reich and State Governments
kept a close
watch upon the military sport movement and
regarded the
participation of political parties and their
auxiliary
groups in military sport activities with
some alarm, 3 there
was little that any State or Reich minister
could
do to

hinder or halt such developments.
March,

4

1921,

The Reichswehr Law of

prohibited the organization of uniformed,

military formations other than those permitted by law
for
defense and police purposes, but there was little danger
of military sport groups running afoul of the law so long
as they emphasized the sport aspects of their programs.

Local government officials who petitioned higher authorities for permission to prohibit military sport activities

often received the reply that no action could be taken because the leagues and clubs active in military sport training explained that their purpose was to further physical

training, the attainment of which was quite legitimate.

4

^Internationale Instituut voor Sociale Gesch.i o den is
(Hereafter cited as IISG)
NachlaB Grzesinski, G 1514, PMdl
II 1420 b 5/1, 7 May 1929; Severing, Lebensweg II, 202ff.
,

,

4

Reichsgesetzblatt

,

1921,

329-341.

^Letter of Reich Ministry of the Interior to Thuringian
Ministerium fur Inneres und Wirtschaft, 28 January 1925, quotEin
ed in Karl Rohe, Das Reichsbanner Schwartz, Rot, Gold.
Beitrag zur Geschichte und Struktur der politischen Kampfve rbande zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik Diisseldorf, 1966, 160.
Hauptarchiv of
(Hereafter cited as Rohe, Reichsbanner
NSDAP (hereafter cited as HA), f. 1554, PDM VId notes, 14
October 1929; f. 1878, PDM report to Bay. Staatsmin d Innern
25 September 1931; F. 1553, PDM VId. 2339/32, 14 October 1932,
:

,

.

)

.

.

,

48

The Socialists (SPD)

,

who were most anxious to pro-

hibit the paramilitary groups of their political
opponents
from conducting military sport activities, conveniently

overlooked the extensive military sport program directed
by the Reichsbanner

6

a

paramilitary organization with

close ties to the Socialist Party.
was short-lived.

Stahlhelm

(a

Their one major triumph

Claiming, in October 1929, that a recent

large veterans organization with close ties

to the German Nationalist Party)

field exercise conclusive-

ly demonstrated the military nature of Stahlhelm military

sport units, Prussian Minister of the Interior Albert

Grzesinski, a Socialist, banned the Stahlhelm in the Prussian Rhineland provinces.

Reich-President Hindenburg, an

honorary member of the Stahlhelm, intervened personally
and lifted the prohibition within three months of its in-

ception

7'
.

The only telling action which the Socialists could

daB gelandesportliche Ubungen militarahnlichen Verbande
nach der Entschl. [oe3ung]. des Staatsmin. des Innern vom
23.7.32, Nr. 2198f. a 32, nur dann wie Versammlungen oder
Aufziige zu behandeln sind, wenn sie demonstrativen Charakter
tragen".; f. 317, PDM report to Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innern,
4033 IA, 22 December 1932.
"...

^See pp. 67ff, this chapter.

NachlaG Grzesinski, G 1524, PMdl, II 1420 b/39,
24 October 1929; G 1520, "Die sog. [enannten] Wehrsporttatigkeit des Stahlhelms in Rheinland und Westfalen" n.d.
[Dec. ]9 29]; G 1524, letter Grzesinski to Otto Braun, Prussian Minister-President, 9 July 1930.
7 IISG,

take against military sport groups was to eliminate Govern-

ment sport subventions to suspect groups.

This procedure

was restricted, however, to the years (1928-1930) during

which the Socialists controlled the Reich Interior Ministry, the agency responsible for sport subsidies.

8

Moreover,

the weapon of withdrawing Government financial assistance

was blunted by the numerous inter-locking directorships and

affiliations which existed among the military sport groups
and which made it extremely difficult for the Government to

determine the recipients of sport subsidies.

Finally, most

military sport organizations were not entirely dependent on

Government assistance, which was at best niggardly.

9

Thus the decision of the Reich Government to termi-

nate its semi-official sponsorship of Volkssport groups in

January 1927 had little effect in the long run on the burgeoning military sport movement.

Military sport groups

proliferated, taking over the facilities of Volkssport
In its search

organizations and expanding their activities.

for an expedient solution to its manpower problems, the Army

had struck a responsive chord.

Command

The facilities of the Braunau Volkssport school were

taken over by a group called the Work-Group Braunau

°Severing, Lebensweg

,

II,

(

Arbeits -

221 ff.

BA, R-43/519, Anlage 2 to RWM WId, Nr. 3669/30, 17
October 1930; and "Wehrhaf tmachung der Jugend" RWM 86/31,
Bl. 18.
4 March 1931
9

,

,

0

1

s
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gemeinschaft Braunau
Severin.

1

)

,

directed by Major General (Ret.)

The Branau school, led by von Winterfeldt,

formed the nucleus of the thirteen military sport schools
that composed the work-Group Braunau.

The schools were

scattered throughout the Silesian mountains.

Winterfeldt

'

growing interest in the National-Socialist movement led to
an increasing number of Nazi leaders, especially Hitler

Youth leaders, participating in the Work-Group's activities.

1

Financial support for the Work-Broup Braunau, in

all probability, came from membership dues and contributions from patriotic individuals and business circles,

although assistance from the Reich Interior Ministry cannot be completely dismissed.

One of the more active figures in the military
sport movement was Brigadier General (Ret.) Ludwig Vogt.

Upon his retirement from the Reichswehr in 1926, he joined
the League of Young Germany, succeeding, as director of
the League, retired General Riidiger Freiherr von der Goltz,
the nephew of the League's founder, Field Marshal Colmar

Freiherr von der Goltz.

12

With ca. 250,000 members, the

10 His last Reichswehr post was City Commandant of
Berlin, from which he retired in 1927. See Rangliste ,
1927, p. 21.
11

IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Volkssport zur Staatsjugend", Bl. 31 f; Vogelsang, RW-S taat-NSDAP 230f.
,

Colmar von der Goltz founded the Bund Jungdeutschland in 1911 for the purpose of furthering pre-military
12

)

51

League of Young Germany conducted encampments at which
the members of various nationalist and conservative
youth

leagues, clubs, and associations could gather and through

sport courses improve "... the physical, spiritual, and

traditional strength of youth in a conscious German Spirit
„13
•

•

•

•

Although the League was composed of numerous political youth organizations, recruiting, propaganda, and other

political activities were not permitted during League encampments.

It was hoped, instead, that sport would forge

the splintered nationalist-conservative youth movement

into a common front, united against the enemy, the political left.

1

4

The League's activities were guided by a board of

directors elected by its national assembly, a representa-

tive body of deputies from each of the member organizations.

The board of directors appointed General Vogt as executive
president.

Financial support came from dues, industrial

youth training. See Dieter Fricke, Geschichte der Burger lichen Parteien in Deutschland, 1830-1945 2 vols., [East]
(Hereafter cited as Fricke,
Berlin, 1968, I, 162-176.
Biirgerlichen Parteien
,

.

13 IfZG, Ed-67/19,
land e.V.", Bl. 161ff.

"Satzungen des Bundes Jungdeutsch" ...zu fordern...
die korperliche,
geistige und sittliche Kraftigung der Jugend in bewuBt
deutschen Geiste..."; Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien ,!, 162f.
l4 IfZG, Ed-67/19,

Bl.

161 ff.

t

5
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circles, and the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

The

member organizations numbered over fifty and among the

most important were the Boy Scouts, the Eagle and Falcon,
the Young Nationalist League, the German Youth League, the

Journeymen, the Bismarck Youth, the Youth of the German
Peoples' Party (DVP)

the Young Stahlhelm, and the Scharn-

,

horst Youth. 15
In late 1930 Vogt organized,

apparently as an af-

filiated organization of the League of Young Germany, the

Work-Group of Terrain Sport Associations
Verbande-Arbeitsgemeinschaf
German initials, GVA.

)

,

(

Gelandesport -

commonly referred to by its

Its goals were to promote all facets

of military sport undertaken by its various member groups,
to prepare guidelines for military sport clubs, to effect

liaison with Government authorities, and to assist in finding financial backing for military sport activities.

1

6

The GVA was a nation-wide organization composed of
clubs, student groups, paramilitary associations, and youth

See also Vogt letter to Dr. von Witzleben
Ibid
(Siemens), 8 May 1928, Bl. 160; and Vogt letters to Siemens
Company asking for funds, 1 February 1929, 9 March 1929, and
A complete list of all member and affiliated
30 August 1930.
groups can be seen in Fricke, Burgerliche Parteien ,!, 162f.
1

.

,

R-43/519, Vogt to Reichskanz ler Briining, 4 Feb.
The enclosures, unfortu1932, Bl. 1-6, with two enclosures.
nately missing, were GVA annual reports. For government
Anlage 2 of RWM, WId, 3669/32, 17
subvention, see ibid
October 1930, Bl. 17.
16 BA,

,

.

,

groups actively involved in military sport programs.

Among

the members were the Boy Scouts, the League of
Colonial Boy

Scouts, the Free Squad of the Young Nation, the Reich

Association League, the Young Storm of Home Defense, the
Reich Group of Patriotic Workers, the Student Corporation,
the German-National Merchant Employees Group, the League
of Country Youth, and the Kyffhauser League. 17

The combined individual membership of the groups in
the GVA numbered ca.

500,000, although it is uncertain if

all these individuals were active military sport participants.

The GVA was best organized in the Berlin area.

Establishing several military sport camps near Berlin, GVA
instructors conducted theoretical instruction in thirtyfour different locations within Berlin alone.

Over 20,000

participants were graduated from military sport courses by
the GVA during the winter of 1931-1932. 18

Vogt maintained close ties with both civil and military authorities.

In February 1931, he held a conference

17 BA-MA, RH-8/v896,

T2IIIA,
"Z"
CHL TA 251/31g.K.
20 March 1931; CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA, 24 July 1931.
There is reason to believe that at one time the SA may have
been a member of the GVA. See p. 164f., n. 78.
,

18

BA, R-43/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932;
IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz iiber eine Besprechung mit Herrn
General Vogt am 7.3.19 32", by Dr von Witzleben, Siemens
G.m.b.H., Bl. 144f; and letter of von Witzleben to Siemens

Director Dr von Winterfeldt, "personlich im Hause",
1933, Bl.

134-141.

6

June
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with Dr. Joseph Wirth, the Reich Minister of the Interior,
during which Wirth boldly asked Vogt if he were training a
militia.

Vogt affirmed this, but insisted that his activi-

ties were neutral, that is, that there were no ties between
the GVA and any political party.

met with Wirth'

s

This statement apparently

approval, for the GVA received financial

support from the Reich Ministry of the Interior during
1931.'1

9

Financial difficulties in 1932 prevented the Reich

Government from giving any monetary assistance to the GVA,
but Vogt succeeded in raising money from the Siemens, I.G.
Farben, and Borsig corporations.

He told these firms that

he needed their assistance only for a short period, until

the temporary "drought" in Government funding, as General

von Schleicher called it, ended. ^°
The Defense Ministry, however, maintained something
of a "fair-weather" friendship with Vogt.

From 1928 to

1930, he was a frequent visitor at the Defense Ministry,

trying to secure, without apparent success, money for

19 IfZG,

7 March 1932; BA,
Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz"
R-43 11/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932.
,

20

Vogt
IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz", 7 March 1932.
told Siemens officials that he needed RM 15-20,000 for his
operations, and that Dr. Kalbe of IG Farben had already
pledged RM 10,000. Dr. Vogler [a leading Volkssport fund
raiser in 1924] of Borsig Company gave RM 1500. Siemens
finally gave Vogt RM 3000 on 17 March; ibid letter of von
Witzleben to von Winterfeldt, 17 March 1932; and BA, R-43
11/519, Vogt to Briining, 4 February 1932.
,

"

"youth and military fitness training.

2

1

Shortly after the

founding of the GVA, the Reichswehr expressed

a

positive

but cautious attitude towards the work of the GVA.

The

"non-political," "military work" of Vogt's group created

a

favorable impression, but Reichswehr commanders were warned
that nothing more than advice could be extended to General
Vogt, and that he and his followers were in no fashion to

be regarded as representatives of, or associated with, the

Defense Ministry. 22

Several months later, in July 1931, the Reichswehr
adopted a more friendly attitude.

Acknowledging the work

of the GVA as a valuable contribution to defense, the Army

Command described the GVA military sport program as "...

preliminary step and

a

23

makeshift foundation...

reserve for the Border Buard and the Army.

a

for a

Nonetheless,

military officials were adamant that responsibilities be
delineated and maintained:

"While the defense fitness

training work is exclusively the responsibility of the

paramilitary organizations, military training is entirely
the provenance of the Reichswehr.

21 Muller,

Wehrertuchtigung"
22

This delineation has

Das wahre Vaterland
,

,

"...Jugend- und

279.

BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA 251/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA,

20 March 1931.

CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA, 24 July
"
Bl. 5.
"...Vorstufe und notdiirftige Grundlage
2 3 Ib jd

19 32,

.

,

.

.

.

6

.
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to be maintained.

Reichswehr support for the GVA and other military
sport groups continued throughout 1931.

Vogt claimed to

have had 60 former officers and non-commissioned officers,

trained by the Defense Ministry, as military sport instructors, placed at his disposal in 1931. 25

Military

authorities also allowed Vogt to use troop training facilities at Doberitz, a training area close to Berlin. 26

While General Staff

(

Truppenamt

)

officers extended

limited assistance to military sport groups, the Defense

Ministry and the Reich Ministry of the Interior planned
to organize their own military sport association, which

would, in effect, render the GVA superfluous.

Vogt had

even proposed such a Government sponsored organization in

June 1931, with, of course, a prominent position reserved
His plan was apparently rejected because it

for himself.

Ibid "wahrend die Wehrertiichtigungsarbeit ausschlieBlich unter die Verantwortung der Verbande fallt, ist
die militarsiche Ausbildung allein Sache der Reichswehr.
Die Grenze mu6 unbedingt eingehalten werden." Bl. 5f.
,

25

7 March 1932, Bl. 144.
IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Aktennotiz"
Efforts to confirm Vogt s claim have been unsuccessful, however, the economic situation was such that instructor positions in the GVA would have been very attractive to recently
discharged or retired military personnel. Other groups
active in military sport also attempted to hire recently
discharged military personnel.
,

'

Ibid. / witzleben to von Winterfeldt, 6 January
See also Fa-88/337, HJ Stabsleitung, Ref.
1933, Bl. 138.
VI, 1/32, 26 August 1932, circular to HJ Gebiets- und
2

Bannf iihrer

s

.

duplicated the Government project. 27
a

"

With both the GVA and

Government-sponsored military sport organization compet-

ing for the same limited funds in 1932, it probably was no

coincidence that funds previously available to the GVA in
1931 were no longer available in 1932.

Vogt realized the vulnerability of his position once
the Government committed itself to establishing a military

sport organization, and in the fall of 1932 he concluded
an agreement with Lt

.

General (Ret.) Edwin von Stiilpnagel,

the leader of the Government military sport organization.

Under the provisions of this pact, Vogt organized a sport

program for boys under

16

years of age, and Stiilpnagel'

group conducted military sport training for young men from
16 to 25

years of age.

Reflecting this new mission, Vogt

reorganized the GVA on 24 November 1932 into the German
Youth Service

(

Deutscher Jugenddienst

)

,

or DJD.

The DJD

received financial support from its predecessor's patrons:
the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Siemens Co.,

I.

G.

Farben, and the Borsig Corporation.^ 0

27 BA, R-43 11/519, Vogt to Briining, (Rk. 5609) 29
May 1931, "Gedanken iiber die Durchfiihrung eines Wehrsportes
The Reichswehr comment on his proin grosseren Rahmen"
posal was, "Man halt eine solche Stelle fur iiberf liissig
.

.

The government-sponsored military sport organization, the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung, is discussed in
Chapters V and VI

28 IfZG, Ed-67/19, von Witzleben to von Winterfeldt,
6 January 1933, Bl. 138.
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Students in various institutes of higher learning

enthusiastically participated in the military sport movement.

Fraternities became interested in small-bore marks-

manship and hand-to-hand combat sports as early as 1926,
and by 19 30 the more traditional interest in gymnastic

sports was eclipsed by the growing popularity of military
sport.

1931 was an especially active year for student

military sport enthusiasts: as a result of student interest,
chairs of military studies were established at several uni-

versities, and the Academic-Scientific Work Office

demisches-Wissenschaf tliches Arbeit sam t, or AWA)

,

(

Aka -

an or-

ganization of student groups interested in military sports,
was founded with the approval of the Defense Ministry. 29

The mission of the AWA was "...to build up the
legally permissible collegiate military sport [movement]
on a non-partisan basis, to prepare and disseminate regu-

lations, and to lead political negotiations with the pur-

pose of securing [approval and assistance] and promoting

^Anselm Faust, Per Nationalsozialistische Studen (Hereafter cited as
tenbund Dusseldorf, 1973, I, 94-97.
Hans-Peter Bleuel and Hans Klinnert,
Faust, NSDStB
Deutsche Studenten auf dem Wege ins Dritte Reich Giiters(Hereafter cited as Bleuel and
loh, 1967, 118, 250f.
Both Faust and BleuelKlinnert, Deutsche Studenten .)
Klinnert state that the Reichswehrministerium approved of
See also BA-MA, RH-8/v896,
the founding of the AWA.
CHL TA 784/31 g.K. "Z" T2IIIA, 24 July 1931.
,

)

;

,

.
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the military sport work [of the AWA]." 30

The most im-

portant student groups within the AWA were the National-

Socialist German Student League, the Weapons Ring, the
Wingolf, and the Catholic Student Association.

31

During 1931-1932, the AWA established offices at
every institution of higher learning in Germany.

Office

directors were either students or young professors.

Mili-

tary sport courses of either eight or twenty-one days
duration, depending on the holiday schedule, were conducted
at encampments during school vacations.

The AWA maintained

close ties with the GVA and the Stahlhelm.

AWA courses,

for example, were given at GVA facilities at Wunsdorf and
at Stahlhelm facilities at Camp Lechfeld, Bavaria. 32

"...den gesetzlich erlaubten akademischen Wehrsport auf iiberparteilichen Grundlage aufzubauen, einheitliche Ubungsvorschriften zu erlassen und die politischen
Verhandlungen mit dem Ziel der Sicherung und Forderung der
Arbeit zu fuhren." in Faust, NSDStB II, 16. The nonpartisan nature of the AWA is suspect; its founder and
leader, Diplom Ing. Otto Schwab, a former front officer,
was a member of the NSDAP and subsequently became the Chief
He apparentof Staff of the Reich SA Hochschulamt in 19 33.
ly maintained close ties with the Riechswehr throughout the
1920s following his discharge from active duty, as he wrote
several pamphlets, among them "Ingenieur und Soldat", for
the Reichswehr.
,

31

BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA 251/31 g.K. "Z", T2IIIA,

20 March 1931
32

IfZG, Ma-619, AWA to Rektor of Universitat Mirnchen,
9 March 1933, Bl. 1612876; and BHStA, IV, Bestand Stahlhelm,
Bd. 54.

)
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The League of Front Soldiers, or the Stahlhelm,
had

shown an interest in military sport activities
as early as
1923.

Military sport training served a dual purpose for

the Stahlhelm.

First, it provided a vehicle for imparting

values important to the Stahlhelm, values which had been

previously imparted during the recruit training of the pre1914 German Army.

These values were comradeship, duty,

discipline, and self-sacrifice. 33

The Reichswehr, of course

emphasized these values in its recruit training programs,
but the small size of the Reichswehr meant that fewer young

men received training in comparison to the pre-1914 Armv.
Second, military sport training kept alive, insofar as was

possible, the concept of universal military training and

service 34*
.

The initial Stahlhelm sport program (1919-1924)
to satisfy Stahlhelm directors.

faile

The program, they felt,

encouraged individual competition and achievement, which
not only contradicted the Stahlhelm doctrine of the "front"
as a leveling and equalizing influence

,

but also resulted

in sport events being restricted to the most talented ath-

letes,

thus excluding most Stahlhelm members.

Per
Der Bund der Frontsoldaten (herausgegeben von)
Stahlhelm. Erinnerungen und Bilder aus den Jahren 1918-1933
(Hereafter cited as
2 vols., 2d ed., Berlin, 1933, II, 89.
Stahlhelm
,

.

34

Stahlhelm Handbuch 4th ed., quoted from Stahlhelm
Reichsbanner 160.
138; Rohe
,

I

,

,

35

,

Stahlhelm, II, 89ff.

,

)

,

.
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Military sport, which emphasized group achievement
in contrast to individual excellence, offered an
acceptable

alternative to the traditional sport program. 36

Not only

did military sport encompass military training, but it pro-

vided a common activity in which most Stahlhelm members and
members of the Stahlhelm-af filiated youth groups (Young

Stahlhelm or Jungs ta, and the Scharnhorst Youth) could
participate

Stahlhelm youth organizations had begun military
sport-type courses as early as 1923.

Most of this activity

appears to have taken place in Northern Germany.

A mili-

tary sport unit, for example, was formed in Luneburg in
192 3 and Capt.

von der Wense gave instruction in

(Ret.)

marksmanship, marching, and terrain studies to ca. 800

members of the Young Stahlhelm

in the Hildesheim area.

a large field exercise with ca.

In 1926,

led by Col.

(Ret.)

1000 participants,

Schulze, was held in Hildesheim.

Over

36 Der Bund der Frontsoldaten

(herausgegegen von)
Geschichte, Wesen und Aufgabe des
Der NSDFB (Stahlhelm)
(Hereafter cited
Frontsoldatenbundes Berlin, 1935, 45.
as NSDFB
:

,

.

37The Young Stahlhelm was founded at the 5th Front
Soldiers Assembly held in January, 19 24, in response to a
recognition of the need for a youth program. It trained
its members militarily insofar as the Versailles Treaty
In 1926, Stahlhelm directors permitted Young
permitted.

Stahlhelm members to transfer to the regular Stahlhelm
after two years active membership in the Young Stahlhelm.
NSDFB, 43ff; Stahlhelm ,!, 48, 53, 64, 113f.

.
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four hundred youth and regular Stahlhelm members turned out

for the 1926 Hildesheim Sport Day, which culminated in a

15km march with full field equipment.

The 1927 Gottingen

Sport Day had ca. 1000 participants. 38
In December 1928,

the central office of the Stahl-

helm ordered each of its local organizations (Ortsgr uppe

)

to organize military sport formations for the purpose of

developing and preserving the practical, as opposed to
theoretical, semi-military skills of its members.

For

Stahlhelm members under thirty years of age, according to
the directive, joining this new formation was mandatory.

For those over thirty, membership was optional.

At the

Stahlhelm National Headquarters in Magdeburg, a new section,
•39

Section lb, supervised all military sport activity.
In addition to military sport activities conducted

during special courses or military sport unit training, 40

LV [Landesverband] Niedersachsen Funfzehn Jahre
Stahlhelm in Niedersachsen Braunschweig, 1936, 9, 19, 26,
(Hereafter cited as S ta hlhelm-Nieder 81-85, 106f., 126.
Participation figures quoted above are, for the
sachsen
most part, from north central Germany, as this was the
Its support
region of the Stahlhelm 's greatest strength.
came from middle and small size cities, and the countryside
See BHStA, I, MI,
or east, north, and middle Germany.
71490, "Referat auf der Nachrichtenkonf erenz in Dresden am
27.4.1928", Bl. 9.
,

,

.

)

letter Grzesinski
II 1420 b 5/1, 7 May 1929 with copy of
to Otto Braun, PMdl
the Stahlhelm Bundeszeitschrif t Nr. 51, 16 December 1928.

39nsG, NachlaB Grzesinski,

G 1514,

,

4o See Stahlhelm , II, 92-96, for a detailed description
of the daily routine in a Stahlhelm Wehrsportlager

)

.

members of the Stahlhelm Labor Service received a minimum
of two hours of military sport instruction daily.

The Labor

Service camps, begun in 1931, allegedly numbered over 1100
by the summer of 1933, with an enrollment capacity of ca.
70,000.

41

Admittedly many of the participants in the labor

service camps had previously had, or later received, military sport training, but a conservative estimate would indicate that at least 150,000 Young Stahlhelm members received

their only exposure to military sport training in the labor
service camps

At the Front Soldiers' Assembly of 1931, Stahlhelm
leaders ordered each Stahlhelm region to establish Defense

Stahlhelm sections

(

Wehrstahlhelmabteilungen

composed of

)

all physically qualified Stahlhelm members under 35 years

The sections were to be ready for action at all

of age.

times and were to maintain a high state of proficiency,

presumably through military sport activity.

In northern

Germany, at least, the Defense Sections were organized.
In lower Saxony, two Wehrstahlhelm battalions led by Lt.

Col.

(Ret.)

Kraut and Major (Ret.) Rodenbeck were formed

in the Hildesheim area, while three battalions were organ-

ized into the "Heidegau" regiment, led by Capt

41

.

(Ret.)

von

Ibid. 128ff; and NSDFB , 36, 41 f. The cumulative
enrollment figure of the camps is not known. A much lower
estimate, without evidence or citation, is given in Klaus
Hornung, Per Jungdeutsche Orden Diisseldorf, 1958, 1 1 8.
(Hereafter cited as Hornung, Jungdo
,

.

der Wense.

The Hannover region conducted military sport

training for its Defense Sections at its Oershausen
school.

A Wehrstahlhelm regiment was raised from Hannover.
burg Stahlhelm members raised

Lune-

regiment of three battalions,

a

and in lower Saxony military sport schools were established
in Scheuen near Celle, Hildesheim, Nordstemmen-Gronau, and
Bad Zwischenann. 42
In May 1932,

Stahlhelm leader Franz Seldte revised

the military sport guidelines of December 1928, and declared

the support of the Stahlhelm for instituting mandatory

military sport training for all young male Germans.
further emphasized the Stahlhelm

1

s

He

commitment to this goal

by elevating its military sport training section (lb) to an

Inspectorate on

1

July 1932.

The Inspector assumed respon-

sibility for training Stahlhelm military sport instructors
and for insuring that they were paid if their services were

utilized in a full-time capacity.

The majority of these ap-

pear to have been recently retired or discharged Reichswehr
personnel.

Advice, lesson plans, and assistance were ex-

tended to the Stahlhelm regional commands by the federal
The remainder of 19 32 (July to December) was

Inspectorate.

42 Stahlhelm-Niedersachsen

,

85f,

99f,

113,

115,

127f,

and 135ff.
43

224, 229.

Ibid

.

,

114;

Stahlhe lm,

I,

102, Berghahn,

Stahlhelm

,

,
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designated by Seldte as a period of preparation and
testing
in order for as many members as possible to qualify
for the

Stahlhelm military sport badge.

In addition to Stahlhelm-

wide testing for the badge, large scale field exercises

were conducted by Wehrstahlhelm units, including an exercise
in the Braunschweig area with ca. 4000 participants. 44

The reason for the increased interest in military
sport manifested by Seldte and other Stahlhelm leaders is

not known.

It may have represented an attempt to rival

the nascent Government-sponsored military sport organiza-

tion or Stahlhelm leaders may have increased their efforts
at the urging of the Defense Ministry.

At any rate, the

Defense Ministry did not ignore the Stahlhem military sport
program.

During the Volkssport Era (1924-1927), Reichswehr

officers apparently gave some assistance to the Stahlhelm

military sport units,

4^

and although the Army showed little

official overt interest in military sport from 1927 to
1930,

1931

saw a revival of Defense Ministry interest.

A

44 BA,

R-43 11/828, Notizen fur eine Unterredung mit
dem Herrn Reichswehrminister , Rk. 904 7, 2 8 September 1932,
Part 1(6); Stahlhel m, I, 105f; Stahlhelm-Nieder-Sachse n
In all likelihood, the
23f; Berghahn, Stahlhel m, 230-238.
Inspector for Wehrsport was Lt. (Ret.) Karl Gornemann, Stahlhelm Bundeswehrsportwart since June 1931, and director of the
Jungsta Wehrsport activities since 1924. For evidence of increased Stahlhelm Wehrsport activity during the summer of
19 32, see Neue Preufiische Kreuzzeitung, passim for June,
July, August, and September 1932.
45 Berghahn, Stahlhe lm,

Berghahn uses sources
from the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, to demonstrate
Reichswehr interest in Stahlhelm Wehrsport, 1924 to 1926.
58f.

.

,
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series of briefings was arranged for former officers
in the

Stahlhelm by the Defense Ministry, and Col. von Schleicher

extended financial assistance for Stahlhelm military sport
activities to Capt.

(Ret.)

the Young Stahlhelm. 46

von Morozowicz, the leader of

In the eastern border provinces the

Stahlhelm was apparently permitted to use military and public facilities for its military sport activities. 47

At the

13th Stahlhelm Assembly, held in Berlin during September
1932, officers of the Defense Ministry attended for the

first time in an official capacity. 48

Exact figures for the number of Stahlhelm military
sport participants are not available.

Berghahn states that

in the fall 1933 transfer of the Young Stahlhelm to the

Nazi Storm Troopers, several hundreds of thousands of

young men changed uniforms.

This is confirmed by the suc-

cessor to the Stahlhelm, the National-Socialist Front

46 BA, Sam Sch/271
Stahlhelm Gau III, Ortsgruppe
[Berlin] Zehlendorf, 856/31 G, to Maj.a.D. Siegfried Runge,
26 October 1931; BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/20, Bl
,

184ff,

197ff.
47 BA,

R-43 11/828, Stahlhelm "Notizen", 28 September
In Part 1(1), the Stahlhelm Bundesvorstand requested
1932.
"Uberlassung im ganzen Reich, nicht nur in den Grenzgebieten
der Kasernenhofe, Exerziersplatze SchieBst^nde stadtischen
"
Turnhallen u. Exerziershauser fur Wehrsportausbildung
which implies that permission to use military and public
facilities in the border regions had been previously granted,
(emphasis in original)
,

,

.

48 Stahlhelm,

I,

129ff.

.

.

,

.
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Soldiers' League (NSDFB)

,

which stated that 314,000 Young

Stahlhelm members were transferred,

^

a

number three times

the size of the then army.

Although the GVA, the Stahlhelm, and the SA were perhaps the most active military sport enthusiasts, they
were
by no means the only ones.

Black-Red-Gold

(

Members of the Reichsbanner,

Reichsbanner, Schwarz-Rot-Gold

)

,

a

pro-

Republic paramilitary association, engaged in military sport
activities, as did various member groups of the German

Gymnasts, the German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises,
the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations, numerous

clubs in Bavaria, and Admiral

(Ret.)

von Trotha's Youth

League
The Reichsbanner, a paramilitary association of pro-

Republic war veterans, was organized as

a

counter-weight to

the Stahlhelm and other anti-Republican veterans groups.

Commencing in 1925, local chapters of the Reichsbanner

participated in military sport activities, emphasizing smallbore marksmanship, terrain sport exercises, hand-to-hand
In 1926, the

combat, marching, and close order drill.

national headquarters of the Reichsbanner, located in Magdeburg, founded the League of Republican Small-Bore Marksman-

ship Clubs, in response to requests from local Reichsbanner
chapters, which were alarmed by the increase of military

49 Berghahn, Stahlhelm ,

268; NSDFB

,

47

o

.
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sport programs sponsored by their political opponents.

Ap-

parently Reichsbanner leaders were worried that anti-Republican elements were training forces to overthrow the Gov-

ernment
The spectacular success of the NSDAP in the Reichstag election of 14 September 1930 appeared to substantiate

Reichsbanner suspicions that an anti-Republic coup d'etat
was in the offing.

Reichsbanner leaders, at

a

meeting of

their federal council, 20-21 September 1930, decided to

organize an elite section to combat the SA.

banner Protective Formations

(

Schuf

)

The Reichs-

were organized with-

in each Reichsbanner region, along with their own staff

for training the new formations.

Following the ouster of

the Socialist Government of Prussia by a Federal Commissar
on 20 July 1932, Reichsbanner officials concentrated all

their efforts on military sport programs, feeling the Republic to be in imminent danger from an authoritarian takeSlogans such as "Military sport more than ever!",

over.

"Universal military service for freedom!

"

and "With every

last man and penny for military sport!" characterized the

intensity of the Reichsbanner commitment, a commitment made
obsolete by the January 1933 forming of the Hitler Government.

51

50 Rohe,
5l

Ibid.

Reichsbanner

,

164,

166f.
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A shortage of trained instructors and leaders severely hampered the Reichsbanner effort to provide
military

sport training for the Protective Formations.

Discharged

and retired Reichswehr personnel showed little interest in

working with the Reichsbanner, a phenomenon consistent with
the ant i -Republican attitude of most Reichswehr personnel.

Defense Minister Groener also showed little interest in
furthering Reichsbanner military sport training.

Reichs-

wehr apathy, or hostility, and the shortage of trained instructors, however, were somewhat overcome by Reichsbanner-

GVA collaboration, and the Socialist Government of Prussia,

prior to its 1932 ouster, arranged for men from the Prussian
State Police to train Reichsbanner personnel.-52

Groener

1

s

successor as Defense Minister was Schleicher,

who reversed Groener'

s

position.

Consistent with the Army

Command's policy of involving every patriotic German who so
desired in non-regular defense planning, Schleicher not only

encouraged Reichsbanner members to participate in the Border
Guard-East training, but also made available for Reichsbanner
53
use the military firing ranges at Tegel.

Owing to the scattering and destruction of local Reichs-

52 BA,

R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to Bruning,
1932; Rohe, Reichsbanne r, 365-74, 441-444.
53

4

February

BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1 Orientation report
for Schleicher, undated, but initialled by Schleicher on 15
June 1932; Rohe, Reichsbanner, 365-74, 441-444.
,

t
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banner records and archives following the Nazi
consolidation of power, and the fact that a permanent
central

head-

quarters for the Protective Formations was never
established,
it is difficult to arrive at an estimate of the
size of the

Reichsbanner military sport program.

The best estimate for

the strength of the Protective Formations

(which does not

include pre-1930 military sport activities) is 400,000, of
whom, by far, the greater part received military sport training, a not always enforced pre-requisite for enlistment in

the Protective Formations. 54

The German Turners

(

Deutsch e Turners chaft

)

,

an or-

ganization of over one and one-half million members, 55 had,
since 1922, stressed "defense-readiness"
as a goal for its members.

(

Wehrhaftigkei

)

The Turners did not view de-

fense-readiness as an end in itself, but rather as

a

vehicle

for the development of manly and nationalistic character

traits.

Defense-Readiness training, to them, formed the

basis for later military training.

By 1931, however, the

~^Rohe, Reichsbanner , 365-74. To prevent over-aging
and to attempt to keep its membership young, the Reichsbanner
created a youth section, the Jungkameraden who were allowed
In 1932, 60 to
to transfer to the Reichsbanner at age 21.
70% of the men in the Protective Formations were under 30
years of age.
,

55 Jiirgen Dieckert, Die Turner jugendbewegung , Schorndorff bei Stuttgart, 1968, 142f. (Hereafter cited as Dieckert

The Deutsche Turnerschaf t was organTurner j ugendbewegung
ized in 1862 and existed until 1933, when it was disbanded by
In 1925 there were 18 regional coun
the National Socialists.
cils and 11,911 local chapters with a membership of 1,622,377
See also Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien,!, 616f.
.

)
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onset of the Depression and the growth of radical political

activity had caused a politicization of German youth, which
in the ranks of the Turners manifested itself in demands

from racist elements that defense-readiness be transformed
into concrete activity.

The Turners' Youth Committee, meet-

ing in Kassel in September 1931, called for the introduction
of marksmanship training and field marches into the associa-

tion's sport program.
these innovations.

The directors of the Turners accepted

The more radical goals of the Bavarian

Regional Council, which demanded the introduction of

a

special year-long program for eighteen year olds, of terrain
studies, first aid, marksmanship, map reading, and rescue

training were not adopted until the following year.

In 1932

the Turner youth groups were militarized: uniforms with in-

signia of rank were introduced, as were military sport training courses and encampments 56
.

In Bavaria,

the Peoples' Improvement Section

ertiichtigungsabteilung

)

(

Volks -

of the Bavarian Society for the Ad-

vancement of Physical Training,

a

state-sponsored organiza-

tion funded by the Bavarian Ministry for Education and Culture,

seems to have coordinated and supervised most military sport
activity.
(Ret.)

The director of the Improvement Section, Lt. Col.

August Horl, had been active in the Deutscher Notbann

in 1925.

With Bavarian Government financial backing, Horl's

Dieckert, Turner jugendbewegung

,

142f.
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section sponsored military sport courses and
underwrote

health and accident insurance for course participants.

The

GVA, Stahlhelm, and local Bavarian clubs took
advantage of

the services of the Improvement Section, which, in
1931,

for example, sponsored over 100 military sport courses. 57

The Bavarian and Reich Federation

(

Bund Bayern und

Reich), the largest (ca. 55,000) and best armed of the

Bavarian defense organizations of 1923, became active in
the military sport movement in 1926.

Despite some personnel

defections following the Hitler Putsch of 1923, most members

remained active and there were over 1200 local chapters in

Bavaria in 1926.

During that year the Bund founded and

sponsored military sport groups and published its own military sport pamphlet, "A Primer for Practical Federation

Work in the Area of Defense Fitness".
remained distant from Epp's Notbann

,

Although the Bund
in 1927 Bund leaders

held a series of conferences with Horl, which apparently

resulted in financial assistance for Bund military sport
activities from Horl's Improvement Section.
in Munich attended Lt. Col. Billman's

Bund leaders

[of Wiinsdorf]

lecture

on German Volkssport about the time of their talks with

Horl, so they were aware of nation-wide currents in the

57BHStA,

It is possibl
IV, Bestand Stahlhelm, Bd. 54.
although evidence is by no means conclusive, that the Volks-

ertiichtigungsabteilung developed from Epp's Deutscher Notbann
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°

movement

.

B un 4 Oberla nd
.

(Upper [Bavarian] Country Federation)

also formed military sport clubs for its younger members
and its youth group affiliates. 59

Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Adolf von Trotha, with financial
support from the Navy, founded the Hanseatic Youth League
in 1925.

Officially organized as a nautical sport club,

the real purpose of Trotha's League was to train interested

young men as crew members for torpedo motor boats.

The

German Navy was not permitted such boats under the provisions
of the Versailles Treaty, yet German civilian firms, with

capital from secret defense funds, manufactured the boats,

ostensibly as civilian recreation craft, and sold them to
"patriotic" yacht clubs.

Experiments conducted in Spain

proved that the boats could easily be converted to

a

mili-

tary configuration, and the Trotha sport school provided a

nucleus of trained crew members for whatever contingencies

might arise.

In addition, prospective naval seaplane pilots

were sent to the Trotha school prior to commencing their illegal flight training.

The school facilities, located in a

former hotel in Travemtinde, were purchased with Defense

Ministry funds and in 1933 the school was transferred to

58 BHStA,

II, Bd. Bayern und Reich,

2/4, and
In 1929
591-99.
2/3,

See also Gordon, Beer Hall Putsc h,
Blind Bayern und Reich affiliated with the Stahlhelm. BHStA,
II, Bd. Bayern und Reich, 2/6.
2/5.

MI 71490, "Referat auf der Nachrichtenkonferenz in Dresden, am 27.4. 1928." Bl. 5.
59 BHStA,

I,
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the Navy and used to train submarine
crews.

Trotha was

subsequently made an honorary Hitler Youth
Leader for his
services to the "national movement." 60

Most of the military sport organizations
mentioned,
which by no means exhausts the list, belonged
to one or
both of two, nation-wide athletic promotion
groups, the

German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises, 61
and the
Reich Committee of German Youth Groups. 62 These

agencies,

in effect, lobbied for and channeled Government
subsidies
to various sport groups.

While their relationship to the

military sport movement is unclear, the two committees, by

60 IMT, XXXIV, Dok. 156-C, (Bearb.
von Kapitan z.
See Schliisser) , "Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles,
1919-1935", 554-557; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 496,
15 October 1940; Adolf von Trotha, Vizeadmiral a.D.
,

(herausgegeben von B. von Bargen) Admiral von Trotha;
Personliches, Briefe, Reden und Auf zeichnungen Berlin,
193 8, 12f.
A corvette-Captain (Ret.) Fritz Albrecht direct
ed a small (ca. 1000) naval military sport youth group, the
"Marinejugend Vaterland"
Its ties (if any) to the Trotha
Organization are unknown. See Neue Preuflische Kreuzzeitung
Nr. 198, 17 July 1932.
,

,

.

,

u

fi 1

'Originally established in 1895 as the German
Olympic Committee/ the Deutscher ReichsausschuB fur
Leibesubungen in 1 932 had 49 member groups, 27 affiliated
university chapters, and representatives from 26 government agencies.
Its total membership was ca. 5.5 million.
See Fricke, Biirgerliche Parteien I, 530-540.
,

^Organized in 1919 to secure Government subvention
for its members, the ReichsausschuB der deutschen Jugendver
bande had 117 affiliated member groups with a combined membership of ca. 4.5 million. See Fricke, Biirgerliche
Parteien I, 481 f; and Baldur von Schirach, Ich Glaubte an
Hitler Hamburg, 1967, 176ff.
(Hereafter cited as Schirach
Ich Glaubte an Hitler.)
,

,

virtue of their traditions and size, contributed
immensely
to the standing and prestige of their
directors, who were

interested in military sport. 63

It is probably no coinci-

dence that the zenith of Government cooperation
with the

military sport movement occurred during the winter of 19311932,

the year of Vogt's election as director of the Reich

Committee of German Youth Groups.
In summary, the transfer of Volkssport from the

Defense Ministry to the Reich Ministry of the Interior in
1927 did not, as the generals had feared, result in a slow

death for military sport.

Government funds, perhaps on

a

smaller scale, continued to trickle to various military
sport groups after 1927.

Reichswehr officers were aware

of and indirectly influenced developments within the mili-

tary sport organizations.

Owing to a lack of evidence, only the roughest estimate of the number of military sport participants from 1927
to 1932 can be attempted.

A very conservative estimate

would be that 1.5 million young men received some type of
training.

6^

In practical terms,

this meant a reservoir of

63 Vogt

directed the Reich Committee of German Youth
Groups after 1931. For the leaders of the German Reich Committee for Physical Exercises and their role in the Government-sponsored military sport organization, see Cpt VI.
.

pp.

152f.
6 ^This

estimate is based on the following figures:
GVA, 500,000 (footnote 18); Stahlhelm, 314,000 (footnote 49);
SA, (See next chapter) 44 6 ,000 (BA, NS-23/124, OSAF I, 14.11.3

,
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partially pre-trained men fifteen times the size of the
then Reichswehr.

While the quality of the military sport

training doubtless varied immensely, the psychological
value of such training far outweighed its deficiencies.

Young men, for the most part belonging to the post-war
generation, could now state, with justice and pride, that
as a result of their training they now had a claim to de-

fend their country, a right denied them by the Versailles

Treaty.

In addition to its potential as a source of re-

cruits for mobilization, Reichswehr officers welcomed

military sport for its service in keeping alive the concept of universal military service.

strength report for September 1932); Reichsbanner 400,000
(footnote 93); and Deutsche Turnerschaf t 500,000 (Bernett,
Leibeserziehungen 177f.) This does not include members of
the AWA, Trotha's Hansa League, or various Bavarian groups,
If one discounts 30% of
as the figures are not available.
the total of 2.1 million military sport participants to
compensate for duplicate training in the Grenzschutz-Ost
plural membership, and inactive members, one arrives at
the estimate of 1.5 million.
,

,

,

CHAPTER

IV

THE SA AND THE MILITARY SPORT

MOVEMENT,

1924-1932

Of the two major, radical political parties in

Germany after 1924, the Communists and the National
Socialists, the Nazis alone made an effort to appeal to

nationalist sentiments.

From the genesis of the Nazi

Party, the strident nationalism of its speakers attracted
the attention of their competitors for the working class
vote, the Communists.

They discovered that their clien-

tele, the proletariat, had a remarkably strong addiction
to the bourgeois opiate of nationalism.

Unable to match

the flag-waving of the National Socialists owing to ideo-

logical grounds, the Communists instead dispatched thugs
to disrupt and break up Nazi rallies and to terrorize

both the audience and the speakers.

The Nazis responded

by organizing a guard force to insure that Communist hecklers were discouraged, normally by the most brutal of

methods.^

Following a particularly vicious melee in the

1548, Polizei Direktion Munchen [PDM] Vl/d,
410/27, Nachlage to 24 February 1927 report, Anlage 1;
Ernst Bayer, Die SA. Geschichte, Arbeit, Zweck und Organi sation der Sturmabteilung des Fuhrers und Oberster SA (Hereafter cited as Bayer, SA
Filhrung , Berlin, 1938, 8.
Geschichte and Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (trans. R. Mann(Hereafter
heim) , Sentry Edition, Boston, 1943, 502-506.
cited as Hitler, Mein Kampf .)
"HA,

)

f.

,
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Hofbrauhaus in Munich in November 1921, Hitler
designated
his hall guard the Storm Section of the National
Socialist
Party (commonly referred to by its German initials,
SA, or
Sturmabteiluncr)

With obvious pride, Hitler noted the de-

.

tails of this action in his autobiography:
iHitler] went' into the hall [where he was to
give a speech] and surveyed the situation with
my own eyes.
Innumerable faces were turned
I_

towards me with sullen hatred, while again
others, with mocking grimmaces let out cries
capable of no two interpretations.
...A few
angry shouts and a man suddenly jumped on a
chair and roared into the hall 'Freedom:' At
which signal the fighters for freedom began
their work. In a few seconds the whole hall
was filled with a roaring, screaming crowd,
over which, like howitzer shells, flew innumerable beer mugs, and in-between the cracking of chair legs, the crashing of mugs, howling and screaming.
For twenty minutes the
hellish tumult lasted.
Your heart almost
rejoiced at such a revival of old war experiences.
The fight slowly ended, the provacteurs
being driven out. 2
,

.

.

.

The SA soon acquired sufficient recruits to begin

counterattacks on their communist foes and Hitler, in
1923, used the SA as the nucleus of a force in an attempt

to overthrow the Republic.

He had known that the odds did

not favor a successful coup de main

,

yet possessed of a

gambler's nature, and inspired by the example of Mussolini,
he preferred to risk all or nothing.

he had no choice.

To a certain extent

As the prophet of a new and revolution-

ary order, the time had come to either lead the upheaval

2 Hitler,

Mein Kampf

,

502-506.

.
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or to suffer discredit, scorn, and the reprobation
of his

followers, who could be subsequently expected to rally to

other flags.

3

Hitler's "March on Berlin" proved an unwise

decision and succumbed to a show of force less than two
miles from its origin, but the attempt to topple the Gov-

ernment by violent means introduced

a

fateful confusion

concerning the mission of the SA which continued to plague

SA-Party relations until

19 34.

Hitler always regarded the SA as an auxiliary to
the Party, responsible for Party Security and for carrying

out assigned tasks of a political nature (e.g.

,

propaganda

marches, recruiting drives, leaflet distribution).

4

On the

other hand, many of the men in the SA, remembering the

Munich Putsch, were convinced that their mission was essentially military and they made preparations for the oft-

mentioned National Socialist revolution during which, they
Al-

assumed, they would take the Government by assault.

though the abortive Putsch in Munich caused Reich and

Bavarian Governments to ban the Party and the SA,

a

number

of SA men appear to have participated, as a means of pre-

paring for what they assumed to be the imminent counterrevolution, in the military sport programs of the Notbann

Ibid., 553; Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch
4 Hitler,

Mein Kampf

,

536f,

543,

546f.

,

242f f

)
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or in similar activities elsewhere.

During his term in prison, Hitler grappled with
the problem of the SA and its future.

Concluding that a

forceable seizure of power had little chance for success,
he decided to concentrate his efforts on gaining political

power through essentially legal means.
work the SA played a definite role.

Within this frame-

Its mission, wrote

Hitler, was political, and "its training must not proceed

from military criteria, but from the criteria of expediency
for the party." 6

Shortly after his release from jail, Hitler re-

founded the Party and the SA.

He did not reins titute a

J In

many instances, especially in Bavaria, the membership of the Notbann, Rohm's and Ludendorff's abortive
Frontbann, and the re-organized (in February, 1925) SA was
identical.
Rohm and Notbann officials were highly interested in pre-military training.
Initially accepting the command
of the new SA, Rohm quit in April 1925, owing to disgust at
political in-fighting. His Frontbann disintegrated; in
areas where the SA was legal, most Frontbann members joined
it.
HA, f. 1636, Frontbann Oberkommando lb 190, 11 September
1924; f. 1549, PDM Vl/d, 131, 30 May 1925, "Richtlinien fur
die Neuorganisation der SA der NSDAP", streng geheim, Miinchen,
5th
24 May 1924; Ernst Rohm, Geschichte eines Hcchverraters
ed., Miinchen, 1 934, 323-327, 334-38, 340, 343. (Hereafter
Andreas Werner, SA und NSDAP
cited as Rohm, Hochverrater
oder Revolut ionsarmee? Studien
SA; Wehrverband, Partei truppe
zur Geschichte der SA und der NSDAP 1920-1933 Phil diss.
Erlangen-Nurnberg, 1964, 199-209, 211-231, 239-50, 256f,
268-76, 280ff, 305-313. (Hereafter cited as Werner, SA und
NSDAP ; Gordon, Beer Hall Putsch 565-571; Heinrich Bennecke,
(Hereafter cited
962, 109-1 4.
Hitler und die SA Miinchen,
as Bennecke, Hitler und die SA.
,

)

:

;

,

,

,

)

1

,

Hitler, Mein Kampf

,

546.

1
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central SA headquarters, and he prohibited SA men
from

carrying or stockpiling weapons.

7

to have stemmed from two concerns:

These provisions appear
first, that an armed,

centrally directed SA could provide Government authorities

with an excuse to proscribe the nascent movement; and
second, a fear on Hitler's behalf that a militarized SA

engaging in military politics would again attempt to force
his hand by rashly precipitating a crisis with either the

Reich or one of the state Governments.

Within two years, however, the Nazi Party leader

reversed himself and appointed an over-all SA commander,
Captain (Ret.) Franz von Pfeffer. 9

7 Volkischer

Beobachter

,

Nr.

8

Hitler's reasons for

1,

26

February 1925.

g

The central SA headquarters for all Germany, the
Supreme SA Headquarters (Oberste SA-Fiihrung, or as it was
more commonly called, OSAF) was located in Miinchen. The
SS (Schutzstaf fel Hitler's bodyguard) and the Hitler
Youth (HJ) were subordinate sections of the OSAF.
Volkischer Beobachter Nr. 234, 29 October 1926; HA, f.
1548, PDM Vl/d, 410/27, 13 November 1926, and report of
the Reichsminister des Innern, 2 8 March 1927,
,

,

9 19

February 1888-?. Pfeffer matriculated at Heidelberg, but left to join the army, saw service on the
Western Front, 1914-1918, as a unit and General Staff
Corps officer, and was wounded several times. He organized and led the "Freikorps Pfeffer" in the Baltic
region and Upper Silesia, 1919-1920. He participated
in the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr resistance, where a
French court-martial sentenced him to death in ab His first contact with the NSDAP came in
stentia
1924, and he was appointed Gauleiter of Westphalia and
later of the Ruhr area. From 1926 to 1930 he was
Oberster SA-Fuhrer.
.

2
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this action are unknown, but he may have concluded
that a

supreme SA commander could bring to a halt SA units engaging in military sport activities 10

He expressed his con'

.

cern about the nature of SA training in a letter to Pfeffer.

"The training of the SA", wrote Hitler, "is not

oriented toward a military standpoint, but instead toward

Party needs."

11

The new SA commander echoed his Fiihrer's

policies, adding that "the political leadership of the

NSDAP directs what shall be done with the SA...
SA

[unit]

can,

[and]

no

in any manner whatsoever, maintain a re-

lationship with the Reichswehr

.

1

Miscreants and re-

fractory individuals, explained both Hitler and Pfeffer,
could expect prompt expulsion from the Party.

These caveats nothwithstanding

,

Lt.

13

(Ret.)

Edmund

Heines 14 conducted military sport activities with the

1553, PDM Vl/d 131, Nr. 1451, 22 July 1926;
Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innern to PDM, 2023 Nr. 3, 19 November
1926.
An exercise planned for the spring of 1926 was cancelled owing to bad weather. PDM VI /d, Lagebericht Nr. 49,
22 June 1926.

HA,

f.

11

ieZG, Fa-107/1, SA Befehl [SABE] 1, 1 November 1926,
"Die Ausbildung
Brief Adolf Hitlers an Hauptmann v. Pfeffer.
der SA hat nicht nach militarischen Gesichtspunkten, sondern
nach parteizwecksmaBigen zu erfolgen."
"Die politische
SABE 2, 2 November 1926.
Leitung der NSDAP hat zu bestimmen, was mit der SA geschehen
Keine SA darf mit der Reichswehr in irgendwelcher
soli
Beziehung stehen."
12 Ibid ,

13 Ibid.

Joining the Army in 1914, he was commissioned in 1918, served in the Freikorps Oberland in 1919,
14 1 897-1 934.

"
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bicycle section "RoGbach"

(a

Munich SA unit) in the Rosen-

heim area in early May 1927, and several other SA units
followed suit. 15

These actions prompted

a

strong rejoinder

from Hitler, who wrote that "any form of military fun and
games is strictly forbidden.
zation.

The SA is no defense organi-

The military training of the nation is the task

of the Reich Army, not the NSDAP." 16

Heines was sacked,

although the gounds for his dismissal were multifarious. 17

then with the Freikorps RoGbach in the Baltic, and later in
Upper Silesia and the Ruhr. He participated in the Hitler
Putsch, and later received a 15 year sentence for participating in the Feme murders but was amnestied. Heines joined
the reconstituted NSDAP in 192 5 along with many ex-RoGbach
men.
Expelled from the Party for numerous pecadillos, Hitler re-instated him in 1929.
Heines later held a number of
important Party and SA posts, culminating as SA leader of
Silesia, where his activities terrorized and scandalized
the region. A blatant homosexual, he was discovered en
flagrante by Hitler at Wiessee the morning of the purge of
the SA, 30 June 1934. He was shot that morning.
15 HA,

1553, PDM Lagebericht 1°, Nr. 56, 6 May 1927;
PDM files 571 and 576 for reports on military training by
SA "sport" units, 30 April- 1 May and 11-12 June 1927, respectively; report of Gendarmeriestation Deining to Bezirksamt
Wolfratshausen, Nr. 69, 5 May 1927.
f.

16 IfZG,

FA-107/1, GRUSA [Grundsatzliche Anordnung] II,
"Strengstens untersagt ist jede Art von mili3 May 1927.
tarischer Spielerei. Die SA ist kein Wehrverband. Die
militarische Ausbildung der Nation ist Aufgabe des Reichsheeres und nicht der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei.
17 Heines apparently had his hands in the Party cash-

When confronted by Hitler, Heines retorted that Hitler
was a reactionary who had surrounded himself with "Bonzen und
Bremsern." Calling together the Munich SA, Hitler denounced
Heines as a mutineer, adding "daG er [Hitler] sich von einem
jahrigen Jungen nicht verschreiben lasse was
kaum 25.
box.

8

"
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Pfeffer, whose own interests inclined toward
a SA

independent of Party control, attempted to enforce
Hitler's
guidelines.

The SA leader reacted strongly to an article

in the 10 November 1928 NSDAP newspaper,

the Volkischer

Beobachter, which printed pictures showing SA men running

obstacle courses and negotiating barbed wire entanglements.
He demanded the names of the men engaged in the "forbidden

exercises". 18

Although Pfeffer dismissed as "patently

fabricated Jewish swindel-news" reports published in the

Wolff's telegraphic Bureau and the Berliner Tagblatt alleging that SA men conducted military exercises near Berlin,

Q

11:7

Hitler used these reports to remind SA men of his

caveat against cooperating with the Army.

In particular,

the Nazi leader was against their participation in the

Border Guard-East, a secret border defense force organized
in the eastern border regions and trained by the Reichs-

wehr with the approval of the Reich and Prussian authorities. 20

Lashing out at Nazis who had ignored his ban

Aktivismus sei." Informing his listeners of Heines' expulsion from the Party, Hitler ended his two hour harangue with
a review of his life's work and stated that his only wish
was to have the swastika flag for his burial shroud. HA,
1549, PDM Lagebericht N/57, 9 June 1927.
1

19

Volkischer Beobachter
Ibid.

,

,

30 November 1928.

2-3 December 1928.

Schwindelnachrichten

"glatt erfundene judische

.

20 For information on the Border Guard, see Gaines
Post Jr., The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy,
(Hereafter cited as Post,
Princeton, 1973, 176-184, 318f.
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against military related activities, he
denounced

Party Comrades, who participate in any
military exercises, regardless of whether
or not weapons are involved, violate the
express prohibition of the Party leadership.
The National Socialist, and above
all the SA and SS man, has no cause to
raise one finger [to help] the present
Government, which has no understanding
of what honor means to us and which has
only perpetuated the misery of our people.

21

In threatening to expel SA men who cooperated with

the Army, Hitler was not, in accordance with his own logic,

being unpatriotic.

SA-Reichswehr joint undertakings of

any sort contained not only the potential for diverting SA

men from their political tasks, but such undertakings also

posed the possibility that SA men might come to identify
the Army's interests as paramount to those of the Nazi

Party.

From Hitler's perspective both these developments

were undesirable.

Moreover, should a defenseless Germany

Civil-Militar y. ). Walter Gorlitz, History of the German
General Staff, 1657-1945
New York,
(trans. B. Battershaw)
1953, 259f. (Hereafter cited as Gorlitz, General Staff .).
Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich 3 vols.,
Boppard am Rhein, 1969, I, 35f. (Hereafter cited as Absolon,
160.
Wehrmacht
and Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
,

,

,

.

)

2 1 Volkischer

,

Beobachter 5 December 1928. "Parteigenos
sen, die an irgendwelchen militarischen ubungen teilnehmen,
ganz gleich, ob diese bewaffneter oder nich bewaffneter
Natur sind, verstossen gegen das ausdriickliche Verbot der
Parteileitung. Der Nationalsozialist und in erster Linie
der SA- und SS-Mann hat keine Veranlassung, fur den heutigen
Staat, der kein Verstandnis fur unsere Ehrauf f assung besitzt
und der das Ungliick unseres Volkes nur verewigt hat, auch
nur einen Finger zu riihren."
,
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be attacked, a revolutionary situation could develop,

hastening the Nazi triumph.
Pfeffer found Hitler's insistence that "the SA
is a means to an end"

22

unacceptable.

The SA leader's

own inclinations led to an increasingly active and inde-

pendent SA, and he eventually resigned his command over
the issue of the domination of the SA by the Party's

political leaders.

23

His resignation by no means re-

solved the issue of SA independence vis-a-vis the NSDAP
and the question of the primacy of the political mission
of the SA was temporarily established only after two

mutinies and a subsequent purge of the Berlin SA.

24

The greatest immediate problem facing the SA fol-

lowing Pfeffer 's resignation was not the question of its
mission, but rather the quality of its leaders.

zz IfZG,

Fa-107/1, SABE
SA ist Mittel zum Zweck."

2,

2

November 1926.

As a

"Die

23

IfZG, Fa-107/1, Bl. 57 for the official, public
letter of resignation. A confidential Pfeffer letter to
SA leaders, 29 August 1930, is also in this file, Bl. 56.
Hitler assumed personal command of the SA on 3 September
Volkischer Beobachter Nr. 200, 3 September 1930.
1930.
,

24

For material on. the Berlin SA Mutiny (Sept. 1930)
and the Stennes Putsch (April 1931), see HA, f. 83, 325,
1550, and 1551; Bennecke, Hitler und die SA 148; and
Johann K.V. von Engelbrechten Eine Braune Armee Entsteht
937,
Die Geschichte der Berlin-Brandenburger SA Miinchen,
33-41. (Hereafter cited as Engelbrechten, Braune Armee .)
360-364.
Also, Werner, SA und NSDAP
,

;

,

,

,

1

7
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consequence of the rapid growth of the SA, 25 leaders were
often quite young and most middle and lower level leaders

had neither SA nor military training suitable for their
SA positions. 26

Efforts of former military officers in

the SA to insist on a rigorous leader selection and train-

ing program met with ridicule and violent opposition from

the "old fighters", the pre-1930 Party stalwarts.
in this respect was the experience of Col.

Georg "Trotsky" Hofmann. 27

(Ret.)

Typical

Hans-

In a speech to SA leaders dur-

From ca. 100,000 in 1930 (IfZG, Fa- 2, Bl. 71; HA,
f. 1553, PDM 717, report of 29-30 November 1930 SA leaders
conference) to over one-half million in September 1932 (BA,
NS-23/124, OSAF I, 14 November 1932
.

26 IfZG, Fa-107/1,

PDM report on SA-Fiihrertagung,

15-16 September 1931; for some idea of the ages of the SA
leaders, see the statistical sections of the reports of the
SA Reich Leaders' School (RFS) in HA, f. 312, RFS 593/31,
4.8.31; RFS 926/31, 5.9.31; RFS 1024/31, 15.9.31; and RFS
1460/31M, 6.11.31.
Of the senior SA leaders who attended
classes 1,2,3 and 5 (the classes for v/hich reports survive),
only 6.7% were over 35 years of age. 19% of the class members were between ages 31-35, 36% were between ages 26-30,
and 25.5% were between ages 21-25. Thus an astonishing
61.5% of senior SA leaders attending the RFS in the fall of
These men, for
1931 were thirty years of age or younger.
the most part, were too young to have served in the war and
although some may have received a small amount of military
training through the Freikorps or Zeitf reiwillige programs,
most had no formal military or leadership training. SA leaders were aware of this problem. See IfZG, Fa-107/1, PDM report on 15-16 September 1931 SA-Fiihrertagung; and HA, f.
1553, Lagebericht Nr. 23, Lapo Berlin, IA, 1 December 1930.

Retired from the Reichswehr in 1926, he
served as SA Gruppenfuhrer of Gruppe Bayern, then Gruppe
Mittelland (1931-1934) and as Staatssekretar for the Reichsstatthalter of Bavaria, General von Epp.
2

1

873-1 942.
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ing a September 1931 SA conference, he encouraged
them to

interest themselves in the Army-sponsored Border Guard
and
to take advantage of the training associated with
it.

He

was rudely interrupted during his speech and scornfully

reminded by some of his audience that the duties of the SA

were political.

He responded by launching into an unre-

strained tirade, emphasizing that it was public knowledge
that the SA leaders were unqualified and ignorant.

Ac-

cording to one astounded recipient of "Trotsky's" philippic, it was evident that he did not really understand the

Nazi movement, and afterwards a dazed Hitler remarked that
"he

[Trotsky] would have to be shipped out." 28
In an effort to improve the quality of SA leaders,

Police Capt.

(Ret.) Walter Stennes, 29 the leader of the

Berlin SA from 1926 to 1931, founded a school to train
Berlin area SA leaders in the fall of 1930.

Classroom

instruction was held at the "wiener Garten" restaurant in

28 IfZG, Fa-107/1, PDM report on SA leaders conference,
15 September 1931 (Pol. Pras. Berlin, I 7. 42.02/24.9).
"Dieser [Hofmann] muB ausgeschift werdenl,"
•

29 Stennes, Walter, Police Captain (Ret.)
A front
officer during the First World War, Stennes later served
with the Freikorps Pfeffer in the Baltic region and eventually found his way to the Prussian Landespolizei (1921?)
from which he retired as a Captain in 1926. Pfeffer appointed Stennes as OSAF-Ost, Berlin, in 1926, a post which
he held until his expulsion from the party and the SA in
He was op1931 after leading a revolt of the Berlin SA.
posed to the legal course of the party and the primacy of

Following incarceration and torture
its political sections.
by the Gestapo in 1933, he was exiled from Germany and found
employment as a military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek.
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Berlin-Kreuzberg, and practical training, including
military
sport instruction, was conducted on weekends at Grundmiihle,

a village north of Berlin.

In May 1931, the

school facilities were re-organized into a two week resident course and the school name was changed to the Sport

Leaders' School.

Enrollment was ca. 150 students per

course, and although the main emphasis of the instruction

focused on leadership training, military sport instruction
was included. 30

Two similar schools were established in

Silesia during 1931, with a combined enrollment of ca.
450 students. 31

Capt.

(Ret.) Ernst Rohm, 32 Pfeffer's successor to

command of the SA, was aware of SA training deficiencies,
and despite a perfunctory order to the SA to refrain from

1

-^HA, f. 1553, Lagebericht Nr. 23, Lapo Berlin, IA,
December 1930; Engelbrechten, Braune Armee 245.
,

31 Volkischer

Beobachter

,

Nr. 288,

11

October 1931.

32 1 883-1 934. Joining the Bavarian Army in 1906, R6hm
served in a number of command and staff positions during the
war. Accepted into the Reichswehr as a General Staff Corps

officer, his duties as Bavarian Division (7) liaison officer
to various paramilitary units led to his increasing involvement in racist-radical politics, which resulted in his premature retirement from the Army in the fall of 1923. He participated in the Hitler Putsch, seizing the headquarters of
Found guilty of high treason, but
the Bavarian Division.
receiving a suspended sentence, his unsuccessful efforts to
organize the Frontbann (see note 5, this chapter) were followed by a sojourn in Bolivia as a military advisor, a post
from which he was providentially recalled to Germany in the
He served as
fall of 19 30 by Hitler to take over the SA.
Chief of Staff (in effect, commander) of the SA unit until
his execution in 1934.
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offering its services to the Reichswehr
in the event of a
Polish attack, 33 he at once set about
contacting Defense
Ministry officers concerning a role for
the SA in the Border
Guard-East. In March 1931, he reached an
agreement with
Schleicher by which SA men, as private individuals,
would
be allowed to participate in the Border
Guard. 34
In negotiating this mutually advantageous
agreement,

both Rohm and Schleicher apparently exceeded their
authority.

Schleicher's approval for individual SA men, but not

SA units, to participate in the Border Guard was
consistent

with both Army policy and Reichswehr experience vis-a-vis
the paramilitary organizations, 35 but the legality of
per-

mitting SA men to participate was questionable.

33 HA,

f.

1554B, SA Befehl,

34 Vogelsang,

RW-Staat-NSDAP

13
,

On

2

Janu-

January 1931.
118f.

35 The Reichswehr was of the opinion
that any patri-

otic German citizen living within the threatened eastern
border regions should be allowed to participate in the
Grenzschutz.
See BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groener letter to Reichskanzler Briining, RWM Wla, - September
1931; RH-8 v896, proposed agenda for lb officers conference,
24-25 November 1931 and the subsequent minutes of that meeting, CHL TA 1207/31, betr. Ic Besprechung am 24.-25. November 1931; and Muller, Das wahre Vaterland 322ff. The Reichs
wehr, in 1921, had unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate
paramilitary groups into the Grenzschutz, an experiment which
left a poor after-taste with the Army Command.
During a Mili
tary District-Commanding Generals Conference, 2 5 October 19 30
Schleicher stated, "Die Erfahrung hat beweisen, daB die
'Verbande' als solche zur Mitarbeit im 'Grenzschutz' und
'Landesschutz ganzlich unbrauchbar sind.... Also, jeder
einzelne nationale Mann soli fur Landesschutz willkommen
IfZG,
sein, 'Verbande' sind als unbrauchbar abzulehnen."
Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bl 157.
,

'

.

.
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ary 1931 the Defense Ministry had secretly
announced that
it would no longer fire civilian employees
found to be

members of the Nazi Party, while simultaneously it
caution
ed soldiers and employees that the issue of the
legality

of the Nazi Party was still under litigation and
therefore

unresolved. 36

The Prussian Government angrily protested

the Schleicher-Rohm agreement, 37 forcing Defense Minister

Groener to refer the matter to the Reich Cabinet, which
eventually resolved the issue in favor of the Nazis. 38
The Rohm-Schleicher Agreement contradicted Hitler's

orders to the SA to refuse collaboration with the "system"

yet is improbable that Hitler did not know of Rohm's
activities, and in all likelihood, he probably approved
of them.

Accutely sensitive to the currents within his

movement, and aware of the psychological importance of
the Border Guard to the inhabitants of the eastern regions

Hitler appears to have concluded that his adamant refusal
to allow SA men to participate in the Border Guard posed a

36

BA-MA, H-24/5, RMW 639.30, g. Wla, Berlin,

2

Janu

ary 1931.
37 Ibid

NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groener lette
to Briining, September 1931; Severing, Lebensweg II, 321ff
326f
.

,

,

38 BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25, Groener to
On 29 January 1 932, Groener perBriining, September 1931.
mitted former members of any political party, except the
Communist, to enlist in the Reichswehr. See Berliner
Borsenzeitung Nr. 65, 9 February 1932, quoted in Ursachen
und Folgen VII, 561ff.
,

,
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far greater risk to the unity of the Party than
did any

Reichswehr-SA fraternization.

Whatever training the SA

received from Border Guard-East authorities or the Reichs-

wehr would only benefit the SA and would help to alleviate
the shortage of trained leaders.

Should difficulties with

Government authorities arise, Hitler could always fall back
on his 192 8 order and disclaim any responsibility for the

acts of his subordinates ^9
.

In light of Reichswehr efforts to allow members of

the paramilitary groups but not the groups themselves, to

participate in Border Guard-East training, there is no

For example, Hitler publicly repudiated the Boxheimer Documents (a draconic Nazi contingency plan for the
consolidation of power in Hesse involving the arming of the
SA) as the private work of dilettantes, and he issued a
public warning to the SA to beware of provocateurs who
urged illegal actions under the guise of a desire for activity and ordered a halt, under penalty of expulsion from post
and party, to "...alle Bestrebungen und Stilubungen aber,
die illegale Handlungen zur Vorausset zungen oder zum Ziele
haben und dadurch die Partei schadigen und gefahrden,
HA, f. 1872, OSAF 725/31, 9 December 1931.
Despite public
disavowal of the documents, the NSDAP promptly hired the
author of the Boxheimer Documents, Dr Werner Best, who had
been released from his civil service post. See also Severing, Lebensweg II, 31 1f; Bullock, Hitler 202f; and VogelManfred von Killinger, a
sang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
141, 146f.
Dresden SA leader, wrote to inform Hitler that his men were
going to join the Grenzschutz regardless of the position
taken by the party and it would therefore be best, he suggested, to approve of Grenzschutz participation, thus giving
at least the appearance that the SA was in command of the
situation. BDC, Personalakt von Killinger, letter Killinger
Hitler's reply is not known, but SA
to Hitler, n.d. [1932].
collaboration with the Reichswehr did continue. See BDC,
Personalakt F-W. Kriiger, letter Kruger to Rohm, 17 August
,

,

,

1932.

,

.
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reason to believe that SA men
received training different
from other Border Guard recruits.
Training courses for
the Border Guard duplicated military
sport training in all
important aspects. The recruits received
instruction in
drill, physical conditioning,
marksmanship, encampment and
entrenchment techniques, and methods of
cover and concealment 4 °
.

Reichswehr-SA ties were, as to be expected, closest
in the eastern military districts,

(Brandenburg-Berlin-Silesia)

,

I

(E

.

Prussia), III

and IV (Saxony)

,

owing to

the Polish threat and the existence of the
Border Guard-

East in these districts.

Training courses for SA recruits

in the Border Guard were held throughout 1931 and
1932,

although actual Border Guard units

(composed mostly of

Stahlhelm members) appear to have been established only
in East Prussia prior to 1932. 41

Records indicating the

40 BA-MA, RH-8/V896, CHL TA
600/31 g.K. T4 Id "Z"
July
1
1931; CHL TA 628/31 g.K. T4 Id, 17 September 1931;
WKVII/734, copy of CHL TA 100/32 g.K.T4 Id, 29 January 1929;
RH-8/v896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA, 25 July 1932, mentions
that terrain sport training was the means of training re-

serves for the Grenzschutz and enclosed for commanders a
copy of "Richtlinien fur die Ausbildung im Gelandesport"
booklet prepared by the GVA and the Defense and Interior
Ministries
41

,

a

BDC, Personalakt von Killinger, letter Killinger to
Hitler, spring 1 932; Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to
Rohm, 17 August 1932; IfZG, F-56, letter of General (Ret.)
Kurt Weckmann to General (Ret.) Hermann Foertsch, 19 May
19 52.
Weckman was assigned to Grenzschutz duties in Pomerania; and BA, NachlaB Kriiger, Aktenbeschlagnahme im
Abschnitt die [SA] Gruppe-Ost, [April] 1932.
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the extent of SA participation in the Border Guard have not

survived but there is evidence showing that SA leaders and
men did receive some training from military authorities. 42
At least one incident of SA-Reichswehr training col-

laboration was brought to public attention.
Peoples' Sport Association

(

The German

Deutscher Volkssportverein

)

,

a

front organization for the Berlin SA, was discovered using
the facilities of the Reichswehr training area of Doberitz.

Although the leftist political press was outraged, the
Reich Government merely suspended permission for the Sport

Association to use Doberitz pending an investigation, 43
which appears to have never been completed.
In addition to the military sport training which SA

men received in the Border Guard-East, extensive military
sport and semi-military training programs were conducted
by SA units throughout the Reich. 44

SA units in the Berlin

42 BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu 2509/32, 16 September 1932,
claims that over 60% of SA leaders in the Berlin-Branden-

burg area attended Army sponsored military sport training
at Doberitz.

43 IfZG, Fa-88/337, HJ Stabsleitung to Referat VI
1/32, 26 August 1932 circular to HJ Gebiets- und Bannfuhrer;
Braun, Weimar zu Hitler 150; Engelbrechten Braune Armee,
128; and
165f., 209; Schutzle, Reichswehr wider Nation
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDA P 159-162.
,

,

,

,

1553, Gendarmeriestation Herrsching to BeBayerzirksamt Starnberg [Bavaria] 172a, 29 September 1930;
large
ischer Kurier Nr. 33 8, 11 December 19 30, reported a
Vl/d, PND
SA field exercise near Breslau; HA, f. 1553, PDM
Munchener Post,
717, SA exercise near Munich, 7 January 1931;
44

HA,

f.
,

,,,

.
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Brandenburg region even organized and trained
signal, medical, security, and combat engineer sections. 45
SA regional
headquarters issued military sport guidelines to
subordinate
units and required them to establish mandatory military
sport courses. 46

An apparently unsuccessful effort was made

by the SA in northern Bavaria to hire recently discharged

Reichswehr officers and non-commissioned officers as instruc
tors for military sport courses. 47

Nr.

January 1931, reported SA marksmanship practice near
Munich which was confirmed by Munich police, HA, f. 1553, PDM
Vl/d, 21 February 1931; ibid.
PDM Vl/d, PND 749, SA military
exercise near Ebersburg [Munich], 29-30 August 1931; ibid
Polizei Direktion Niirnberg-Furth Nr. 196/31, 25 October 1931,
noted a large SA field exercise near Schweinfurt and Bayreuth;
Munchener Post Nr. 259, 7 November 1931, reported numerous SA
training exercises in Silesia and Saxony; HA, f. 1553, PDM
Vl/d, PND 757, 21 December 1931, gave a report of an SA exercise north of Munich; ibid
f. 317, PDM to Bay. Staatsmin. d.
Innern, 401221a, 22 December 1931, stated that a May, 1931 SA
field exercise involved the "taking" of opponents after a
village was "captured"; SA Mann Nr. 8, February 1932, showed
Danzig SA men practicing hand grenade throwing from trenches
and negotiating barbed wire obstacles; HA, f. 1553, PDM Vl/d,
939/32, 4 May 1932, reported SA field training exercises near
Kempton; ibid
PDM Vl/d, PND 788, 9 September 1932 reported
that Munich SA units had conducted a night passage of lines
near Dachau; ibid
PDM VI/N, morning report of 14 October
1932, stated that a SA field exercise led by General (Ret.)
Ritter von Epp [the former Notbann commander] was planned for
the immediate future and would involve all Munich SA units;
Volkischer Beobachter Nr. 285, 11 October 1932, reported a
SA Wehrsport exercise of SA Gruppe Siidwest [Wuttemberg] at
which Rohm was present.
8,

12

,

.

,

,

.

,

,

.

,

.

,

,

III,

8

45 BA, NS-23/123, OSAF 7367/31, Viertels jahrebericht
December 1931
46 HA,

PDM to Polizei Direktion Wiirzburg,
1624/32, VIV, 17 June 1932, reference SA Gruppe Mittelland
SA Gruppe Mittelland, Nr.
"Richtlinien" 23.9.31; ibid
233/31, 16 January 1932.
f.
,

47 HA, f.
6 October 1932.

1554

,

.

,

1554, Wehrkreis VII/7th I.D.

30a/R Ic geh
1880 geheim

.

.
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During the summer of 1931, Rohm founded
the Reich
Leader School in Munich. During the three
week
course,

students received

42

hours of military sport training as

well as a further 10 hours of land navigation
(compass)
training. 48

Lower level (squad and platoon) leaders received
their initial training at SA Leader Prepatory Schools,
es-

tablished by Rohm in 1931.

By the fall of 1932, there were

at least sixteen of these schools through the Reich
and

Austria.

Courses lasted two to three weeks with a minimum

enrollment of 35 and a maximum enrollment of 60 students

per course.

Of the forty-nine hours of instruction pre-

sented weekly, ten were devoted to drill, 17 to terrain

military sports, and

5

ar*d

to marksmanship. 49

In 1932, Rohm created a special staff section for

military sport and other training activities, the Chief

4 8

The Reichsfiihrerschule directed by Major (Ret.)
Kurt Kuhme, was founded
June 1931. Average enrollment
was ca. 60-80students per course. HA, f. 1548, PDM Vl/d,
"Akten betr. RFS", 14.10.31; PDM to Bay. Staatsmin. D. In
nern, 229/32, 11.2.32; ibid
f. 312, RFS to OSAF, Iter
Lehrgangsbericht, 591/31, 4.8.31; RFS to OSAF, 2ter Lehrgangsbericht 926/31, 5.9.31. Prior to coming to Munich
in May 1931, Kuhme lived in Wiinsdorf, and, in all likelihood, had ties with the military sport school there. See
HA, f. 1565, letter Kiihme to Hptm.a. D. Schreyer, Braunes
Haus, 22 March 1931.
,

1

.

,

,

4Q

BA, NS-23/124, Chef des Ausbildungsstabes und
Inspekteur der Schulen, A, Nr. 3380/32, 17 November 1932.
Rohm wanted to establish a Fuhrervorschule in every SA

Untergruppe

3
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of the Training Staff and Inspector
of Schools. 50

Briga-

dier General (Ret.) Franz Ritter von
Horauf 51 was appointed
to this position.
He also supervised non-military
sporting
activities, which Rohm encouraged in
order to promote a
high level of physical fitness. 52
In the fall of 1932, Rohm launched an
ambitious

military sport training program and ordered
his SA leaders
to begin to train their units, commencing
with
programs in

the smallest units and advancing progressively
to the largest formations.

53

It is doubtful that much was accomplish-

ed by this program, because SA priorities underwent
a

drastic change following Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January

19 33.

In addition to the actual military sport activities

50 BA, NS-23/123, OSAF Qu
1509/32, 23 June 1932;
Fa-90/1, OSAF Ch. 1565/32, 1 July 1932, "Di enstanweisunq

fur den Chef des Ausbildungsstabes und Inspekteur der Schulen."
5lRe joined the Bavarian Army in 1896 and was in the
10th Infantry Regiment which Rohm joined in 1906.
In 1912
Horauf entered the Kriegsakademie in Berlin and was appointed to the General Staff Corps in 1914, and served with distinction in various Bavarian Army units throughout the First
World War. He was ennobled for bravery (Max Joseph Orden)
and served with the Freikorps Epp in 1919. He joined the
NSDAP in 1930, after a year in the Stahlhelm, and was appointed an SA Gruppenf iihrer and assigned as Chef des Fiihrungsstabes until his assignment as Chef des Ausbildungsstabes in 1932.
52 HA,
5

f.

1553, OSAF I, Nr.

6197/31,

15

October 1931.

Ibid. , PDM Vl/d, Auszug aus dem Morgenrapport des
Referat VI /N, 14 October 1932.

;

.
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conducted by the SA, several National
Socialist pamphleteers worked to increase public
awareness of the benefits of military sport as a
substitute for the defunct
conscription. Col. (Ret.) Friedrich
Haselmayr, 54 founded
the Work-Group for Defense Improvement
in
1930.

This or-

ganization published six pamphlets, apparently
at public
expense, between 1930 and 1932, on various
defense related
subjects.

The six pamphlets and their authors were:

"Germany's Right to Defense"
ful Hours"

(Haselmayr);

(Haselmayr); "Polish War Threats"

enberg of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
chure"

"Germany's Fate-

(Friedrich Fecht)

;

)

;

(H.

"Naval Bros-

"Air War is Imminent"

and "Pre-Military Defense Training"

von Falk-

(GroBkreuz)

(Fecht). 55

The Fecht pamphlet, "Pre-Military Defense Training",
is worth paraphrasing because the outlines of the program

Fecht proposed were later adopted by Hitler.

Fecht began

with the usual nationalist condemnation of the "Dictate of

54 Retired from the Reichswehr
in 1928 as a Colonel,

Haselmayr joined the NSDAP and entered the University of
Munich, where he was elected to the student government as
an NSDStB representative.
He left the University in 1930
and founded the Arbeitsgemeinschaf t fur deutsche Wehrverstarkung. In September 1932 he joined the NSDAP Wehrpolitisches Amt, headed by Epp, the former Notbann leader.
In 193 5 Haselmayr received an honorary promotion to Brigadier General. Recalled to active service in 1939, he was
retired in 1943 as a Generalleutnant
55

IfZG, Zgs. 62, Generalleutnant a.D. Friedrich
Haselmayr, Bl. 6f. He claimed he had Government support
and that his most influential friends were in the Foreign

Ministry.
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Versailles", and although he acknowledged
that pre-military
training was banned by the Treaty, he called
upon every
German to repudiate and ignore this shameful
prohibition.
The experiences of the First World War
proved, he wrote,

that mass, conscripted armies were essential,
yet modern

weaponry was so advanced that a lengthy training
period
was required to gain proficiency in even the most
basic
of weapons.

No nation, he explained, could afford to

maintain, let alone properly train, the hordes of recruits

necessary for a future war of materiel; therefore the logical task was to reduce training time to the minimum.

Fecht

proposed pre-military training as the best means by which
the term of military service could be reduced.

This sug-

gestion was especially applicable to Germany, and indeed,
he claimed, its only alternative owing to the military

restrictions imposed by the Allies.
To be effective, wrote Fecht, pre-military training
had to be mandatory and universal, and only the state could

afford such a program.

Pre-military training could, he ex-

plained, be most easily conducted in three phases.

The

first phase, physical training, would be instituted for

school children from

8

to

1

3

years of age, and conducted,

he noted, during the school day, with Saturday afternoons

reserved for Boy Scout training.
said Fecht, would be required of
second phase.

Terrain sport training,
14 to

17

year olds in the

Terrain sport encampments would be held dur-

,
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ing school vacations and, he explained,
students would

progress from physical conditioning to small-bore
marksmanship, drill and marching, and terrain
utilization techniques.

The third phase, weapons training, would be
re-

quired of 18 year olds who would then begin their
active
service upon completion of the weapons training phase. 56
It is not possible to say if Fecht's pamphlet
is

entirely original, for he appears to have developed ideas,
albeit in greater detail, proposed a year earlier by Col.

Konstantin Hierl, 57 in his book, German Defense

(Ret.)

Policy

(

Deutsche Wehrpolitik

)

He hoped that schools

.

would help prepare young men from

14 to 20

years of age

for their military service by means of conducting a military sport program, while simultaneously identifying and

training potential leaders.

Military service, he wrote,

should follow immediately upon completion of schooling. 58
There is little evidence by which to estimate the

56 Friedrich Fecht, "Vormilitarische Wehrerziehung"
Miinchen, n.d. [1930], passim .

57 1 875-1 948. Hierl retired from the Reichswehr in
1924, prematurely, owing to irregularities in his personal
life.
He claimed that he was forced out owing to his conIn 1926 he led the Tannections with National-Socialism.

nenbergbund fur Siiddeutschland a Ludendorff organization.
Hierl became Organisationsleiter II for the NSDAP in 1929
and served as a labor service and military consultant to
Hitler.
In 1933 he became Staatssekretar for Labor Service
in the Labor Ministry.
,

58 Konstantin Hierl, Deutsche Wehrpolitik , Miinchen,

1929,

28-31.
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influence, if any, of Hierl's or
Fecht

'

s

pamphlets on the

German public.

What is more important, however,
is that
prior to the Hitler Government,
National Socialist leaders
were giving some consideration to
the concept and potential
value of a pre-military training program,
a concept which
they developed fully after 1933.
In reviewing Hitler's response to the
problems posed

by the burgeoning military sport movement
and the Border

Guard, one is struck by the outward consistency
of his attitude. He did not deviate from his insistence
that the

political activities of the SA constituted its raison
d'etre
and for as long as possible he tried to prevent
non-political SA activities.

By 1931 such a course was no longer

possible, yet the change in tack was never official, but

surreptitious.

Rather than risk defections from the SA by

men who felt the Border Guard preserved their way of life,

Hitler overlooked violations of his non- compromise policy.
He relaxed his attitude toward military sport activities,

which enabled Rohm to create a military sport training section within the SA, a partial remedy for the dearth of

qualified SA leaders.

Nazi leaders, confident of their

eventual political success, looked toward military sport,
as did the Army, as a means of subverting the Versailles

Treaty.

.

CHAPTER

V

GROENER, MILITARY SPORT,

AND THE SA BAN

The clandestine support for military
sport promised
by the Reich Government in 1927
failed to materialize in
any appreciable amounts.
It is uncertain if the DNVP
Reich Interior Minister Keudell made
available funds to

military sport enthusiasts, but his successor,
Socialist
(SPD)

Carl Severing who served from 192 8 to
1929, used the
extensive ministerial discretionary authority as
to the

disposition of sport subsidies to deny funds to organizations espousing conservative or radical political
philosophies.

"The assumption, naturally," he wrote,

"in all

cases involving the distribution of money [to sporting

organizations] was that the official line [of the Republic]
was at the same time supported [by these groups]."

1

As in-

terpreted by Severing, the condition of endorsing the "official line" tended to exclude racist, anti-Republican

Severing, Lebensweg II, 202ff.
"Vorausset zung
in alien Fallen, daB mit der Hergabe von Geldern auch der
Staatsgedanke gepflegt wurde " Severing* s hostile attitude
toward Volkssport was compounded by budget reductions, apparently related to the onset of the Depression. Prior to
1929, RM 1.5 million was allocated for sport subsidies,
which by 1931 had fallen to RM 750,000. BA, R-43 11/519,
RWM WId, Nr. 3669/30, Anlage 2 [excerpt from 1931 Reich
budget]
,

.

4

s
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organizations, such as the Stalhelm
and the SA.
Since the majority of military
sport associations
either enjoyed close ties with or
were sponsored by con-

servative and racist political organizations,
Severing'
definition effective crippled the hopes of
the Defense
Ministry for indirect Government subsidization
of the

military sport movement.

2

Initially, the absence of

military sport movement constituted more of

a

nuisance

than a problem for the Defense Ministry, but
the completion in 1929 of a new mobilization plan dictated

a

more

active role for the Army vis-a-vis the organizations
in-

volved in military sport.
In 1929 the General Staff adopted a mobilization

plan incorporating several changes from the existing

mobilization schedule which had been approved in 1926.
Like its predecessor, the

19 29

plan called for the expan-

sion of the Reichswehr in units of seven (from

infantry divisions, then 21, etc.).

7

to

1

The major difference

between the two plans was that the 1929 mobilization
schedule assumed

a

standing Army strength of 300,000 men

BA , R-43, 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei 18
October 1930, Bl 2; IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, "Auf zeichnungen des
Generals Curt Liebmann", Bef ehlshaberbesprechung, 25 October 1930. Liebmann 's notes indicate the chagrin of the
Heeresleitung over the lack of support from the Reich Interior Ministry: "Die Innenministerien haben in diesem
Punkt [support for Volkssport] das RWM betrogen! Die 'Sport
vereine' wurden 'seinerzeit nur unter die Bedingung an die
Zivilbehorden abgegeben, da£ sie im Geiste der Wehrhaftmachung weiter gefhiirt werden. Dies geschiet tatsachlich
,

.

nicht." Bl.

157.

)

)

104

while the 1926 plan accepted
the Versailles Treaty strength
of 100,000 men.
The expansion plan attached to
the 1929

mobilization scheme called for no
less than a thorough reorganization of the Reichswehr.
Proposing a gradual tripling over a five year period of
the number of soldiers,
commencing in 1933, the expansion plan
envisioned a shortening of the actual term of military
service.
Instead of
the mandatory twelve year enlistment,
most soldiers would
spend only a year or two with the colors,
followed
by an

indefinite number of years in an inactive status,
subject
to recall in the event of a national
emergency. 3
The General Staff left the task of convincing
the

Allies to accept the change in Treaty strength to
the Foreign
Ministry.

With unrealistic optimism, however, Defense Min-

istry officers hoped for Allied concurrence no later than

April

19 33,

the time for which they scheduled the initiation

of the expansion plan.

While awaiting Allied approval, the

Defense Ministry began, in 1930, to procure supplies and

3 BA-MA,

II H/135-2;

II H/597;

and RH-896.
See HansJiirgen Rautenberg, Deutsche Abrustungspolitik vom Beginn
d er Genfer Abriistungskonf erenz bis zur Wiedereinf iihrung ~der
allgemeinen Wehrpflicht, 1932-19 35, Phil. Diss, Bonn, 1975,
212-219.
(Hereafter cited as Rautenberg, Rustungspolitik
Vincenz Miiller, Schleicher's assistant, dates the first
mobilization plan to 1928, while Field Marshal Erich Von
Manstein, then a Lt.Col. in the Operations (T-1) Section of
the General Staff, dates the 21 division plan from 1929.
In
all likelihood Manstein considered the 1926 plan as a first,
rough draft. See Miiller, Das v/ahre Vaterland 318ff; and
Manstein, Aus einem Soldaten leben Bonn, 1958, 111-115.
(Hereafter cited as Manstein, Soldatenleben
.

,

,

.
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equipment for the anticipated influx
of new soldiers. 4
Should the Army have to mobilize,
the Defense Ministry planned to implement immediately
the expansion of
the army to 300,000 men and to follow
the scheme outlined
in the 1929 mobilization plan.

The expansion plan simply

called for the Army to triple in size,
with new units
forming around the nucleus of Reichswehr
units.
This
meant, for example, that a Reichswehr regiment
of three

battalions would, with the influx of new recruits,
become
a division of three regiments, with the
former regiment

commander assuming command of the new division and the

former battalion commanders becoming regiment commanders.
The actual mobilization scheme envisioned in the
1929 plan resembled, in all major points, its 1926 pre-

decessor.

In the event of the outbreak of hostilities or

an order from the Reich President to mobilize, the 23 regi-

ment size units of the Border Guard-East would protect the
eastern border regions while the Reichswehr mobilized in
the fortified areas some 50km behind the actual border.

The Border Guard would conduct delaying tactics and gradu-

ally fall back to the fortified areas under enemy pressure,

trading space for time, until the mobilized Reichswehr of

4 BA-MA,

Wi F 5/499, CHL TA 957/30 g.K., 30 September 1932; Post, Civil-Military , 197; Rautenberg, Rustungs politik , 212-219; Wohlfeil, Reichswehr und Republik 210.
,
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twenty-one infantry divisions was
prepared to take the
field. 5 This mobilization format
assumed an attack from
the east (Poland); the military
situation in the west was
apparently regarded as hopeless and no
serious efforts
were made with to cope with the
possibility of a French
attack.
The shortage of trained personnel to fill
the ranks
of the mobilized Reichswehr constituted
the weakest point
of the mobilization scheme.
Defense Minister Groener

estimated that the Army needed from five to eight
days in
which to mobilize and expand from seven to twenty-one
infantry divisions.

6

On the other hand, studies conducted

by the General Staff during 1931 and 1932 demonstrated
that
at least seven and preferably fourteen days were required
in which to train recruits to perform even the most ele-

mentary military skills.

7

In other words,

in a scenario

which assumed optimum conditions and the existence of

a

Post, Civil-Military
198ff. Cf. Carsten, Reichswehr , 273, who incorrectly states that the forces to supplement the 7 infantry divisions would come from the Border
Guard.
,

6

Reichswehrminister to CHL, CML PF
1930, cited in Post, Civil-Military
198.
,

3

4072,

16

April

,

7

BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 600/31 g.K. "Z" T4Id, 1 July
1931; CHL TA 628/31 g.K. "Z" T4Id, 17 September 1931; WK
VII/734 CHL TA 100/32 g.k. T4Id, 29 January 1932; H-24/6,
Anlage 11 of CHL TA 660/32 g.K. T4Id, 15 September 1932;
IfZG, Zgs. 152, Generalleutnant a.D. Otto Stapf, then assign
ed to section T2, Organization of the General Staff, Bl. 6.
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trained reserve, the Border Guard had
to delay the Poles
for a minimum of five days while
stark reality required
a poorly trained and equipped,
under-strength Border Guard
to contain within a thirty mile zone
over a front
,

of sev-

eral hundred miles for up to two
weeks an advancing and
well-equipped Polish force. The most experienced
and reliable shock troops of the First World War
would have been
unequal to such a task.

The inevitable solution to the reserve problem
was

either some form of secret and illegal military
training
or pre-military training, that is, training which
would

considerably shorten the time needed to train recruits
once mobilized and which would not run afoul of the Versailles limitations.

The patent illegality of creating a

military reserve force, as well as the difficulty in disguising or keeping secret such a program, ruled out
massive, secret reserve training scheme.
a

a

On the other hand,

vast pre-military training program and the apparatus al-

ready existed: the numerous military sport organizations
and associations, which by 1932, had trained an estimated
1.5 million men.

g

It would be a relatively simple matter

for the Army to issue guidelines to the various military

sport groups in order to insure uniform, militarily useful
training.

In the event of mobilization, personnel who had

See Chapter III, note 64.
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completed military sport training
could be conscripted to
fill the ranks of the mobilized
Army. Moreover, voluntary
military sport training did not
necessarily or clearly
constitute a violation of the Versailles
Treaty.

General Groener intimated his acceptance
of such
solution to the reserve problem as early
as March 1930.
a conversation with Chancellor
Heinrich Briming,

a

in

9

the De-

fense Minister stated that establishing a
state physical
and military fitness program for young men
was the one remaining goal of his life. This program, he said,
would

serve as the preparatory step to replacing the
professional

mercenary Reichswehr with a peoples' army. 10

Thinking initially of his state-sponsored military
sport program for youths as

a

solution to a military exi-

gency, Groener quickly discerned a potential political

profit from the project.

Military sport would act, he

hoped, as an antidote to the cancer of fanatical political

extremism, metastizing among the nation's youth and threat-

ening the body politic.

The Defense Minister apprehensively watched the

growing political radicalization of Germany's youth.

Con-

siderable numbers of the post-war generation, alienated by

9

885-1 970.

A front officer in the First World War
and a Center Party Riechstag Deputy, he served as Reich
Chancellor from March 1930 to May 1932.
1

10 Heinrich Bruning, Memorien
1918-1934,
159-160.
Hereafter cited as Bruning, Memorien.
,

Stuttgart,

1

2

.
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an unresponsive, unpopular
Government and a social system
that in the current economic crisis
could offer neither em-

ployment nor hope, accepted the promising
rhetoric of the
extremist, anti-Republican movements 1 1
By 1929 National
Socialists made their earliest and most
spectacular breakthrough in the youth movement: starting
at the Universities
of Erlangen and Greifswald, Nazi
students rapidly gained
control of the student governments at most
institutions of
higher learning. 1
To a certain extent, the infatuation of the
students

and the younger generation in general could be
ascribed to
the normal inclination of the young toward rebellion
and

1

In 1930, ca. 30% of NSDAP membershiD in Bavaria
were between 21 and 30 years of age, with 30% more between
31 and 40 years of age.
In 1933, the 21 to 30 group accounted for ca. 40%, with ca. 28% between ages 31 and 40. Thus
two-thirds of party membership came from the war (31-40) and
post-war (21-30) generations. These figures are from the
Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP Parteistatistik I,
Berlin, 1935, 202-204, quoted in Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's
Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in Bavaria 1923-1933 New
York, 1973, 205-206.
(Hereafter cited as Pridham, Hitler's
Rise to Power .)
These figures are comparable to those of
the SA leaders given in chapter IV, footnote 26.
In contrast
see Richard Hunt, German Social Democracy New Haven, 1964,
106, who states that more than one-half the members of the
Social Democratic Party were over forty years of age. See
also the characterization of the Nazi electoral success in
1930 by Reichswehr officers as an inexorable youth movement
in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1933
(ed. Woodward, Butler, and Lambert), 2d series, London, 1950, vol. I,
512, note 2; as well as Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catas trophe
(trans. S. B. Fay,) Cambridge, Mass., 1950, 44-45.
(Hereafter cited as Meinecke, The German Catastrophe .)
,

,

,

,

,

,

2 Karl

Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship
(trans. J. Steinberg), New York, 1974, 164ff; and Klinnert
und Bleuel, Deutsche Studenten passim
^

,

,

.

,

1

10

novelty.

What made this otherwise perennial
attraction of
youth and radicalism especially
deplorable to Greener was
the absence of the earlier means
for moderating the exuber
ance and idealism of youth, the
conscripted armed forces,
the "school of the nation".
Inducting an impressive percentage (50%) of eligible youths, the
pre-1914 Army had
served as a vehicle for inculcating the
civic values of
discipline, responsibility, obedience and loyalty.

13

in

addition, the Army had been the embodiment
and defender of
the existing social and poll tical order. Not
only had

military service provided a useful outlet for the
surplus
energies of young men, but it was

a

sobering experience

conferring a certain respectability and civic status.

Groener envisioned his state sponsored military sport program becoming a substitute "school of the nation".
task was immense.

The

Not only would he have to subordinate

the idealistic instincts of the nation's youth to the de-

fense of institutions they hated, but he would have to

demonstrate that the Republic had values worth preserving
that merited their allegiance.

3 0n

the concept of the "Army as the school of the
nation", see the famous military publicist, Friedrich von
Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War
(trans. A. H. Powles)
New York, 1914, 116, 206, 244f, 248; General (Ret.) Max van
den Bergh, Das Deutsche Heer vor dem Weltkrieg: Eine Dar stellung und Wiirdigung Berlin,
934, 53f, 56; and the exhaustive monograph by Richard Hohn, Die Armee als Erzie hungsschule der Nation Bad Harzburg, 1963, passim
*

,

,

,

1

.
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He addressed himself to this problem
in a letter of

August 1930 to Reich Minister of the Interior
Joseph
Wirth. Expressing his concern that the
Reich Government's
policy of responding to the symptoms instead
of treating
the cause of student unrest merely
exacerbated the
1

problem,

he explained that banning student paramilitary
groups in
the name of the Versailles treaty would
associate the Gov-

ernment with enforcing that treaty.

Such action, he said,

could only increase the unpopularity of the Government
and

further radicalize the students.

The Government must be

very careful, he added, that in doing away with student
play-soldiering, it did not destroy the will and desire of

youth to serve the state.

In closing, Groener warned that

proscriptions would not suffice, but rather:
an educational effort [is] necersary,
which has to be jointly directed by the
state and the educators. Only through
such [an effort] can the dual goals of
the Government vis-a-vis the [radical]
movement be realized: the prevention of
actions inimical to [our] foreign policy
and showing youngsters a way to forgo
•

•

•

radicalism.

'

14 BA-MA,

1
August 1930. "Eine
RH-8/896, RWM to RMdl
Erziehungsarbeit [ist] notwendig, die gemeinsam von Staat
und Lehrerschaft geleistet werden muJ3. Nur durch sie kann
das doppelte Ziel der Regierung gegeniiber der Bewegung
erreicht werden: die Unterbindung aussenpolitisch gefiihrlichen Handlungen und das Herausfiihren der Jugand aus dem
Lager des Radikalismus " Bl. 4-5.
,

.
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In a secret letter written
several months later to

Chancellor Bruning, Greener sketched
the outline of his
state-sponsored military sport project.
Claiming that the
Government policy of proscribing
organizations interested
in military sport thwarted the
natural desire of the nation's youth for defending their country
Wehrhaf ticrkeit
(

),

he explained that continuing this
policy "... without at
the same time giving positive inducements ..." 1 5
to the

military sport organizations would only
serve to embitter
and alienate young Germans. Already the
suspicion existed,
he added, that the Government used the
Versailles Treaty
as a police measure against the paramilitary
associations

of its political opponents, a theme which the
demagogues

continued to elaborate to the masses with great success.

16

The Defense Minister then suggested establishing a

physical training program.

It was of critical importance,

he wrote, because the Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany

from raising a military reserve.

However, he noted, the

Treaty did not proscribe a voluntary, nation-wide physical
training organization that would enable the German Government to bring all its young men to prime physical condition

15 BA,

R-43 11/519, Groener to Reichskanzlei Nr.
3669/30, WId, geheim, 18 October 1930.
"...ohne gleichzeitig positive Anregungen zu geben..."
16 Ibid.

,

8
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prior to their actual military
service.
it was for this
purpose, explained the Defense
Minister less than candidly,
that the Reichswehr in 1924
had begun the Volkssport program, which, he added, the
Reich Interior Ministry had
sub-

sequently subverted into subsidies
for sports such as tennis
and rugby. 17 Not Qnly did
Government

^

^^

its sport subventions into
projects he considered important
to the nation, but, raged
Greener, it did not even demand
any service in exchange for its
subsidies. He concluded by
stating that he strongly recommended
that the Government

establish a youth physical fitness training
program and
requested that Bruning refer the matter to

the Reich Cabinet,

noting that his proposal involved the
jurisdiction of the
Reich Ministry of the Interior.
He appended a

twelve page

"Summary of Military Youth Training Abroad",
apparently to

illustrate how other countries expended their sport subsidies and to intimate what the Defense Ministry felt
was a

project deserving Government support. 18

1

7

Ibid
Groener enclosed, as exhibit 2 to his re
port, a copy of the Reich budget relating to sport subsi
dies for fiscal year 1929. The names of Socialist and
Socialist-oriented groups were underlined in an apparent
attempt either to indicate disgust that a party beridden
with pacifists would receive funds supposedly ear-marked
for defense purposes or to emphasize his predecessor's
(Severing) "impartial" disbursements.
.

Ibid
Anlage 1, "Zusammenstellung uber die
militarische Ausbildung imAuslande."
1

.

,

"
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Within a week after submitting
his report, Greener
told Bruning that until his proposed
project was approved,
the Reioh Ministry of the Interior
should be required to
obtain the approval of the Defense
Ministry prior to awarding sport subsidies.
He claimed that the generosity
of the

Interior Ministry had gotten out of
hand and he hoped that
once again the Defense Ministry could
exercise some control
over sport subsidies. 19
.

At the end of January 1931, Groener asked
the Reich

Cabinet to reconsider his youth fitness training
project,
but this time he abandoned his proposal to
review Interior

Ministry subsidies.

Instead, he suggested that their sport

subventions be merely "regulated", which he interpreted
as

meaning the award of sport funds only to groups pursuing
activities useful to the armed forces.

The Defense Minister

also wished to issue guidelines in cooperation with the In-

terior Ministry regulating military sport training.

Groener

noted that his suggestions could, in all likelihood, be
carried out at no expense to the Government. 20
On the 4th of March 1931, General Schleicher forwarded to the Chancellory a twenty page, top secret report titled

1

9

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Befehlshaberbesprechung, 30 October 1930.
20 BA, R-43 11/519, Vermerk, Betr. Wehrhaf tigkeit der
Jugend, Rk. 8732°, 21 January 1931. On the margin of the
report is written, "Herr Reichskanzler ist einverstanden
.

1

.
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"Defense-Readiness of Youth"

,

in which he further
elaborat

ed Greener's concept of a
youth fitness training program.
The subtitle of the report,
"Construction of a Useful Re-

serve for National Defense"
exposed the direct military
nature of the project. 21 Schleicher
explained that the
Army had become interested in
military sport training because Germany no longer had the
opportunity to train a
military reserve force. Consequently,
he added, mobilization measures depended, for the
most part, on a ready
supply of untrained volunteers. A
physical training program with military overtones involving
the nation's youth
would help to alleviate the reserve
shortage, as well as
to provide some activity for the thousands
of unemployed

youths, who, according to Schleicher, were daily
becoming

more susceptible to radical oratory.

A military fitness

training program would, he explained, provide young
men

with an alternative to the paramilitary organizations
of
the political parties and perhaps win the loyalty of some
of the program's participants for the Republic. 22

Schleicher then reviewed the status of militarv
training conducted by the Reichswehr for civilians.

In

the eastern border regions, he wrote, Border Guard members

2

Ibid

Schleicher to Oberregierungsrat Planck,
4 March 1931, with enclosure RWM 36/31 g.K., wid streng
geheim!
"Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend"
.

,

,

22 BA, R-43
11/519,

Bl.

1.

"Wehrhaftmachung der Jugend",
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received military and terrain sport
instruction,

m

addi-

tion, he explained, a minimal
amount of actual training

with weapons was conducted, but,
he hastened to add, such
training was only experimental. The
Army did not conduct,
he noted, any training in the
demilitarized areas along
the Rhine Valley, but it did provide
some classroom ins true

tion in other parts of the Reich.

The General emphasized

that the Army cooperated fully with local
civilian authorities concerning its training courses for
non-military personnel.

Participants for these courses, he stressed, were

selected on an "above-party" basis and no paramilitary
groups participated as such, although, he readily acknowledged, individual members of those groups were allowed
to

enroll. ^3

Turning to finances, the General noted that the Defense Ministry hoped to work with existing military sport
groups, thus avoiding personnel and administrative costs

associated with the creation of a new agency.

Groener,

according to his assistant, wanted to award Government subsidies only to those groups which pursued activities of

Ibid. , Bl. 10.
There were two advantages which
accompanied an "above-party" approach. First, the Army
avoided accusations of partisanship while minimizing the
exposure of its men to political involvement. Second, by
dealing with individuals rather than groups, the Army
weakened the cohesion of the groups, a phenomenon noticed
by Hitler. See chapter I, 14 f.

5
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interest and merit to the armed forces.

The Reich Govern-

ment, he ennunciated, should issue
guidelines to those organizations awarded sport subsidies, clearly
defining its
standards and expectations, and, of equal
importance, stating what it did not want. 24
As a condition of awarding subsidies,
explained the
General, the Defense Ministry would demand
evidence that

military sport organizations met Government
imposed standards.

In all likelihood, he added, this evidence
would

take the form of requiring that

a

certain percentage of

students from a military sport organization pass a Govern-

ment-sponsored and supervised test.

Along with the subsi-

dies the Defense Ministry would issue lesson plans and

guidelines to prevent, he noted, military sport enthusiasts
from becoming involved in "foolish soldiering games" which

might involve infractions of the Versailles Treaty. 25
The Defense Ministry proposal for a youth fitness

program failed to receive immediate attention from the Reich
Cabinet, apparently because the Defense Minister and the

Minister of the Interior could not agree on the organization
of the sport program.

Groener wanted to supervise and con-

trol the participating military sport groups through the

24 BA,
2

R-43 11/519, "Wehrhaf tmachung"

,

Bl.

13-14.

"Einem Verband, der torichte Soldatenspielerei betriebt, kann die Ausbildungsplan als
Richtlinie fur seine weitere Arbeit angegeben werden."
Ibid.

,

Bl.

17.

.

1 1

8

awarding of subsidies, namely
giving assistance only to
those organizations adhering to
Defense Ministry guidelines.
Regardless of the subsidizing agency,
either the
Defense or Interior Ministry,
ultimate control
of the

program would rest with the Defense
Minister, who would
determine the standards for awarding
assistance 2 6
On the other hand, the Reich
Minister of the In-

terior wanted to create an intermediate
supervisory agency,
under his control, which would watch over
the youth fitness
program. The head of this agency would be
appointed by and

responsible to the Minister of the Interior.

Assisted by

a committee of Government experts and
representatives of

the military sport organizations, the supervisory
agency

would allocate subsidies, issue guidelines and directives,
and prevent political partisanship in the administration
of the program. 27

These differences between the two Min-

istries had not been resolved when the first Briining Gov-

ernment collapsed in October 1931.

Following Briining' s shifting of cabinet posts, Groener emerged as the acting head of the Reich Interior Ministry in addition to retaining the Defense Ministry.

Evidence

26 BA, R-43 11/519, Vermerk des S taatssekretar [Punder]
in der Reichskanzlei, Rk. 5609, 6 June 1931.

27±bid., letter of Generalmajor a.D. L. Vogt to Reichs
kanzler, Rk. 5609, 29 May 1931; Punder Memorandum to Staatssekretar [des Reichsprasident s Hindenburg]
8 August 1931,
,
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indicates that he did not seek the
extra post, but he appears to have demonstrated no reluctance
to assuming the
additional burdens. In fact, he may
have welcomed the addi
tional post as an opportunity which
would enable him to
implement his military sport training
program.
He appears
to have had an understanding with
Bruning that he could use
his new post to hasten progress toward
implementing
his

military sport program.

Both men hoped to see it become a

mandatory school subject. 28
In a newspaper interview, published shortly
after

his appointment to the Reich Ministery of the
Interior,

Groener stated that one of the most important tasks facing
the Government in the coming months was to effect a diminu-

tion of the physical and moral misery of the country's un-

employed youth.

The state, he claimed, could not alleviate

this suffering by itself; it was imperative for all youth-

oriented clubs and fashions to assist the Reich Government.

28

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, remarks of General
Hammerstein, 21 May 1932; Captain Noeldchen (Schleicher's
adjutant) on MeiBner's book in Werner Conze's "Zum Sturz
Brunings", Viertels jahrhefte fur Zeitgeschichte I, 1953,
273. (Hereafter cited as Conze, "Sturz Brunings"; Severing,
Lebensweg II, 33 6; and Eugen Mayer, Skizzen aus dem Leben
der Weimarer Republik Berlin, 1962, 128f.
(Hereafter cited
as Mayer, Skizzen
Mayer became the "Obmann" of the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, a position created by Groener.
Mayer's duties included facilitating Groener' s projects,
above all the military sport project, "ein Lieblingsthema
des Ministers."
,

,

,

.

)

!
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He then added:

My most noble task as Reich
Minister
Interior will be to support, insofar of the
as
possible, all efforts and attempts
the young men off the street, and to get
teach them
discipline and order, to improve them
physically, and to make them willing
to defend
their convictions .... Youth needs
They should have the freedom to liveide als
for
ideals as long as they are not inimical those
to the
m fc
inStead contr ibute to Germany's
fSture 29
'

^

Groener 's hopes for a speedy resolution of
the organizational difficulties between the two
Ministries regarding his fitness organization were frustrated
when the
Reich Finance Minister refused to release the
necessary
funds until after the Reich presidential elections,
sched'

uled for March 10th, 1932. 30

^ Frankfurter

The Defense Minister also

Zeitung Nr. 782, 2d morning edition,
"Es wird meine vornehmste Aufgabe als
Reichsinnenminister sein, alle Bemuhungen und Versuche,
die gemacht werden, urn die Jugend von der StraBe wegzubringen
sie zu Zucht und Ordnung zu erziehen, sie korperlich zu
ertiichtigen und in ihrer geistigen Haltung wehrhaft zu
machen, so weit wie moglich zu unterstiitzen
Die Jugend
br aucht Ideale Sie soli die Freiheit haben, fur sie zu
Ieben, wenn sie nicht gegen den Staat gerichtet sind, sondern auf Deutschlands Zukunft." (emphasis in original) Cf.
Mayer, Skizzen 134, "Eine Sache, die dem Minister sehr am
Herzen lag ... war die Entpolitisierung der Jugend."
,

20 October 1931.

.

.

.

.

i

,

30 BA-MA,

NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, Oehme Fragebogen,
31 December 1932.
Groener stated that Reichsf inanzminister
Deitrich wanted to wait until after the March Reich Presidential elections, for if Hindenburg lost, "... die Gelder
nur den Nazis zu gute kamen." This is a strange argument,
its logical extension being the suspension of the entire
Reich budget until after the presidential election! Perhaps
Groener misinterpreted Dietrich, who wanted to wait until
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made little progress in ending the
dispute between the two
ministries concerning the organizational
difficulties arising from the youth fitness program. 31

Owing perhaps to impatience with an
overly cautious
Finance Ministry and disgust at
inter-departmental
squab-

bling, Greener approached the Stahlhelm
in the hopes that
it would assume a leading role in his
military sport league.

From a military standpoint, the Stahlhelm was
the most reliable of the large paramilitary organizations,
and Groener
asked Stahlhelm leaders Seldte and Duesterberg, 32 on 18
De-

cember 1931, to direct his military sport program.

Express-

ing interest, the Stahlhelm leaders refused to commit their

organization without the approval of its directors.

Some

after the election when the political atmosphere would be
calmer, a thesis which is corroborated by Hammers tein s
statement to the division commanders on 27 February 1932:
"Finanz [ministerium] bereit, Summe bereit zu stellen.
Dietrich mochte die S[ache] aber nicht einstellen, ehe er
in d. Entwicklung der pol[itische] Vernal tnisse klarer
sieht." See Thilo Vogelsang, "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte
der Reichswehr", Viertels j ahrhef te fur Zeitgeschic bte
(2),
1954, 422.
Befehlhaberbesprechung am 27.2.32.
1

,

31

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung des
Chefs der Heeresleitung auf der Fiihrerreise, 21 May 1932,
Bl.

182.
32

Lt. Col. Retired.
He was the Deputy Commander of
the Stahlhelm (Zweiter Bundesfiihrer)
An ardent nationalist, he was the unsuccessful candidate of the DNVP and the
political Right in the first Reich Presidential election
of 1932.
The Nazis hounded him from the Stahlhelm after
discovering that his grandfather had converted from Judaism.
.

.
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Stahlhelm leaders protested the
proposed undertaking, but
before the directors met, Groener
33
withdrew his
offer.

Like some of the Stahlhelm leaders,
Groener had
second thoughts. At a Reichswehr commanders
conference in
January 1932, he stressed that although
the Army wanted to
attract and nuture the "good elements" in
the paramilitary
organizations, it could not become associated
with any one
group in particular. Schleicher then outlined
to the of-

ficers Groener »s plans for the military sport
organization,

explaining that participating groups would have considerabl
freedom, yet the Defense Ministry, by allocating funds
to

only those groups which followed its directives, would

exercise ultimate control.

The paramilitary organizations,

he crudely added, would soon learn who paid them and for

what purposes, and would accordingly restrict their activities to military sport instead of politics.

The General

then announced that recently retired Lieutenant General

Edwin von Stiilpnagel 34 had been selected to head the

Berghahn, Stahlhelm 19 4-195. Berghahn does not
specify the nature of the opposition. See also Meinecke,
The German Catastrophe 67
,

,

34

with the
his last
(Saxony)
tired in

1876-1933. General der Infanterie a.D.
Decorated
Pour le merite medal during the First World War,
post had been commander of Military District IV
and the 4th Infantry Division, from which he reOctober 1931.
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putative military sport organization 35
.

Within three weeks Groener again changed
his mind
and informed the generals that the
military sport organization would be run by the Reich Ministry
of the Interior. 36
Although the reasons for his reversal are unknown,
he may
have feared that direct administration of the
military
sport organization by the Defense Ministry would
compromise
Briining's efforts to improve Germany's military
position

35

Groener s notes for this conference have survived.
See BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/152, Notizen fur Fuhrerbesprechung beim RWM, 11 January 1932. Groener wrote:
"Das Gute aus den Verbanden an uns heranziehen, jedoch
nicht, wie Italien Wehrmacht in Geflogschaft politisch
eingestellt Miliz bringen." This statement is confirmed
by General Liebmann, who reports: "Groener:
Scharf betonen:
Nicht Hoheres als Wehrmacht! Das Gut der Verbande wollen wir
erhalten und pflegen, aber nicht etwa Anhangsel von irgendwelchen Verbanden werden. " See IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen, Bl. 1 70.
f

f

1

36 IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen,

letter of Liebmann (Commanding General, Wk V) to Infantrie- und Artillerie
fuhrer V, 8 February 1932. Bl. 171. It is possible that
Groener may have adopted the Interior Ministry's organization as early as the 11-12 January Commanders Conference
as Liebmann s letter does not give the date of Groener s
change of mind and Liebmann may have been informing his
subordinates of an important fact which he had forgotten in
his earlier report to them.
His letter reads: "Zur Organisation des Wehrsports erganzende Bemerkung: Wehrsport
Organisation wird unter Reichsminister des Innern aufgezogen
It is likely, however that Liebmann s letter reflects a
turn-about in Groener s position, as it was normal practice
for the division chief of staff to accompany the commander
to the conferences and it is improbable that both men would
have ommitted an announcement of such importance.
1

1

f

1

,
f

.

,
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at the imminent Geneva Disarmament
Conference.

3?

m

addi-

tion, promotion and subvention of
sport activities had

traditionally been a function of the Interior
Ministry, a
function which General Hammerstein 38 the
Chief of the Army
Command, implied that Ministry of the
Interior officials
were reluctant to relinquish. 39
The excesses committed by the SA during the first

inconclusive presidential election campaign 40 appalled
the

governments of several of the states and their interior

37 Briining hoped
to secure a much needed triumph by

winning League of Nations recognition of German sovereignty
in relation to its defense posture.
He called for general
disarmament as stipulated in Article 53 of the Versailles
Treaty, but hoped instead that his suggestion would be refused and that Germany would be allowed gradually to increase
its defense forces.
Not only would such a success have allowed the Reichswehr to implement its expansion plan, but
it would have been a major tour de force for Briining s sagging government.
See IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen,
Befehlhaberbesprechung, 11-12 January 1932, Bl. 167-168;
Bracher, Auflosun g, 483-84; Craig, Politics 441-46; Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
180-184; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis
1

,

,

,

228-230.
38 Hammerstein-Equord, Kurt Freiherr von (1876-1943).
Hammerstein had served in the same regiment (3rd Guard Infantry) as Schleicher and Hindenburg's son prior to the
First World War. Sympathetic to the Republic, Hammerstein
was the Chief of the Army Command from 1930 to January, 1934,

and retired a Generaloberst
39 IfZG,

Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bef ehlshaberbesprechung mit dem Chef der Heeresleitung auf der Fiihrerreise, 21 May 1932, 31. 182.
4o The Prussian Government claimed that the Nazis had
mobilized the SA on election day and were planning a Putsch,
prevented only by the intervention of the Prussian police.
See HA, f. 32 8, "Eine Erklarung des Preuflischen Innenministers

gegen die NSDAP,

17.3.32"; Albert Grzesinski, Inside Germany

,

2
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ministers demanded that the Reich
Government take some
action against the SA.41 Their
entreaty placed Greener in
an exceptionally difficult
position. On
the one hand, re-

sponsible for public security as Reich
Minister of the
Interior, he could hardly ignore their
pleas; on the other
hand, his solution to the problem
of political
extremism,

his military sport organization for
young men, would be

jeopardized by Government action against the
SA.

Moreover,

as Defense Minister his constitutional
responsibility to

defend the nation was intimately linked to the
military
sport program, which formed the nucleus of the
Army's ex-

pansion plan.

Groener attempted to convince the Interior Ministers
of Prussia, Baden, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Hesse and Bavaria,

during a meeting on

5

April 1932, that disbanding the SA

without providing an alternate outlet for the idealism of
its members would solve nothing. 42

The problem of the SA

New York, 1933, 252; and the Frankfurter Zeitung Nr. 254-6,
5 April 1932.
In a letter of 18 March to Groener, Rohm denied Severing 's charges of treason, claiming that the SA had
been alerted merely to defend itself against possible marxist
uprisings which would be supported by the marxis t-dominated
Prussian police. Rohm submitted reports from his units concerning their activities on 13 March. See HA, f. 328, letter
Rohm to Groener, 18 March 1932. Rohm's original mobilization
order to the SA, OSAF I Nr. 6 73/3 2, 2 March 19 32, which supports his refutation of Severing, can be seen in HA, f. 307.
,

41
4

Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
Ibid.

,

161-165.

Dok. 21, "Niederschrif t des Regierungrats von
LengieBer uber die Besprechung der Innenminister der Lander,
,

5.4.32", 445-449. Bracher incorrectly claims that Groener was
committed to banning the SA long before 5 April. See Bracher,
Auf losung 483ff.
,

,
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was serious, he acknowledged,
but

Many thousands of men of the
best convictions
are among them [the SA]
who should not be rejected by the Government. These
people have
to be grven the opportunity to
side with the
Government.... One has to attract
the best
elements to the Government and
meaningfully
3
*
involve them. 43
,

Prussian Minister of the Interior Severing
promptly objected
to Groener's implication that the SA
men were patriots, citing as evidence to the contrary Hitler's
recent order prohibiting SA men from participating in the
Border Guard-East,
even in the event of a Polish attack. 44

Apparently Groener, like so many of his countrymen,
had proven susceptible to the siren song of nationalism
sung by the Nazis and was willing to overlook the
more rep-

rehensible elements of their program.

At any rate, he

lamely attempted to explain the excesses of the SA as the

manifestations of impatient and frustrated youngsters.

Im-

plying that further violence would accompany a ban of the
SA unless its members were provided with some useful, altern-

4

3vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP "Niederschrift"
"Viele
Tausend Menschen von bester Gesinnung seien unter ihnen [SA]
die nicht vom Staate abgestossen werden sollten.
Diesen
Leuten miisse die Moglichkeit gegeben werden, daB sie zum
Staate kommen.... Man miisse die guten Elementen an den
Staat heranziehen und positiv fur den Staat einstellen."
Carsten's unfair criticism of Groener's actions
pp. 448-9.
makes no mention of Groener's Wehrsport project plans. See
Reichswehr and Politics, 340.
,

.

Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP, "Niederschrift", 449.

)

.
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ative activity, the Defense
Minister revealed his plans to
establish a military sport
organization.
Participation,
he explained, would be opened
to members of all the paramilitary organizations, not just
the SA.45 Nonetheless,
he gave no indication that he
planned any immediate action,
prompting the state interior ministers
to state that if the
Reich failed to act to curb the SA,
they would not be so
remiss 46

Faced with this ultimatum, he reconsidered
his
position concerning the SA and overnight
changed his mind.
On the following day,

6

April, he revealed to General

Schleicher his plan to disband the SA following
the second
Reich presidential election on 10 April. 47 The
Defense

4 5

^Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP "Niederschrif t" 445ff;
see also Groener's memorandum "Chronologische Darstellung
der Vorkommisse, die zur meinem Rucktritt als Reichswehrund Reichsinnenminister gefiihrt haben" in BA-MA, NachlaB
Groener, N-46/145, Bl. 1.
,

,

46 Vogelsang,

RW-Staat-NSDAP , "Niederschrif t" 449.
In at least one instance this was not an idle threat.
At a
secret meeting (7 April) in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Severing promised to disband the SA in Prussia shortly after the 10 April election.
The SA knew at once of this
meeting. See BA, NachlaB Kruger/20, Aktenvermerk 7.4.32.
Incredibly, the party leadership received no word of the ban
until 11 April.
See Goebbels, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei
Berlin, 1934, 65f. (Hereafter cited as Goebbels, Kaiserhof
,

,

.

47 BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, "Chronologische
Darstellung", Bl. 1; Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP 168ff, states
that Severing s publication on 5 April of compromising SA
material may have contributed to Schleicher's initial support of Groener's proposed ban. Supposedly Schleicher was
upset that Hitler had ordered the SA not to assist the Border
Buard in the event of Polish attack. Schleicher's support of
,

1

,

1

Minister explained his volte face in

28

a letter to Briining,

writing that any unilateral prohibition
of the SA by the
state governments would be interpreted
as an admission of
the impotence of the Government.
He added

that he was con-

vinced that Prussia and Bavaria were
preparing to ban the
SA following the election.
Recommending a pre-emptive
action by the Reich against the SA as
imperative, he further
added that it was intolerable for any
government to permit
a political party to have its own army. 48
Groener's action against the SA cannot be dismissed
as a haphazard and impromptu reaction to immediate
pressure

the SA ban for this reason would be unlikely, as the SA role
in the Border Guard was at best minimal, and Hitler's
order
(reflecting the official NSDAP position) was hardly novel
and could have been attributed to campaign rhetoric.
It is
possible that Groener's attitude took Schleicher by surprise
(cf IfZG, Zgs 217, General der Art. a.D. Erich Frhr. von dem
Busche-Ippenburg, Bl. 53. Busche was the head of the Army
Personnel Office)
Schleicher may have even been momentarily convinced by Groener's argument, but after reflection,
returned to his original position. See IfZG, Zgs. 248,
Holtzendorf f Bl. 30, and Groener-Geyer (Groener's daughter)
in BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/
.

,

48 BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/152, letter
Groener to
Briining, 13 April 1932.
In an updated memorandum, written
after 13 April, Groener instructed his press aide to make
public that "... der einzige Grund fur die Auflosung der SA
die Gefahr fur die Staatsautoritat war." Briining, Memoiren
538, 542-44, states that Groener was convinced that unless
the SA were disbanded, it would prove to be a stumbling
block for Briining' s disarmanent talks at Geneva. See also
Mayer, Skizzen, 137.
,
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generated by the state governments.

Greener claimed later

that he knew of the political
hazards involved in recommending that the Reich Government
proscribe the SA. 49 Although
he had in the past warned of the
dangers of outlawing

polit:

cal paramilitary organizations
without providing an alternate outlet for the energies of their
rank and file, he apparently felt that with the organizational
difficulties of
his own military sport organization
resolved, he could offej
it as a substitute to the SA. 50

Generals Schleicher and Hammerstein initially
went
along with Groener's proposal to ban the SA,

51

but after

49 BA-MA, NachlaB
Groener, N-46/112,

letter Groener
Richard Bahr, editor of the Braunschweigerische
Landeszeitung 22 May 1932.
to Dr.

,

5oApparently confident that
the military sport organi

zation would be quickly established, Groener released the
" Richtlinien
fur die Ausbildung im Gelandesport" during the
spring of 1932.
See BA, R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to Reichskanzlei, 4 February 19 32; and BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to
Lander, IA 1414/13.9 II, 24 October 1932. See also Cpt. Ill
In all likelihood Groener issued the "Richtlinien"
pp. 21.
immediately prior to the SA ban, hoping that the release of
the "Richtlinien" would be interpreted by the military sport
groups as a statement of the Government's intention to sponsor a comprehensive military sport program.
J,

For the official Reichswehr version see IfZG, Ed-1/
1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung mit dem Chef des Heeresleitung auf der Fiihrerreise, 21 May 932, Bl. 183. For contradictory, but more accurate versions, see BA-MA, NachlaB
Groener, N-46/145, letter Groener to Chief Editor Biicher of
Miin chner Neuesten Nachrichten
5 August 1932; and N-46/1 52,
Hermann Piinder (S taatssekretar in der Reichskanzlei "Neider
schrift uber die Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei iiber den
Verbot der SA" 30 May 1932, Bl. 1-3.
1

,

,

,

130

reflection they faltered in their
support.

Schleicher

suggested instead forcing Hitler to
exercise greater control
over the SA by issuing him an ultimatum.
In the
event he

refused to accept it, the onus for
disbanding the SA would
fall on the Nazi leader rather than
on the Reich Government. 52

Bruning and Greener both rejected this
idea, and

persuaded Hindenburg to sign the decree
outlawing the SA. 53
Although the divergence of opinion between
Groener
and the Army Command did not at first
appear to be of great

significance, 54 Schleicher's and Hammerstein

•

s

opposition

remained firm and the gap between the Defense Minister
and
his generals could not be bridged.

The political Right,

hostile to Groener since 1918, successfully utilized the
split between him and the Army Command to undermine Hinden-

burg 's confidence in the Defense Minister and to drive him

52 BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145,
Groener to Bucher,
5 August 1 932, Bl. 1-3; N-46/152, Piinder Niederschrif t , Bl.

5-7;

Bruning, Memoiren

,

537-39.

53

BA-MA, NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, Groener to Bucher,
5 August 1932, Bl. 5-7; N-46/152, Piinder Niederschrif t, Bl.
5-7; Bruning, Memoiren
540-544.
,

54

"Auch habe ich [Groener] nicht den Eindruck gewonnen,
als ob Schleicher grundsatzlich seine Meinung [Schleicher's
initial approval of the SA Verbot] geandert hatte." BA-MA,
NachlaB Groener, N-46/145, "Chronologische Darstellung" Bl.
4.
When first informed on 15 April by Schleicher that there
was unrest in the Reichswehr over the SA ban, Groener merely
replied that it was the Army's duty to obey its leaders, not
to question them.
Bl. 13.
See ibid.
,

,
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and Bruning from office by the end of
55
May.

Franz von

Papen56 and the "presidential" cabinet
succeeded Bruning
and Papen rescinded the SA ban on 16
June in return for
the acquiescence of the Nazis in the
Reichstag
to the

existence of his government 57
.

Ironically, it appears that Schleicher's and Ham-

merstein's opposition to the SA ban originated from
an
apparently sincere conviction that the ban threatened
Groener's military sport project, a program which promised
to help alleviate Germany's youth problem, while simul-

taneously improving its defense posture.

The Army Command'

official position regarding the SA ban was that Groener's
dual ministerial responsibilities had compromised the

political impartiality of the Reichswehr by indirectly involving it, through the person of Groener, in domestic,

55

Bracher, Auf losung 490-99; Carsten, Reichswehr
and Politics
344-48; Craig, Politics
430, 448-53; Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
173-80, 184-202; Wheeler-Bennett,
Nemesis 236-244.
,

,

,

,

,

56

A former career Army officer who had served with
Hindenburg in the First World War, Papen left the service
in 1919 and became active in Center Party political circles
serving in both the Prussian Lantag and the Reichstag. A
relatively unknown politician, his own party abandoned him
after his role in Bruning' s downfall became public. Sponsored by Schleicher, Papen served as Chancellor from June
to December 1932.
5^Franz von Papen, Die Wahrheit einer Gasse Munchen
77, 81-84; Vogelsang,
1952, 161-3; Goebbels, Kaiserhof
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 189-191, 215-221.
,

,

.
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partisan politics.
[against]

According to Hammerstein, the "action

the SA was purely domestic and
partisan.

The im-

partiality of the armed forced was
injured, as the [Defense]
Minister has to be impartial." 58 The
Chief of the Army Command admitted that he had supported
Greener's assignment to
the Ministry of the Interior "...
because it already had
been clear that the dismantling of the

[para] mi litary organi

zations

[was]

necessary.

[This dismantling was] possible

only if there was something else to offer." 59

That "some-

thing else" was Groener's military sport program,
the planning for which was unfortunately incomplete at the
time of

the SA ban.

Schleicher and Hammerstein felt that Groener's

action against the SA was not only inopportune, but also

politically motivated. 60

It damaged the Army's reputation

for political neutrality as well as the plans for a non-

58

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Besprechung mit
dem Chef der Heeresleitung auf der Fuhrreise, 21 May 1932,
Bl. 183.
"Aktion SA war rein innen- und parteipolitisch
Uberparteilichkeit der Wehrmacht war verletzt, auch Minister
muB iiberparteilich sein."
59 Ibid

Bl.

182f.

"... weil schon damals klar,

daB
Abbau der militarischen Organisationen notig. Nur moglich,
wenn etwas anders zu bieten." Carsten ignores this statement, which does not corroborate his thesis, namely that
Hammerstein s alleged concern for the impartiality of the
Reichswehr was a pretext for opposing Groener, who was blocking the "taming" of the Nazis.
See Carsten, Reichswehr and
Republic 340, 343.
.

,

'

,

60 BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/22,
to Bruning, 18 June 1932.

letter Schleicher

s
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partisan sport organization.

6

1

Schleicher's critics have questioned
his opposition
to Greener and the SA ban, maintaining
that he followed
a

devious course, attempting to exploit
the Nazi movement
for the benefit of the Reichswehr.
Groener's campaign
against the SA, in this interpretation,
became an attack
on Schleicher's plans.

The General therefore manuevered

Briining and Groener from office and replaced
them with the

pliant Franz von Papen. 62
In fairness to Schleicher, it should be
pointed out

that the policy of exploiting the Nazis or any other

political movement was not restricted to the Army Command
but enjoyed the tacit acquiescence of the Government.

Since

1924 the Army had attempted, directly or indirectly, to

benefit from the pre-military training conducted by military sport enthusiasts.

Groener hoped to continue that

policy by exploiting the patriotic sentiments awakened in

61

IfZG, Zgs. 248 (II), Generalmajor a.D. Hans-Henning
von Holtzendorf f Bl. 28. Holtzendorf f in 1932, was a
Reichswehr civilian employee and economic consultant to
Schleicher; 7 February 1949 interview of Dr. Adam von Carlowitz, Schleicher's legal advisor, by Dr. von zur Miihlen
in Conze, "Sturz Brunings", 270-271, and Holtzendorf f
comments on same, ibid., 272-3. See also Miiller, Das wahre
Vaterland , 349, Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP 175; and Bracher,
Auf losung , 495-99.
,

,

'

,

D

Bracher, Auf losung 276-81; Carsten, Reichswehr
and Politics 343, 348-50; Craig, Politics 428, 453-55;
Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP 185; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis
,

,

,

,

226.

,
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the young by the Nazis. 63

Schleicher and Ham^nerstein turn-

ed against Greener after they
concluded that his apparently
precipitious action against the SA
threatened to alienate
the political Right and thus
destroy Reichswehr plans to
recruit supporters for the military
sport program from all
interested groups, regardless of their
political doctrine.
Schleicher continued this policy in a
more even-handed
manner after Groener resigned.
Unaffected by his predecessor's mistrust and hostility to the
Socialist Reichs banner, Schleicher encouraged it to
become active

^

in the

Border Guard and the proposed military sport
program. 65

6 3 Craig,

who did not utilize the documents of the
Reichskanzlei, states that Groener, as a soldier and
cabinet
member, was firmly convinced from the beginning of 1931
of
the necessity of eliminating the SA.
Craig does not mention
that Groener saw "valuable elements" in the SA and hoped
to
attract these elements. Thus Craig, like Wheeler-Bennett,
makes the mistake of interpreting Groener »s military sport
organization as a sop to the critics of the SA Verbot. See
Craig, Politics
440-442, and Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis
229f.
According to this interpretation, Schleicher's opposition to the SA Verbot appears to be a policy of opportunism rather than one of continuity.
,

,

64 See,

for example, Schleicher's article in Illus trierte Zeitung (partly reproduced in Neue PreuBische
Kreuzzeitung 206, 26 July 1932) in which he wrote that
"...der Staat zum aktiven Trager des Wehrgedankens werden
muB, daB der Staat die Ertuchtigung der Jugend, im vaterlandischen Geist und korperlicher Leistungsf ahigkeit nicht
den Parteien und Verbanden iiberlassen konne.
Der Staat
darf aber 'in der heutigen Lage unseres Vaterlandes keine
Hand zuriickstoBen die ihm im Dienst dieser Idee geboten
wird "
(emphasis in original)
,

,

.

'

.

65

BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1, 15 June 1932. Groener' s hostility to the Reichsbanner as well as his inactivity
vis-a-vis the growing SA menace, contributed to growing SPD
,
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It would also be unfair to
characterize military

leaders as either blind to the
Weimar Republic's political
difficulties or myopic in presenting
only military solutions to complex social problems.
Although their proffered
solution (a youth military fitness
program) to counteract
the growing alienation of the
young had immediate and obvious benefits for the armed
forces, Greener and Schleicher
attempted to grapple with what they
regarded as the gravest
problem of the Weimar Republic: its
failure to inspire
confidence. The Republic, according to
the Defense Minister
and his assistant, had simply lost the
support of a majority
of the population, especially the
younger generation from
which the nation's future leaders would come.
Characteristic of many Germans who had reached maturity
prior to 1914,
the Army leaders were convinced that the Army,
the "school
of the nation", represented the best means of
inculcating

civic virtues and for developing citizenship. 66

dissatisfaction with the Bruning Government. See Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP 161. The Socialists had supported Hindenburg's re-election and their toleration in the Reichstag was
essential for the survival of the Bruning Cabinet. Apparently angered at Groener's attitude towards the Reichsbanner,
they offered no help to Groener when he came under violent
attack.
Schleicher did not repeat Groener's mistake.
,

6^In a letter to Reichswehr Commanders, 22 January
1932, Groener stated that one immutable value during the
current crisis was "...die Staatsidee. Die Wehrmacht ist
ihr notwendiger und sinnf alligster Ausdruck." BA-MA, NachlaB
Stiilpnagel, N-5/23, RWM B Nr. 295, Will, 22 January 1930.
One should not assume the concept of the army as school of
the nation to be regressive; Hitler later adopted it for the
benefit of the SA. See also Schleicher's radio address of
26 July 1932 in BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/22.
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Prevented by the restrictions of the
Versailles
Treaty from a return to the Army as
the
school of the

nation, Greener and Schleicher had
favored a comprehensive,
state-sponsored youth program, of which the
military sport
organization was to be but one phase, aimed
at capturing
the loyalty and enthusiasm of the nation's
67
youth.

in a

secret letter to Chancellor von Papen, Schleicher
wrote

that "teaching the coming generation to advocate
the ideology of the Government is unquestionably one of the
most im-

portant pre-requisites of a national recovery and of an
autonomous conduct of state." 68

Admitting that he viewed

67

IfZG, Zgs. 37, General der Infanterie a.D. Hermann
Foertsch, Bl. 30-31. Foertsch, assigned to the Ministeramt
in 1933, states that Schleicher was very concerned with a
solution to Germany's social problems, and "In diesem Zusammenhang sah er [Schleicher] auch das Problem der Jugend, die
er in einer staatlichen Organisation "Staats j ugend" erfaBt
sehen wollte, um sie den reinen Parteieinf liissen zu entziehen; seine Plane bezuglich der Vermehrung des Heeres auf
300,000 Mann entsprangen daher u.a. auch der Absicht, diese
Jugend von der Strassen wegzubringen " Bl. 30-31. See also
IfZG, Ed-1/1-2.
Liebmann Notizen, Commanders' Conference,
undated notes, December 1932, Bl. 186; Zgs. 1709, Ma j. a.D.
Dr. Wolfgang Huwe, letter of Oberst a.D. Arnim, Bl. 36; and
Eugen Ott, Botschafter and Oberstlt.a.D.
"Ein Bild des
Generals Kurt von Schleicher", Politische Studien 110, June
1959, 367.
Ott, then a section chief of Schleicher's Ministeramt, was Schleicher's choice to be Chief of Staff in a
proposed Youth Ministry. For Schleicher's Youth Program,
see Kreuzzeitung Nr. 351, 17 December 1932.
(

)

.

,

,

,

68 Schleicher to Papen, RWM Nr. 486/32 g.WV, 17 October
1932 (from DZA-Potsdam, RMdl, Bd. 2 56 74, photo copy in Schutzle
"Die Erziehung der heranReichswehr wider Nation appendix)
wachsenden Jugend zu tatiger Staatsgesinnung ist zweifellos
.

,

eine der wichtigsten Voraussetzungen nationaler Gesundung und
unabhangiger Staatsfuhrung " Bl. 13.
.

"
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the proposed youth program from
a military standpoint, he
added that it was a "... guarantee
of the national defense
by means of healthy, able and
committed young men. "69
In retrospect, the divergence
between Greener and

the Army Command was one of tactics,
not strategy.

Both

parties were troubled by the impossible
task of the armed
forces, namely to protect, with insufficient
forces,
a

system of government which

a

considerable number of Ger-

mans, especially younger ones, rejected.

A state-sponsored

military sport program sppeared to be the best
solution
for augmenting the Army with trained manpower
and

for in-

stilling among the young confidence in the Republic.

The

tragedy causing Groener's hounding from office was bureau-

cratic obstructionism which delayed the military sport

program for two invaluable years.

Available evidence does

not indicate the extent to which Groener was responsible
for failing to break through bureaucratic chicanery.

dence does

Evi-

show that the Defense Minister, exasperated

with obstructionism, spiritually and physically exhausted,
his health shattered, and under vitriolic personal and

political attack, succumbed to the intense pressure of the
state governments and agreed to execute a hasty, ill-con-

ceived action against the SA.

p ^ Ibid

This action destroyed not

Sicherstellung der Landesverteidigung durch eine gesunde, leistungsf ahige und einsatzbereite junge Mannschaf ten.
.

,

Bl.

14.

"

.

.

.
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only his own political future but that of
the Republic as
well. Convinced that Groener's actions
against the SA were
premature, Schleicher confronted the choices of
either re-

maining loyal to Groener and perishing politically
with
him, or of disassociating himself from his former
mentor

in order to present the vital military sport
organization
at a more opportune time.

He chose the latter course.

CHAPTER

VI

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
THE REICHSKURATORIUM FUR JUGEND-

ERTUCHTIGUNG

Despite his preoccupation during the crisis
caused
by the SA ban, General Groener found time
to initiate the
steps to establish his youth, or military
sport project.

Because the fiscal year had already begun
March)

(1

April to

31

and he had not requested an appropriation, he ap-

proached Reich Finance Minister Dietrich late in April to
see if he could unearth and shepherd funds for the
youth

sport project.

Dietrich appears to have assured Groener

in early May that he could help 1 and within a week the De-

fense Minister submitted to the Reich Council
a detailed budget for his project.

(

Reichsrat

)

He asked for an appro-

priation of RM 1.5 million, which would allow him to begin

K6hler, Arbeitsdienst 219. According to Schutzle,
Reichswehr wider Nation 187, who quotes from DZA-RMdl Bd.
25676, Bl. 2f, Groener requested funding authorization in
April. His rationale: "Als Folge der ungewohnlichen groBen
Arbeitslosigkeit ist eine wachsende Verwahrlosung der Jugend
eingetreten. Es sind MaBnahmen erforderlich durch korperliche
Ertiichtigung der Jugend dieser fur den Staat bedrohlichen
Entwicklung Einhalt zu gebieten und dadurch zugleich die
Voraussetzung fur eine gesunde geistige Einstellung der
Jugend zu Volk und Staat zu sichern." Except for a short
chapter in Kohler's Arbeitsdienst there is no substantive
treatment of the Reichskuratorium. Kohler's chapter is incomplete; he did not use material from the Bavarian archives
or the Bundesmilitararchiv.
1

,

,

,

,
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operating the military sport program
from July until the end
of the fiscal year in March 1933.2
A special outlay would
then no longer be required, as the
expenses for the sport

program would be listed in the operating
budget of Reich
Ministry of the Interior.
The Reich Council did not consider
Groener's request
until the end of June, 3 apparently adopting
an attitude
of

"wait and see", following his resignation
and subsequently

that of the Briining Government.

The new Papen Regime

adopted a similar dilatory attitude toward the
military
sport project.

To a certain extent, this attitude may have

reflected Schleicher's policy; as the new Defense Minister
he continued the former policy, momentarily abandoned
by

Groener, of an "above party" approach to the military

sport project.

He could take little action until the Gov-

ernment concluded a rapprochement with the offended political Right, which was mollified with the lifting of the ban

on the SA on the 16th of June.

Moreover, the General did

not want to repeat Groener's mistake of acting too hastily,
namely proscribing the SA before the military sport program

2 BHStA,

MK 13828, letter of Bay. Stellvertretende
Bevollmachtiger zum Reichsrat to Bay. Staatsmin. des Aussern,
Nr. 613, 12 May 1932; letter Bay. Stellvertrende Bevollmachtiger zum Reichsrat to Bay. Staatsmin. fiir Kultus und
Unterricht, 13 May 1932.
3

I,

Deutscher Reichsanzieger und PreuBischer Staats anzieger Nr. 150, 29 June 1932.
,

.

,
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was ready for operation.

When the leaders of several of the

state governments asked Papen about the
status of the military sport project during a conference on
June 12th, he la-

conically replied "that in general, all of these
[para] military organizations will be placed under some
sort of control
[exercised] by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Confer-

ences concerning the implementation of this control
are not

completed, nor has the Reich President been informed of any
of the details." 4

Improvisation and delay subsequently characterized
the establishment of the military sport organization.

Dur-

ing the summer of 1932, for example, the name of the organi-

zation underwent several changes 5 and the start of the first

instructor training course was twice postponed.

6

In at least

4 IfZG,

Ma 87, Niederschrif t iiber die am Sonntag, 12.
Juni
1932] Besprechung.
"Im iibrigen wiirden alle diesen Organisationen unter eine Kontrolle des Reichsministeriums des
Innerns gestellt werden. Die Besprechungen iiber die Durchfuhrung dieser Kontrolle sind noch nicht abgeschlossen, es
1st auch dem Herrn Reichsprasidenten noch kein Vortrag iiber
die Einzelheiten gehalten worden." Bl. 91.
[

5
6

July;

BA-MA, NachlaG Bredow, N-97/1
4

6

,

"Kurze Orientierung"

August 1932.

MF 67303, letter of Wehrkreis VII, 929/32
g./A. to Bay. Staatsmin. des Finanzen/Ausserns/Kultus und
Unterricht, 3 August 1932; IfZG, Fa 88/337, JH Stabsleitung
Ref. VI 16/31, 14 September 1932; and letter of Stiilpnagel
to RMdl, 7 November 1932, DZA-Potsdam, RMdl, Bd. 25676 (reproduced in Schiitzle, Reichswehr wider Nation appendix,
BHStA,

I,

,

p.

5.

)

9

142

one instance a regional
director was appointed only
after
the program was to have been
functioning. 7 The makeshift
arrangements and failures to meet
schedules suggest either
that Greener's concept experienced
considerable modifications or that planning for the
program had not been as advanced as Groener had indicated in
January.

The new Reich Minister of the
Interior, Baron von
Gayl, apparently felt that the money
committed
to the

military sport project could be better
spent elsewhere,
namely for a volunteer labor service.
Schleicher, during
a cabinet meeting on June 18th,
emphatically spoke against
Gayl's suggestion that the Government establish
a labor

service, stating that although the concept
appeared promising,

finding the necessary extra funds would, he thought,

7 BH StA,

MK 13828, Horl, Nr. 1723, to Bay. Staatsmin.
fur Kultus und Unterricht, 26 September 1932; MK 1384
7, Bay.
Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht, Ref. VII 36161, to
Horl, 28 September 1932.
g

See the letter of Bavarian Representative to the
Reich Council Imhoff, in BHStA,-I, MK 13 828, to the Bay.
Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht, 7 July 1932. Former
Staatssekretar Hermann Piinder later wrote that "... im
Kabinett habe er [Schleicher] manchmal Krach mit den
Minister von Neurath und von Gayl.", indicating that there
were difficulties between Gayl and Schleicher. See Piinder's
Politik in der Reichskanz le i 141.
,

9 At

the Commanding Generals' Conference of 11-12 January 1932, Schleicher stated that "Organisation fur Wehrsport
ziemlich weit vorgeschritten " IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
.

Notizen, Bl.

169.
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prove difficult.

In any event, insisted the
Defense Minis-

ter, military sport and its
budget had to be kept separate
from any labor service projects.
Gayl had no answer for

Schleicher. 10
It is possible, but unlikely,
that military planning

contributed to the delay in organizing
the military sport
program. The disarmament conferences
at Geneva had not
been successful from Germany's
viewpoint, 11 and the Foreign
Office as well as the Defense Ministry
may have delayed the
implementation of the military sport program
pending further
progress at Geneva.

Army leaders, however, decided on 14

July to begin preparations for implementing
their 21 division
expansion plan (of which military sport was an integral
part) regardless of the outcome at Geneva, 12 and
it would

hardly appear coincidental that at this time the Reichswehr

commenced extensive assistance to General Edwin von Stulpnagel and his staff.

On the other hand, military assistance

to the military sport program might have been related to the

0lfZG, Ma 88, 18 June 1932 Reichskabinettsprotokoll,
Bl. D790242.
1

1 1

Bruning, Memoiren

,

556-565.

12 BA-MA,

II H/27, CHL TA 562/32 g.K. T2III, 14 July
1932; II H/228, CHL TA 549/32 g.K. T2IIIB, 15 July 1932.
This order called for preparation for a 15% personnel expansion, commencing 1 April 1 933
See also Rautenberg, Riistungs
politik 212-219. The Disarmament Committee adjourned on 23
July v/ithout making any changes favorable to Germany. See
Heiden, Der Fiihrer, 476
.

,

.

—

5
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approval of the program's budget
by the Reich Council on 29
June. 13 In all likelihood/ the
decis on Qf the
.

Staff to implement its expansion
plan did not precipitate
the military sport project, but
merely added a sense of
urgency that had been absent since
Greener's resignation.
It is also possible that the
temporary modus vivendi

of the Reich Government with Hitler
concerning his acquiescence of the Papen Regime may have
lulled Government officials
into a false sense of security in respect
to the threat posed
by the National Socialists.
In the eight week election campaign (ending 31 July) for the Reichstag, the
actions of the
SA, especially the carnage at Altona ending
in nineteen

deaths, 14 gave every indication that the Nazis
still consti-

tuted a menace and dispelled any illusions concerning
Hitler's

acceptance of the Papen Government.

In light of the ex-

cesses committed by the SA, and especially after the spec-

tacular Nazi electoral success on

1

anzeiger

31

July, 15 Schleicher may

3
°
Deutscher

Reichsanzieger und Preufiischer Staats Nr. 150, 29 June 1932.
'

,

14 Heiden,

Per Fuhrer 46 7ff; Pridham, Hitler's Rise to
Power 281 ff; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny rev.
ed., New York, 1962, 213ff; and Joachim Fest, Hitler
(trans.
R. and C. Winston), New York, 1974, 338ff.
,

,

,

,

The Nazis, now the strongest party in the Reichstag,
more than doubled their representation, winning 230 seats as
compared to their 1930 shoring of 107 seats. See appendix C
of Fritz Stern (ed.), T he Path to Dictatorship 1918-1933
Essays by Ten German Scholars
(trans. J. Conway), New York,
1966, 206f. A voting pattern analysis is given in Bracher,
Auf losunq part II, chapter X.
1

.

,

,
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have decided that the situation
demanded an acceleration of
the pace at which he had progressed
toward setting up the

military sport program.

Whatever the reason for the delay,
the Defense and
Interior Ministries subsequently
worked closely with one
another during July and August in an
effort to organize the
military sport program. 16 The Defense
Ministry furloughed
50 captains and lieutenants,

for three months, to serve as

military sport instructors, and the Army
Administrative
0ffice (Heeresverwaltungsamt) provided surplus

uniforms and

equipment to General von Stiilpnagel.

Army General Staff

officers were ordered to work closely with him. 17

Reichswehr interest in the Stiilpnagel Organization
was clearly expressed in a memorandum entitled "Military

Requirements of an Organization for the Physical Improvement of German Youth", which was published as an appendix
to the furlough directive.

1

According to the Army, Stiilp-

6

On 6 July General Bredow [Schleicher's successor
in the Ministeramt] forwarded to Schleicher a report (unfortunately missing from the NachlaB) outlining Stiilpnagel
progress, and on 4 August Schleicher received a draft copy
(also missing) of "Satzungen des Reichskuratoriums fur
Gelandesport" requesting his approval. See BA-MA, NachlaB
Bredow, N-97/1, 6 July 1932 and 4 August 1932.
See also
Keitel, Verbreche r, 50, letter of Keitel to his father,
10 July 1932.
17 BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA,

1

25

July 1932. The order did not specify the dates of the furlough, which, in all likelihood, began about 1 October, the
scheduled course commencement date.

1
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nagel's ultimate goal was the
"physical improvement and
pre-militarv training, of all male
Germans between the ages
of 6 and 21.-18 As a more
practical and iinmedlate object _
ive, the Army wanted him to
provide terrain sport training
for "... the reserve for the
Border Guard, the
Army, and

the Navy,

[and for youth] between the
ages of 16 and 21.-19

In encouraging General von
Stulpnagel to train a reserve,

the General Staff stated that his
training courses should
encompass "infantry ba sic (recruit)
training without

arms..." 20 the exact content of which
was detailed in the
pamphlet "Guidelines of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior
for Training in Terrain Sport. "21
By early September work on the military
sport organi-

1

8

1

9 Ibid

Ibid., appendix "Militarische Forderungen an eine
Organisation zur Ertiichtigung der deutschen Jugend".
§ 1.
"Endziel: Korperliche Ertiichtigung und vormilitarisc he
Ausbildung der gesamten mannlichen deutschen Jugend im
Alter von 6.-21. JahrenV (emphasis in original).

Ziel fur die nachste Zeit: Gelandesport lich Vorbildung des Ersatzes fur Grenzschutz, Heer und
Marine, im Alter von 16.-21. Jahren"
(emphasis in original)
.

,

"b.

.

20

BA-MA, RH-8/896, CHL TA 570/32 g.K. T2IIIA, 25
July 1932.
"Ausbildungsziel: Inf anteris tische Grund (Rekruten Ausbildung ohne Waf fen
"
(emphasis in original).
.

.

2

.

Ibid
This booklet, prepared by the Reich Ministry
of the Interior, can be seen in BHStA, I, MK 13828. This
booklet was drawn up in consultation with General Vogt of
the GVA and the Defense Ministry.
See BA, R-43 11/519, Vogt
to Reichskanzlei
4 February 1932; and IfZG, Ed-67/19, en-"
closure to v. Witzleben letter to Siemens' Director v. Winterfeldt, 6 January 1933.
.

,

,
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zation had progressed sufficiently22

to allow the Govern-

ment to announce publicly the
existence of Stulpnagel's
Organization. The Reich Cabinet,
meeting on 12 September,
approved a presidential decree which
established a "Reich
Board of Trustees for Youth Physical
Fitness Improvement
(Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichti 0 ,,n^ "
After affirming the importance of physical fitness
for national defense,
the Cabinet:

Upon request of the Reich Minister of the
Interior, resolves ... that all measures
this area [youth fitness] are to be effected in close cooperation between the
Defense Minister and the Minister of the
Interior. The Reich Minister of the Interior is specifically required to secure
the agreement of the Defense Minister prior
to approving changes in the articles of the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung and
the Association for the Promotion of Terrain
Sport.
In the event of a change in the
position of the Executive Presidency of the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung, the
Reich Minister of the Interior, in agreement
with the Defense Minister, will nominate [a
replacement] to the Reich President. 23

m

22

For examples of Reich-Lander cooperation, see BHStA,
I, MF 67303, Wehrkreis VII, b Nr. 929/32 2/A, vertraulich,
to Bay. Staatsmin. des Finanzen, 3 August 1932; correspondence between the Bavarian Ministry of Finance and Augsburg
(Lechfeld) and Wiirzburg (Hammelberg) of 9 August, 12 August,
and 26 September; see also MK 13828, Horl to Ministerialrat
Jahn, 13 August, and the correspondence between Horl and the
Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus und Unterricht in MK 1384 7.
23

IfZG, Ma-88, Reichskabinettsprotokoll
12 September
1932, "Punkt 5; AuBerhalb der Tagesordnung: Berufung eines
Reichskuratoriums fur Jugendertiichtigung," Bl. D790674f.
"Auf Antrag des Herrn Reichsministers des Innern beschlieBt
daB alle MaBnahmen auf diesem Gebiete im engen Einver,
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Neither the dominant role of the
Defense Ministry
nor the military purpose of the
Reichskuratorium appeared
in Hindenburg 's public decree of
13 September which
for-

mally established the Reichskuratorium.

Hindenburg instead

carefully stressed the supervisory
function of the Reichskuratorium; it merely reflected, he
said, the desire of the
Reich Government to rationalize the
numerous youth physical
fitness programs and to direct a unified
and concerted effort
by all organizations interested in the
physical welfare of
German youth. The Reich Minister of the
Interior, he stated,

would serve as chairman of the Reichskuratorium,
assisted by
General (Ret.} Edwin von Stulpnagel, who had the title
of

Executive President.

In concluding the decree, Hindenburg

directed Gayl to appoint to the board of the Reichskuratorium
persons both qualified and experienced in youth affairs. 24

nehmen zwischen dem Reichminister des Innern und dem Reichswehrminister zu treffen sind. Insbesondere ist der Reichsminister des Innern verpf lichtet sich der Zustimmung des
Reichswehrminister zu versichern, ehe an den Satzungen des
Reichskuratoriums fur Jucendertuchtigung und des Vereins zur
Forderung des Gelandesports eine Anderung vorgenommen wird.
Bei einem etwaigen Wechsel in der Stelle des geschaf tsfiihrenden Prasidenten des Reichskuratoriums fur Jugendertuchtigung
wird der Reichsminister des Innern dem Herrn Reichsprasidenten einen Vorschlag nur mit Zustimmung des Reichswehrministers
machen." Bl. D790674f. Throughout the remainder of this
dissertation, Reichskuratorium will be employed in lieu of
the complete title.
,

24

BA, R-43 11/519; BHStA, I, MK 13828, letter of
Reichprasident von Hindenburg to RMdl, IA 1414/13.9, Berlin,
13 September 1932.

,
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Composed of a board of thirty-three
members, 25 the
Reichskuratorium had four functions: (1) to
train and certify military sport instructors,

(2)

to develop and encourage

a cooperative relationship among all
military sport organi-

zations,

(3)

to supervise the operations of the Government-

sponsored terrain sport schools [in reality military
sport
schools], and (4) to recommend and supervise the
awarding
of Government subsidies to groups active in the
military

sport movement.

In an apparent effort to insure close

ties at all levels between the military sport organizations
and the Reichskuratorium, Stulpnagel established twelve

regional offices, which were also to act as contact points

between the civilian military sport organizations and the

Government military sport schools. 27

Regional office

25

Bayerische Staatazeitung Nr. 24 9, 26 October 19 32.
Of the 3 3 member board, three members were representatives
of the Reich government; 11 were Lander representatives; 13
represented the military sport groups; and the remaining 6
had no affiliation.
,

26

Stulpnagel outlined the functions of his organization in a letter apparently sent in early September to all
military sport organizations. The SA response, with excerpts
from Stiilpnagel 's letter, has survived. See BA, NS-23/124,
OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September 1932.
27

Regional offices were located in the following
cities: Konigsberg, Stettin, Berlin, Breslau, Dresden, Madgeburg, Stuttgart, Kassel, Minister, Kiel, Hannover, and Miinchen
See letter of Stulpnagel to RMdl 7 November 1932 (from DZAPotsdam, Bd. 25676, reproduced in Shiitzle, Reichswehr wider
Nation appendix, p. 5.).
,

,
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directors chosen by Stulpnagel, were,
for the most part,
retired military officers. 28
In practice, the Reichskuratorium
functioned mainly
as a reviewing agency for authorizing
funds for Stulpnagel

military sport schools. 29

's

it also determined which military

sport groups were eligible for Government
subvention and
for participation in the Stulpnagel
program, although the
criteria for selection have apparently not
survived. 30 At
its first meeting, on 3 October 1932,
the Reichskuratorium

certified eighteen military sport organizations
as eligible
to participate, 31 and decided that rather than
sending its
28

BA-MA Nachlafi Bredow, N-97/2, "Kurze Orientierunq"
17 September 1932.
,

29

Letter of Stulpnagel to RMdl 7 November 19 32 (from
DZA-Potsdam, Bd. 25676, reproduced in Schutzle, Reichswehr
wider Nation, appendix, p. 5.); and BHStA, I, MF 67303, Nr.
544 79/32, contract between Bavaria and the Verein zur Forderung des Gelandesports, 26 October 1932. For an example of
Reichskuratorium subvention of a Wehrsport group (SA)
see
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/22, letters Grupperf iihrer z.b.V. IVa to
OSAF, 1 March 1933; 8 April 1933; and 12 June 1933. The
Reichskuratorium awarded the SA RM 157,500 from January to
June 1933.
,

,

30

It is probable that the criteria for eligibility to
participate in the Border Guard were used for the Reichskuratorium. Border Guard eligibility was defined as "...
jeder waf f enf ahiger Deutsche ... soweit er wehrwillig und
staatsbejahend eingestellt ist." BA-MA, II H/292, CHL TA
816/32 g.K. T2IIIA/T4III , 1 December 1932.
31

BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to Landesregierungen, IA
1414/8.10, Berlin, 22 October 1932. The following Wehrsportverbande were allowed to participate: Stahlhelm (including
Jungsta) ; SA and HJ; Reichsbanner Kyffhauser and Kyffh^userjugend; Reichs junglandbund; DHV (Deutsch Nationale Handlungsgehilf enenverband) ; Jungdeutscherorden; Jungsturm; DOB
,

.
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own instructors to these groups to
teach military sport, it
would be easier for Sttilpnagel s staff to
train and certify
•

personnel selected by the groups who would
then conduct their
own programs. 32 At their second meeting, 33
on 27
October,

Reichskuratorium members inspected

a

proposed military sport

school site near Berlin and admitted several
more military

sport organizations to the Reichskuratorium. 34

(Deutscherof f iziersbund)
ReichsausschuB fur Leibeserziehungen (Deutsche Turnerschaf t) AWA (Akademisch-Wissenschaftliches Arbeitsamt)
Institut fur Leibesubungen an den
deutschen Hochschulen ; GVA; Freischar junger Nation; Bismarck j ugend; Reichsverband vaterliindischer Arbeiter; Reichskuratorium fur Reit- und Fahrschulen; and the Klei nkaliberschiitzenverbande
;

;

;

32

BHStA, I, MK 13 82 8, "Niederschrift " of a conference
on Gelandesport, VII/35975, 4 October 1932.
Stiilpnagel was
already committed to this decision since early September.
See BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September 1932.
33

According to Kohler, Arbeitsdienst 221, the Reichskuratorium planned to meet twice annually, the first meeting
taking place on 27 October 1932. A letter of the RMdl to the
LandeSregierungen of 22 October (BHStA, I, MK 13832, RMdl to
Landesregierungen, IA 1414/8.10, 22 October 1932) states that
the first Reichskuratorium meeting was held 3 October.
,

34

BHStA I, MK 13 832, RMdl to Landesregierungen, IA
1414/24.10, 7 November 1932. Admitted were the: Eichenkreuz;
Jugenbund im Gewerkschaf tsbund der Angestellten (GDA) Wehrwolf; and Deutsche Jugendkraft. The Bayernwacht and Pfalzwacht were admitted in December. See BA, R-43 11/519, RMdl
to Ministerialrat von Lex, MdR, 1414 a/ 12.12, 24 December
1932.
The Communist Party and its affiliated organizations
were banned from the Reichskuratorium. See also Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 9 7-100.
,

;

.
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It is not certain if Interior Minister
Gayl ever

appointed the full complement of thirty-three
members to
the board of the Reichskuratorium. At the
end of October
1932, he had named only ten: Defense Minister (Ret.)
GeBler,

State Secretary (Ret.) Dr. Theodor Leewald, 35
former Reich
Minister for Food and Agriculture Dr. Heinrich Haslinde 36
State Minister (Ret.) Dr. Alexander Dominicus,

37

Dr. Carl

Diem, 38 the famous surgeon Dr. Ferdinand Sauerbruch

39

Reich Commissioner for Voluntary Labor Service Dr. Fried-

35

1860-1947. Lewald, Staatssekretar in the Reich Interior Ministry, 1919-21, was a founder of the Hochschule fur
Leibesiibungen in 1920.
Director of the Deutscher ReichsausschuB fur Leibesiibungen (the successor to the pre-war
German Olympic Committee) from 1919-1933, he maintained
close ties with the Reichswehr and the Volkssport movement.
He served on the International Olympic Committee from 1924
to 1939, and was its director after 1933.
He was also the
director of the German Olympic Committee.
36

1881- ?. Regierungsprasident in Munster from 1922 to
1927, Haslinde was Reichminister fur Ernahrung und Landwirtschaft during 1926. He was associated with the Center
Party
37

1873-1945. Mayor of Berlin-Schoneburg from 1911
to 1920, he served as Prussian Minister of the Interior in
1921. From 1921 to 1933 he was a board member of the Deutscher
ReichsausschuB fur Leibesiibungen and was a member of the Board
of Directors of the Deutsche Turnerschaf t and was director
of that organization from 1929 to 1933.
,

38

1882- 1962. Diem was General Secretary of the Deutscher
ReichsausschuB fur Leibesiibungen, 1 91 3-1 933, and General Secretary of the International Olympic Committee, 1936-39.
39

1875-1951. The most famous surgeon of his time in
Germany, he was the Ordinarius of the Berlin Charite Hospital
and medical school. He also had a distinguished career in
both world wars as a military surgeon.

.
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rich Syrup, 40 President of the
Catholic Voung Mens

Father Ludwig Wolker,
icz

42

41

,

Captain (Ret.) Elhard von Morozow-

of the Stahlhelm, and Lieutenant
(Ret.) Friedrich-

Wilhelm Kriiger

^

of
u
the
Lue SA

Tho
ine first seven members were

appointed by Gayl as representatives of
the Reich; the
40

1881-1945. From 1920 to 1927, Syrup was
President
of* the Rexchsarbeitsverwaltung, and
in 1 92 V^ecame Present
5
1
' "5 ^beitsvermitt lung und Arbeits^osenversicherung.
He served as Reichskommissar fur den
Freiwilli
itS ien
1932 - 1933
and aS ^ichsarbeitsmiLsSr \n
?he S^h?
H
the
Schleicher
Cabinet.

vfrsroh™

^^

^-

'

41

1887-?. Generalprases of the Katholischen Junamannerverband, Wolker was also a director of the
ReichsausschuB des deutschen Jugendverbande (along with
General Vogt)
•

42

1893- 1934. A landowner from Brandenburg, he served
as leader of the Stahlhelm region Brandenburg
and as Reichsfuhrer des Jungstahlhelms
Appointed to the OSAF in 19 33,
he was killed the following February in an auto accident/
.

43

1894- 1945. A graduate of Lichterfelde Cadet school
and son of a regimental commander, Kriiger was commissioned
in the Prussian army in 1914.
He served all four years of
the war on the front, was wounded three times, and was highly decorated.
Following the war and service in several Freikorps (Iron Torpedoboat Flotilla and the Freikorps Liitzow)
he resigned in March 1920.
From 1924 to 1928 he was the
Director and Vorstandsmitglieder of the Berlin Miillabfuhr AG.
He joined the NSDAP in 1929 (Nr. 171,199) and the SS in
1931 (Nr. 6123).
Transferring to the SA in April 1931, he
remained in it as Gruppenfiihrer-Ost Gruppenf uhrer z.b.V.,
and Chef des Ausbildungswesens der SA, until 1934, when he
became the head of the Organisation Kriiger (Chef AW)
In
June 1935, following the disbanding of the Chef AW, Kriiger
rejoined the SS as Obergruppenf uhrer serving as HSSPF-Ost
(Poland) from 1939 to 1943.
He became commander of the 6th
SS Gebirgsdivision in 1944 and then commander of the Vth SS
Mountain Army Corps. He is reported to have died in 1945,
either in action or by his own hand.
,

,

.

,

,
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latter three represented military
sport organizations. 44
The Reich Government attempted
to insure the political impartiality of the
Reichskuratorium, as an examination
of the list of approved organizations
indicates.
It also
attempted to encourage the trade unions,
with their vast
membership, to participate, an attempt
not altogether unsuccessful. 45 Nonetheless, the infreguency
of the Reichskuratorium meetings and the inter-locking
directorships
held by Sttilpnagel tended to lessen the
influence of the

Reichskuratorium.
Sttilpnagel,

in addition to his duties as executive

president of the Reichskuratorium, directed the
"Association for the Promotion of Terrain Sport", an
organization

which Hindenburg founded along with the Reichskuratorium. 46
Organized as

a legal entity

(a

corporation) distinct from

the Reich Ministry of the Interior in order to free it from

44

Bayerische Staatszeitun g

,

Nr.

248,

26 October 1932.

45

On 16 January 1933, the Reichskuratorium invited
the Allgemeiner Deutschen Gewerksschaf tbund to participate,
an offer which was accepted, but which the Nazi takeover
rendered obsolete. See Schiitzle, Reic hswehr wider Nation,
203.
46

BHStA, I, MK 13832, letter RMdl to Landesregierungen
1414/13.9, Berlin, 15 September 1932. "Stulpnagel Organization" is employed for the sake of simplicity rather than the
more cumbersome full title. Many scholars (e.g., Vogelsang,
Kohler, Bracher, Carsten) have either been unaware of, or
have ignored the difference between the Reichskuratorium and
the Stulpnagel Organization.
While in practice the difference
may have been blurred, the two organizations were quite
separate in theory.

,

,
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administrative details, the purpose of
the Terrain Sport
Association was to organize and operate
the sixteen military (terrain) sport schools
sponsored by the Reichskuratorium. 47

The Terrain Sport Association, like
the Reichskuratorium, had a board of directors.

The board, chaired by

General von Stiilpnagel, was composed of
Senior Counselors
Max Adam
and Hans Erbe, 49 Counselor (Ret.) Richard
Jahn, 50
Capt.

(Ret.) Hans-Henning von Holtzendorf
f

51

and Majors

47

Ibid., and letter of RMdl to Landesregierungen
IA 1414/17.1 III, 3 February 1933.
The sixteen schools were
located in: Arys, Lokstedter Lager, Burg Stargard, Wunsdorf,
Dobentz, Neuhammer, Altengrabow, Konigsbruck, Ohrdruf,
Ganseweg-Munsingen, Oershausen, Scheuen, Munsterlager Lechfeld, Hammelburg, and Kiel-Friedrichsort
See Vogelsang,
RW-Staat-NSDAP, 286-87. Stiilpnagel originally planned for
18 schools.
Compare the above list to OSAF Qu Nr. 1509/32,
16 September 1932 in BA, NS-23/124.
,

.

48

terior

Oberregierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of the In-

(?)

.

.

.

49

Oberegierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Erbe was responsible for supervising the activities
of the Reichskuratorium.
50

Regierungsrat (Ret.) Jahn was the administrative
chief (Verwaltungschef of the Reichskuratorium and later
assumed the same position in the Chef des Ausbildungswesens
der SA.
)

51

Koltzendorff served under Schleicher and Groener
during the First World War, but left the Army as a captain
to administer family estates.
In 1928 Schleicher hired him
as an economic advisor to the Reichswehrminister
Holtzendorf f re-entered the Army in 19 33 and was a Brigadier General
at the end of the Second World War.
.
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(Ret.)

Hans Walter von Olberg

52

and Herbert Scultetus. 53

Olberg and Scultetus were also executive
vice-presidents
of the Terrain Sport Association. 54
The majority

of the

Association's instructor and staff personnel
were former
officers and non-commissioned officers selected
by Stulpnagel.

J

In a letter sent in early September to all
military

sport organizations, Stulpnagel outlined the goals
and
plans of his new organization.

Its function, he explained,

was to train and certify military instructors from
the

participating military sport organizations.

Although the

organizations could nominate whomever they wished to attend

52

A former AWA instructor at Wunsdorf, with close
ties to the GVA (Vogt)
Olberg was the Press Chief in the
Stahlhelm Bundesleitung and operated the Wehrsport program
of the Stahlhelm Student Group, Langemarck.
,

53

Little is known of the background of this man.
He
later apparently served in some capacity as a liaison officer
between the Army General Staff (T-4, Training) and the Chef
des Ausbildungswesens der SA.
54

BHStA, I, MK 13832, letter RMdl to Landesregierungen
IA 1414/13.9 and 1414/17.1 III, 15 September 1932 and 3 Febru
ary, respectively.
55

BHStA, I, MK 13832, Minutes of a Conference on Terrain Sport Schools, Kultusministerium, VII 35975, 4 October
27
1932; BA, R-36/2013, Deutscher Gemeindetag, "Vermerk"
February 1933; Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich I, 98f.,
states that according to CHL PA 1017/34, PI (W)
29 January
1934, service with the Reichskuratorium was credited as
military service for re-activated officers.
,

,

,
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the instructor training, he noted
that enrollment in the
Association's schools would be computed
on a percentage
basis: the number of students from
any military sport organization would be determined from the
number of members
in that organization in comparison to
the total of all

military sport participants in the region
in which the
organization was located. 56 The courses,
explained Stiilpnagel, would last three weeks, commencing

1

November.

57

The regional Reichskuratorium branch office
would make the
actual student allocations from lists submitted
by
local

military sport organizations, and, he added, would
arrange
transportation to and from the schools and assume all expenses.

All students, he insisted, would be screened prior

to admission to insure that they had some prior sport and

marksmanship training.

In closing his letter, the General

ennunciated his policy that political activity within the
camps and schools of the Association would not be tolerated

and would result in the immediate dismissal of the perpetrator.^^

BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32,

1932,

16

September

"Merkblatt".
57

IfZG, Fa 88/337, HJ Stabsleitung, Ref VI 16/31,
14 September 1932.
CO

BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr.

1932,

"Merkblatt".

2509/32,

16

September

.

1

58

Defense Ministry and Army Command planning
for implementing the 21 division expansion program
progressed
along with the organization of the
Reichskuratorium. The
Disarmament Conferences at Geneva had been
fruitless from
the perspective of Germany, and as early
as September 1932,
the Reich Government began to consider
going ahead with its

expansion plan on

1

April 1933 regardless of the outcome of

the talks at Geneva. 59

On

7

November Defense Minister von

Schleicher ordered the General Staff to issue the orders
authorizing the Army to increase its personnel strength by
14%.

The Army, he wrote, would enlist the extra recruits

the following April in anticipation of the later expansion
to 21 divisions. 60

The General Staff at once took advantage of the Reichs
kuratoriurn training program: recruits for the expanded

Reichswehr were expected, insofar as possible, to have completed a Reichskuratorium pre-military training course or a
similar course conducted by Reichskuratorium certified instructors.

61

The same requirement was extended, three weeks

59

letter Bredow to
BA-MA, NachlaB Bredow, N-97/1
Freiherr von Richtofen, 12 September 1932. Germany's theoretical right to re-arm was recognized on 10 December, 1932.
See Bracher, Auf losung 631
,

,

60

BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA 737/32, g.K.T2IIIB,

ember 1932.
61

Ibid.

7

Nov-

1

later, to prospective Border
Guard recruits. 62

59

The Reich

Government underscored the importance
of the Reichskuratorium
contribution to the defense effort by
approving Minister
Gayl's request63 that Reich officials
be given
furloughs

to attend the Terrain Sport
Association courses. 64

'

Although the Reich Government
enthusiastically endorsed Stiilpnagel's courses, the
reaction to the Reichskuratorium by the military sport
organizations and their

political sponsors varied.

The radical political parties

predictably condemned the Reichskuratorium
in theory but
not in practice, while the conservative
organizations and
parties supported it.

A surprising acceptance came from

the Socialists, although their enthusiasm
soon waned as

their traditional pacifism and hostility toward
the Reichswehr re-appeared.

Stahlhelm leaders, strongly committed to an extensive

military sport program of their own,

62
1

65

had initially been

Ibid., II H/292, CHL TA 816/32, g.K. T2IIIA/T4 III,

December 1932.
63

BA, R-43 11/519, letter RMdl IA 1414/15.10, to
Staatssekretar in der Reichskanzlei 12 November 1932 (Rk.
Nr. 11227).
,

64

Heeresverordnungsblat t

,

1933, para.

55,

15

February

1933.
65

Berghahn, Stahlhelm 229, 233f. For the expanded
Stahlhelm Wehrsport program, see Chapter III, pp.64ff,and
BA, R-43 11/828, Rk
9047, Notizen fur eine Unterredung mit
dem Herrn Reichswehrminister 26 September 19 32.
,

.

,

.
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skeptical of Papen and Schleicher
and had not expressed any
feelings toward either the
Reichskuratorium or the Terrain
Sport Association during the genesis
of these organizations.
By the fall of 1932, however,
Seldte and Duesterberg had
reversed their attitude toward Papen,
realizing
that he

better represented their interests than
Schleicher, with
whom their relations had been strained. 66
Following the

Reichstag vote of no-confidence of

12

September 1932 in his

Government, Papen attempted to gain the support
of the

Stahlhelm and the Nationalist Party (DNVP) by offering
Seldte a vice-chancellorship as well as control of
the

Reichskuratorium and the Voluntary Labor Service. 67

Before

anything concrete developed from this offer, Schleicher became Chancellor

(6

December 1932) and re-asserted the Army's

long standing policy of neutrality vis-a-vis the military

sport organizations, a neutrality which excluded the Stahl-

helm or any organization from assuming control of the
Reichskuratorium.
In spite of their mistrust of Schleicher, Seldte and

Duesterberg did not discourage Stahlhelm members from attending the Stiilpnagel schools.

66 Berghahn,

In practice the Stahlhelm may

Stahlhelm

,

233-37.

Seldte s interest in gaining control of
the Reichskuratorium and the Voluntary Labor Service may have
originated from Papen s overtures but at any rate, the interest became an idee fixee.
See Reichsminister Hugenberg's
letter to Seldte, 17 April 1933, in BA, R-43 11/143, "Zustandigkeitsf ragen"
Ibid.

,

2

38

1

.

1

,
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have received more than its fair share
of enrollment allocations. Total attendance for the
first Terrain Sport Association three week instructor course
(7-28
November) was

2150 men, of whom 549 or 26% were from the
Stahlhelm. 68
This appears to be a higher percentage
than that to which
the Stahlhelm was entitled; its relative
strength in the

military sport movement was only 20%.

It is possible that

the extra Stahlhelm participants were enrolled
to fill the
quota of the Reichsbanner which sent students to
Stulp,

nagel

schools only in Bavaria. 69

's

Although the National Socialists did not expressly
condemn the Reichskuratorium, their reception was distinctly cold:

An invention of the Papen Regime, to be
viewed with suspicion.... How can anyone
conceive of bringing together for a common
task Nazi and let us say Marxist organiza-

68

The figures are from Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP
2 86, who lists enrollment by group. The document from which
Vogelsang quotes, Anlage 4 of a letter of Stulpnagel to the
RMdl, 7 November 19 32, is reproduced in the appendix of
Schutzle, Reichswehr wider Nation
,

.

69

Using the estimates of 1.5 million military sport
participants (Chapter 111/64) and 314,000 Wehrstahlhelm members (Chapter 111/49)
the Stahlhelm percentage of the movement is 20.
It is possible that the 6% variance can also be
explained by the defection of many Wehrstahlhelm members to
the Nazis after January 1933, as the Stahlhelm estimate dates
from July 1933. For Reichsbanner participation in the two
Stulpnagel schools in Bavaria, see BHStA, I, MK 13828, Abt.
"Volksertuchtigung" der bay. Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
31 October 1932.
Leibesubungen, Nr. 275G.
,

,

.
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tions, as Government circles are
of doing, only Messers. Paper and thinking
Gayl
*
know. 70

Brushing aside the reservations of the
Party leaders, the ever-practical Rohm promptly
informed
his SA

commanders that the "request of the
[Reichskuratorium]
branch offices regarding [SA] attendance
at the instructor
71
training courses would be met as closely as
possible."
After acknowledging the unpalatable conditions
e.g.
a ban
on all political activity by students during
the training
(

,

courses, communal camp arrangements mixing Nazis
with Marxists)

attendant to participation, he ordered complete

compliance with Stiilpnagel's regulations, adding that the
benefits arising from the training exceeded any momentary

disadvantages

72

The SA leaders appear to have obeyed Rohm's orders

requiring maximum SA participation and strict adherence to

A front page article in the Volkischer Beobachter
Nr. 260 (Reichsausgabe)
16 September 1932, denounced the
Reichskuratorium as "eine Neugriindung der Regierung Papen,
gegen die Mifitrauen geboten ist.... Wie man es sich allerdings in den Kreisen der Regierung vorstellt, etwa
marxistische und nationalsozialistische Organisation 'zu
gemeinsamer Arbeit zusammenzuf assen bleibt das Geheimnis
der Herren Papen und Gayl."
,

1

71

BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932. "Der Aufforderung der Zweigstellen zwecks Teilnahme
an den Lehrkursen muB in moglichst hohen Zahl nachgekommen
werden."
(emphasis in original)
72
/<£

Ibid.

,
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Reichskuratorium regulations. 73

SA attendance at the first

instructor training course was
714 of

21 50 students,

or 33%,

the largest of any group and
consistent with the strength
of the SA in relation to
the military sport movement. 74
comparison to the Stahlhelm and the
Reichsbanner, the SA had
an immense advantage vis-a-vis
the Stulpnagel attendance
formula: most SA men were under
the maximum age of 26 set
by Stulpnagel, while the bulk
of the men in the Stahlhelm
and the Reichsbanner exceeded that
age.

m

In appointing Gruppenf iihrer z.h.v._
(zur besonderen

Verwendung

)

Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger as SA Liaison Officer

73

The SA, for example, asked that its members
be
permitted to wear their uniforms while in transit
to and
from Reichskuratorium courses as well as in
the students'
free time.
The Reichskuratorium replied that it would
permit, though discourage, the wearing of
paramilitary group
uniforms for students in transit, but would not
allow students to wear paramilitary uniforms, except in
extraordinary
circumstances, during leisure time. BHStA, I, MK 13832,
Reichskuratorium to all branch offices, 14 February 1933.
The Bavarian Government promptly protested the wearing
of
any uniforms. See ibid.
letter Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus
und Unterricht, Nr. VII 6847 ZA, to RMdl, 18 February 1933.
,

74

Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP 286. R6hm ordered his
SA commanders to include SS and older HJ members in their
strength calculations. See BA-NS-23/1 2 4 OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/
32, 16 September 1932.
As of September 1932, SA strength
was 446, /42, with 26,998 Motor-SA, 24,405 SS and 24,859 SA
recruits, a total of 522,304.
See ibid
OSAF I, 14 November 1932. Carsten, unaware of Stulpnagel' s percentage enrollment formula, attributes incorrectly the large SA participation to a favorable Reichswehr attitude. See his
Reichswehr and Politics, 354f.
,

,

,

.

,
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to the Reichskuratorium and the Terrain
Sport Association,
Rohm, in effect, placed him in charge
of all SA relations

with the military sport program, sponsored
by the Government,
although the SA Chief of Staff reserved "basic
policy" de-

cisions for himself. 75

Kriiger 's special task was to estab-

lish personal contact with the leaders and staff
of the

Reichskuratorium branch offices as well as the Terrain
Sport
Association.

Rohm further authorized Kriiger to contact

directly in behalf of the SA the appropriate Government
agency on questions concerning the Reichskuratorium, the

Border Guard, and the Volunteer Labor Service.

76

The Terrain Sport Association eclipsed General Vogt's
GVA

(

Gelandesport-Verbande-Arbeitsegemeinschaft

effect, rendered it superflous.

)

and,

in

Stulpnagel's attendance

formula proved disastrous for the GVA.

Several of the

groups which had belonged to the GVA withdrew,

77

apparently

75

BA, NS-23/124, OSAF Qu Nr. 2509/32, 16 September
1932; ibid
Sam. Sch/409, OSAF Qu Nr. 3388/32, 20 November
1932, "Dienstanweisung fur den Gruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin";
BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, OSAF II Nr. 2 791/32, Rohm to Rmdl,
4 October 1932.
.

76

1932,

,

BA, Sam Sch/409, OSAF Qu Nr.

3388/32, 20 November

"Dienstanweisung".
77

These were the Kyf f hauserbund, Junglandbund Reichsverband vaterlandischen Arbeiter, DHV, and the Freischar
Junger Nation. Compare this list to Chapter 111/17. It appears that at one time or another, most major Wehrsport groups
belonged to the GVA. For Stahlhelm involvement in the Bund
Jungdeutschland (the predecessor to the GVA) see IfZG, Ed-67/
For Reichs19, "Satzungen des Bund Jungdeutschland e.V."
banner-GVA cooperation, see BA, R-43 11/519, letter Vogt to
,

s

.
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convinced that their enrollment quota
in Stulpnagel's
schools would be greater if they
applied individually.
Although itself admitted to the
Reichskuratorium, Vogt
organization was apparently a fraction of
its former size,
and he quickly concluded an agreement
with Stulpnagel
which allowed him to concentrate his
energies on training
youngsters under 26 years of age, i^., those
too young to
qualify for the Reichskuratorium. Following
'

this pact,

Vogt disbanded the GVA and founded, on the
24th of November,
the German Youth Service Deutscher Jugenddienst
which in
(

)

1933 was absorbed into the Hitler Youth.

,

78

Initially the Reichskuratorium subsidies and the
free training provided by the schools of the Terrain Sport

Association appeared attractive to the Reichsbanner

,

which

also conducted its own extensive military sport program.

Reichsbanner Commander Karl Holtermann persuaded SPD leaders that participation in the Reichskuratorium allowed

Socialists, for the first time, a chance to work indirectly

with the Army, an opportunity which he categorized as having
great potential.

79

The Reichsbanner joined the Reichskura-

February 1932. A Hitler Youth circular of August
1932 indicates that the SA and the HJ, in all likelihood using the cover of the "Deutscher Volkssportverein" (Chapter
IV/94.) had once belonged to the GVA.
See IfZG, Fa 88/337,
HJ Stabsleitung Ref. VI, 1/32, 26 August 1932, Bl. 168.
Briining,

78
6

4

IfZG

,

Ed-67/19, letter Witzleben to Winterfeldt,

January 1933, Bl. 138.
79

Rohe, Reichsbanner,

449ff

,
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torium in October and sent its
meters, apparently only in
Bavaria, to at least the first and
second instructor t aining courses. 80

By December, however, official
Reichsbanner

Reichskuratorium cooperation had ended.

Socialist Party

leaders, convinced that the
Reichskuratorium was the first
step toward the re-introduction of
conscription, ordered
all Reichsbanner participation in
the Reichskuratorium and
Terrain Sport Association ended, 81
it is not clear if

Holtermann, who had tearfully argued in favor
of continuing
ties with the Reichskuratorium, actually
ordered a complete
halt to all Reichsbanner-Reichskuratorium activity.82
in

80

BHStA I, MK 13832, RMdl to Landesregierungen IA
1414/8.10, 22 October 1932; letter H6rl, Abt. Volksertuchtigung, Nr. 275G and 591G, to Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus
und
Unterricht, 31 October and 8 December 19 32.
,

,

,

81

Rohe, Reichsbann er, 449ff; Absolon, Wehrmacht im
Dritten Reich I, 9 7ff; Vorwar ts, Jahrgang 49, Nr. 435, 15
September 1932; Nr. 515, 1 November 1932; and Nr. 578, 8
December 1932.
,

82

Reichsbanner members did participate at least in
Bavaria in the second course (conducted during December)
although the SPD directive to cease participation may have
been issued too late to affect this course.
See BHStA I,
MK 13832, letters Horl to Bay. Staatsmin. fur Kultus und
Unterricht, Nrs. 591G and 743G (BHStA, I, MK 13828), 8 and
23 December, respectively.
A letter from the Reichskuratorium of 16 February 1933 states that for political reasons
the Reichsbanner may not be allowed to participate in the
fourth course (26 February-18 March 1933), which implies
that the Reichsbanner participated in the third course (22
January-1 1 February 1933).
See ibid
Reichskuratorium to
Zweigstellen 16 February 1933. This letter is signed by
Major Model, an officer then assigned to the Training
Section (T-4) of the General Staff Rangliste 1932, p. 3. ).
According to fellow Truppenamt officer and later General der
Waffen-SS Felix Steiner, Model was responsible for military
,

.

,

,

(

,

.
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any event, following the National-Socialist
take-over of
the Weimar Republic (30 January
1933), Reichsbanner participation became a moot issue, as various
state governments, followed by the Reich, outlawed
the Socialist organization. 83
The Communist Party, whose paramilitary
organization, the Red Front Fighters' League,
was banned from the

Reichskuratorium, apparently at the whim of the Papen
Government, responded with a Reichstag motion calling
for the

dissolution of the Reichskuratorium.

Communist Reichstag

Deputy Torgler and twenty others requested the motion
on
17 November 1932,

mittee

a

proposal which apparently died in com-

84

The political effectiveness of the Reichskuratorium
does not readily lend itself to assessment.

While it is

easy to criticize politicians for their lack of enthusiasm
for the one program which promised to lessen the alienation
of Germany's youth, it must be remembered that the Army, at

least initially, had presented the Reichskuratorium as a

liaison with the Reichskuratorium. See Felix Steiner, Von
Clausewitz bis Bulganin Bielefeld, 1956, 112ff.
(Hereafter
cited as Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin .)
,

83

Rohe, Reichsbanner, 459-470.

RTV, Torgler (KPD)
17 December 1932, vol. 456,
Antrag Nr. 258. There is no record of this motion ever
,

leaving committee.
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solution to a military problem, not
a political one.
This
presented grave difficulties for the
Socialists, who found
it difficult to countenance what
amounted to a violation
of the spirit of the Versailles
Treaty. Ever suspicious of
the Defense Ministry, they missed a
major opportunity to
demonstrate good will and to participate
meaningfully in
the national defense effort. Their
vacillation and reluctance to commit themselves openly to an
alliance— even
one

of convenience— with the Defense Ministry
doubtless increased

the mistrust of the officer corps for the
Party, to say

nothing of alienating considerable numbers of patriotic,

republican workers.

The Stahlhelm, with more than its

usual ineptitude, failed to seize the opportunity to take

control of the military sport project on two occasions, and

foolishly entered, for all intents and purposes, into a

rivalry with the Reichskuratorium.

Their distrust and sus-

picion of General Schleicher were manipulated by Papen and
the venal Seldte into a mesalliance with the Nazis.

Ironically, the SA profited the most from the Reichs-

kuratorium.

With their uncanny ability to use the institu-

tions of the Republic for their own benefit, i.e ., to under-

mine it, the Nazis cynically encouraged the Weimar Republic
to train their brown battalions.

The Government, of course,

welcomed the participation of the Nazis, regardless of motivation, hoping that their exposure to responsible military

and political activity would deradicalize most of the SA men.
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Just how long Hitler would have
permitted SA participation
had the Government succeeded in its
aims must remain an unanswered question, as must the question
of his successfully
carrying out that prohibition.
In assessing the military
contribution of the Reichs-

kuratorium, one must conclude that it
(and its successor,
the chef d es Ausbilduncrsw esens der SA)
was highly successful.
On the other hand, it was established

too late to ac-

complish its twin political goals of
depoliticizing the
youth of Germany and providing an alternate

"school of the

nation".

Commencing operations in the last months of the

Weimar Republic, the Reichskuratorium was simply

a

matter

of too little, too late.
Its potential, however,

as a substitute school of

the nation did not escape the Nazis.

Already thinking of

universal military sport training for the youth of Germany? 5
the Reichskuratorium provided a ready-made base from which
to expand.

Such an area of activity, moreover, appealed to

Rohm and Kruger, the SA liaison officer to the Reichskuratorium, as an ideal task for the SA once the Party came to

power.

See Chapter VII, 179ff,;
279f, 408-414.

and Hitler, Mein Kampf

,

CHAPTER

VII

RELUCTANT SURRENDER:
THE TRANSFER OF PRE -MILITARY

TRAINING TO THE SA

The advent of the Hitler regime paved the
way for
the eventual take-over of the Reichskuratorium
by the SA.

The political potential of the Reichskuratorium
had not
escaped the National Socialists, who no longer found
in-

doctrination objectionable when aimed at supporting their

new Government.

There was, moreover, no question that

Hitler planned to continue military sport training.

In

his book he had written that the Nazi state:

will have to look on post school physical
training ... as a state function, ... through
state institutions. This education in its
broad outlines can serve as a preparation for
future military service. The Army will not
have to teach the young men the fundamentals
of the most elementary drill book as hitherto,
and it will not get recruits of the present
type; no, it will only have to transform a
young man who has already received flawless
physical preparation into a soldier. 1
.

.

.

Yet despite Hitler's interest in military sport,
two factors prevented the SA from immediately assuming the

duties of the Reichskuratorium.

First, the attitude of the

Army toward the SA was problematical, and until the Army

Hitler, Mein Kampf

,

413f,

279ff,

408-411

.
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approached the SA Hitler could
ill-afford to antagonize th
soldiers.
Second, the SA had a number of
demanding and im
portant duties during the first
months of the Nazi regime.
These duties included, for example,
the usual propaganda
marches, leaflet distribution,
and assembly protection, as
well as the assigning of SA men to
serve as auxiliary
police. Not until the Nazi Regime
was finally anchored
would Rohm be able to devote his full
attention to the
future of the Reichskuratorium and
the SA military sport
program.

The National Socialists met with a mixed
reaction
from the Army. While many Reichswehr
officers were sympathetic to certain elements of the Nazi world-view,
e.g.

,

its nationalism, anti-liberal and anti-democratic
outlook,

and hierarchical organization, its very nature
as a political party compelled most officers to avoid any
public asso-

ciation with the Nazis.

2

Seeckt's doctrine of the politi-

cally impartial Army remained dogma to most soldiers.

conviction

This

the Nazis, despite strenuous efforts, never

completely undermined.

Field and general grade officers, by and large,

2 Manfred

Messerschmidt Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat
Zeit der Indoktrination Hamburg, 1969, 2-3, 17. (Hereafter
cited as Messerschmidt, Wehrmacht und NS
and Klaus-Jurgen
Muller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und Nationalsozialist isches Regime Stuttgart, 1969, 29-33. (Hereafter cited as
Muller, Heer und Hitler)
,

;

,

)

,

;

,
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exercised more restraint toward National
Socialism than did
their younger counterparts, the company
grade officers.

The

activism and radicalism of the Nazis had
little appeal to
the older officers, whose age and experience
had

taught them

to be suspicious of instant solutions.

The more perceptive

officers probably realized that even a policy of
political

neutrality was bankrupt: should the Nazis succeed in
solving

Germany's problems and becoming the first political party
to

win the loyalty of a majority of Germans, it would be extremely difficult to retain the political impartiality of
the Reichs

wehr.

Nonetheless, most senior officers tolerated what they

perceived to be a triumph of conservative, national forces,
and hoped that the Nazis would demonstrate responsibility in

their new position.

3

Younger officers, on the other hand, showed more enthusiasm for the new government than did their superiors.

Many younger officers saw the combination of the leader principle, the concern for the common welfare, and the strong

nationalism espoused by Hitler and his followers as the ans-

wer to Germany's internal unrest and weak international
position.

Hitler carefully nurtured this enthusiasm by ap-

pealing to the idealism and self-interest of his audience.
Casting off the shackles of Versailles meant military ex-

Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics
Wehrmacht und NS 2f
6f.
,

.

,

,

310; Messerschmidt

.

.

,
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pansion, which implied more
rapid promotions, always an
issue of concern to the junior
officers. 4
Of crucial importance in
determining the relationship of the Reichswehr to the
Nazi state were the appointments of Lieutenant General Werner
von Blomberg, 5 Commanding General of Military District
I (East Prussia)
and his
chief of staff, Colonel Walter von
Reichenau, 6 as Defense
Minister and Chief of the Ministry
Office Ministeramt
respectively. While the circumstances
of Blomberg' s appointment are still unclear, 7 his tour of duty in East
,

(

)

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, n.d. [Spring]
1932,
Bl. 173f.; Zgs. 326, General a.D. Eccard Freiherr
von Gablenz, Bl. 23; Bracher, Machtergreif ung 738-43; Carsten,
Reichswe hr and Politics 396; Muller, Heer und Hitler 29-33,
3 8f
,

,

,

(2878-2946), Generalf eldmarschall He entered the
army in 1897, completed the General Staff school in 1907, and
held a number of General Staff positions during the First
World War, and afterwards. He was Chief of the Truppenamt
(General Staff) from 1927 to 1930, but was transferred to E.
Prussia following difficulties with the Reichstag. He appeared
to suffer a nervous breakdown in May 1932, following the death
of his wife, and was temporarily assigned as Chief of the Military Delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conferences, an undemanding position, from which it was expected he would retire.
.

6

(1884-1942)
Generalf eldmarschall. Entering the army
in 1903, Reichenau was graduated from the General Staff school
during the First World War. After the war he held a number of
command and staff positions culminating with his appointment
as Blomberg's chief of staff in 1931. A progressive and energetic military figure, he commanded a number of armies during
the Second World War, but died of a heart attack while commanding Army Group South in Russia.
,

7

IfZG, Zgs. 37, Foertsch, Bl. 56; Zgs. 182, Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian Frieherr von Weichs, Bl. 4; Messerschmidt
Wehrmacht und NS 5; Muller, Heer und Hitler 49f.; and Vogelsang, RW-Staat-NSDAP, 375, 386f.
,

,

.
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Prussia since 1930 had kept
him from public involvement
in
or connection with politics,
a condition highly
desirable
to both Hindenburg and Hitler.
Considering the National
Socialist and German Nationalist
cabinet coalition to be
the most favorable political
solution to the instability
of the Republic, Blomberg
naively expected the politicians
to restrict themselves to
non-military activities, allowing
him and his staff the necessary
time and resources to concentrate on military affairs. 8
Blomberg

's

laissez faire attitude toward politics

was not shared by his assistant, von
Reichenau.
Introduced
to leading Nazis as early as 1931
by Ludwig Muller, then
Chaplain of Military District I, Reichenau
maintained close
and public ties to the Nazi Party. Meeting
with Hitler on
several occasions, he became an avid supporter
of National

Socialism.

9

Impressed with the dynamism and mass appeal of

the Nazi movement, Reicheanu felt that solidarity
with Nat-

ional Socialism could only benefit the Army and himself
in

BA-MA, NachlaB Stulpnagel, N-5/27, 75 Jahre 309;
Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics 394f.; Messerschmidt Wehr
macht und NS 19; Muller, Heer und Hitler 49-52; Vogelsang"
,

,

,

RW-Staat-NSDAP

,

"

,

,

375.

See, for example, Reichenau's letter of 7 April 1932
to Schleicher, BA-MA, NachlaB Schleicher, N-42/25; IfZG, Zgs
105, General d. Art. a.D. Horst von Mellenthin, Bl. 27f.;
Muller, Heer und Hitler 52-6; and Robert J. O'Neill, The
German Army and the Nazi Party London, 1968, 19. (Hereafter
cited as O'Neil, German Army
,

,

)

1

.
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the long run. 10

Personally impatient, energetic,
and am-

bitious, he was a progressive
military thinker who favored
efforts to increase Army mobility.
His colleagues considered him a trifle eccentric on
account of his preference
for civilian clothes, his anglophilia,
and his distressing
habit of accompanying lunches with
two liters of Moselle
wine 1
'

'

Reichenau's position as Chief of the Ministry
Office,
which acted as a liaison between the
Reichswehr and the Government, assumed a greater importance
on account of
the

peculiar circumstances surrounding General von
Hammers tein,
the Chief of the Army Command.

Hammerstein, clearly identi-

fied with the disgraced Schleicher, had become
an outspoken

opponent of the Nazis and he had offered to resign
when

Hitler became Chancellor.

Although Hindenburg did not im-

mediately accept the resignation, feeling perhaps that a
change of the entire military command might undermine confidence in the new government, Hammerstein knew that his

tenure of office was insecure.

Never a very energetic per-

son, he abandoned himself to his favorite pastime, hunting. 12
10 IfZG,

Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl
27f.; Messerschmidt
Wehrmacht und NS 4f.; Miiller, Heer und Hitler 53-6.
.

,

11

IfZG, Zgs.

,

37, Foertsch,

56-64; BA-MA, NachlaB
Generaloberst a.D. Ludwig Beck, N-28/3, "Fritsch Auf zeichnung,
2 January 1938; and Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin , 100.
Bl.

12 IfZG,

Zgs. 37, Foertsch, Bl. 56ff; Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl. 8; Zgs. 217, Bussche-Ippenburg, Bl. 22; Manstein,
Soldatenleben 108; Bracher, Machtergreif ung 733f; Miiller,
Heer und Hitler, 59ff; and O'Neill, German Army, 19f, 23.
,

,

)
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in what amounted to
the almost complete
absence of the Chief
of the Army Command,
Reichenau's Ministry Office
became the
central point of contact
between the Army Command and
Blomberg, with all important
matters

passing through Reichenau's

hands.

in addition, his outspoken
support and sympathy for

the National Socialist
movement, unique among the
senior
military officers, allowed him
access to Hitler.
In spite of the many different
attitudes toward the
Nazis expressed by Army officers,
there was one issue on
which all agreed: that the armed
forces of the state were
and would remain the sole agency
of national defense. 13

This issue arose from the fact
that for the first time in
German history a chancellor had his
own army, the SA.

De-

spite its role in his electoral
victories, Hitler had apparently not given much thought to the future
of his political soldiers once he gained power.

Although their deployment

as auxiliary police during the spring
of

1933™ relieved him

of the necessity for an immediate decision,
the ultimate

13 Messerschmidt,

Wehrmacht und NS, 20; Karl Martin
GraB Edgar Jung, Papenkreis und Rohmkrise 1933-34,
phil.
diss., Heidelberg, 1967, 98. (Hereafter cited as GraB,
Rohmkrise
'

,

.

14 BHStA,

IV,

Stahlhelm, Bd. 78, "Durchf uhrungsbes timmungen zum ErlaB vom 22.2 1933, betr. Hilf spolizei" Hans
Buchheim, "SA-Hilf spolizei SA-Feldpolizei und Feldj agerkorps
und die Beamtenliche Stellung Ihrer Angehorigen" in Gutachten
des Instituts fur Zeitgeschichte Munchen, 1958, 335-40. Rohm
did, on one occasion, attempt to prevent SA Hilf spolizei from
engaging in revenge and vendettas. See Volkischer Beobachter
Nr. 55, 24 February 1933; and Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the
;

,

,

,
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disposition of the SA and its
relation to the armed forces
were to prove an issue of
major concern.

Whatever his doubts concerning
the future of the SA,
Hitler had none regarding the
Reichswehr. Meeting with
leading generals and admirals
at Hammerstein' s apartment
three days after becoming
chancellor, he reassured them
that the armed forces would
remain non-political, adding
that the coming struggle for
the consolidation of the Nazi
state was not their tasfc, but that
of his party organizations.
There would be, he noted, no merger
of
the SA and

the Reichswehr.

Outlining a program sure to win their
approval, he explained that he planned
to orient his domestic
policy toward improving the disastrous
economic conditions,
crushing pacifism, and eliminating Marxism,
while simultaneously directing his efforts in foreign policy
to breaking
the shackles of the Versailles Treaty.
Such a program, he
acknowledged, presented grave difficulties, requiring the

conscription of the nation's youth in various state service
projects, and of course, the eventual re-introduction of

universal military service.

It would be the Government's

function, he added, to insure that youth was not poisoned

by Marxism and pacifism.

Concluding his two hour harangue,

he emphasized that the most dangerous period would be that

Bitter End

,

(trans.

R.

andC. Winston), Boston,

1947,

50f.,

103ff.; Grafi, Rohmkrise 99f.; Bracher, Machtergreifung
434-442; Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power, 307-317.
58,

,

,

t
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of the building of
the milltary forces
seen if France had any
statesmen, Hitler explained,
for if
so, France would at
once attack Germany. 1 5
_

^

^

Hitler's speech largely
coincided with that of Defense Minister Blomberg,
delivered earlier that morning
to
the generals. His own
goals, explained Blomberg,
consisted
of retaining the impartial
political position of the Reichswehr, making the Army a truly
useful instrument of
security,

and reinforcing the Reichswehr
by militarizing the entire
population. This last goal, he
stated, would necessitate
increasing and expanding activities
related to defense,
especially the activities of the
Reichskuratorium.
"The
man for that in the Cabinet,"
said Blomberg, "is Seldte
(his ministerial portfolio is
only provisional). Hitler's
and Seldte 's thoughts and intentions
come together in the
desire for the [greater] defensive
preparation of the populace.

:

Seldte,' explained Blomberg,

1

5

IfZG

"is just the man to carry

Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 3 February 1933,
191f.
Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl. 6.
Hitler, at this
stage in his career, was consistent in what he
said to his
generals and civilian aides, and his message to the
latter
within a week of his conference with the generals was unequivical: "Die Zunkunft Deutschlands hange ausschlieBlich
und allein vom Wiederaufbau der Wehrmacht ab. Alle
anderen
Aufgaben mussen hinter der Aufgabe der Wiederauf rustung
zurucktreten." in BA, R-43 11/1292, Rk. 1188, "Niederschrif
uber erne Sitzung des AusschuBes der Reichsreg.lerung fur
Arbeitsbeschaf fung in der Reichskanzlei" 9 February 1933,
Di
Bl.

'

;

,

Bl.

9.
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out this task together
with us soldiers." 16
in other words, as General
Liebmann wrote in a secret
letter to the subordinate
commanders of his 5th Division,
the attitude of the Army
to the youth training and
military

sport associations would
change.

it was, he noted,

the wish

of both the Chancellor and
the Defense Minister that
the
armed forces henceforth would
participate at once in discussions with the relevant groups
on this issue. 1 7

Hitler and Blomberg were not the
only ones who had
given thought to a semi-military
training program for the
nation's youth. Gruppenf uhrer Kruger,
the
ambitious SA

representative to the Reichskuratorium
and de facto head
of the SA military sport program,
drafted a proposal calling
for the establishment of a "German
Military Sport Office",
an agency similar to that suggested
by Seeckt in 1925. 18

Kruger recommended that the Government
organize the
new office to direct all youth physical fitness
and military
sport training. The current military sport activities
of

the SA and the Stahlhelm would, he wrote, remain
essentially

1

6

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 3 February 1933.
"Der Mann dazu im Kabinett ist Seldte (Minister-Portef euille
nur vorlaufig). Hitlers und Seldtes Denken und Wollen munden
im Wunsch auf Wehrhaftmachung des Volkes. Minister [Blomberg]
bezeichnet Seldte als geeigneten Mann dafur, im Verein mit uns
Soldaten diese Aufgabe durchzuf iihren " Bl. 188f.
.

1

7'

Ibid
draft of a secret letter from Liebmann to his
5th Division subordinate commanders, 6 February 1933, Bl
193.
.

,

.

18 IfZG,

1933, Bl.

Fa-90/2, "Vorschlag, Grundgedanke"
131-143.

,

19

February

unaffected by this office

.
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^^

^

would be to centralis
and standardize all
fitness and
tary sport programs,
especialiy those conducted
by organizations outside the "national
movement"
Coordinating the
activities of these groups,
he noted, would be the
function
of the Reichskuratorium.
GroU ps which presently
supervised
military sport training in
the spirit of
.

the "new" Germany,

he hastened to add, would
have the complete support
of the
purported military sport office,
but those organizations
hostile to the new course would
be ruthlessly and inexorably disbanded. 19
In effect, Kruger envisioned
an agency

(with a promi-

nent position reserved for
himself) supervising the military
sport activities of an otherwise
autonomous SA and Stahlhelm, and a subordinate Rei
chskuratorium, training over
250,000 adolescents per year. The Chief
of the Military
Sport Office, attached to the Defense
Ministry with a rank
analogous to State Secretary and equivalent
to the Chief
of the Ministry Office, would receive
instructions from and
be responsible to a committee composed of
the Chancellor
and the Ministers of Defense, Air Transport, and
Labor.

In

carrying out its duties, added Kruger, the Military
Sport

Office would "... establish the bases for the subsequent ex-

pansion of the armed forces and, within the framework of the

9 Ibid.,

Bl.

132-35
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m

restrictions of the [Versailles]
fVer« a
aB peace
treaty, make preparations for universal military
„, c „
service
XVice "20 His
presumptio
in suggesting that he
be given a position
comparable to
State Secretary and elevated
to head an agency that,
in
effect, would supervise
Rohm was rivaled only by his
naivete in believing that the
Defense Ministry, the SA, the
Stahlhelm, and the Reichskuratorium
would all meekly abdicate their individual pretensions
to the control of a program of the greatest importance
to the state
i

*

and the Army.

Although Kruger apparently prepared
his report at
Rohm's insistence, it appears that
the SA Chief of Staff
was unable to act immediately upon
its

suggestions, in all

likelihood owing to his pre-occupation
with the consolidation of Nazi power. 21 Officers in the
Defense Ministry,
however, sensed the increasing importance
of military
sport activities and began efforts to
insure that Franz
Seldte would direct any program that might
be established.

That Seldte should direct the military sport
effort

would have appeared only natural to the Defense
Ministry,
especially after Blomberg's warm endorsement of

20

3

February.

"Das D [eutsche] W. [erhsport] A. [mt] stellt...
die Grundlage fur spatere Wehrmachterweiterungen
her und
bereitet im Rahmen der heute durch den Friedensvertrag
gezogenen Grenzen die allgemeine Wehrpflicht vor." Bl. 143.
2

IM^-/

.

1

BA, Nachla/3 Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme zur 'Niederiiber den Chef des Ausbildungswesens
10 October
"
1935, Bl. 1f. (Hereafter cited as "Stellungnahme".)
For
some idea of Rohm's activities during this period, see foot-

schrift

'

,

note 13, this chapter.

182

^

^

Moreover, Seldte, in his
capacity of
trolled the Voluntary
Labor Service, a growing
activity in
which the Stahlhelm had
participated and which the
Army had
seen as a constant
to its military sport
program." But
perhaps most important, he
still headed the Stahlhelm,
Which not only equaled the
SA in size, but was composed
of
the right" sort of people
(Hindenburg was an honorary
member) , and it pursued its
own active military sport
program.
Finally, the Nazis were still
a minority i„ the Cabinet
with a seemingly uncertain
future and to turn over to
the
SA the responsibility for
the military sport training
effort
would have appeared irresponsible
to Blomberg.
Certainly
few outside of the Nazi Party
believed that Hitler would
soon drive out or neutralize his
coalition comrades.
On the 4th of March Hindenburg
appointed Seldte
Chairman of the Reichskuratorium, 23
thus transferring effective control over the military
sport program from the Reich

Interior Ministry to the

Labor Ministry.

The importance

of this transfer became apparent two days
later upon the

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, "Schleicher als
C
ler "' DSC
1932
B1
186; letter Schleicher to Papen
m™
RWM 486/32, g.W.V. , 17 October 1932 (reproduced in
SchutzleT
R eichswehr wider Nation appendix); and Kreuzzeitung
Nr 351
17 December 1932.
The Nazis also saw the Labor Service as a
preparatory step towards military service. See Hans-Henning
Freiherr von Grote, Konstantin Hierl; Oberst a.D. Staats sekreta r fur den Arbei tsdiens t Per Mann und sein Werk Berlin
.

^?5

*

'

'

,

,

.

•934/

4

55f

'

,

•

23 BA, R-43
11/519,
March 1933.

Rk.

2487, ErlaB des Reichsprasidents
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unexpected death of Genera!
von StUlpnagel.
Seldte and
Blomberg, in compliance
with the Cabinet directive
of 12
September 1932, recommended
Captain
(Ret
r-„„
^ aiI1 ^Ket.j
Georg von Neuf2
ville ^ as stiilpnagel s
d
succe^nr
u- u
successor, +-o
to which
Hindenburg
assented on 16 March. 25
)

•

Although Neufville made the
obligatory promise to
work closely „ ith all mllitary
sporfc organizations 26
_

^

fact remains that the
Stahlhelm had taken over, with
the
active support of the Defense
Ministry, the state-sponsored
military sport program, a
program which the new Chancellor
had already indicated would
be enlarged.
Indeed, by the
middle of March, Seldte, in
his triple capacity of Reich
Labor Minister, Stahlhelm
Bundesfuhrer, and Reichskuratorium
chairman was in apparent control
of most youth oriented

military training programs.

Being on excellent terms with

the Defense Ministry, he appeared
to be "just the man."
Seldte and Blomberg wasted no time in
attempting to
consolidate Seldte -s control of youth
training programs.

~

41?)

Rittmeister a.D. The former leader of
aM
;
2
stahlhelm
Landesverband
Baden-Wiirttemberg, Neufville, after
q,

(

,

1

,

'

the disolution of the Reichskuratorium,
joined the Chef AW
R ^ ferent with the rank of Standartenfiihrer
In March
iyjb, he was appointed to lead the newly-created
OSAF Ausbildungsabteilung. Apparently re-joining the army, he fell
in action in Russia in 1941.
.

25 BHStA,

MK 13832, Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertuchtigung, Der Geschaf tsf uhrende President, Nr. 4169 a
18,
to Bay. Staatsmin. d. Innerns, 24 March 1933.
26ibid.

I,

•
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At Blomberg-s request

Dr

^ ^^
^^

„ alter Kayser( a
h±gh ievei
servant wo rking ln
Relchenau s
,

.

,

^

cerning the

feasiMUty

of organizing

aH

Government-spon-

sored youth programs
under . singlg
shortages, poor organization,
dupUoatlon, and bureaucratic
red tape characterized
current Government subsidized
youth

proems,

Kayser su gg ested establishing
a Reich Youth MinIt would, he explained,
have four

istry.

sections: the

Reichskuratorium (greatly expanded)
Services division, the Labor
ing division.

m

,

a Youth Employment

Service, and a Physical Train-

contrast to the existing
haphazard arran g ements, he argued that
a youth ministry could
rationally
dove-tail all youth programs
with proposed mobilization

measures.

The Youth Minister, for reasons
unexplained by
Kayser but perhaps reflecting a
hint from Blomberg, would
also act as either Reich Labor
Minister or Prussian Minister for Academics, Art, and
Education. 27

Urging that a special commission be
created to study
and organize the proposed youth
ministry, Blomberg forwarded
Kayser -s report to the Chancellory, the
Reich Interior and
Labor Ministries, and the Prussian Ministry
for Academics,

27

oZZ

I

o-,-,

o

i

7-23

G ' MA" 260 ' KWM 1630/33 W.F.,

18

March

1

933, Bl.

.

**.

and Bducation

-

^

^

^
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^

discussed ideas reseinbUng
Biombergis propQsa
^
nothing concrete appears
to
come
oept the approval of
the Labor Servlce

eventual

Hitler rejected

^

^

^
^

„

^

^

youth Ministry demonstrated
that both the SA and
the Reichs° bSerVed 3
f° r
* comprehensive youth training
program a„ d that both had
specif ic, although confUctlng
.deas regarding the
organization of youth military
sport
programs 30

"~

,

'

Blomierg meanwhile lost no
time in expanding the
activities of the Reichskuratorium.
In an order of „ ftprll
to Reichswehr commanding
generals, General Wilhelm
Adam

„

to Dr
.

Ibl 3Bl. 6227822f. ; BA, R-43 IT/sio
Lammers, Rk. 3054, 18 March 1933
(V

n^

,

'

?

v
Kay se r

4
5
e k
Chefb ^Prechung unter
dem VorsIt^des Lrrn
Herrn
ReI
c
f
Reichskanzlers
am 4. April 1933"
pv
»,.., ,7
,,ftQ/,5
3509/33;
Vol kischer Beobacht er Nr.
95, 5 April 1933.

hI^

'

,

3°

K
er claimed that Rohm had long
forseen him as h^r\
f^
of 4.u
the youth program (BA, NachlaB
Kruger/L,
hlle Blomb ^g's remarks of 3 February "Steilunqnahme"
and Kavser's
vl\Z J" 8
8a leaVe littlS d ° Ubt ^at'thf L^c'h
wehr
s3d?r?° ; h
Blomber
g's curious remark of
3 Februarv
* ,*^* heading
Seldte's
Y/ tltt
the
Labor Ministry was only
?
iJZSZ
temporary, xmplxes
that both Blomberg and Seldte had already
given thought to a Youth Ministry. This
is confirmed in a letter
tter
r
U
e
t0 Se dtS in WhiCh thS f ° rmer Petulfnily
pi aTns that
plains
?h^ »?
T
\[Seldte] Absicht, ein Ministeriumcot
"Es war Ihre
ftir
^beitsdienst zu ubernehmen" nicnt aber
1St 1Um< Sie haben dieS in eine Unterhaltung...
trk^J?
Sie das Ar beitsministerium vorlaufig als
solches
«u
J'
ubernehmen...." BA, R-43 11/143, letter Hugenberg
to Seldte,
'

}

Sv^Wd

-

\

^iTrZT^T
Tc f
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(Chief of the General Staff)

explained that the Reichskura-

torium would sponsor, during
the coming summer, an
increased
nUmb6r ° f miUtar S
^ P°^ encampments.
Noting that neither
the Reichskuratorium nor
the para-military organizations
(the SA and the Stahlhelm)
could provide a sufficient
number
of instructors for these
new encampments, he ordered
each

Military District to provide about
40 sergeants or corporals
for this duty.
Stressing that commanders should
select

competent men, he added that those
chosen would attend a
special training course to be conducted
by the Reichskuratorium during early May. 31

Apparently the soldiers did not think
highly of this
duty, for a week later Hammerstein
reminded all
commanders

that the Army Command placed the highest
value on military
sport training. To suppress any doubts,
he stated that
from the 1st of May, all recruits for the
Border Guard-East

would be required to complete

a

military sport course prior

to receiving any military training.

Noting that familiariz-

ing recruits with military weapons took relatively
little
time in comparison to marksmanship training which could just
as easily be provided in a military sport course, he con-

cluded that "the Army Command hopes that every soldier upon
enlistment is ready to begin immediately combat training

31

13 April

BA-MA, WK VII/2188, CHL TA 261/33 g.Kdos. T4 III,
1933.

'
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with [his] weapon." 32
While Blomberg and
Seldte were expanding
the activities of the Reichskuratorium
and ensconcing Seldte
authority over military
sport training, RShm was
Dre 0 cc U pied
with the "coordination"
of the state governments.
He had
however, by no roeans
..

^

^

^

Reichskuratoriu, as a preparatory
step to an increased
role for his SA in military
affairs. 33 Although aware
Qf
Seldte's improved position,
there was little Rohm could
do
to block the Stahlhelm
leader,
aside from making threatening noises, 34 untll the
completion Qf

^^

^

32-r
.^.Ihid-,
CHL TA 262/33, g. Kdos. T4 III,
21 April
1
Strebt « n ' daB eder Soldafmxt
3
sein^m Dienstantntt
seinem
Dienst'T
so vorgebildet ist, daB bei der
Trucoe8
Gef eoht
mit d4r Waf
warden

^^

kannf"'
33

—^-g

fe^"^"^

Nac

a K ^ger/9a
"Stellungnahme" According
^
|^
... SA sich unmittelbar nach der Machtergreifung
ZU befassen und den Anspruch auf
FUhrnia^nf
h
6 1
d
^^^tarischen Ausbildung geltend
"
p
zu machen.
Das Prasidum des Reichskuratoriums fur Jugendertuchtigung wurde daher im Fruhjahr 1933 von der
Obersten SA-Fuhrung beansprucht und als erstes damaligen
greifbares Ziel
fur die Betatigung der SA im Sinne der Landesverteidigunq
ins
Auge gefaBt." Bl. 1f. See further IfZG, Fa-88/337,
Hitlerjugend, Stabsleitung/Ref VI, 1/32, vertraulich, 26
August
1932, which states that universal, mandatory Wehrsport programs
will be set up in the "Third Reich". Bl. 167ff.

Kriiapr
to Kruger,

™L

,

£

x^r

.

^ ^

34 BA, NS-23/124,
OSAF I, Nr.

751/33, 18 March 1933.
Rohm stated that new guidelines (presumably his own) would
follow for selection of the students for Reichskuratorium
courses.
Evidence does not indicate if new regulations were
ever issued.

"

.
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Power in April.

He did order KrUger,
in

Penary,

to prepare for the SA take-over
of the Reichskuratorium, 35
but
Kruger made no visible
progress except for attending
a
conferenoe in mid-April during
which ali participants (SA
and Stahlhelm leaders,
as well as Neufville and
the Reichskuratorium direotors) merely
agreed that military

.

sport

courses were of great importance
and required more subsidization 36

To a certain extent, Kruger's
lack of visible progress
in his discussions with
Reichskuratorium leaders
can perhaps

be explained by the fact that
from outward appearance, he
was negotiating from a position
of weakness.
Seldte and

Neufville, unaware that Hitler planned
to turn on his coalition allies once the Nazis had
eliminated their potentially dangerous foes, saw no reason
to enter into conversations with Kruger. Nonetheless, Kruger's
lack of progress
in his conversations with Seldte and
the leaders of the

Reichskuratorium did not really matter.

In any question of

jurisdiction concerning Nazi Party affairs, the
final arbiter
was Hitler, whose decision in this episode was
predictable.

35 BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a,
36 Volkisc her

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

2.

Beobachter Nr. 103/104, 13-14 April
A budget, expanded or not, was necessary, as the
original Reichskuratorium budget ran only through
March
See IfZG, Thilo Vogelsang, "Der Chef des
Ausbildunqs wesens
unpublished MS (15pp.), p. 1.
1933.

,

'
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As the Nazis consolidated
their power, RShm moved
to eliminate or render impotent
all paramilitary
organizations except
the SA.
B y the end of April
it was public knowledge
that
the Stahlhelm would shortly
lose its independence,
becoming
subordinate, in some as yet
unknown fashion, to the SA.37
There could no longer be any
question that the SA would inherit control of all pre-military
training programs.
With his own future made secure
by this recent turn
of events, Kruger traveled
in early May to Geneva with
SS
Gruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, Chief
of the SS Security
Service.
Officially, Kruger and Heydrich
went to Geneva as
SA and SS representatives,
respectively, to represent the
Nazi Party at the Disarmament
Committee discussions, but
the third member of their delegation,
Rudolf Hess, did not
accompany them. It is possible, but
unlikely, that the
trip was merely an excuse to get the
prickly Kruger out of
town in an effort to facilitate the
discussions between the
SA and the Stahlhelm over the future of
the Reichskuratorium.
For one reason, Heydrich was too valuable
an assistant to

Himmler to waste on a wild goose chase, and for
another
reason, less expensive pretexts could have been found
to

There had been some difficulties between the SA and
the Stahlhelm since February, and by the end of April, it
was
clear that the Stahlhelm would shortly lose its independence.
See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 19 April 1933; Berghahn,
Stahlhelm 263-267; and Hans Buchheim, "Die Eingliederung des
Stahlhelms in der SA" in Gutachtendes Instituts fur Zeit geschichte Munchen, 1958, 370-77.
,

,

,

,
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exclude Kruger from the
talks with the Reichskuratorium.
in all likelihood, the
Krliger-Heydrich mission was
either
a crude attempt to
intimidate the delegations to
the Dis-

armament Conference or a by
no means unique example of
Nazi exuberance and enthusiasm
in the first months of the
Hitler Regime. Whatever the
purpose for their presence in
Geneva, Kruger and Heydrich left
an unpleasant impression 38
During Kruger »s absence from
Berlin,
.

his chief of

staff, Helmut Wahmann,39 assisted

R6hlR/

whQ nQw

&

more personal and active role in
the discussions with Neufville over the future of the
Reichskuratorium. On 5 May,
Lt. Col. Walter Model, the
Reichswehr liaison officer to
the Reichskuratorium, met with

Wahmann.

Allegedly speaking

for Neufville, Model stated that
once the SA had assimilated

kruger and Heydrich created a sensation by
appearnn ,
uniform during conference sessions. Expressing
ihf
anti-Semitism of the Hitler Reqime, they shock^
a t
ed Ambassador
Nadolny by demanding that the Delegation's interpreter be immediately replaced, claiming that
his
ishness offended them. Another ugly scene followed "jewwhen
Kruger discovered that the Delegation neither
possessed nor
riew a Swastika flag. In his report to R6hm, Kruger
urged
that the members of the Delegation be dismissed.
They had,
he claimed, lost all touch with the Fatherland and
should
be replaced by men more sympathetic to the "new"
course.
See Ba, Nachla/3 Kruger/15, Report to Rohm, 12 May 1933
It
is perhaps no coincidence that within a week after
the return of Kruger and Heydrich to Germany, Hitler made his 17
May Reichstag "peace" speech, aimed at dampening fears of
resurgent German militarism. For the speech, see footnote
47, this chapter.
,

S

^

.

39 A member of the SA since February
1932, he served
as adjutant, then staff leader under Kriiger's Gruppenstab

z.b.V., and became chief of staff of the Chef des Ausbildungswesens in 1933. Allegedly an alcoholic, who frequently required "drying out", he joined the SS in 1935 with Kruger.

.
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the Stahlhelm, the
Reichskuratorium would place itself
under
the SA and recognize Rohm
as the organizer of all
non-military

defense preparations. «>

it is not certain why
Neufville

adopted this position, but perhaps
he drew the proper conclusions from Seldte-s visibly
weakened position vis-a-vis
the SA,H which apparently even
Blomberg recognized, as the
Army certainly offered no objections
to Neufville's proposal

Two days later, Neufville personally
repeated his
offer, first to Rohm in a private
conversation,
then to

Wahmann, Model, and Reichskuratorium
Executive Secretary

Major (Ret.) von Olberg.

Neufville stated that there could

only be one agency for non-military defense
preparations,
the SA.
Rohm explained that he envisioned
a role

for the

Reichskuratorium as a liaison office between the Reichswehr
and a putative SA Ministry, adding that he would fill
in

more details following Hitler's awaited decision concerning
the SA Ministry.

Although he had indicated that there might

40 IfZG, Fa-90/1

Bl.

,

letter Wahmann to Kriiger,

2f.
1

5

May 1933,

In addition to his difficulties with the SA, by the
end of April Seldte had lost control of the Labor Service to
Col. (Ret.) Konstantin Hierl.
See the concluding chapter of
Kohler's Arbeitsdien st Berghahn, Stahlhelm , 252f.; Bracher,
Machtergreifung 206-208; and Paul Meier-Benneckenstein (ed.),
Dokumente der Deutschen Politik ,!, Berlin, 1935, Nr. 86,
Erklarung des Staatssekretars fur den Arbeitsdienst Hierl
iiber die Aufgaben
des Arbeitsdienstes"
248-252. (Hereafter
cited as Dokumente der dt. Politik.)
;

,

,
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be some role for the
Reichskuratorium, Rohm went on
to
state bluntly that some of
its personnel were flatly
unacceptable. These were, he said,
people with whom his SA
men simply could not work,
which necessitated the immediate
dismissal of the personnel in
question. 42 Neufville assented, stating that he would
quickly take care of this matter.
He then asked Rohm to name a SA
leader as OSAF Deputy to
the Reichskuratorium, who
would also simultaneously serve
as its vice-president.
Rohm agreed to this suggestion,
but
added that only Kriiger, on account
of his past ties to the
Reichskuratorium, could be considered for
this post, and

suggested that Neufville discuss this
position with him. 43
After the meeting had ended and the
Reichskuratorium
participants had left, Rohm told Wahmann that "...
this

42

Rohm did not mention anyone by name, but perhaps
he had in mind Lt Col. (Ret.) August Horl,
the Munich region
al office director.
He had drawn the fire of the Franconian
bA leader v. Obernitz, who alleged that Horl,
prior
had been anti-Nazi. Horl vainly defended himself, to 1933
but Obernitz insisted on his removal, claiming that Horl, as a
Reichs
kuratonum leader, "...die SA benachteiligte und die systemtreuen Verbande oder Organisationen bevorzugte, [and he] hat
in unserem Reich an fuhrenden Stellung nichts mehr zu suchen.
Im Namen der ganzen frankischen SA bitte ich
den Oberstleutnant Horl so schnell wie moglich verschwinden zu lassen."
See BHStA, I, MK 13843, Bay. Staatsmin. f.Kultus und Unterricht, VII, 13821, to Horl, 13 April 1933; Horl's reply in
MK 13874, 21 April; and Obernitz 's letter, Nr. 7292/32 [sic],
24 August 1933. The final disposition of Horl's case is urP
clear, but his name does not appear again, so it is likely
that he was dismissed.
.

.

43 IfZG, Fa-90/1, Bericht Nr. 1
Wahmann' s 5 May letter to Kriiger, Bl.

(7

5f.

.

.

May), attached to
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Neufville is an

indigent

and nice fellow, and
that s why
he m ust be ruthlessly
e U,» inated . .44
Perplexed/ he askefl
,

wahmann if Neufville always
surrounded himself with "ruins"
such as Olberg. 45
Model, Olberg, and Wahmann
met on the 9th of May to
discuss the plans of the
Reichswehr to utilize military
sport training. Model
explained that in accordance
with
its expansion plan, the
Army needed as many military
sport
program graduates as possible.
He added that graduates of
the Reichskuratorium and SA
military sport courses would
receive training in the use of
military weapons. Further
details and information concerning
weapons training, he
noted, would be provided at a
later date by the Defense
Ministry. 46

Blomberg partially addressed this
problem

a

week

later, on 17 May, agreeing to
transfer sufficient small
arms to the SA for "... its training
and its domestic

political tasks...." with the explicit
understanding that
44

Ikidw "... der Neufville ein ganz
netter Kerl sei und gerade darum riicksichtlosgescheiter und
gleichgeschaltet werden musse." Bl. 6.
45
46
10

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

,

Bericht Nr.

May 1933, Bl. 12-15.

2

of letter Wahmann to Kriiqer,
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all such weapons

refined Reichswehr property"

Although
issuing Army weapons to the
SA implied recognition
of a SA
role in national security
affairs, Blomberg buttressed
his

position by securing a decree
from Hitler asserting the
primacy of the Reichswehr
in all defense issues.
Hitler
further emphasized the authority
of the Reichswehr by subordinating the Labor nxiubtry,
Ministrv still
efiii nominally
r™ n responsible
for the Reichskuratorium
and fitness training
•

programs, to

the Defense Ministry in all
matters relating to military
sport and youth fitness programs. 48

Nonetheless, with the existence of
the Reichskuratorium in doubt, its subordination
to the Defense Ministry
had little meaning and without
establishing some form of
control and supervision over the weapons
given
to the SA,

the Army might as well have relinquished
all its claims to
the weapons loaned the SA.
Blomberg solved both these

47

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bef ehlshaberbesprechung, 1 June 1933.
"... fur ihre Ausbildung und
inre mnerpolitischen Aufgaben
" Bl.
199f. Cf. Hitler's
Peace Speech" of the 17th of May, in which he stated
Aufgabe, daB die SA und SS der nationalsozialistischen "Die
Partei in irgendeiner Beziehung zur Reichswehr in dem
Sinne
stunde, daB es sich urn militarisch ausgebildete Bestande
Oder Reserven der Armee handeln wiirde, ist unwahr.
... Ihr
[SA] Zweck war und ist ausschlieBlich die
Beseitigung der
kommunistischen Gefahr, ihre Ausbildung ohne jede Anlehnung
an das Heer nur berechnet fur Zwecke der Propaganda, der
Aufklarung, der psychologischen Massenwirkung, des Niederbrechens des kommunistischen Terrors." Dokumente der deuts chen Politik, I, Nr. 35, Hitlers Friedensrede im Reichstaq,
17 May 1933, 9ff.
48 IfZG,

Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen,

1

June 1933.
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problems in early June by
agreeing with Kruger to
disband
the Reichskuratorium and
to allow the SA, under
what amount
ed to Army supervision,
to assume sole responsibility
for
all military sport training.
Reiohenau concurred. 49
Blomberg's support for the SA
at the expense of the
Stahlhelm, a reversal of his
position in February, was
dictated by circumstances beyond
his control. The equality
in the "national" movement
that Blomberg had assumed in
February between the SA and the
Stahlhelm, which had never
existed in the minds of Hitler and
his followers, had disappeared by June. Moreover, the Defense
Minister abandoned
his earlier hopes that the Reichswehr
could remain apolitical.
During a conference on
June with his division commanders, he stated that the era of
political parties had
run its course, adding that "being
apolitical now is over
1

{for us]

and there remains only one

[course of action]:

to

support the national movement with all devotion." 50
The Defense Ministry solved several related
problems

by acknowledging the SA as the sole military sport
training
agency.

By dealing directly with Kruger rather than a

number of military sport groups, the Reichswehr greatly

49

BA, Sam Sch/421, letter Kruger to Reichenau, K/P,
Qu 1538/33, 19 June 1933. Bl. 2.
3U IfZG, Ed-1/1-2,
Liebmann Notizen, 1 June 1933,
"Jetzt ist das unpolitisch sein vorbei und es bleibt nur
eins: der Nationalen Bewegung mit aller Hingabe zu dienen."
Bl. 199.

)
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simplified its responsibilities
for control and supervision
Moreover, by channeling the
SA into pre-military
training,
the Defense Ministry hoped
to satiate SA claims to
a meaningful role in national
defense affairs, 51 while
8lmultane _
ously providing an activity
for considerable numbers
of unemployed SA men. 52
It is unlikely that Blomberg
and Reichenau handed
the SA the task of pre-military
training without some misgivings. They feared, with some
justification, that SA

leaders might see military sport
activities as a pretext
for a greater voice for the SA
in defense preparations.
Nonetheless, Army leaders were hardly
in a position to do
otherwise, for their own 14% expansion
and increased training commitments 53 left most Reichswehr
units short of ex-

5

l^ m

NachlaB Beck N-28/3, Fritsch Auf zeichnung;
»
NachlaBn Stulpnagel, N-5/27, 75 Jahre, 350;
Bracher, Machtergreiiun g, 945ff. ; Messerschmidt , Wehrmacht und
NS
poller, He«£jmidjmiep 91. Many SA men believed 35; and
themselves
to be the vanguard of a new peoples' army.
See HA, f 1876
OSAF, Stellvertreter-Sud, November 1930; f.
1874, SA Generalmspekteur, 453/31, 17 December 1931.

n

'

'

.

f

52 Kruger's

Wehrsport organization, when disbanded in
mot
1935, employed over 10,000. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Nieder-

schrift

iiber den

Chef des Ausbildungswesens" by General Fromm,
Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935. For the problem of SA
unemployment,
see HA, f. 1547, PND 741, 9 July 1931; f. 1874, SA Generalinspekteur, 453/31, 17 December 1931; Engelbrechten, Braune
Armee 122f., 190ff; and Heinrich Bennecke, Die Reichswehr un d
die "Rohmputsch" Munchen, 1 964, 37f. (Hereafter cited as
Bennecke, Rohmputsc h.
,

,

,

53

In addition to normal recruit training activities,
expanded by 14% in 1933, the Army Command had assigned a further
264 officers and 792 men as Border Guard instructors. An additional 45 officers and some 150 men were scheduled to train
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perienced instructors.

To drain .ore instructors
for military sport training from
units already committed to
an ex-

panded recruit training effort
would cause immense difficulties, and to relinquish or
curtail the pre-military
training program meant effecting
corresponding changes in
or abandoning the expansion
and mobilization plans of
1929.
Thus someone had to be given
the task of pre-military train,
ing, and in spite of possible
misgivings, the evolution of
the Nazi state by June 1933 left
Blomberg and Reichenau
little choice but to turn to Kruger
54
and the SA.

Other Nazi Party organizations at
that time apparently did not openly question
Kruger' s title to military
sport

activities, although Baldur von Schirach, 55
the Hitler

university students, but it is not certain if this
commitment were carried out. See BA-MA, II H/139 latter
CHL TA
232/33, T2 IIIA/T4 III, 10 April 1933, and CHL Ta'300/33
g.K., T4 III, 11 April 1933, and Chapter VIII, 216ff.
54

Bracher, Machtergreif una 886; and O'Neill, German
Army, 33f
state that the SA was given control of the premilitary training program in return for acknowledging the
authority of the Reichswehr in all defense related matters.
While the Defense Ministry may have promoted the idea that
pre-military training was assigned the SA as a quid pro quo
the over-extension of the Reichswehr' s training capacities
suggests that Blomberg and Reichenau simply made the best of
a necessary bargain.
,

.

,

,

55 (1907-1974)

He joined the NSDAP (Nr. 17251) in 1925
while a university student, and became Reich Leader of the
National Socialist German Students' League in 1928. In 1931
he was named Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP and Reich Leader
of the Hitler Youth in 1932. He became Gauleiter of Vienna
in 1940 and remained there until 1945.
.
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Youth Leader, and Hans von
Tschammer and Osten,56 the
Reich
Sport Commissar, both contested
his claims to control all
youth fitness programs. During
the spring of 1933, Schirach
and Tschammer und Osten had
methodically eliminated or taken
over most non-Party youth and
sport organizations, including
some with military sport
interests. 57 Schirach attempted
to
become Reich Youth Commissar, an
ambition which Tschammer
und Osten and Rohm resolutely opposed. 58
Schirach eventually

ColmTllssloned a lieutenant in the
Saxon
Armv in I9n? Zl
i
TSCha er Was invalided in 1919 with
a lame
riaht
right Lll
hand, ia war injury. He administered
estates after his
discharge, and served as leader of the
Jungdo in Saxony until
in ^30 (Nr. 205742) and held a
number of
nV?a
SA positions in Dresden until
1933, when he was
Mar
Reich
-PortskoMnissar
in the R^ich InM nl^ Y He *5
became Reic h Sport Leader in July 1933,
hfi^ ?!
an^
I position until
and held
that
his death in 1943.

L
™

^

Sof

'

^

1

.

57

See Baldur von Schirach, Ich Gla ubte an Hitler,
HamU
9
176 ~ 181
191-195. HereiTte-r cited as Schira ch
kZ'
t
Ich Glaubte;
Dokumente der dt. Politik, T, Nr. 96, Frick
speech of 9 May 1933 on Tschammer s "duties,
307; Herbert
Michaelis und Ernst Schraipler, Ursachen und Folgen. Vom
deutschen Zusammenb ruch 1918 bis zur staatlichen Neu ordnuna
Deutschlands in der Gegenwart Frankfurt-, n r\
t'y/"'mv
oo'^q
Order banning the GroBdeutsche Jugendbund [Trotha group] and'
the ReichsausschuB der deutschen Jugendverbande [Vogt group],
23 June 1933, 518; Hajo Bernett, Nationalsozialistische
Leibeserziehungen. Eine Dokumentation ihrer Theorie und
Organisation, Schorndorf, 1966, 177f.; Hajo Bernett, Sport politik im Dritten Reich Schorndorf, 1971, 25-31; HansChristian Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ. Wege und Irrwege
einer Generation Koln, 1968, 283-6; and Jiirgen Dieckert, Die
Turner j ugendbewegun g Schorndorf, 1 968, 1 1 1-121.

£V

'

•

,

.

.

f

,

,

,

C O
JO
IfZG, Fa-90/1, letters Wahmann to Kruger, 5 May, 10
May 1933. Bl 4, 10; BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, letter Wahmann to
Kruger, 11 May 1933; and Schirach, Ich Glaubte, 186ff., 190f.
.

.
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triumphed, but his
appointment as Reich youth
d
not resolve the
jurisdictional problem over
youth fitness
program, because the activities
of the Labor Service,
the
Heich Sport Com.issar,
and the SA, all of which
over-lapped,
remained unaffected by
Schirach's new

^^^^ ^

title.

With the seizure of the
Reichskuratorium by the SA
imminent, Neufville made one
last attempt to

save his posi-

tion.

He suggested to Reichenau,
on 17 June, that the

Reichskuratorium should continue
"as the central training
agency of the paramilitary
groups

(SA ,

National Socialist Motorized
Corps)

SS, Stahlhelm,

«.™

and

Kruger would, he

wrote, be named chief of staff
of the Reichskuratorium,
and Captain von Bernuth, a regular
officer assigned to the
Defense Ministry, would become the
military chief of the
Reichskuratorium, a new position upon
which Neufville did
not elaborate. 61

Reichenau informed Kruger of his conversation
with
Neufville, which prompted Kruger to reply

two days later in

an angry missive "... that Neufville

5

's

proposal is an unac-

Wumente

der dt. Politik, I, Nr. 33, "Verfiigung
Adolf Hitlers uber die Ernennung des Jugendf
uhrers des
h
elCheS
17 6 1933 "' 65f "' Stachura, Nazi
Youth? ^99f
'

'

'

-

60

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, Reichenau' s notes, "Besprechung am 17.6 [1933] mit Neufville als Vorschlag"
Written
on the bottom of the notes is [Reichskuratorium]
"als zentrale
.

Ausbildungsstelle (T.4) der Wehrverbande"
61

Ibid.; and Sam Sch/421, letter Kruger to Reichenau,
K/P, Qu 1538/33, 19 June 1933.
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^^

ceptable compromise for the
SA ......62 claiming
ville's suggestions went
contrary to all his own
KrUger
added that he believed
Neufville's latest ideas had
the
support of the Defense Ministry,
it was difficult, he
admitted, to understand the
apparent volte
,

face by the

Army Command, when Reichenau
himself had acknowledged that
Neufville's leadership of the
Reichskuratorium had been
poor.
Kruger then reminded Reichenau
of Rohm's promise
to watch the Reichskuratorium
with "Argus Eyes",

and added,

in a naked threat, that Rohm
would be coming to Berlin in
two days and that he, Kruger,
felt duty-bound to take what-

ever measures seemed appropriate
to insure the realization
of the SA's wishes vis-a-vis the
Reichskuratorium. 63

Reichenau 's response to KrUger'

s

insubordinate

letter has unfortunately not survived,
but either Kruger
successfully carried out his threat or
Reichenau thought he
would and abandoned his support for Neufville's
proposal.
Rohm, who had come to Berlin to celebrate
the incorporation
of the Stahlhelm into the SA, 64 met with Blomberg
and

62

BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, K/P, Qu
1538/33
39 June 1933. "... da/3 dies Vorschlag des Herrn
v. Neufville

tur die SA einen unmoglichen KompromiB bedeute
und [ich] erwahnte weiterhin, daB d a s Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung uberholt sei." Bl. 1. Kruger »s impression that
Reichenau
ravored Neufville's proposal may have been erroneous. See
IfZG
Zgs. 1709, Huv/e, Bl. 17, 35. Huwe states that
Reichenau supported Kruger' s candidacy throughout the spring of 1933.
63

BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, K/P, Qu 1538/33.
19 June 1933, Bl. 2ff.
64 Publicly

announced on 21 June 1933. See BA, R-43
11/828, Wolffs' Telegraphisches Biiro, Nr. 1495.
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Reichenau and resolved the
issue of the leadership
of the
military sport project in
favor of Kruger." 0n 2?
Rohm promoted Krilger to
the
cue rank
o» Obe
ranK of SA
rgruppenfuhrer
and named him Chief of
Training Affairs

^

^

of the SA (Chef

^^bildu^v^^er_SA)
man form, Chef AW. 66

,

or in its abbreviated Ger-

"

After the resolution of the
military sport leadership question, there remained
the task of determining
Kruger's responsibilities. The
interested

parties, Kruger,

Reichenau, Rohm, Tschammer und
Osten, Schirach, and Hitler,
met at the SA Leaders' Conference
at Bad Reichenhall from
to 3 July. They discussed, among
1
ether things, the youth
training program. 67 During the
conference, Hitler told
Kruger that he wanted him to train
annually some 250,000
men in the use of military weapons.
Hitler envisioned the
courses lasting from four to six weeks. 68
At the end of
the conference, Rohm issued an order
outlining Kruger «s

65 BA, Nachlafi
Kriiger/9a,

"Stellungnahme"

66 IfZG, Fiihrerbefeh
l, Nr. 15, OSAF II,
July 1933, effective 26 JuKe 1933.

,

Bl

.

2.

1328/33,

1

67 For a summary of the
conference and the speeches

given by the participants, see SchultheB Europaischer
Geschicht skalendar 1933 Berlin, 1934, 167f., and Norman
Baynes, (ed.) The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922August 1939, (trans. N. Baynes) London, 1942, 553f.
1

,

68 BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a,

"Stellungnahme", Bl. 8; IMT,
XXIX, 1850-PS, "Besprechung mit Oberst von Vietinghoff, Chef
der Wehrmachtabteilung, am Mittwoch, 5.7. 1933", 4.

9

.
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tasks as Chef
er aw.
AW

With ±u
the concurrence of the
Defense
Ministry, wrote the SA
Chief of Staff, "... the
entire pre _
military youth training
program is transferred
w-i +-v>

to the

Supreme SA Headquarters

.

"

6

A week later, Hitler
superseded Rohm's order, issuing his own "Basic Directives
for Pre-Military

Youth Train-

ing."^

Hitler delineated three
classes of sport:
sport, for youngsters under
15 years of
age,

(1)

youth

to be conducted

in the schools and in
youth groups directed by Youth
Leader

Schirach;

(2)

terrain sport, for

16

and 17 year olds, to be

conducted in the schools and by
the various sport organizations under the jurisdiction
of Reich Sport Commissar Tschammer und Osten; and (3), SA-sport,
which OSAF would conduct
for its men between 18 and 35
years of age. The SA leader

responsible for SA-sport, wrote Hitler,
was Kriiger, who,
after consulting with the Defense
Ministry, would prepare
the basic directives for all three
classes of sport, insur-

n jj
in
die
t

dl « gesamte vormilitarische Jugendertiichtigung
V
Hand der Obersten SA-Fuhrung gelegt worden."
Rohm's

tt

:

order, apparently OSAF Ch. 2001/33, is reproduced
without a
heading or number in Rundbefehl Nr. 184 of the
Stahlhelm
Bundesamt, Abt. Ia, 4 July 1933, in BHStA, IV, Stahlhelm,
Bd. 78.
On the problem of the number of this order, see BA,
NS-10/77, letter Kriiger to Bruckner, Chef AW Ch.
213/33,
Geheim, 13 July 1933.
70 BA,

NS-10/77, "Grundsatzliche Anordnungen fur die
vormilitarische Jugendertiichtigung", 12 July 1933. The two
orders, Hitler's and Rohm's of 4 July, are basically the same,
with minor wording changes. Hitler did rescind Kriiger 's author
lty to regulate the Wehrsport activities of the Reichsarbeitsdienst
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ing that all sport
activities merged into a
comprehensive
youth fitness program. The
implementation of Kruger's
guidelines for youth and terrain
sport, explained Hitler,
was the responsibility of
Schirach and Tschammer und Osten,
while Kruger was responsible,
after consulting Blomberg,
for implementing the guidelines
for SA-sport. 7 1
By July, five months after
the advent of Hitler to
power, he and Rohm had eased
Seldte, Neufville, and the
Stahlhelm out of the military sport
movement, replacing them
by Kruger and the SA, a phenomenon
paralleling the Nazi
seizure of power in other spheres of
activity during the
first half of 1933. Everywhere the
conservative Nationalists were routed, displaced by the
irrepressible Nazis whom
they had hoped to exploit. The Army,
like so many other

organizations, acknowledged the Nazi victory
when it turned
over its cherished youth fitness program to
the SA.

The consolidation, under the aegis of the SA, of
all

defense related youth activities, recognized at Bad
Reicheenhall, represented the ironic completion of Groener's
youth

fitness program concept of October 1930.

The SA, the better

elements of which he had hoped to convert to loyal supporters
of the Weimar Republic, instead adopted, albeit in mirror
image, his idea of using the Government sponsored youth fit-

ness program as a substitute "school of the nation" to com-

71

Ibid.
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bat political partisanship.

Rather

^

eradicating

^

cal partisanship, the
Na2is wanted tQ
Socialist loyalty through
youth tralning and
activities. In the words
of Rohm, the SA had
become »
the grand school for the
education of the German
youth in
a militant and National
Socialist spirit." 72

^

72

Schulthe fi' Europaischer Geschichtskalendar 1933,
167
•••die groBe Schule fur die deutsche Jugend zur
ung in wehrhaftem und nationalsozialis tischem Geist." Erzieh-

CHAPTER

VIII

THE CHEF AW ORGANIZATION:
KRtiGER'S EMPIRE

Upon returning to Berlin from
the Bad Reichenhall
SA Conference (1 -3 July
1933 ), Kruger faced immence
problems.
The SA pre-military training
program, which Rohm
had recently appointed him to
direct, existed

in name only.

An organization capable of
providing pre-miiitary training
for 250,000 men annually, which
Hitler demanded of Krtiger
simply did not exist. No less
nr P ,.!„„ was
= 0 the
tK „ problem
xct>t5 pressing
of
the disposition of the personnel
and facilities
of the

Reichskuratorium.

With characteristic energy, however,
Kruger lost no
time in disbanding the Reichskuratorium.
On the
5th of

July, he promptly rejected a suggestion
from Neufville that
the Reichskuratorium be allowed to retain
a vestige of

autonomy 1 and three days later the SA leader ordered
Neufville 's organization disbanded. 2 The budget of the
Reichs-

1

IMT, XXIX,

hoff conversation,

1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk"
5

July 1933, 2ff.

,

Kriiger-Vieting-

2

BHStA, I, MK 13832, Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung, Zweigstelle Munchen, Nr. 2167R, to Bay.Staatsmin. f. Kultus und Unterricht, 8 July 1933.
The Reichswehr
claimed that Kruger assumed control of the Reichskuratorium
on 7 July.
See BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Niederschrif t" Bl.
,

1

•

s

5

kuratorium was absorbed
by the chef AW
Organization. 3 To
insure the co mplete isol
a ti on of Seldte
an. hi s Stahlhelm
lieutenants from any facet
of military
sport training/

Kruger proposed that
ministerial responsibility
for the
Chef AW Organization
budget be transferred fro,
Seldte'

Heioh Labor Ministry back
to the Reich Ministry
of the
interior, a proposal to
which Blomberg agreed. *
Krliger
also received authorization
fro, Rohm on the 6th of
July
to take over Stahlhelm
military sport training
facilities.
In organizing the
headquarters of his new Chef AW
Organization, Kruger apparently
used the personnel of his
former Group Staff for Special
Purposes

(Gr^enstab

?

b
'

'

VJ

35 3 nucleus for the new
Chef AW Organization

staff.

From an original strength of three
men at its inception in June 1932, the
had grown tQ
number at least twenty by June 19 33 .6
very little evidence

Gj^en^^

aCh1

^ Mber

9a '

/
"Stellungnahme", Bl. 4; IMT,
1^n'pQ C ° nference of
Kr er an d Staatssekretar Im~
ll^Ll
Reichsfmanzmmisterium Reinhard, 18 July 933, 7.

XXIX

^

1

4

BA, NachlaS Kriiger/lO, "Aktenvermerk"
BlomberqKruger conversation, 10 July 1933; IMT,
XXIX, 1850-PS "Aktenvermerk", Blomberg-Kruger meeting7~1 5
July 1933, 4f.
,

5 BA,

Sam Sch/270, OSAF 1336/33,

io^^.S

6

July 1933.

6 Gruppenstab z.b.V. was organized in
Tnn. 1932, Rohm did not
June
issue the "Dienstanweisung fttr den
Gruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin", until 20 November
1932.
See
Sam
Sch/408,
OSAF
Qu.
Nr.
~'
3388/32, 20 November 1932;
IfZG, Fuhrerbefehl II, OSAF 2420/32, 9
September 1932;
Fuhrerbefehl IV, OSAF Reichartzt/II 3790/32, 15 December
,

I

11

iZ

m

.
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concerning this organization
is known to have survived,
but
its mission was to serve
as a iiaison between the
SA and
the Reichswehr in matters
relating to military sport
programs,
the Border Guard-East, and
the Volunteer Labor Service.'
At any rate, the central staff
headquarters of the
Chef AW Organization, located
in Berlin at Friedrich-Wilhelmstr. 5, seems to have emerged
from the Gruppenstab z.h.v
by mid-July. The Chef AW
Organization headquarters, under
the direction of Staff Leader
WHhmann, initially had six
sections: personnel, training,
organization, financial administration, a general section, and the
staff inspectorate
sections. 8 The Army Command assigned
two liaison officers,
Captain von Bernuth and Major Model, to
the Chef AW Organization g
While the duties of most of the staff sections
are
self-explanatory, the general section, headed by Dr.
Carl
Kriimmel, 10 acted,

1932,

in effect, as Kruger's liaison with Gov-

?BA ' Sam Sc h/M08, OSAF Qu. Nr. 3388/32, 20 November
"Dienstanwei sung fur den Gruppenstab z.b.V. in Berlin".
„

o

See next page.
9 IfZG,

Zgs.

248 (II), Holtzendorf, Eidess taatliche
Erklarung, 16 April 1957, Bl 63; IMT, XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk" , Kruger-Vietinghof f " 5 July 1933, 2ff. Little
information can be found concerning Bernuth, who reportedly
fell in action in Russia in 1941.
.

,

l0 A machine gun company commander during the
First World
War, Kriimmel entered the Universitat Munchen after the war,
became active in athletic clubs, and earned a doctorate in
political science in the early 1920s. An employee of the Army

1
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ernment and Nazi Party agencies
which had interests in the
military sport program. Krummel
also served as public relations officer for the Chef
AW Organization.
The four
staff inspectorates, horse and
vehicle driver training,
naval training, communications
training, and pioneer (combat engineer) training, were each
led by a Chef AW Organiza
tion Inspector responsible for
conducting not only Chef AW
training, but also training carried
on by the entire SA in
his area of competence.
The four inspectors, two of whom
were recent Army retirees, 12 had their
own small staffs as
well as a liaison officer assigned to them
from the Defense
Ministry. 13 Although the Chef AW Organization
inspectors
1

Sport School in Wiinsdorf from 1923 (?) to 933, he
became close
ie
S Wlth Reichenau
^d at his insistence, transferred to
Z?
the Su
Chef^ AW in 1933. Krummel left the Chef AW in 1934
to become
head of the office for physical education (Abt. K)
in the ReichPrussian Ministry for Education, Culture, and Popular
Education.
He died in an airplane crash in 1938.
1

'

11

diagram.

BA, NachlaB Kruger/10, undated organization schematic

12 Brigadier General

(Ret.) Leo Hederich, Inspekteur der
SA/SS Reiterei, and Lt. Col. (Ret.) Alexander Bernay, Inspekteur des SA Nachrichtensports.
1

3

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, undated organization schematic
diagram; Oberste SA-Fuhrung, Gleiderung des Stabes des Obersten
SA-Fiihre rs, Miinchen, n.d. [19 34], 33-43. (Hereafter cited as

OSAF, Gliederung
The Reichswehr assigned Major Graf Rothkirch
(a former commander of the Army Sport School, Wiinsdorf) as liaison to the Inspector of SA/SS Riding Affairs, and the Navy assign
ed Lt. Commander von Kieseritzski to the Inspector of SA Naval
Affairs. Evidence indicating the names of the other two liaison
officers has not survived.
.

)

6

,

•
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~

had the authority to
araw up training
regulatiQns

reSPOnSiM1Uy
S

°f

fOT

^~„U

SA G

^-

^^^

g these was sharea wlth
the
-

Vision

which later caused

difficulty.

During the fall of 1933
and the winter of
933-34
Kruger added several
c,+- = - f
«*J.
™.»more staff
sections
and made minor reorganizations of his headguarters 1
5
He eliminated W.hmann's
Position as Staff Leader of
the Chef AW Organization,
assigning him instead to head
the newly created "staff"
section,
the functions of which
appear to have been routine
matters
of administration. 16
Kruger moved Krummel to the
new terrain sport section, making
him responsible for supervising
the Chef AW Organization
military sport schools. Krummel
still retained his public
relations duties, but Kruger
seems
to have personally assumed
responsibility for dealing with
agencies outside his own organization
with interests in military sport.
In addition, the Chef AW created
a technical
(building construction and plans)
section, and an Inspectorate of SA Schools section which
appeared to enjoy a slightly
1

.

Sain

1933
iyjJ,

Sch/405

0SAF Ch

Nr

1513/33, 11 September
»n^n<U
Dienstanweisung fur den Inspeckteur der Marine-SA
sowie
>

at

«

-

^

n Plan
diS Marine-SA", NS-23/125,OSA? cht NR
i?
c
2 September 1933, "Dienstanweisung
'
fur den InspekI
teur des Nachnchtensports"

?^T/^

.

1

5

See next page.

1

OSAF, Gliederung 33. The reasons for Wahmann's
demotion are unknown, but a colleague claimed he was
an
who had to be persistently "dried out". Perhaps this alcoholic
resulted
in his degradation.
See IfZG, Zas. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 8ff
,

8
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elevated position compared
to Kriimmel s baliwick
and the
four inspectors of the
technical schools. The Inspector
1

of SA Schools, Heinz Spaiing,
acted as an inspector general
for all chef AW Organization
and SA training. 17
By the spring of 1934,
Kriiger's staff numbered 181.
Forty-five were listed as
"specialists" and ninety-four
were either assistants to the
specialists or secretaries to
the same.
Kriiger hired one doorman,
and the remaining
forty-one employees held jobs such
as handyman, driver, and
guard. 1

Although the headquarters of the Chef
AW Organization
was located in Berlin, Rohm authorized,
during September
1933,
(

the appointment of a Chef AW Organization
deputy

Beauftragter

)

to the staff of each major SA command.^

To

certain extent, Rohm followed normal military
practice in
defining the responsibilities of the Chef AW
Organization
deputy. While reminding the deputies in
an order issued on
a

the 9th of September that they had "... to attend
to the

17
1

8

1934, Bl.
19

OSAF, Gliederung

,

33-43.

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, October 1933-March
12f.

BA, NS-23/126, OSAF II, Nr. 1607/33, 20 October
1933, effective 15 September 1933.
(There were 8 SA Senior
Groups (one in Austria and 7 in Germany) and 20 SA Groups.
See IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1525/33, 8 September 1933.

.
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timely and proper execution
of all orders of the
Supreme SA
Headquarters and the Chef AW
pertaining to training, "20 the
SA Chief of Staff strongly
reitPrafpn to <-u
y y -^eireratea
the senior SA commanders that they were still
atill f«n»
fully •
y
responsible for the state
of training in their commands. 21

Rohm made, however, some
deviations from orthodox
military custom. By tradition,
a military commander is
permitted to pick his own staff,
the only exceptions coming in
the area of technical advisors
(e^, surgeons,
lawyers,

communications specialists) where
professional training
dictates the choice. The SA Chief
of Staff partially ignored this custom and ordered both
Rrttger and the concerned
SA commanders to recommend candidates
for appointment as
Chef AW Organization deputies. Rohm
reserved
the final de-

cision for himself, 22 and the entire
arrangement caused considerable rancor among the parties involved. 23
He further

complicated staff relations by assigning the
deputies to
Kruger's staff for administrative matters (pay and
promotion),
7n

BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1510/33, "Betr. Ausbildung im SA Sport", 9 September 1933. Er hat dafiir zu sorgen,
daB alle Anordnungen der Obersten SA-Fuhrung bzw. des Chefs

des Ausbildungswesens, die die Ausbildung betreffen, rasch
und
richtig durchgefuhrt werden." See also BA, NachlaB Kriiqer/9a,

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

7.

21

Ibid
and OSAF, Ch. Nr. 1507/33, "Betr. SA-Schulungslager," 9 September 1933.
.

,

22 Ibid.

23 See Chapter IX, 245ff
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whrle at the same tin,
the SA Chief of Staff
winded each
deputy that he »
nonetheless belongs generally
to the
staff to whioh he is
attached. "24 The ambiguities
inherent
in this relationship led
to constant quarreling
between
Kruger and the SA commanders.
.

.

.

The direct lines of
communication between the Chef
AW Organization schools
and the central headquarters
in
Berlin were severed by Rohm.
Some of the SA commanders
asserted that the Chef AW
Organization schools that were
located within the boundaries
of their commands ipso

facto

fell under their authority,
a position hotly disputed
by
Kruger. 25 Rohm sided with his
commanders and encouraged
them to inspect all facilities
within their commands. 26
Kruger did succeed, in October
1933, in removing all purely
internal administrative matters
concerning the camps from
the purview of the SA commanders, 27
but the chain of command between the Chef AW and his
schools continued to pass
through the major SA headquarters until
the separation of

BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1510/33, "Betr.
Ausbrldung im SA-Sport" 9 September 1933.
"...gehort jedoch
im ubrigen zum Stabe der Dienststelle der er zugeteilt
ist."
,

,

25

Nr.

BDC, Personalakt Kruger, Rohm to Kruger, OSAF Ch.
1527/33, "personlich"
13 September 1933."
,

26 BA,

NS-23/126, OSAF 1552/33, "Dienstanweisung fur
den Fiihrer einer Obergruppe."
18 September 1933.
27

IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, Nr. 0/5515/106/3 3,
21 October 1933.

1
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the Chef AW Organization
from the SA in August 1934.28
In October 1933, Kruger
authorized the Chef AW Or-

ganization deputies small staffs
of their own. At the
Senior SA Group level, deputies
were permitted seven
assistants ,29 while their colleagues
at the SA

^^

had to make do with an assistant
and driver. 30 Within six
months the staff of the Senior
Group deputy had increased
to twenty, and a similar
proliferation had occurred at the
level of the SA Group.
addition, Kruger assigned each of
his deputies a security specialist 3
1
while some of this
increase in personnel can be attributed
to the bureaucratic
phenomenon of spontaneous generation,
some posts were probably created to meet the expanding
work load of the Chef
AW Organization. Spurred on, moreover,
by the Nazi Party,
Kruger made special efforts to find
positions for the Party

m

.

stalwarts, the "old fighters".

32

28 BA, NachlaB
Kruger/9a,
29 Ibid.

30
3

/

These efforts apparently

"Stellungnahme"

Bl.

8.

OSAF/Chef AW, V/6001/33, 26 October 1933.

Ibid., OSAF/Chef AW, V/6557/1 1 7/33
Ibid., Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag

32 ga,

,

,

2

,

3

November 1933.

June 1934, Bl. 86f

NS-10/77, "Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehrund Ausbildungspersonal Chef -AW", bi/2, 20 December 1934.
There is some ambiguity in the term "old fighter." In its
proper usage, the term applies only to those Nazis who were
Party activists prior to September 1930, but it often meant
anyone who had joined the Party before January 1933.
It is
not clear which definition Kruger used.
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included creating

"

ma ke work" positions.

Although the basic control
apparatus of the Chef AW
Organization consisted of
the central staff in
Berlin and
the regional deputies,
a se m i-autono m ous
agency,
the Keich

SA university Office,
was established by R5h
m on the 9th of
Septe mb er as p art of
KrUger's organization. 33
The Reich SA
University Office supervised
the .iUtary sport
progra ra for
students at universities
and other institutions
of higher
learning. „ hile the
University

^

^

xt S inclusion in the Chef
AW Organization represented
a considerable triumph for Kruger.

Hitler's "Basic Principles
for Pre-Military Youth
Fitness Training" of 12 July
had defined Kruger's
responsibilities in respect to youth
and terrain sport programs,
but had
not mentioned the considerable
military sport activities
con-

ducted by university students
under the aegis of the Naioriented AWA, led by Otto Schwab. 34
During the spring of
1933, he had increased the AWA s
activities and with the approval of the National Socialist
German
'

Students' League,

the German Student Corporation,
educational authorities, and
the Army, had established AWA military
sport offices at all

33 BA,
19 33.

Sam Sch/279, OSAP

The te

ed in
SA Un
34 See

Chapter III, 58f.

I,

Nr.

1586/33,

16

October

.
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the universities and
institutions of higher learning. 35
Schwab had approached Rohm
and the Reichswehr in
late April or early May,
asking for assistance in
finding
suitable leaders for his military
sport offices. Rohm responded at once, ordering his
subordinate commanders on the
4th of May to recommend
prospective candidates to Kriiger,
who, because of the immediacy
of the projected appointments,
made the final selections. In
urging the commanders to submit their recommendations to
Kriiger immediately, R6hm pointed
out that "positions not occupied
by SA and SS leaders will,
in all likelihood, end up in
the hands of the Reichswehr ." 36
The Army, justifying his suspicions,
allocated on the 15th
of May the funds necessary to support
military sport training squads for Schwab's offices. 37 It
is questionable

35BA/ NS - 23 /125, OSAF I, Nr. A 174/33, 4
May 1933;
request to the Reichswehr for assistance was
the
subject of CHL TA 400/33 g.K. T4III, 29 April
1933 [missing],
G
in BA ' MA/ 11 H/139 ' Wehrai*t Memorandum to TA,
£
?5nn/J°
Nr.
3899/33 g.K., Wehramt III, 15 May 1933.
c u
k. s
Schwab

36 BA/ N
s-23/125,

OSAF I, Nr. A 174/33, 4 May 1933.
8. Stellen, die nicht durch SA-und SS-Fuhrer besetzt
werden,
gehen hochstwahrscheinlich in die Hande der Reichswehr iiber."
Bl 2
.

3 7 BA-MA,

II H/1 39, Wehramt memorandum to TA, Nr. 3899/33
g.K., Wehramt III, 15 May 1933. The personnel for these training camps had already been assigned on 10 April. See CHL TA

232/33 g.K. T2IIIA/T4III Commencing with the Winter Semester
1933-34, the Reichswehr assigned five officers to the universities to teach military science courses.
IMT, XXIX,
1850-PS, Gerullis-Kriiger conference, 17-18 July 933, 8.
For
some idea of the nature of these military science courses, see
IfZG, Ma-619, Haushofer Papers, "Wehrwissenschaftlichen Vorlesungsverzeichnis des Wintersemesters 1933-34", Universitat
.

1

Miinchen. Bl.

161 851

.
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whether or not the Army
could have met this
cogent, a
fact which the Army
seemed to realize a month
later when
the shortage of military
instructors undated the
transfer
of the entire military
sport training program to
the SA.
in order to consolidate
his position as director
of all military sport
training, Kruger had to
bring Schwab
and his AWA under the
authority of the Chef AW
Kruger had no difficulty in
gaining the support of the
Army
for such a move.
Colonel Heinrich von Vietinghoff
genannt
Scheel, an officer assigned
to Reichenau's staff,
endorsed
the idea on the 5th of July. 38
The chef Aw
Reich Minister of the Interior
Wilhelm Frick, under whose
jurisdiction student affairs fell,
as well as responsibility

^

for military sport subsidies.

Frick agreed "... that the

entire military sport training
program for the university
students should be placed under
the direction of the Chef
AW. "39

Kr0ger hurdled the

lajgt

poss ble obstacle tQ h
.

.

s

plan

by securing an endorsement of Frick
's position from Ministerial Director Gerullis 40 of the Prussian
Ministry for

_

38 IMT/
..

Kruger meeting

XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk," Vietinghoff9
5

July 1933, 2ff.

39

BA, Nachla/3 Kriiger/10, "Aktenvermerk,
Besprechunq
mit Minister Frick", 10 July 1933. "
daB die gesamte wehrsportliche Ausbildung der Studentenschaf t ebenfalls
unter die
Aufsicht des Chef des Ausbildungswesens gestellt werde."
.

40

.

.

A former university professor from Konigsberg, he was
aMmistenaldirektor in charge of student affairs in the Prus
sian Mmisterium fur Wissenschaft Kunst und Volksausbildung
,

,
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Academes, Art, and Popular
Education.

Gerullis not only

seconded Prick, but suggested
to Kruger that he
forestall
any opposition fro m the
touchy students by appointing
one
of their leaders, either
Schwab or Gerhard Kruger, ^
to
the staff of the Chef AW
Organization. 42

Kruger followed this advice and
appointed Schwab to
his staff, probably in August,
although Schwab seems to have
worked already for the Chef AW
Organization in som e capacity
during July.
Apparently Schwab made an attempt
to retain

his relative independence as
head of the AWA, but his appointment to Kruger 's staff and the
disbanding of the AWA
in August frustrated this effort. 44

Having thus neutralized by absorbtion
any potential
opposition from the AWA, Kruger, on the
9th of September,

41

December 1908-) Kruger headed the German
Student
Corporation. He hoined the NSDAP in 1928 while a student
at
e
d
In 1 29 he transfer red to Leipzig, and
from 1931
, ? the
u
to iP?r,
1933 he \headed
Deutsche Studentenschaf t Receiving his
(6

.

S

.

n

ry

tiSnruntii i945?°
42
.

1

n
7-1<o8

™r,

July

1

XXIX,

933,

"

**

*

nw*"*

°f

m

^ si "

1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk", Gerullis-Kriiger

8.

J Schwab's

retroactive appointment to 1 July 1933, (BA
NS-23/126, OSAF II, Nr. 1607/33, 20 October 1933) and the
fact
that he was not mentioned in the first set of orders listing
Chef AW appointments (see IfZG, Fuhrerbef ehl Nr. 16, OSAF II,
Nr. 4411/33, 1 August 1933) suggests that his initial activities for the Chef AW were either unofficial or undetermined,
but later recognized, hence his appointment with seniority as
of 1 July.
,

44 IfZG,

Machtergreifung

Zgs. 1685, Heinrich Bennecke, Bl
895.
,

.

17f.; Bracher,
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replaced the defunct AWA
with his cwn creation,
the University Office. He named
the Dresden SA Brisade^r^
Heinrich Bennecke^ to lead
Univergity
Schwab as Bennecke'
An integral section of
s deputy.
the Chef
AW Organization staff,
Bennecke' s small section
enjoyed
considerable autonomy from
Kruger in its supervision
of the
military sport offices at
the universities and other
institutions of higher learning.
Bennecke personally selected
the military sport office
leaders, choosing students
or
recent graduates. The military
sport camp directors were
chosen by Kruger and local SA
leaders, and there

^

^^

seems to

have been some hostility between
the camp leaders and the
students. During the winter of
1933-34, Rohm ordered all
healthy German male university
students to report to their
respective university military sport
office to register for
attendance at a military sport camp.
The student, prior to
his fifth semester, had to complete
successfully a military

5p rs ° nal kt Heinrich
Bennecke, OSAF II, B, Nr. 3583/
f
f
f
33, 10
September
12
1933. Bennecke claimed that he received word
ls Unexpected appointment while on
vacation. IfZG, Zgs.
?;Li}
D
Jb«b, Bennecke,
17f. and Bennecke, Rohm P utsch, 28. Born

«

8
February 1902, Bennecke had a long history of
involvement with
radical nationalist causes. A Zeitf reiwilliger
with I.R. 23
in 1920 (during the Kapp Putsch), he served
in Upper
with the Freikorps HaBfurther, and was again a Zeitf Silesia
with Pionier Abt. 7 in Munich during the time of the reiwilliger
Hitler
Putsch. A member of the NSDAP (Nr. 4840) since 1922,
he served
in the Dresden Frontbann (1924 to 1926), the National
Socialist
German Students' League (1926-28) and in the Dresden SA from
1929. He commanded SA Brigade 33 when appointed to the Chef AW.
Following the war he became an apologist for the SA.

,
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sport training course. 46
While consolidating his
position vis-a-vis rival
daunts for the mantle of military
sport training tsar,
KrUger busily recruited
personnel for his organization.
Despite Rahm's f urinations
in May concerning
"unacceptable"
Reichskuratorium personnel, the
Chef AW kept most Reichskuratorium employees, including
von Neufville and von 01berg. 4 7 other personnel
fojf
chef
0rgani2ation
recruited from the SA and the
general public.

^

^

^

SA men interested in joining
Kruger's organization
had to apply through SA channels,
with their immediate SA
commander making his evaluation
of their military abilities,
character, and "... the degree of
[their] ideological solidarity ....» 4 8 BefQre sending the
application
tQ Krtiger/

46BA Sam Sch/279, OSAF I, Nr.
1632/33, 31 October 1933
nW
n
r
dSS R
SA^ochsc^mts"
and ?fZG Zar ?,^
°~
* lm 2
23
B ^cher, in Machterllil'
grei±ung_,
greifuna' llV
895, states
that the Reich SA Hochschulamt w as inabove-mentioned "DlenstanweJsung;
sectlons 2°3
f% and f'.^e
2,3,6,7,
9 clearly establishes the subordinate
It^tl
Bennecke s section to the Chef AW. See also
°
Tflr Zgs.
^at
I1ZG,
1685, Bennecke, Bl. 20.
,.

n

.

4.

:

-^s

'

'

^

'

47 BA, NS-23/157,
OSAP/Chef AW IIa/314/33, 17 Jul y 19332741/33 t0 Kr0ger ' 23 Jul
7
and letter
rh o^Jtt^wt?
Chef
AW St/IIa ?;
820/33 to OSAF, 4 August 1933; NachlaB Kriiger/
10, has an undated organization schematic diagram listing 01'

^

berg as head of its administrative section. Regierungsrat
a D
Jahn transfered to the Chef AW as Olberg's assistant. See
IfZG,
Fuhrerbefehl Nr. 19, OSAF II, 1640/33, 9 November 1933; and
Neufville transferred to the Chef AW, section A-9, Referat
fur Gelandesport, on 27 March 1934. See IfZG, Fuhrerbefehl
Nr. 23, OSAF P, 6400.
48 IfZG, Fa-90/1,
OSAF/Chef AW IIa/313/33,

...den Grad der weltanschaulichen Festigkeit

.
.

.

.

17 July 1933.
"
Bl. 30.

«
the appropriate SA
regional

zander

reviewed it and made

hrs own recommendations,
whioh was apparently
decisive.
Non-SA applicants wrote
Kruger's staff in Berlin
directly, fillip out an
application fQrm
respondlnq
to a questionnaire.
In addition, they had
to submit a
certificate of exemplary
character from their local
police
authorities, as well as military
proficiency and evaluation
records and letters of reference. 50

^

Kriiger hurried to begin
training operations, and he

usually notified successful
applicants within ten days of
receipt of their files. He
assigned newly appointed personnel to instructor training
courses conducted
by the

Army.

51

Most appointments to the Chef AW
Organization were
probationary for 90 days, at which
time, following a review
and evaluation of the candidate's
performance, permanent
appointment followed. 52
By January 1935, at the time of the
disbanding of
the Chef AW Organization, it employed
over 10,000 people. 53

49 BA, NachlaB
Kruger/9a,
1q

„

0

"Stellungnahme"

,

u IfZG, Fa-90/1,
OSAF/Chef AW, IIa/313/33,
51 BA-MA

Bl.
1

7

8.

July

II H/139, CHL TA 578/33 g.K. T4IIIa, 2 August 1933. This order required each Military District
to establish a training school for Chef AW instructors.
52 IfZG,

1933, Bl.

/

Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, IIa/313/33, 17 July

30.

53 BA,

NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrif t" Bl. 5. This
figure represents those on the payroll as of 24 January 193 5.
,
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As was to be expected
from the nature of the
training, a
large percentage of Kruger's
instructors were veterans of
military service, about
40%
and many of these were
former career men whose military
service had been cut short
by the drastic reduction in
the size of the Army following
the loss of the war. 55 Krager
made a conscious effort fo
hire the "old fighters" and
he claimed that more than
half
of his employees fell into
thie category. 5 6
,

At the bottom of the Chef AW
Organization, and its
reason for existence, were its
schools and military sport
camps.
Surviving evidence indicates that the
Chef AW Organization had some 242 schools, of
which 148 were devoted
to military sport training, 24
were used for terrain sport
Gelandesport instruction, 14 provided SA
leadership train(

)

ing, and

3

were Chef AW Organization instructor
training

facilities.

An additional

7

schools gave advanced marks-

manship instruction, 17 prepared SA men for
cavalry and

Bennecke claims that there were over 13,000 Chef AW
See his Rohm Putsch, 27ff. Kruger requested in his employees
budget,
for the period from October 1933 through March
1934, funds
for 7303 employees. See IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, Bl.
26
54 BA, NS-10/77,

"Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehrund Ausbildungspersonal Chef AW", Bi/Z, 20 December 1934.
55 BA,

penchef
Bl.

I,

NachlaB Kruger/10, [Chef AW] Personalamt to Grupim Hause, 29 January 1935; IfZG, Zgs. 1709, Huwe,

4.

56

BA, NS-10/77,

"Staatistische Abteilung, betr. Lehrund Ausbildungspersonal Chef AW", Bi/Z, 20 December 1934.

transportation duties,

9

taught communications

technics

(including pigeon post and
dog handling)
8 instructed
would-be combat engineers,
9 were SA naval
schools, and one
gave instruction to SA
medics and f irst aid
specialists 57
Chef AW enrollment statistics
have unfortunately not
survived, and any estimate of
attendance must come from the
planned enrollment estimates
contained in Kruger 's budget
proposals, which may not have been
attained.
in the first
six months of the operations
of the Chef AW Organization
(October 1933 through March
1934), it appears that some
110,000 to 115,000 students attended
military sport courses. 58
Prom April 1934 through March
1935, Kruger planned to train
316,330 students. 59 In all likelihood,
owing
,

.

to the re-

57 There

are several conflicting
the number of Chef AW schools. The most lists and totals for
detailed Ust
that
aS ldent d r Reichsanstalt fur
Arbeitsvermittlung
und
Arb^?^
^
Arbeitslosenyers
1C herung,
III 7480/252, 30 December 1935, in
BA, Sam Sch/421, reproduced in
appendix A. This document listed
all former Chef AW Organization AW schools
in order for former
employees to establish a claim for unemployment
According to this list, there were 233 Chef AW compensation.
schools, but for
some unknown reason, the 9 Chef AW naval schools
not appear.
Kruger himself stated that he ran 236 schools. Seedo BDC,
Personalakt Kruger, I, letter Kruger to Dr Hans Frank, 9
August
1935. The Chef AW budget proposal for fiscal year 1933
requests
tunds for 240 schools, but the proposal for fiscal
year 1934
requests money for only 215 schools. See IfZG, Fa-90/2, Bl.
For a list of Chef AW schools, see Appendix
2, 63.
A.
58 BA, NachlaB
Kruger/15, undated letter of Kruger to response to RWM 32/33g. VGH, 22 September 1933. Kruger was requested to respond no later than 29 September. See also IfZG,
Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, Bl. 7.

L

.

59

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, 2 June 1934, Bl. 63,
indicates a projected enrollment of 276,640. In addition, Kruger planned to train 39,690 terrain sport students. See BA,
NachlaB Kruger/10, Etatsvorschlag, Abt. "G", 2ff.

1
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organization of the ch&?
,
&t,t
Chef AW
following
the »R6hm Putsch" of
30 June 1934, the organization
fell bnort
short or
of its
if. projected
goal, and may have
trained only 220,000 men. 60
In the
twenty months of its
formal existence, a
conservative estimate is that some
330,000 men attended Chef
AW Organization
schools and camps.
-p

n

Chef AW Organization personnel
received excellent
salaries which generated envy
and created considerable
illwill, especially in the
rest of the SA, the vast
majority
of whose members received
no pay. ^
Claiming,
with some

™

tisticarreporfofmi

b ° rated

an SA
SA men

received thfsA bfdge n T934
badge was awarded to those who and Ile'sZfi '-"till
sport courses and passed a test.coveted Che? II mil
trons in March 1935, so probably The chef AW ceased ooera
those receiving the SA badge in no more than 00 000
1935 attenaea KrUgerV
camps and some of the men who
received the badge in 1934
p:Letea the Chef Aw instruction in
1 933
See BA
5»» ? S^?"
1<3
1606
V41/Be/Se.
'
March
31
In March 19^°^' nc'
SAF assumed responsibility to award
the
11 ' See °BA,
SA sport badge.
NS-23/128, OSAF 13174, 16 March
5

t™^
6

^

m

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a,

"Niederschrif t "
"An das
Personal" of the Chef AW Organization,
wrote General F?omm
"
Y ene al ° f iCe
WUrden «berhOte Gehalter be™
t
zfhi^" Bl.
m 2;
o
u ,
zahlt.
ibid.,
"Stellungnahme" Bl. 19; IfZG,
Gaertner "Erlebnis", Bl. 19; Bennecke, Rchmputsc Zqs
h ; 29.
{
R«hm
Rohm
nearly
May 1933, had received 15 mil lion RM fr om the
Reich Interior and Finance Ministries to
assist unemployed
m
m
ndSd
t0
^ arrison ca. 100,000 men in camps.
oL ?$; *°£Fa " i^?
90 /
Wahmann letter to Kruger, 7 May 933, and
BA, i
NachlaB Kruger/15, letter Wahmann to Kruger, 11 May
1933
Rohm expressed his chagrin at the shoddy treatment
accorded
the SA in financial matters in letters of the
23rd and 25th
of May 1933, to Nazy Party Treasurer Schwarz.
See HA, f. 328
Rohm only received 3 million RM, the remainder being
directed
to Kruger in July. The money thus passed effectively
from
Rohm's control. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, Frick-Kriiqer
meeting, 10 July 1933.
,

'

,

1

'

1

.

justification, that he needed
the relatively high
salaries
in order to compete with
the military servlces
anfl

Labor Service in the search
for good instructors."
ger paid his full-time
instructors, on the average,
monthly, 63 about
same pay

^ ^

^

^

^

Kru-

m
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^

earned monthly. 64

Kruger 's largess in dispensing
generous salaries was
matched by his seemingly extravagant
outlay
for the sport

schools and their attendant
facilities. While critics in
the Army later accused him
of fiscal irresponsibilities 65
the circumstances associated
with the military sport program
dictated that it would be expensive.
The enormous expansion
of student enrollment (from
approximately 12,000 trained by
the Reichskuratorium in the spring
of 1933 to the 250,000
students per year mandated by Hitler)
necessitated
,

the ac-

quisition of numerous training facilities
in addition to

During the winter

of 1933-34, Kruger attempted to
W4M
h s .P^ rso nel f rom joining the Reichswehr,
claiming
Ihtl^t
J
£ was deliberately
that the Reichswehr
enlisting
.

his best perfZG/ Fa ~ 9 °/ 1
Blomberg
to
Rohm,
RWM 168/34 g.K.
;. February
LIIA, 22
1934; Kruger to Rohm, Ch/G 837/34, 24 February 1934; and Rohm to Blomberg, 26 February 1934.

Se

6
64

V

'

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a,

IfZG,

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

19ff.

Zgs.

44, Gaertner, memorandum of conversation
with Reichenau, November 1933, Bl. 6.

65 BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a,

"Niederschrif t "

,

passim

.
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the 28 Reichskuratorium camps
and the 16 SA military
spert

schools which Kruger already
had.

The obvious source of

training facilities, namely the
pre-war Army garrison facilities, which were available
at no cost and plentiful, had
to
be rejected for security
reasons. Most of these garrisons
were located in large towns and
cities, where the clandestine training of the SA would be
all too easily observed.
The need for secrecy dictated
that most Chef AW Organization schools be located in small,
relatively isolated rural
communities, 66 which meant that building
had to begin from
scratch.
In his instructions for establishing
Chef AW Organi-

zation facilities, Kruger urged his
assistants to try every
conceivable means to keep construction costs to
a minimum.
He stated that communities which offered to
assist either
in the construction or the financing of Chef
AW facilities

would be given first consideration for the location of
the
schools.

For whatever construction or renovation was neces-

sary, he wrote, it was imperative to approach the Reich
Labor

Service for assistance, which presented the most economical
means of building a camp or school, involving only the cost
of materials.

If the Labor Service refused to assist, he

cautioned his staff members to sign contracts only with
reputable firms owned by Nazi Party members (preferably of

66 BA,

NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellung nahme"

,

Bl.

22f.

,
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long-standing) which would
be
SA xnen for Chef AW

projects."

^

^

Kruger also urged his
assis .

tants to explore other
avenues of economy, such
as long _ tem
leasing, or arranging tax
credits with the Reich
Finance
Ministry for communities
which assisted the Chef AW
building program.
Insofar as possible, Kruger
attempted to
build his camps and schools
on public property.
Bavaria,
in contrast to the
arrangements of the Bavarian
Government
with other Nazi Party agencies,
the Chef AW Organization

m

negotiated an arrangement so that
it did not pay any rent
for using state property. 69
Despite attempts to reduce costs,
the enormous growth
of Kruger 's staff and the
tremendous increase in pre-military training activities necessitated
an immense expenditure
of funds.
Kruger absorbed the small (RM 1.5

million) Reichs-

kuratorium budget in July, and received
during the summer of
1933 some additional assistance from the
Reich Ministry
of

the Interior and the Army. 70

while this money covered his

67 IfZG, Fa-90/1,
OSAF/Chef AW 0/G Nr.
September 1933, Bl. 59F.
68 BA, NachlaB

90/70/33, 14

Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

23ff.

6 9BA,

Sam Sch/421, Bay. Staatsmin. d. Finanzen, Nrs.
18000 and 18001, to Landeszweigstellen 27 April 1934.
,

70 BA, NachlaB
Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme", Bl. 11;
"Niederschrift" , Bl. 1; IMT , XXIX, 1850-PS, "Aktenvermerk"
Blomberg-Kruger meeting, 15 July 1933. During the winter of
1933-34, Kriiger received some funds from the Prussian Minis
try of the Interior. See BA, NachlaB Kruger/11, PMd1 VOI
,
1403/33/1 F, 1105/1-18.12, 2 January 1934.
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Mediate

operating costs, a firm
budget was imperative
and
Kruger prepared one by
November, estimating
his yearly ex _
Penses at KM 118,203,600.
To see his organization
through
the remaining half
.(1
Oct. 1 933 - 31 March
934) of fiscal
Year 1933, he requested RM
79,382,000.
The budget, however,
never gained official
approval from the Finance
Ministry.
Its experts, along with
Defense Ministry and Chef AW
officials, agreed that a formal
confirmation of the Chef AW
Organization budget could serve
no useful purpose, because
the scope of the Chef AWs
mission was as yet undefined? •"
Kruger did not receive the RM
79 million, but got instead
RM 47 million. 71
,

1

Similar problems developed in
preparing the 1934
budget.
During the first six months of
1934, neither the
OSAF nor the Defense Ministry would
agree to allow the other
to assume responsibility for Kruger
's finances.
The purge
of Rohm in June 1934, ended this
conflict.
The re-organization of the Chef AW Organization during
the summer of 1934

occasioned a repetition of the strange argument
that an undetermined mission obviated the need for official
approval

of the budget.

Perhaps this was a sign of unwillingness on

the part of the Government and the Army to legalize
and make

permanent the Chef AW Organization.

Kruger nonetheless re-

71

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag, n.d. [Nov. 1933], Bl.
7-26, 126; BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
12f.;
"Niederschrift" , Bl 1.
,

.

.
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quested

m

120 railli on in 19 34 for
his schools and
tiona! KM 23 m illi on for
terrain
sporfc

SA University Office,
and

received RM 90

»UUon.

HiUer

^^^^^

^

^

Reich

Vouth training camps.

of which all but

He

^^

8

the Chef AW Organization. 72

The fact that Kruger had
considerable difficulty and
finally failed to seoure
„ sound financlal foot±ng

^^

organization should not be allowed
to obscure the remarkable
support which he did receivp
~
j-eceive.
in +->^
the nine
months of its
existence, the Reichskuratorium
received RM 1 5 million,

m

•

.

in contrast, the Chef AW
Organization, which existed for
slightly less than two years,
enjoyed subsidies of RM 137

million
The purpose for the outlay of all
this money was to
expand the military sport training
program, and Kruger began
his first courses in some 70
camps on the 15th of October
1933.
Terrain sport camps began four days later. 73

m

spite of the efforts of the Reichswehr to
train Chef AW
instructors during August and September, there
appears to
have been a shortage of trained Chef AW
instructors, which

72 BA,

NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
"Niederschrift", Bl. 1f.

,

Bl.

73 IfZG,

13-18-;

Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef AW, G. Nr. 138/81/33, 20
September 1933, and OSAF/Chef AW AA 4318/93/33, 9 October
1933. For a list of schools in operation see ibid
Bl. 198f
The schools were equally distributed in each military
district
1 -e
5-6 schools per district.
.

.

,

,
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necessitated further assistance
from the Army, already
short-handed itself. On ,9
September, the Army Command
ordered each Military District
to assign two officers

and

20-25 enlisted men to assist
Chef AW Organization schools
within their respective
m
~ ,
xve uistricts.
district-*
K „ Defense
r
The
Ministry
specified that whenever possible
district colanders would
assign to this duty the same
soldiers who had earlier
assisted the Chef AW Organization
or the Reichskuratorium
instructors. To maintain the deception
that the Chef AW
Organization and the Reichswehr had
no contact, the Defense Ministry in September 1933
ordered its men assigned
to Kriiger's organization to
wear the SA uniform. 74

The Army provided further assistance
to the Chef AW
Organization by preparing the programs of
instruction and
the lesson plans for Kriiger's schools.
SA military sport

training was, wrote the Army Command in an
order of the
27th of July 1933, basic recruit training
under arms. 7 ^

BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA 730/33, g.K. T4IIIA, 19
September 1933; WKVII/2188, WKII/Ib, 1588/33 g.K./Ia-A,
25
September 1933; and WKVII/734, CHL TA 740/33 g.K T4IIIA/
337/33 g.K.H., 29 September 1933.
5

BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift of CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien fur die vormilitarische Ausbildung"
27
July 1933. "SA-Sport ist Rekrutenausbilung mit der Waffe
Das Ziel der SA-Sportausbildung ist die grundliche Einzelaus
bildung (Rekrutenausbildung)
"
See also BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl. 8. (emphasis in original)
J

,

According to regulations
issued in the summer of
1933,
successful completion of the
basic SA military sport
course
was a pre-requisite to
76
enlistment.

SA military sport courses
lasted four weeks, and the
technical (communications,
combat engineer, riding and
driving, and seamanship) courses
averaged three weeks in duration. 77 The students'
13 hour day was long but
well-regulated and the students were
kept busy.
Reveille
came at

AM,

followed by physical training and
breakfast. Mornings were devoted to learning
field exercises (e^.
forced
marching, offensive and defensive
tactics, and field fortification techniques)
while afternoon instruction focused
on marksmanship, range estimation,
map reading, assembly/
disassembly of military weapons, and
outpost and sentry duty,
followed by more physical training,
drill, and team sports.
Organized into squads and platoons, the student
groups competed against one another, with the victors
receiving
6

,

,

special privileges, usually an extended leave
from camp.
Dinner was held at 6 PM, and unless some form of
night training was scheduled, evenings were free.

The students were

7

BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien"
27 July 1933. This was later changed to
give priority to those who had completed pre-military training. See BA, Sam Sch/405, "Merkblatt fur den Eintritt in die
Reichsmarine" Fruhjahr 1934; and NS-23/319, Merkblatt fur
den Eintritt in das Reichsheer" April 1934.
,

,

','

,

7

BA-MA, WKVII/1451, Abschrift CHL TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, "Richtlinien", 27 July 933; IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF/Chef
AW Insp. d. SA/SS Reiterei 490/33, 26 October 1933; and BA,
NS-23/319, Chef AW, Landesfiihrer IV, Pi/G, 201/34, Be/Fa,
1

9

November 1934.
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they received from the
chef Aw Organlzation
canteen or in the local c
ity
The
normally extinguished at
78

_

.

10 PM.

^^

^^^
^

Some of the first Chef
AW teohnioal courses had
to
be conducted in Army
garrisons because the SA
facilities
were not completed. Various
Reichswehr units were ordered
by the Defense Ministry
in September 19 33 to assign
soldiers
to assist the Chef AW
Organization instructors and to
provide logistical support and
lodging for the Chef AW schools
quartered in their garrisons."
The orders to the garrison
commanders stressed the secrecy
of the program, insisting
that all correspondence concerning
any SA training employ
the street, rather than the
military address of the garrison and its units "because foreign
policy reasons prohibit
any visible relationship between
the SA and the Reichswehr,
and for the duration of the courses,
the wearing of the SA
uniform by the students in the vicinity
of the garrison is
80
prohibited."
The Chef AW Organization students in
this

Fa 9 °/ 1 CHL T A 533/33 g.K. [T4III, 27 July
109*1 Anlage
a
f
7
1933
2, Bl. 1-24; BA, R-53/191, letter Karl-Heinz
btigler (zur Zeit bei der SA-Sportschule Aschaf f enburg)
to
his uncle Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, 20 March
1934.

^

'

^BA-MA, WKVII/734, CHL TA 734/33 g.K. T4IIIA, Wehr.

A 648/33 g.K. In 51, 28 September 1933.
8 ° Ibid

and CHL TA 740/33 g.K./337/33 g. K .H
29
September 1933. "Da aus aussenpolitischen Grunden kein
Zusammenhang zwischen Heer und SA nachweisbar sein darf,
ist den Teilnehmern wahrend der Dauer der Lehrgange das
Tragen der SA-Uniform im Bereich des Standorts verboten."
.

,

.

,

.

.
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instance wore the uniform of
the Reichswehr 81
Although a few SA men attended
technical training in
Reichswehr garrisons, most SA
men received their military
sport training in Chef AW
Organization camps. The typical
camp was new and situated
on the outskirts of
or at some

distance from a rural community.

This relative isolation

aided the physical security
of the camp and helped to
discourage the curious. The camp,
surrounded by a fence, was
usually constructed of wood and
had private bungalows for
the staff and their families,
barracks for the students,
and communal dining, bathing,
and recreation facilities.
The Chef AW Organization initially
adopted the camp arrangement because of its low cost and
ease of security,
but later the camp became extolled
by the Nazis as an end
in itself, a place where young
Germans learned not just to
work, but to live with one another in
the "healthy" atmosphere of a National Socialist community. 82

Although the size of the camps often varied on
account of location, Kriiger attempted to achieve
uniformity
among them.

Military sport schools had an average enroll-

ment of 210 students per course, as did the terrain sport
schools.

There were 54 staff members assigned to each of

these schools.

81

Enrollment figures for the technical schools

Ibid.

82

°^Bemett, Leibeserzeihungen

,

79 f f
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fluctuated fro, 280 students
per combat engineer course
to
160 per communications course.
The staff of a communications school numbered
85, in comparison to 64
at combat
engineer schools, and only 37
83
at marksmanship
schools.

To recognize the growing
number of SA men who had
been graduated from Chef AW
Organization military sport
courses, Rohm established the
SA Sport Badge in December
1933.
Applicants had to complete several
preliminary tests
prior to attending a Chef AW military
sport camp, and at
the end of the four week course
the final test was conducted.
SA and SS men who passed all the
tests were entitled to wear the badge on their
uniforms. 84

When Rohm created the sport badge in
December, Kriiger's Chef AW Organization had already
been in operation
for several months and had probably
graduated some forty
or fifty thousand SA and SS men from
its courses.

nucleus of 18 Reichskuratorium camps and

16

From a

SA schools,

Kruger had built and put into operation over seventy
military sport schools by mid-October 1933.

In addition, with-

in a scant five months he had organized a command structure

83 IfZG,
2

Fa-90/2, Etatsvorschlag (1.4.34-31.3.35)

June 1934, Bl. 63, 66-94.
84 BA,

NS-23/1, OSAF, I Nr. 1719/33, betr. SA-Sportabzeichen, 5 December 1933. The precise requirements
for the
SA badge were issued in a 15pp. pamphlet prepared
by Kruger,
a copy of which can be seen in BA, Sam Sch/415,
"Ausf iihrungs
bestimmungen.
See also SA Mann No. 13, 31 March 1934
,
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capable of directing and
supporting his large and
far-flung
military sport sohool empire.
Finally, he ha d outmaneuvered
his rival Nazi Party
comrades who had contested
his claim
to direct all military
sport programs. On the
other hand,
Kruger's position was by no
means secure and the most
bitter
and prolonged opposition
to his organization came
from his
fellow political soldiers in
the SA.

CHAPTER

IX

BETWEEN THE SA AND THE
REICHSWEHR

JULY 1933 - JUNE

1
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The Bad Reichenhall
Agreement of July 1933 represented the highpoint of R
elchswehr _ SA relations
Army .3 standpoint, the
decision to allow the SA to
direot
the military sport program
relieved the already over-oommitted military instruotors
of the burden of having
to
train thousands of SA men.
Moreover,
.

^^

in the eyes of the

Army command leaders, the
SA now had a meaningful
role in
national defense, with which
they falsely assumed the SA
would be satisfied.
Rohm, however, appears to have
interpreted the

Reichenhall Agreement as the beginning
of an increased role
for the SA in national defense
and national policy determination.
He expected Hitler, at any
moment, to create a SA

Reich Ministry, which among other
things, would be responsible for all non-regular defense
forces and activities. 1
Rohm had, for the most part, gained
control of all irregular
forces at Reichenhall, but his ambitions
were greater.

Execrating the lack of political commitment in
the pre-1914
4

'IfZG, Fa-90/1, Wahmann to Kruger, Bericht Nr.
1,
7 May 1933, Bl. 5.
Messerschmidt , in Wehrmacht 27, argues
that Rohm, by gaining control of all pre-military
training
programs, had already won an important concession and
that
,

pre-military training provided him and the SA
which to expand their power.

a

base from

.
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Army and the Reichsvehr,
he castigated the Army
for its
non-partisan politican attitude.

Such attitudes, he wrote,

had contributed materially
tc the loss of the 1914-1918
war.
The German soldier did not,
he claimed, have any political

convictions to inspire him to
carry on the struggle when
all appeared lost.
Such courage of conviction,
explained
the SA Chief of Staff, could
only emanate from a sincere
commitment to a political ideology.
the new NationalSocialist state, he asserted, the
traditional efficiency
of the German Army must be tempered
by the political conviction of its soldiers, whose loyalty
for not only the
state but the Nazi movement must
be unshakeable.
Thus,

m

explained Rohm, the apolitical Reichswehr
was an anachronism in the Nazi state and it would have
to be replaced by
an army of steadfast National Socialists. 2
R6hm apparently
never expressed a clear decision regarding
the future of

the Reichswehr, but ambiguously implied
that the Reichswehr

either would become

a

training cadre for a SA Peoples' Army

or would become the elite striking force of
the Nazi Peoples'

Army

J

With a series of misunderstandings marring Reichswehr-

2 R6hm,
J Papen,

112

Hochverrater
Memoirs

,

,

110,

168f.

313; Gisevius, To the Bitter End ,
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SA relations during the
spring of ,933, < both
parties hoped
that the agreement
reached at Reichenhall would
eliminate
areas of conflict. Army
officers left Bad Reichenhall
convinced that their difficulties
with the SA had been resolved
and that the SA would
atte.pt no further inroads
into military spheres of activity.*
This relative calm and
was quickly shattered when
the Army Command began to
discover that Rohm had no
intention of allowing the Army
to
dominate the SA pre-military
training program. While this
program did provide a temporarily
useful outlet for the SA,
Rohm saw the danger of allowing
Blomberg and Reichenau to
fashion Kruger and the Chef AW
Organization into a brown
auxiliary of the Reichswehr. The
SA Chief of Staff had to
retain his authority over Kruger
in order to further his
ambitions for a greater military role
for the SA, while the
Reichswehr could not allow the SA any
further incursions

4A

number of these misunderstandings were
gui+-e pettv
such as the failure to exchange salutes
between SA and ReichsPe
el
S e BA
NS - 2 3/1 25, OSAF IIB 107/33, 1 9 April
f
19 33; and Messerschmidt
Wehrmacht und NS 32. For the more
serious matter of SA men arresting military employees,
see the
^f^thy correspondence in ^A-MA RW 6/V66 and WOl-5/108; BA,
NS-23/125, OSAF 1313/33, 27 June 1933, and IfZG,
F-56, Aufzeichnung des Generals a.D. Kurt Weckmann, Bl. 8f.
The question of whom should lead SA units incorporated into
the
chutz presented the thorniest problem of 1933. The SA Grenzsinsisted on retaining its own leaders, and the Army demanded
that it should name the leaders. This issue wrecked the
Grenzschutz of that period. See IfZG, Zgs. 39 (I), FretterPico, Bl. 31f; Zgs. 11, Bockmann, Bl. 3f; Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, Bl. 33f; and F-56, Weckmann, Bl. 5-8."

^°r

-

'

,

.

,

Keitel, Verbrecher letter of Frau Lisa Keitel to
her mother, 5 July 19 33, 53.
,
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into the sphere of national
defense without abrogating
its
claim of being the sole
national military force. To
allow
R6hm undisputed control of
the pre-military training
program
was to open a veritable
Pandora's Box of insatiable SA
demands which might culminate in
the replacement of the Army
by the brown battalions.
Thus Kriiger, from the onset of
his appointment as Chef AW,
found himself in the extraordinarily difficult position of
being responsible to two
antagonistic factions, each intent
on eliminating the influence of the other. 6 While the
domination of the Kriiger

Organization was only one facet of the
struggle between the
Reichswehr and the SA, it was the most
visible and tangible
objective for each party.
While the majority of Kriiger 's problems
stemmed from
the antagonisms of the Army and the SA
toward one another,
more than a few of his difficulties arose
from his attempts
to institutionalize his precarious position,
namely to give

his organization some statutory definition and
hence pro-

tection against caprice.

His efforts were perhaps not un-

justly perceived by Rohm and Reichenau as "empire building"
In this contest Kriiger'

s

abrasive personality proved of

6 BA,

NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme" Bl. 5-9;
IfZG, Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis", Bl. 17-24; Vogelsang,
"Chef AW", 9f; Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulganin
112f; Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch 30, 46.
,

,

,

7

BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, Himmler to Kriiger, 29 De-

cember 1939.

J
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inesti^ble value.
COfflPr °miSe
'

^

-t, essential

Sh

"

With a sense of duty
that allowed no
nk fr ° m "° 'ask, no
matter

to the completion of
his mission.

When the

occasion denuded, he could
be brutally frank
He had already accused Reichenau
of working against hi.
and the SA,*
and had become involved
over an alleged slight in
an acrimonious dispute with the
Prussian Ministry for Education,
Arts, and Vocational Training.
9
Supremely confident, his
.

self-righteousness could be insufferable.
An idealist, he
drove himself and his personnel
ruthlessly, yet they rewarded his excessive concern for
their welfare with considerable respect and fidelity. 10
Hls portraits reveal a
cold haughtiness and a lack
of either expression or emotion.

11

Kriiger's personality, his
military background, and his austere

private life made him suspect in
the eyes of many of the
radical SA leaders, while these same
characteristics gave

him

a certain entre

with the Defense Ministry.

Kruger had developed one additional
capacity which
was to serve him well: an instinct for
identifying

and in-

gratiating himself with the "right" people, those
who

BA, Sam Sch/421, Kruger to Reichenau, Qu 1538/33,
19 June 1933.
9

Ibid., Gerullis to Kruger,
to Gerullis, 17 August 1933.
10 See IfZG,

15

August 1933; Kruger

Fa-90/1
Wahmann letters to Kruger, May
1933; Steiner, Clausewitz bis Bulgani n, 112ff.
1l The

,

only picture of Kruger readily available in the
United States is in Nikolai Tolstoy, The Night of the Long
Knives New York, 1972, 47.
,
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wielded power.

For example, at the end
of February 1933,
radioal SA leaders from
Silesia requested his assistance^
in blocking the appointment
of an allegedly notorious
Free
Mason to the Breslau Police
Presidium. Deploring
the fact

that the political leaders
of the Nazi Party rarely
consulted SA leaders prior to making
important personnel appointments, the radical SA leaders
in their letter to Kruger
noted that this most unacceptable
candidate was even alleged to be friendly with Goring.
Kruger's reply to the
Breslau SA leaders has not survived,
but he forwarded their
letter on 2 March to Goring 's Prussian
Ministry of the Interior where it was surely read and
recorded with interest,
as well as gratitude. 12

Although Kruger had already clashed with
Reichenau,
and perhaps recognized in him an
opponent of equal ambition
and energy, the two appeared to have
resolved their differences by the end of July in the light of the
greater threat

posed by the ambitious Rohm.

Side-stepping a clumsy effort

earlier in the month by Reichenau to assert Reichswehr
control over his budget, 13 Kruger nonetheless apparently
agreed

1

2

BDC, Personalakt Kruger, letter of Gruppens tabsfuhrer
Puckler to Kruger, " vertraulich" , 28 February 1933. The letter
has Kruger's initial at the top and a stamp marking receipt by
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, 2 March 1933. Goring,
a former commander of the SA, despised Rohm and feared his
power. He especially hated SA leaders Edmund Heines (Breslau)
and Karl Ernst (Berlin)
for whose arrest and execution he
was personally responsible.
,

13 IMT, XXIX,

15 July 1933,

4f.

1850-PS, Blomberg- Kruger conversation,

.

,
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in the interests of
harmony to submit his final
budget to
the Reiehswehr for review.
By the end of July
Kruger and

^

Reichenau signed an agreement
which oalled for Kruger to
train some 250,000 men
yearly with the Army providing
whatever assistance he needed. 15
Keichenau's greatest success
in his dealings with
Kruger consisted in gaining
a strong voice in Chef
AW personnel selection. The military
nature of the Chef AW training programs dictated employment
of as many veterans as
possible and it appears that
Reichenau proved quite willing
to supply Kruger with numerous
personnel suggestions
and

recommendations.

1

*

Reichenau, moreover, had "liaison-

officers assigned to the important
Chef AW Organization
staff sections.
These military liaison officers kept
Reichenau informed of activities at the
highest level of
the Chef AW Organization and in all
likelihood influenced
Kriiger's plans and decisions. 17

After Hitler became alarm-

ed in October 1933 over alleged security
leaks in the Kruger

Organization, Kruger created security specialists for
the

14 BA,

Slhi-A

NachlaB Kruger, "s tellungnahme"

,

12f.

9; BA-MA, WK VII/1451, RWM TA 533/33 g.K.
T4III, Berlin, 27 July 1933 (Abschrift)
1

-

,

6

Bracher, Machtergreif ung
Wehrmacht und NS 26f.

893f; Messerschmidt

,

,

17 IfZG,

Zgs.

248 (I), Holtzendorf f Bl. 58; BA,
NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stellungnahme" Bl. 9.
,

,

.
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staff of each SA Group
headquarters.

These specialists

were almost entirely selected
by Reichenau, who encouraged
them to work closely with
local Reichswehr counterparts.
The Chef AW security sections
provided the Reichswehr with
considerable information concerning
internal SA

activities.'

Finally, Reichenau secured the
appointment of Dr. Karl
Krummel to head the General Section
of the Chef AW Organization staff.
Krummel was responsible for liaison
and coordination of Chef AW activities with
government agencies.
Krummel left his position of instructor
at the Army Sport
School in Wiinsdorf only at the insistence
of Reichenau,
who had been a close acquaintance for
ten years. 19
In addition to gaining some influence
in the Chef

AW Organization by influencing personnel
selection, it is
possible that Reichenau may have considered using

the Kriiger

Organization to split and weaken the SA.

By providing SA

men, disgruntled with their small share in the spoils
of the

Nazi regime, with an example of Reichswehr-SA cooperation,

namely the Chef AW Organization, Reichenau may have wanted
to show SA men that not only was cooperation with the Army

1 ft

IfZG, Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk Kriiger, 19 October 1933;
Zgs. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 11; Zgs. 44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis" Bl
5; Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch
46f; Manstein, Soldatenleben 184-187.
,

,

,

1

9

am indebted for this information to Prof. Dr.
Horst Uberhorst, who graciously permitted me to read his
manuscript of a forthcoming biography of Krummel.
I
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feasible, but beneficial:
beneficial to the Army by
alleviating the manpower shortage,
and beneficial to the SA
by
providing employment. He may
have hoped that in the long
run
such an example might attract
the conservative and reasonable
elements of the SA to the
Reichswehr and the state, leaving
Rohm and his radicals isolated
and without significant political influence. There was,
from Reichenau's standpoint,
little
risk in pursuing a policy directed
at dividing the SA.
Should
he have only partial success,
at least the Kruger Organization
vital to defense plans, would remain
safely under Army control
and should he achieve complete
success, rallying the "decent"
SA men to the Reichswehr banner, the
problem of the intractabl,

Rchm would disappear.
Although his own position between the Army and
the
SA was not at all clear, Kruger had no
doubts as to
his

position vis-a-vis other SA leaders.
19 July,

In an order issued

he informed them that they would no longer visit

Defense Ministry officials without his permission,
noting
that "by the establishment of the headquarters of the
Chief
of Training Affairs of the SA, all intercourse and the
sole

liaison with the Army has been laid in my hand". 20

Two days

later Rohm explained to his SA commanders that they would

provide Kruger any assistance he needed in making personnel

20 IfZG, Fa-90/1, OSAF Chef AW, V/R/360/33,
19 July 1933.
"Durch die Einrichtung der Dienststelle des Chefs des Ausbildungswesens der SA ist der gesamte Verkehr und die einzige
Verbindung zur Reichswehr in meine Hand gelegt."
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sections.

Further

,

wrote the gA

CMef

of gtaff(

ers would piace no obstacles
in the path of their
men who
wished to join the Chef AW. 2
"!

In dealing with men whose
inflamed sensitivities demanded twelve lives as
retribution for every SA man
lost in

action,^ R5hm

order authorizing a personnel
raiding expedition and Kruger's arrogant
tone were bound to provoke
a
strong reaction. The SA Group
Commanders complained bitterly to Rohm, 23 and according
tQ Kr( ger/ procrastinat
_
,

s

.

.

on/

re

luctance, begrudging compliance,
and in some cases outright
defiance, characterized the
cooperation he received from his
fellow SA leaders. 2 4 A conference
held at Bad Godesburg
during the middle of August, at
which Hitler, Rohm, Reichenau,
Kruger, and the senior SA leaders
were present, failed to resolve the nascent conflict. Hitler
and Rohm repeated, in
lengthy and "flimsy" speeches, the tired
platitudes that the

Army remained the sole fighting force of
the nation.
was accomplished toward resolving Kruger

's

Nothing

anomalous position

or tenuous authority, and Hitler's attempt to
paper over

21

22

Ibid

.

,

OSAF Chef AW Nr. 490/33,

21

July 1933.

,

Ibid., OSAF Ch.

1415/33,

31

July 1933, "Disziplin".

23

Rohm immediately scheduled a conference of all major
SA commanders and staff leaders for 3 August 1933.
See BA
NS-23/125, OSAF I, Nr. 1413/33, 28 July 1933. No record of
this conference can be discovered.
24 BA, NachlaB
Kruger/9a,

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

3,

If.
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serious rifts between warring
factions with vague formulas
did not prove to be a crashing
success. 25
In the absence of a
decision by Hitler, Rohm was
not

slow in either responding to
Reichenau's efforts to dominate
indirectly the Chef AW Organization
or in answering the
angry cries of his subordinates
who professed to be outraged
at Kriiger's arrogance.
While not quite countermanding
his
order of 21 July, the SA Chief of
Staff effectively superseded it six weeks later. Reserving
for himself the authority to approve Kriiger's regional
staff director (Chef AW
deputies) nominations, Rohm permitted
senior SA commanders
to make recommendations concerning
the suitability of Kriiger's nominees. 26 in addition, he made
Chef AW deputies
subordinate not to Kriiger but to the senior
SA commanders 27
who were made responsible for implementing
Kriiger's direct,

ives. 28

in a similar fashion, Rohm authorized the
four Chef

AW training inspectors to issue training regulations
for the
entire SA, but assigned authority for executing these
direct-

25Muller, Heer
und Hitler

,

93;

GraB, Jung

26 BA, NS-23/125, OSAF
Ch Nr. 1510/33,
1933; NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
Bl.
.

,

9

,

119.

September

7.

27 Ibid.
BA, NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr.

1507/33, 9 September
18 September 1933, "Dienstan-

1933; NS-23/126, OSAF 1551/33,
weisung fur den Fiihrer einer Obergruppe."
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ives to SA unit colanders. 29

The SA Chief of Staff thus

effectively subverted Kruger.
s authority, granted
in July
by Hitler, 30 to deal directly
with SA colanders in matters
relating to military sport.
the event of non-compliance
by refractory SA leaders,
Kruger could now only request
R6hm, who alone had the
prestige and authority

m

in the SA to

compel obedience, to enforce
the training directives.
Fearing that Rohm's newest orders
would only exacerbate his worsening relations
with SA leaders, Kruger complained to the Chief of Staff that
his "...regulations
governing the relations between SA
unit headquarters and
[the Chef AW] Inspectors could be
expected to lead to difficulties ." 3 1
a p rivate reply, Rohm all but
accused
Kruger of disloyalty and sharply admonished
him to avoid
the imperious tone which permeated
his correspondence.
"I

m

accept", wrote Rohm, "the responsibility
[for any problems]

because

I

have issued the order.

You have", he continued,

BA Sam Sch /405, OSAF Ch. Nr. 1513/33, 11 September
Dienstanwesiung fur den Inspekteur der Marine-SA sowie
Organisationsplan fur die Marine-SA"; NS-23/125, OSAF Ch. Nr.
1511/33, 12 September 1933, "Dienstanweisung fur den Inspekteur des Nachrichtensports.

„

1Q
1933,

'

„

3o OSAF Ch/A/35/33,
5 August 1933, quoted in BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl. 3.
This order has not been

discovered.
31

BDC, Personalakt Kruger, Rohm to Kruger, OSAF Ch.
1527/33, 13 September 1933, personlich. "...Regelung des
Verhaltnisses zwischen Dienststellen und Inspektionen Schwierig
keiten zu erwarten waren."
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"dutifully expressed your
apprehension;

[however]

after

I

have made the decision, the
matter rests." 32

While the actions of SA commanders,
who appointed
men hostile to Kriiger to the Chef
AW deputy posts, 33 seemed
to justify Kriiger's predictions,
a new issue arose which

threatened to destroy the Chef AW
Organization.

From the

genesis of the Organization, Kriiger
and Reichenau had incorporated training with military weapons
into the curriculum of the military sport program. They
planned to prevent
public disclosure of this aspect of SA
training 34 at least

until Germany received approval to re-arm
from the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations.
Kriiger appears to
have naively expected the League to acquiesce
momentarily,

but he did warn the Defense Ministry in September
that

despite stringent security precautions, it would be
impos-

Ibi d

"Die Verantwortung dafiir trage ich, da ich
die Anordnung getroffen habe
Du hast Deine Auffassung
pflichtgemaB vertreten; nachdem die Entscheidung von mir
getroffen wurde, muB es damit sein Bewenden haben."
.

.

33 BA, NachlaB
Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl. 8;
Sam Sch/421, Kriiger to Rohm, 5 December 1933, personlich.
34

As early as August 193 3 the German Government took
steps to prohibit press reports concerning SA military sport
training.
IfZG, Ma-260, RMdl to RM fur Volksauf klarung und
Propaganda, IA 2200/1.8, 7 August 1933, Bl. 6227728. For
military security precautions, see BA-MA, WK VII/1451,
(Abschrift) RMW TA 533/33 g.K. T4III, 27 July 1933; WK VII/
734, CHL TA 734/33 g.K. T4IIIA, Wehr. A. 648/33 g.K.
In 5L,
28 September 1933; and CHL TA 740/33 g.K./337/33 g.K.H.,
29 September 1933.

250

sible to maintain complete
secrecy for a prolonged
period. 35
Well aware of the potentially
damaging effects that premature public disclosure of
the military sport program
could
have on his efforts to find
approval to re-arm, Hitler, who
probably knew of Kruger's warning,
ordered in early October
a halt to all weapons training
in the SA sport
36
camps.

The halt was merely temporary,
for "as soon as the diplomatic situation permits", said
the Army Command, "weapons

training in SA sport camps will recommence ." 3 7
The security measures instituted
in July by the Army

and Kriiger to conceal military sport
training proved insufficient for Hitler, who castigated SA
leaders for lax

security precautions during a meeting on

17

October.

After

insisting that there were spies in the SA, he
claimed that
it was possible for these agents to expose
SA military training activities, with terribly detrimental
consequences to

current diplomatic negotiations 38
.

Hoping to transfer some

35

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/15, RWM 32/33 geh. VGH IV, to RMdl
RL-M, OSAF (CHEF AW), 22 September 1933, with Kruger's

PMdl,
comments on the enclosure, returned 26 September 19 33.
36 BA-MA,

WK VII/1451, WK VII/7 I.D., Ib/Ia 1679/g. Kdos
M, 5 October 1933, with telephone call notes of 6 October, referring to Ib/Ia 1664/g.K./M, 3 October 1933 memorandum from
Hitler.
37

Ibid
WK VII/1342, RMW CHL TA 788/33 T4lIIa/T2IIIc
g.K., 10 October 1933. "Die Waf f enausbildung wird in den SASport Lagern wieder aufgenommen werden, sobald die auBenpolitischen Lage es zulaBt." SA units which trained in Reichswehr camps (normally specialized training) continued their
weapons training.
.

,

38 IfZG, Fa-90/1,
Kriiger Aktenvermerk

,

19

October 1933.
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of this censure from the
SA, Rohm sought to shift
responsibility for any future problems
to the Army.
He instructed
Kruger to inform Reichenau
that Blomberg must accept
responsibility for any security leaks
arising from the military
sport program. Otherwise,
noted the Chief of Staff, he

would order a halt to all
SA-Reichswehr training activities 39
Hitler's remarks to the SA were
doubtless prompted
by the German walk-out from
the League of Nations
.

on 14 Octo-

ber following unsuccessful efforts
to secure League approval
to rearm. 40 Hitler seems to
have feared that disclosure of
SA military sport programs
could become an excuse for intervention by hostile powers. Paradoxically,
as the success

of the walk-out tactics became evident,
so did Germany's

isolation and vulnerability.

Hitler's observation of

3

February 1933 concerning the quality of French
statesmanship
became painfully obvious to the officers in the
Defense Min39

Ibid. Cf. Bracher, Machtergreif ung 932f., who alleges
that Hitler's speech of 17 October 1933 was a distinct
blow to
Rohm, placing him on the defensive vis-a-vis the Army.
Following Hitler's speech, both SA and the Army increased security
measures. See BA-MA, II H/153, RWM Abw. 496/33 IIIL g.K., 3
November 1933; BA, NS-23/126 OSAF Z, Nr. 1615/33 g.K. 25 October 1933.
,

4o Hitler had continued,
without success, the efforts of
his predecessors, to secure approval of the
Disarmament
sion of the League of Nations to re-arm and expand the CommisReichswehr. His failure to secure concessions led to the
German walkout on 14 October. He was apparently still willing
to negotiate
unilaterally in February. As a quid pro quo he offered to
cease
weapons training activities in return for permission to expand the Reichswehr. See DGFP C, II, Nr. 271, Memorandum
of
Hitler-Eden conversation, 20 February 1934, 516ff; and Nr. 306,
German Ambassador to England to German Foreign Ministrv, 8
March 1934, 572.
,

,
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Ut*<

in light of Germany's
isolation and weak military

posture, accelerating the
Army expansion plan adopted
in
1932 became imperative, and
alteration of any of its provisions, especially those
regarding pre-military training,
which had acquired even
greater importance and urgency,
bordered on irresponsibility.
it at once became obvious
to both Rohm and the generals
that accelerating the expansion program would further
strain the over-taxed Reichswehr and could not be accomplished
without a steady influx
of pre-trained recruits from
the military sport program.
On the surface, Rohm's ultimatum
to Blomberg to accept complete responsibility for
security for SA military
sport programs appears to have been
a mixture of arrogance
and presumption, but it was actually
a shrewd and almost
successful attempt to wrest control of
the Kriiger Organization from Reichenau.
Rohm not only knew that the Army would
not and could not assume responsibility
for the actions of
a party organization,

but he was also cognizant that the

Army considered the military sport program to be
essential.
Even Reichenau had acknowledged the Army's reliance
on the
SA sport program, telling Kriiger that if the program
were

discontinued, the Border Guard and certain aspects of military training would have to be abandoned.

41

Regardless of

'ifZG, Fa-90/1, Kriiger Aktenvermerk, 19 October 1933.
Effective 1 October 1933, the Reichswehf required Border Guard
recruits to have completed either a Reichskuratorium or Chef
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Reichenau's hopes for dividing
the SA, the Array oould not
allow Rohra to halt Chef AW
Organization activities. Already burdened with the task
of training additional reoruits,
the Relchswehr oould not easily
have
assuraed the vast train-

ing activities carried out by
the SA, yet these activities
were essential to the success of
the Array's expansion and
mobilization plan. 42
It thus became imperative for
Reichenau to reach a

new modus Vivendi with Rohm to
insure that the work of the
Chef AW Organization continued.
Rohm's ultimatum of October,
however, placed the Army in an awkward
position: were it to
accept responsibility for Chef AW security,
the blame for
the inevitable security disclosures
would
fall upon the

Reichswehr, yet it was patently impossible to
scrap the SA
military sport program. The obvious alternative,
which Rohm
hoped to see Hitler adopt, was to divorce the Chef
AW Or-

ganization from all ties with the Reichswehr, giving the
SA

Chief of Staff undisputed authority over his semi-autonomous

AW military sport training course.

BA-MA, II H/139, CHL TA
510/33 g.K. T4lIIa/ Richtlinien fur die Tatigkeit der Grenzschutz A-Bataillone ab. 1.10.33, 17 August 1933.
42 m

The most succinct reasoning for Reichswehr-SA cooperation was given by the 7th (Bavarian) Division's Artilleriefiihrer in BA-MA, WK VII/741, Art.Fu. VII, la 65/33 g.K.,
24 October 1933.
"Die Zusammenarbeit [with the SA] erstreckt
sich auf folgende Gebiete: ... (b) Gewinnung des planmafiigen
Rekrutenersatzes fur das Heer, (c) Gewinnung von Ersatz fur
kurzeren Dienst im Heere, (d) A=Vorberei tungen [mobilization]
in personneller und materieller Hinsicht." (emphasis in origi-

nal)

.

,
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subordinate
In early December,

the General staff considered
in-

creasing, as soon as was
possible, the Reichswehr to
twentyone infantry divisions as
outlined in the 1932 expansion
plan.
Already
mil±tary personnel assigned
KrUger s
camps and schools had been
ordered to return to their units
no later than 1 March 1934«
and similar orders were issued
to the Border Guard advisors.
As mllitary personnel at .
tached to the Chef AW Organization
returned to their units,
much of Reichenau's influence
over it would evaporate, and
as the Army accelerated its
expansion program, it would depend on Rohm's favor.

^

«

^

,

«

By December, the Reichswehr could
neither put off

43
°n

Decem ber, General Ludwig Beck, the new
Chief
circulated a study calling for the immediate implementation of the November 1932
Noting that volunteers would suffice to meet expansion plan.
manpower quotes
only for the first half of 1934, he stated
that a universal
military service requirement would have to be
later than October 1934 in order to continue introduced no
the expansion efrort. To create a reserve force, he wrote, the
new recruits
shouxd only have to serve for one year of active
service followed by a number of years in a reserve status. BA-MA,
II H/153
CHL TA. 1113/33 g.K. T2IIIb, 14 December 1933,
"Neues Friedensheer
On the following day, the Defense Ministry informed major
unit commanders that "alle yom O ktober 1934 in das Reichsheer
emgestellenden Soldaten werden nur noch auf die Dauer ein es
Jahres ve rpf lichtet " Ibid
V7K VII/1517, RWMin 660/33 g.K.'
Wehr. A. Allg. (II), 15 December 1933. (emphasis in original).
See also Rautenberg, Riistungspolit ik 306ff.

^
of

1

the n
Generalf Staff,

4.x,

'

.

'

.

.

,

,

44 BA-MA,

WK IV/89, WK IV la Op 2 278/33 g.K., 13 November
1933. Rautenberg, Rustungspoli tik
224f., indicates that by the
winter of 1933, 1530 Reichswehr officers and 4590 enlisted men
were attached to either Reichswehr or SA units conducting military
sport training. In other words, over one-third of the entire
Reichswehr officer corps was committed to aiding SA training!
,

4 5 BA-MA,

ii h/153, TA 1228/33 g.K., T2IB,

15 December 1933.

'

,
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reaching some understanding with
Rohm nor afford to risk
angering or alienating him by
categorically rejecting his
demands for a greater role for
the SA in defense preparations.
His elevation to the long-desired
Reich cabinet
rank, albeit without portfolio,
on 1 December

«

cated his growing importance.

1933 indi-

The establishment, on the

same date, of the SA sport badge,
was a measure of the
growing number of military sport
graduates. Knowing the
predicament of the Army, Rohm pressed at
once for a greater
role for both himself and the SA in
military affairs. Even
today the extent of his demands is unknown,
but it appears
that he insisted on complete control of
the Border Guard
and recognition that the SA constituted
Germany's military

reserve force. 47

46
Kriiger

claims that Rohm became a Reichsminister on
8 November 1 933. See BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, " Stellungnahme"
Bl. 4f. It is more likely that Hitler told Rohm of
his pending appointment on 8 November, the anniversary of the Munich
Putsch and the date on which NSDAP honors lists were published,
as Rohm's certificate of appointment signed by Hitler and Hindenburg, is dated 1 December 1933. See HA, f. 328, Rk. Nr.
13837, 1 December 1933.
47 IfZG,

of

7

Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. 1,7, 14ff., conversation
September 1951, Bl. 1; Zgs. 1709, Huwe, Bl. 39; Bennecke,

Reichswehr und Rohmputsch 40; Foertsch, Schuld und Verh^ngnis
4 7f. Both Stapf and Bennecke state that Rohm wanted tosee the
SA become a militia, modelled on the Swiss system. Predicated
on universal military service, the Swiss militia was impractical
as a model for Germany for a number of reasons, among them geography, expense, and prohibitions against compulsory military
service. Rohm certainly knew of these limitations and instead
probably favored only the Swiss pattern: a cadre/mobile striking force (perhaps to be assumed by the Reichswehr) with a substantial defensive force, the militia, whose function in Germany would be assumed by the SA.
,

,
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During December and early
January, Reichenau and
RShm (or their assistants)
conducted a series of inconclusive talks concerning the
role of the SA in the military
expansion effort. Just how far
these talks progressed and on
just what points they broke
down is unclear. 48 Because
the
Reichswehr personnel shortage
really left no other choice,
it seems that Reichenau agreed
to allow the SA to take over,
without interference from the Army,
all military sport train
ing, and he appears to have
discussed the possibility of an
expanded role for the SA in the Border
Guard, hinting that
the SA might take over the Border
Guard.
General Staff officers, led by their new chief, Ludwig
Beck, 49 opposed the
transfer of the Border Guard to the SA.
Noting that the
Border Guard was integrated into the
mobilization plans,
they logically claimed that the Army,
responsible for all

mobilization measures, had to retain command of the
Border

IfZG, Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. 141 Stapf, a Lieutenant
Colonel then in charge of mobilization plans, states that
Reichenau offered extensive concessions to the SA, to include
transferring to its control the Border Guard. This claim has
no collaboration, and Reichenau' s alleged concessions were
not so "extensive". See below.
49

1880-1944. A brilliant staff officer, Beck had
initially been sympathetic to younger officers who supported
the Nazis.
Beck became Chief of the General Staff on 10 October 1933. His later moral and practical objections to the Nazi
regime were ignored and he retreated into the purely profession
al aspects of his work.
Retiring in 1938 on account of his
opposition to Hitler, Beck later became a chief conspirator
and was shot for his role in the attempt on Hitler's life,
on 20 July 1944.
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Guard. 5 °

Actually, Relchenau's
conversations with Rohm, however unpalatable to the
General Staff, did not
compromise
anything essential to military
interests.
In the unlikely
event that the Border Guard
was transferred to the
SA, the

loss was negligible.

The military efficiency of
the Border

Guard, staffed after 1933
almost entirely by SA men, was
poor 51 and hence its contribution
to the defense effort was
limited.

The Army, moreover, could simply
not spare the
soldiers needed to improve the
readiness status of the
Border Guard.
The dilemma the Army faced with
regard to the SA and
R6hm-s demands received considerable
attention at the Army
commanders conference held in late December.
After confirming the preparatory steps taken by
Hammerstein and Beck
to implement the expansion plan, Blomberg
stated that
the

Reichswehr would expand to
next four years.

21

infantry divisions within the

For 1934, he explained, voluntary enlist-

ments would prove sufficient to meet enlistment
quotas, but

50 IfZG,

Zgs,

152, Stapf, Bl

14. See also Stapfs note
to other General Staff sections stating that only
after the
mission and organization of the putative SA Ministry was made
public could Army planners include the SA in military planning
BA-MA, H-1/319b, TA, Chef T2, 1218/33 g.K., 7 December 1933.
51

IfZG, Zgs.

.

Fretter-Pico Bl. 32-38; F-56,
Weckmann, Bl. 5. Not all relations between SA units and
Border Guard instructors were hostile. See BA-MA, WK VII/
182, Aktenvermerk Kommandantur Regensburg, 13 November 19 33.
39

(I),

,
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his long range goal was
to have compulsory
military service
reintroduced. There were, he
noted, two additional
problems: the future of the
Border Guard and the efforts
of the
SA to form its own armed
force.
However, "the Reich Chancellor agrees ... completely",
he said, "that everything
[relating to defense] except

E£-miU^^

sport]

[SA

is the function of the
armed forces. "52

miUtary

The DefGnse

minister cautioned the generals
not to argue for the time
being with SA leaders (whose men
still staffed the Border
Guard)

concerning command authority over
Border Guard units.
Instead, he urged that these problems
be brought to his attention so that he could handle them
personally.
"Such
problems must not", he insisted, "be
allowed to disturb the
relationship [of the Army] to the SA and
53
its leaders."

The implication was clear: the SA was not
to be disturbed
as its men, services, and assistance
were still needed. 54

52 BA-MA,

WK VII/4082-2, "Besprechung in Berlin am
22. und 23.12.1933."
"Der Reichskanzler stimmt mit dem
Reichswehrminister darin uberein, da£ auBer der vormilitarishchen Ausbildung alles bei der Reichswehr liegt.
Bl. 2. (Emphasis in original)
A week later, weapons training in SA sport camps resumed.
Ibid
WK VII/1453, CHL TA
1139/33 g.K., T4IIIa, 28 December 1933.
.

.

.

,

53

Ibid., "Durch solche Schwierigkeiten darf das Verhaltnis zur SA und ihre Fiihrer nicht getriibt werden."
54

The Chief of the Allgemeine Abteilung was more
specific when he later states: "Die Bezirkskommandos sollen
der Truppe vorallem Leute zuleiten, die vormilitarische Ausbildung [SA military sport] mit Erfolg durchgemacht haben."
Ibid.

.
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Prior to the Army conference
of 22 December, Rohm
apparently had reached the
conclusion that he would be
able
to take-over full control
of the Chef AW Organization
because of the Army's
preoccupation with its expansion
program.
Wasting little time, he
intimated during a December
conference with regional SA
leaders that responsibility
for all

training conducted by the
Chef AW Organization school,
and
camps would soon be transferred
to them.
This transfer
would, he added, result when
the SA Ministry became operative and would produce a drastic
change in the mission of
the Chef AW. 55

Although not invited to this conference,
Kriiger had
discovered its deliberations, and
protested to Rohm that
transferring the military sport program
responsibilities
to the senior SA commanders would
destroy his
hopes for

assuming

complete take-over of the program when the
military advisors returned to their units.
Execrating
a

the

senior commanders, he complained that they
had dealt imprudently and independently, in violation of his
orders to the
contrary, with the Reichswehr, frustrating and
complicating

his own work.

The leader of OSAF section 1,56 he added,

had publicly stated that the newly issued SA sport
badge
was unnecessary.

Kriiger concluded his letter with a request

55 BA, Sam Sch/421,

193 3.

letter Kriiger to Rohm,

5

56 Generalmajor a.D. Franz
Ritter von Horauf.
Chapter IV, n. 51

December
See
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for a personal meeting to
resolve these grievances,
clearly the work, he added, of
jealous third parties. 57

Rohm's response, if any, to
Kriiger's charges
unknown, but Kriiger seems to have
concluded that his tenure
as Chef AW would be very
short should Rohm gain complete
control of the military sport
program. Accordingly, he
approached Reichenau in January to
forestall Rohm's anticipated take-over of the Chef AW
Organization. The Defense
Ministry initially favored retention of
the current system,
that is, with Kriiger in coordination
with the Defense Ministry conducting the military sport
program. 58 Krager instead
suggested that his staff be organized into
two sections: one
for training and one for administration 59
and asked Reichenau to appoint a military officer to direct
the training

U

,

section.

Because this suggestion would clearly allow him

some influence within the Chef AW should it be
completely

transferred to Rohm, Reichenau agreed and nominated Lt

.

Col.

Wilhelm Auleb for the new position, with the proviso that

57 BA, Sam Sch/421,

letter Kriiger to Rohm,

5

December

19

See the report of a conference on terrain and military sport, 5-7 January 1934, held in the Defense Ministry and
chaired by Dr. Kayser, Reichenau' s specialist for training. BA
Sam Sch/421, NSLB Reichsref erent fur Gelandesport E. Lin/3 to
NSLB Reichsgeschaf tsfiihrer Kolb, 22 January 934.
1

59 IfZG, Fa- 90/1, OSAF Chef AW,

"Geschaf tsordung fur den
Stab des Chefs des Ausbildungswesens"
23 January 1934.
,

1

1
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Auleb receive an appropriate
SA rank. 60 Kruger accepted
Reichenau's proposals and the
two men prepared an agreement
authorizing Kruger's proposed
re-organization of his staff
and Auleb 's transfer to
the post of Chef AW chief of
Staff
with the SA rank of Oberf iihrer 6
.

Blomberg presented the proposed
agreement to Rohm,
along with suggestions delineating
the Reichswehr
's

concepts

of what tasks the SA should
fulfill in the event of mobilization and in the Border Guard.
These proposals, except for

Kruger's and Reichenau's draft
agreement, have not survived,
but Rohm rejected all of them.62
From his perspective# an
Army officer serving as Chef AW chief
of staff perpetuated
military meddling in internal SA affairs
and shattered whatever hopes he had of assuming complete
control over the military sport program. Kruger's proposal,
moreover,
left no

doubt as to where the SA stood vis-a-vis the
Reichswehr:
"

...

in the areas in which the SA has a military
interest

(training, mobilization, Border Guard), it is subordinated
60 IMT,

XXXI, 2823-PS, "Vorschlag RWM iiber Aufgabengebiet Oberstleutnant Auleb im Stabe des Chefs AWs", 24
January 1934, 166f.
6

162.

Ibid., "Vereinbarung zwischen RWM und OSAF, 1/34",

62

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bef ehlhabersbesprechung, 2-3 February 1934. See Blomberg 's remarks, Bl. 212
The surviving agreement (footnote 61) was never signed by
either party. Auleb, in April 1934, was assigned as a deputy
commander of the Lubeck Wehrgau. See 1934 Reichswehr Stel lungsbesetzung I, 27. Cf. Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten
Reich, I, 111, who incorrectly asserts that the Chef AWReichswehr agreement became operative.
,
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to the Defense Minister
and his chain of command. "63
R5hm, who had maintained
all along to the public
the
fiction that he had no ties
with Reichswehr and had
dutifully acknowledged the
Reichswehr as Germany's sole
military
force, 64 was apparently
surprised by
prQposals
His hopes for a greater and
more autonomous role for the
SA
in military affairs were
dashed, and this disappointment,
ooupled with the lack of visible
progress towards the creation of the SA Ministry65
profoundly upset hlm
0utrage<J
and chagrined, he sent an angry
missive to Blomberg at the
end of January, which arrived
providentially (for Blomberg)
during the middle of a generals'
conference. After hearing
the Defense Minister briefly recount
his failure to reach
_

_

an understanding with the refractory
Rohm, the generals

then listened while Reichenau read aloud
the SA Chief of
Staff's letter.
"I envision," wrote Rohm, "the
Reichswehr

IfZG/ Ed ~ 1 / 1 ~ 2 Liebmann Notizen, 2-3 February
1934
den Gebieten, auf denen SA sich militMrisch
betatigt
(Ausbildung, Mobilmachung, Grenzschutz)
untersteht sie dem
,
Reichsverteidigungsminister und den nachgeordneten Kommandostellen der Wehrmacht." Bl. 212. Cf. Zgs. 152, Stapf,
who
asserts that Reichenau made many concessions to the SA,
Bl.
14ff, and conversation notes, 7 September 1951, Bl.
1.

...auf*

'

J

64

See his interview in the SA Mann (2), 13 January
1934.
Zwischen der Reichswehr und der SA bestehen keinerlei
Bedingungen
.

65 Even the Army
had expected Hitler to create the SA

2^ rY

A General

Staff stu <3y of mid-January 1934 included
:
a SA Ministry
in mobilization plans, placing it on a level
with

tne Army and the Navy Commands, and the Air
Transport Ministry
Y
BA-MA, H-1/319b, Chef TA, "Vorschlag:
Spitzengliederung" ?
15 January 1934.

*
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from now on only as a
school for the training of
the nation.
Direction of war efforts and
those of the mobilization
will
be, from now on, functions
of the SA.-66 Blo
calmly
noted that Rohm-s attitude
left him no choice but to
approach Hitler and request his
intervention. On account of
the unstable foreign affairs
situation, the Defense Minister
explained, it was impossible
that Hitler would reach a decision before the end of the
month, but, he hastened to add,
any information on the
subject would be relayed at once
to
the generals.
For the meantime, said Blomberg,
the generals
were to avoid clashes with the SA
leaders.
The new Chief
of the Army Command, Major
General Werner Freiherr von
Fritsch,* 8 promised "...that he
would oppose the demands of

^

66 IfZG

Z 9S
182, Weichs, February 1934 Commanders
^<f
n
Conference
notes: »Ich erkenne die Reichswehr nur
noch aL
Schule fur das Volk an. Die Kriegsf uhrung
und also aSch die
Mobilmachung sind kunftige Sache der SA
B1.8;
Liebmann Notizen, Bl. 212. Liebmann s record of and Ed-1/1-2
wording is slightly different, but conveys the Rohm's exact'
same message.
-

.

'

67

Ibid-/ Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 2-3 February 1933
Betehlshaberbesprechung, Bl. 21 2f.
68 1 880-1939. A highly
respected General Staff
Fritsch opposed, on account of professional reasons, officer,
any participation by the SA in defense matters. A batchellor, he
dedicated his life solely to his profession, serving as Chief
of the Army Command from January 1934 to 1938. He incurred
Hitler's displeasure by appearing to move too slowly. Too
popular and respected to be relieved, instead he was smeared
by the Nazis on false charges of homosexuality and suspended
from duty. Although he was exonerated of all charges, Hitler
did not return Fritsch to his post. Exercising his privilege
as honorary commander of an artillery regiment, Fritsch accompanied it into the field in 1939, where he fell in action.

'
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the SA with all his
power and energy. "69

During the week following
the 2-3 February generals
conference, Fritsch apparently
convinced Hitler that the
Reichswehr, constitutionally
responsible for defense, required undisputed authority
in all aspects of national
security in order to accomplish
its mission.
Hitler, who
had previously appeared
unconcerned about Rohm's
pretensions,
told Blomberg on 11 February,
as they travelled to
Berchtes-'
gaden for the Army ski championships,
to assume a more recalcitrant attitude vis-a-vis the
SA.
This
meant, he ex-

plained, that the SA was to have a
major role only in the
area of military sport. 70

IfZG Ed " 1 /1-2, Liebmann Notizen,
"...da/3 er
rw4. u? sich/ mit aller
iFntschj
Kraft und seiner ganzen Ferson
Person den
Anspruchen der SA widersetzen werde." Bl. 213?
70
15
St *P f Bl. 14ff; Zgs. 105, Mellen^w't^
l'
n0t knOWn when or if Fritsch personally
I J J'e
V
h
^y Hitler told theassembled
*'
S?w£ atl Friednchsroda
T -°u Febru
that their tasks were to spread
3

thin

Bl

>

*

S

5

Ltf-

the National-Socialist ideology, anchor
the Fiihrer principle,
and assist the movement by acting as the
guarantor of the new
order See SA. Mann (5), 5 February 1934. Considerable
eneray
and ink has been spilled to explain why Hitler
"chose" the
Reichswehr instead of the SA in 1934. While interesting
and
imaginative, these essays overlook the consistency of his
utterances since 1924, namely that the armed forces were
the
sole military force of the state and that the mission of
the
SA was political and educational.
Hitler's assignment of the
military sport program to the SA did not deviate from this
position. To him, the main function of the Chef AW Organization was sport and ideological education.
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A

c«ittee

of senior staff

office^

frora

the SA

and the Reichswehr
reached a new understanding
on 23 February.
This latest draft,
submitted to RShm and Blomberg,
dearly established Reichswehr
supremacy in all areas of
national security.
" The duties
of the SA ±n connectiQn
with national defense are
regulated. .., - read the first
sentence of the draft, "by
the Reich Defense Minister. "72
SA defense responsibilities
consisted, according to the
proposal, of providing military
sport instruction in connection with youth training,
of training elegibles not
called to military service,
and of preserving the skills
of both veterans and SA
sport course graduates who had
no
active military service. 73 Although
restricting all SA

military-related activity to military
sport training, the
draft proposal cannot be regarded
as a victory

for Kruger;

instead, considerable authority was
taken from him.

in ac-

81
14ff
From the A rmy,
Beck BnVlllli
and Stapf; from ^11'
the SA, Generalleutnant a.D. Friedrich
V
S hUlenbUrg (SA Fu hrungsamt
liaison officer to
°\
fh!
p
u
the Reichswehr)f Max Juttner (OSAF,
z.b.V.), and Friedrich
T VOn Krausser SA Deputy Chief of
Staff and head of
l -u
the Fuhrungsamt).
It is indicative of Rohm's attitude
toward
Kruger that the latter, although most concerned
and affected
by any Army-SA agreements, did not represent

T*

'

'

«

,

S

<

the SA.

72 IMT,

XXVIII, 1849-PS, "Aktenvermerk betr. Denkschrift
Reichsverteidigung, streng geheim!", 23 February 1934.
"Die
Aufgaben der SA werden von seiten des Reichsverteidigungsministers im Zusammenhang mit der Landesverteidiqunq
festgelegt. "
583.
.

,

73 Ibid.,

583f.
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cordance with the terms of
the 1933 Bad Reichenhall
Agreement, he prepared general
policy guidelines for youth
and
terrain sport programs so
that these programs would
interlook with his own. The
new proposal stipulated that
the

Reioh Sport Commissar and the
Reioh Youth Leader, under
the direction of the Defense
Minister, were to assume

autonomous responsibilities for
terrain and youth sport
programs respectively. 74

Evidence does not permit reconstruction
of the week
of 23-28 February, 75 but Rohm
protested his almost complete
exclusion from military affairs to
Hitler.
The SA Chief of
Staff apparently elicited some sympathy
from

the Chancellor,

who permitted several face-saving
alterations to the final
agreement, which was signed by Hitler,
R6hm, and Blomberg
at the well-documented Schlieffen
Association meeting, 28

74

In al l likelihood the Army was responsible
for this diminution of Kriiger's (and SA)
authority. While
Rohm had no love for Kruger, it is inconceivable
that he
would have willingly surrendered any of his authority
(however indirect) to his fellow satraps and rivals.
On the

other hand, the transfer of the direction of youth and
terrain sport from the SA to its rivals would not materially
affect the military sport program and would permit the Army
to play Rohm's rivals against him.

75 Harry Wilde, in
"Rohm's Putsch", Polit i sche Studien ,
110, June 1959, 376f., claimed that Rohm and Fritsch reached

an agreement during this week allowing the SA some role in
defense preparations. Wilde bases his assumption on an
interview with Reichsleiter Max Aman. More recent scholarship rejects the idea of a Rohm-Fritsch understanding. See
Muller, Hitler und das Heer, 109ff.
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February 1934.76

^

The definitive agreement77
between
SA and the Reichswehr
embodied several significant
changes
from the earlier proposal
of 23 February, encompassing
increased defense-related
responsibilities

m

for the SA.

addition to those defined on
23 February, SA units
could
now be accepted into the
Border Guard so long as they
could meet minimal military
proficiency standards established by military region
commanders (Wehjxyau^^
.

Prospective Reichswehr and Border
Guard recruits had to
complete successfully a Chef AW
Organization military
sport course, but membership in
the SA was no longer mandatory prior to attending such
courses. 78 SA responsibilities
in the event of mobilization
were relatively minor, but
their inclusion in the final agreement
represented
a

stantial triumph for Rohm.

sub-

In addition to maintaining

mobilization schedules for designated SA units,
the SA
agreed to make available its equipment if
needed to the

Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch 45f;
Hi tler und das Heer 98f; Bracher, Machtirgr'eifunq Miiller
943
All these sources reconstruct the meeting from General
mann's notes (ifZG, Ed-1/1-2, Bl 219ff.) and Krttger's LiebAktenvermerk of 23 February 1934 (Cf. Footnote 72)!
,

,

.

.

77

The document signed on 2 8 February has not survived.
However, its contents can be reconstructed from the exhaustive
notes of General Liebmann and an order of Artillerief uhrer
VII, Nr. 312/34 g.K., Ia, 8 March 1934, and CHL TA
100/34
g.K. T4lIIa, "betr. kunftige Ausbildung a.d. RH"
5 March
1934, both in BA-MA, WK VII/1451, (Rh 26-7/254).
,

78

BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Art.Fiihrer VII, Nr. 712/34
g.K. Ia, 8 March 1934, Ziff. 8.
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Reichswehr.

The provision to call SA
units to aotive
service was a major concession
in principle, by Army
author!
ties, who carefully insisted
that "military qualification
is
a pre-reguisite [and]
military requirements are
decisive. " »
The Reichswehr also expressed
a willi„ gness to consider
Sft
unit leaders for command
positions in mobilized SA and
Border Guard units, but these
leaders had to meet military
standards. 80
The changes between the draft
of 23 February and
the final agreement did not
all benefit the SA.
The SA had
to acknowledge that "the
Reich Defense Mini*^ has sole
responsibility for defense preparations ,» 8 1
and military
officers received greater freedom to
inspect Kruger's camps
and schools. All SA activities
contributing to the military
effort were subject to military review
and inspection 82
Finally, Hitler indicated that he approved
of this Reichswehr-SA cooperation only as a temporary, expedient
solution.
.

79 Ibid
-

setzung.

ziff 12, "Militarische Eignung ist VorausMilitar-Belange entscheiden
-

*

-

.

8 ° Ibid .

,

Ziff.

13.

8

Ibld
Ziff. 1. " Reichsverteidigungsminister tragt
allei n Verantwortung fur Vorbereitung der Landesverteidigung.
(emphasis in original).
See also IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann
Notizen, Bl. 219.
«

/

.

82BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Art.Fuhrer VII Nr. 712/34 g.K.
Ia, 8 March 1 934
Ziff. 1,2,3,8,9,10, 1 2 1 3 1 5 1 7 and 18; and
CHL TA 100/34 G.K. T4lIIa, 5 March 1934; IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bl. 219ff.
,

,

,

,

"
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"He

[Hitler)

had decided," wrote General
(later Field mrshal) von Weichs, "to develop
a large standing army
from
the nucleus of the Reichswehr....
For the transition period
Ifrom the Reichswehr to a
conscript, standing array] he approved the Defense Minister's
suggestion to utilize the SA
for Border Guard duties and
pre-railitary [military sport]
training. 83

Following some expressions of initial
unhappiness
which may have been feigned to
placate radical

,

84

SA leaders,

Rohm faithfully executed his portions
of the 28 February
agreement. On 12 March he established
four special SA inspectors whose job was to insure " f
rictionless cooperation "
between the Army and the SA.
" The direction
of national
defense and its [associated] measures lies/'
wrote the SA
Chief of Staff, "in the hands of the Reich
Defense Minister

83 IfZG/

Zgs
182, Weichs.
"Er [Hitler] sei daher
entschlossen, ein Volksheer, aufgebaut auf der Reichswehr...
aufzustellen. Fur die Ubergangszeit genehmige er den Vorschlag des R.W.M., die SA fur Grenzschut zauf gaben und fur
vormilitarische Ausbildung heranzuziehen " Bl. 9; and Zgs. 37,
Foertsch, Bl. 1. An Army order of 3 April indicates that the
Reichswehr viewed the 28 February agreement as a temporary
measure: "Bis auf weiteres bleibt die Ausbildung auSerhalb
des Reichsheeres als UbergangsmaBnahme
"
BA-MA, WK VII/
2188, Art.Fuhrer VII, la 385/34 g.K.
.

.

.

.

84At

a SA

.

.

reception held immediately after the Schlieffen Day meeting, Rohm allegedly spoke of the Reichswehr-SA
agreement as "a new Versailles Dictation". IfZG, Zgs. 105,
Mellenthin, Bl. 34. See also Zgs. 152, Stapf, Bl. If., 7.

<Reichswehrminister)." 8 5

to Qrder Qf

^

^
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^

pre-empt discontent expected
to arise from the
exclusion of
the SA from greater
participation in military affairs.
Rohm
acknowledged the disappointment
and frustration of his
men
especially the "old fighters",
who had expected to reap more
tangible benefits from the Nazi
political victory,
and he

promised immediate relief to
those with no employment prospects. Nonetheless, he felt
compelled to

conclude his order

with a strong reminder that duty
and discipline were more
important than personal gain. 86
The definitive SA regulation
governing the relation
of the SA to the Reichswehr
was signed by Rohm on 19 March. 87

^

eib
S l0
Zusammenarbeit" and acknowledged thatXS^"f
Leitung der TLandesverteidicruna und ihrer
woSk
X^reitun^en
liegt
den Hande des Reichs^teidicTu^ff1B
te
(Reichswehrministers)".
BA-MA, WK VII/1342, OSAF
if
~
p
*' Nr ; G 371
Dienstanweisung fiir die Inspekteure Ost,
Sudost, Mitte und West der SA"
12 March 1934, Bl
1
The
S
re SUb ° rdinate to the SA Fuhrungsamt.'
(Emphasis
in or?g?nalT?

?

m

^

^

'

,

86 SA

Verordnungsblatt (18), 15 March 1934.
Rohm promised tto establish SA-Hilfslager, of which little
is known and
whose fate appears to have been similar to that of the
National
Workshops of Paris in 1848.
.

,

87

BA, Sam Sch/4

OSAF Fuhrungsamt, G-429, "Betr.
Spitzengliederung der SA und Zusammenarbeit zwischen 'den
Spitzendienctstellen der wehrmacht und der SA"
19 March 1934.
This document, a photostat with Rohm's signature, is erroneously dated 19 April in IMT, XXXI, 2821 -PS, 162f. The schematic diagram found in the BA is not reproduced in the IMT
version. Kruger's file note accompanying his copy of theorder indicates that he did not see it until 14 April. The
Reichswehr order faith the same schematic diagram) paralleling Rohm's 19 March directive is "Vorschlag fur die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den obersten Dienststellen der Wehrmacht
1,

,

"

.

.
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He indicated that all
activities concerning mobilization
and the Border Guard would
be handled by

the SA Fiihrungsamt

while Kriiger retained control
of all military sport
training<
Moreover, Kriiger 's authority
to issue directives to the
Reich Youth Leader and the
Reich Sport Commissar, in order
to insure that sport programs
were comprehensive and progressive, was re-affirmed. 88 The
SA Chief of Staff reversed
his gradual diminution of
Kruger's authority to direct training within the Chef AW Organization
schools and camps, noting
that "the Chef AW is responsible
for this training. "89
Rohm's reason(s)

for restoring Kruger's control over
all SA

military sport training is unknown, but
it is possible that
Blomberg may have insisted that the vital
military sport
training program remain in "safe" and
experienced hands, as
any disruptions could cause chaos in the
Army's expansion
efforts
At any rate, following the agreement signed at
the

Schlieffen Assembly meeting, there appear to have been no

major controversies or arguments of substance between the SA
and the Reichswehr, or between Kriiger and Rohm.

A huge Army

propaganda effort to cultivate the image of the Reichswehr

und der Obersten SA-Fiihrung;
in BA-MA, RW 6/v65, Der Reichsverteidigungsminister TA Nr. 9/34, g.K. T2IV, 18 May 1934.
,

88 BA,

Sam Sch/421, OSAF Fiihrungsamt G-42 9,

19

March

1934, Ziff. 3.
89 Ibid

Ziff. 4.
"Verantwortlichkeit fur die Ausbildung ist der Chef des Ausbildungswesens
.

,

.
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as the sole German military
force, 90 which began in April,
appears to have been an unnecessary
and wasted effort to

insure the success of the 28
February Agreement. Reichswehr
intelligence officers discovered no
SA intentions of violating the agreement.
Army-Chef AW Organization relations
were relatively f rictionless and
orders issued by Blomberg
in late May governing terrain
and youth sport training merely re-affirmed the policies
established almost one year
earlier at Bad Reichenhall 92 Military
officials approved
the wearing of the SA Sport Badge
on the Army uniform. 93
,

.

There is insufficient evidence to indicate
if Kruger's
relations with Rohm improved or worsened
after 28 February.
Many SA commanders still regarded Kruger and
his organization as a tool of the Army, 94 even though on
at leagt Qne
9 ° See

BA-MA, RW 6/v56, for Major Hermann Foertsch's
Briefing Notes outlining a Reichswehr campaign to improve
the
public image of the armed forces.
.

.

9

During the 2-3 February Commanders Conference, Fritsch
had ordered the generals to collect material concerning Rohm's
plans and intentions. IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann, Bl. 213, and
BA-MA, WK VII/1295, CHL TA 544/34 f.K. T2IIIa, 17 April 1934.
This material never revealed any anti-Army actions on behalf
of the SA. Miiller, Hitler und das Heer 111.
Rohm, who believed that the SA would have its day of reckoning, albeit it
in a different fashion from what actually occurred, ordered
his subordinates to make careful notes on those people and
agencies defaming the SA. IfZG Fa-90/1, OSAF P Nr. 1455/34,
16 May 1934.
,

,

92

BA-MA, WK VII/1451, Der Reichsverteidigungsminister
TA 300/34 g.K. T4IIIa, 24 May 1934, and Anlage 1 to the same.
93 Heeresverordnungsblatt

Zgs.

(16),

1

8

June 1934, Ziff. 289.

94 BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
44, Gaertner, "Erlebnis", Bl. 20.

,

Bl.

8;

IfZG,
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occasion he supported the position
of SA Group BerlinBrandenburg instead of that taken
by one of his own staff
members. 95

Difficulties in preparing

a

Chef AW budget still

continued, and both Rohm and Blomberg
contested the responsibility for the budget. Blomberg
eventually prevailed,
and Rohm agreed on 28 May to allow
the Defense Ministry to
assume responsibility for Kruger's
financial support. 96
This transfer was still in progress
when it was superseded
by the events of 30 June 1934, the
so-called Rohm Putsch.
This well-documented event need not be
retold here.

Recent scholarship has concluded that Rohm
had developed
no immediate Putsch plans and that most Army
officers, with
the possible exception of Blomberg, Reichenau,
and Fritsch,

had no foreknowledge of the action to be taken
against the
SA.
SA,

On the other hand, Hitler's motives for smashing
the

the extent of the death list during the planning stages,

and the moment at which Hitler decided to smash the SA are
still debated.

y

Whatever the final outcome of these argu-

95 BDC, Personalakt Kruger,
II

96ba, NachlaB Kruger/9a,
Niederschrif t" Bl. 2.
vr

I,

Bl.

210f, 284.

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

17f;

,•

,

9

7Bennecke claims that the NSDAP leadership and the
Reichswehr, not the SS, were the driving forces behind the
events of 30 June. See his Reichswehr und Rohmputsch 55, 61 f.,
and 68ff. Messerschmidt acknowledges that Reichenau played
the most active and meaningful role of any Reichswehr officer,
but he admits that the extent of Reichenau s role is unknown.
Wehrmacht und NS 48. Muller, in Hitler und das Heer 113ff.,
agrees that Reichenau* s activities are not at all clear, but
he implies that Reichenau may have forced Hitler's hand.
,

1

,

,
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ments, there is no evidence
indicating that Kruger and the
Chef AW Organization members
either knew of or participated
in the events of 30 June.
Not a single Chef AW Organization
man was shot in connection with
the Putsch, those few arrested were released almost at once,
and the Chef AW units were
the only ones in the SA allowed
to retain their weapons after
30 June 19 34. 9

The indictment of Bennecke, namely that
the conflict

between the OSAF and the Chef AW exacerbated
the tense situation between Rohm and the Reichswehr and
precipitated the
events of 30 June," cannot be sustained.
While SA-Reichswehr relations had not been overly friendly,
serious hostility was temporarily avoided by the acceptance
of the Schlieffen Assembly compromise by both parties.

With Rohm no longer

in a position to threaten the existence of the
Chef AW Organi-

zation or its vital contribution to the re-armament effort,
the Army had no immediate reason to seek his destruction.

Kruger, with his own position secure after 28 February, like-

Bracher, in Machtergreif ung 934ff., states that Hitler had
no alternative but to kill Rohm who had become too dangerous a
rival. See also Helmut Krausnick, Das 30. Juni 1934. Bedeutung
Hintergrlinde Verlauf , supplement to Das Parlament 30 June
1954, who also argues that the Army-SA conflict was secondary
to the struggle between the SA and the Nazi Party.
,

,

,

98 See Heydrich's instructions to SS and police, BA, Sam
Sch/421, Funkausspruch aus Berlin, Nr. 91-48-2, 1325; and Nr.

97-82-2, 1345, 3 July 1934; BA-MA, LPI-SW, H04-1/17, Chef der
LAPO, Nr. 81-0107-1700, 1 July 1934; Bracher, Machtergreifung
916.

"Bennecke, Reichswehr und Rohmputsch

,

45.

,

,
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wise had no reason to seek
Rohm's elimination. Kruger
did hope eventually to become
independent of the SA, which
K6hm. s removal, might or
might not have assisted, but
Kruger,
for all intents and purposes,
achieved his goal of autonomy
from OSAF when Blomberg and
Rohm agreed to military super-

vision of the Chef AW budget.

Kruger thus had no reason to

sabotage a fragile agreement
which guaranteed his autonomy.
Finally, there is no evidence
that Rohm seriously attempted
to subvert or renounce his
agreement with Blomberg. 100 Although the "night of the long knives"
(June 30 1934) appears
to have degenerated from a
strike at Rohm and his coterie
to a vendetta of the triumphant
faction in the Party against
personal and political enemies, there
seems to be no reason
to believe Hitler's assertion that
he acted to crush an imminent revolt by Rohm and his clique. 101

0n 3 March Blomberg wrote Hitler complaining
that
the SA Headquarters Guards (Stabswache) were
being heavily
armed and appearing under arms in public. Blomberg
more upset over the public display of armed SA men appeared
than
over their existence. Rohm, prompted by Hitler, reminded he was
commanders of his earlier orders forbidding a display of his
armed
guards. See IfZG, Fa-90/1
Blomberg letter to Hitler, confidential, 3 March 1934 and OSAF G, Nr. 312/34, persolich, 6
March 1934. See also Zgs. 105, Mellenthin, who describes
mutual SA-Reichswehr slights during this period.
101 DGFP, C, Vol.
Ill, Nr. 55, Reich Cabinet Meeting
Minutes 3 July 1934, 118-122. Hitler also claimed that
Rohm
nad violated the agreement of 28 February 1934 (the
editor's
designation of the violated agreement as one made on
the cruiser
U
nd iS incorrect and had been procuring arms for the
ca
u
SA.
The
Reich Chancellor claimed that a letter from Blomberg
(possioly that mentioned in footnote 100) "completely
established" Rohm's treason. The letter from Blomberg
establishing
Rohm's guilt has never been found.
,

)
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Evidence, in a positive sense,
indicating that Reichenau had succeeded in
isolating Rohm and the radical
leaders
from the more moderate
majority of SA men is lacking.
Yet,
in a negative sense, the
ease with which the SS
dispatched'
Rohm and purged the SA, as
well as the total absence
of any
opposition or reaction to the
wholesale executions, tends to
indicate that Rohm and his
fellow radicals were indeed isolated,
on the other hand, there can
be no doubt that the
military goals which Reichenau
envisioned for the Krtiger

Organization were accomplished.

After military personnel

attached to the Chef AW Organization
as advisors returned
to their units in the spring of
1934, Kruger's organization
continued to function and provide
the Reichswehr with recruits whose basic military training
was behind
them.

In

May 1934, Blomberg expressed further
confidence in Krtiger
by requesting that the Chef AW train
240,000 additional men
by 1 October 1935, 102 a strong endorsement
of the mllitary
sport program indicating that the Army
depended on the Chef
AW Organization to relieve the over-taxed
soldiers of
the

onerous burden of conducting basic recruit training.

102 BA-MA, WK VII/1451,
Reichsverteidigungsminister,
TA 300/34 g.K. T4IIIa, 24 May 1934, Bl. 15. An additional
4000 were to be trained by the Navy.
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The events of 30 June 1934 drastically
altered the
relationship among the Reichswehr and
the SA,
the SA and

the Kriiger Organization, and the
Army and the Kruger Or-

ganization.

In early July Hitler ordered the
Army to assign

no further defense-oriented tasks to
the SA, and instituted
a purge of SA leaders.
He allowed the Reichswehr a free

hand in suggesting replacements for the
vacated SA posts.
Of perhaps greater importance to the Reichswehr

1

than the

emasculated SA was the uncertain future of the Chef
AW
Organization.

Scanty evidence indicates that in mid-July

Kruger and Reichenau planned not only to continue the military sport programs conducted by the Chef AW Organization,

but to separate it from the SA and increase Kruger
sponsibilities.

1

s

re-

It is impossible to ascertain if these

plans originated prior to 30 June, and although no evidence

1

BA-MA, WK VII/744, WK VII/7

August 1934.

I

r

D,

344 g.K.

lc,

17

2

Meeting v/ith his chief of staff, la and Ic officers
on 1 July 1934, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division,
General Adam, expressed his grave concern about the future
of the military sport program, Muller, Das w ahre Vaterland,
361

.

3

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, hand-written notes on Wehrjugend
proposal; Reichsverteidigungsminister Nr. 653/34 g.K. L Ila,
10 July 1934; 9a, "S tellungnahme"
Bl. 10f.
,

,
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e* 1S ts to support
such an assertion, it
cannot be entirely
hissed. certainly the idea of
an independent Chef
AW
can be found in Kriiger'
s proposal of February
1933 and a
Defense Ministry study of
March 1933. 4 R 5 hm's
approval,
in May 1934f for the
transfer Qf ministeriai
for the Chef AW budget
to the Defense Minister 5
intimates
that some larger project
may have been in the works.
At any rate, Reichenau
sent Kriiger, on 10 July,
a
Proposal for the reorganization
of youth training programs.
Reichenau and Blomberg apparently
envisioned transferring
all youth training
organizations and associations to
one
large agency.
Blomberg, in his capacity as
Defense Minister, would have had, according
to Reichenau's plan, supervisory responsibility for the
agency, but its actual direction and operation would be handled
by Kriiger.
He would
have sufficient authority to insure
cooperation

6

of all

interested parties.

Reichenau tentatively assigned this

putative agency the designation "military
youth" (Wehrjucrend
Agreeing with Reichenau's proposal, Kriiger
merely suggested
a few minor changes.
A note in Kriiger 's writing
indicates

that he insisted on a clear definition of
his authority over

4

Cf. Chapter VII, 179f f , 184f.
.

5

BA, Nachlab Kriiger/9a,

6 Ibid.

"Stellungnahme"

,

Bl.

17f.

10, Reichsverteidigungminister Nr. 653/34 g.K.
,
L Ila, 10 July 1934.
The wording of the order indicates that
it was prepared for Hitler's signature.

)

7

the Hitler Youth and
student training programs

.

A tentative understanding,
reached with the Defense
Ministry during July, defined
the responsibilities of
the
"Director of Military Youth"
(Kruger).
His new responsibilities included supervising
all sport and military
sport
training, required for all
eligible (physically and racially) German males, commencing
at age 10 and continuing

through their twenty-first year.

Although he had no

responsibility for conducting rudimentary
sport training
in either the Hitler Youth or
the public schools according
to this latest agreement, he
would train sport instructors
for the Hitler Youth and the
state schools. Kruger 'a actual
instructional responsibilities were to
be limited to conducting military sport courses for the
above-mentioned
sport in-

structors and for German males, ages 19
through 21.
theory, young men joining either the
Labor Service or the
armed forces escaped having to attend the
"military

m

youth"

courses, but in practice the military services
gave preference
to prospective recruits with credentials
from either the Kru-

ger Organization or the Reich Labor Service which
conducted
its own military sport program.

All in all, the Reichswehr

clearly profitted the most from the proposed "military youth"
program: just about all male Germans, whether or not they

served in the armed forces, would receive military training

Ibid., Kruger marginalia
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in some fashion.

8

Even though Kruger and the
Defense Ministry officials
were convinced of the
necessity for a single youth
sport
agency, Hitler avoided
committing himself to the
project.
His procrastination can,
in all likelihood, be
attributed
to the rapid deterioration
of President von Hindenburg's
health during July. With the
demise of the Reich President
imminent, Hitler shrank from
creating dissention
in the

Party, a sure consequence
should he attempt to impose order
on the factious state and
Party potentates with vested

interests in the youth question.

The death of Hindenburg

and Hitler's smooth assumption
of power on 2 August ended
fears of a succession crisis,
and on 8 August Hitler sepa-

rated the Chef AW Organization from
the SA,

hoped Kruger, toward forming

9

the first step,

Reich youth agency around the

a

nucleus of the Chef AW.

IfZG Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann, 9 Oct. 1934. Bl.
229ff.;
Aktenvermerk, 12 October 1934; Anlage 1, "Entwurf
eines Gesetzes iiber die Zugehorigkeit zu den
nationalsoziallstischen Erziehungsverbanden" BA, NachlaB Kruger/10,
"Entwurf
with Kruger's marginalia; Sam Sch/421, letter (former NSLB
...
Gelandesportreferent) Sturmfuhrer E. LinB im Stabe des Chefs AW
to Reichsgeschaftsfiihrer [of NSLB] Kolb, 14 September
1934; NS12/1313, letter Kruger to Bay. Staatsmin. und Reichsleiter [des
NSLB] Schemm, Chef AW J, 105723/34, 9 October 1934.
_

nrs/ ^
Fa-90/2,

'

;

9

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrif t iiber den Chef
des
Ausbildungswesens", Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935, Bl 1; "Stellungnahme", Bl. 9; IfZG, Fa-90/1
Kruger to Schatz, G, 4296/34,
10 August 1934. It is not certain if this order was initially
kept secret. A SA order of 9 August indicates that the "bisherigen Unterstellungsverhaltnis " of the Chef AW to the OSAF remained in effect. BA, NS-23/127, OSAF Fuhrungsamt F-2, 204604,
9 August 1934.
.

,

1
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Throughout August and September
Kruger worked closely
with Reichenau "...with the
goal of placing all pre-military
training in one hand. "10 Both
„
conceived of
miUtary
youth" program enrolling nineteen
and twenty year olds who
would spend one year of their
"military youth" period in
the Reich Labor Service and
the second in the Chef AW Organization.
To facilitate implementation
of this program, Kruger re-shaped his entire organization.
With its separation
from the SA, Chef AW Organization
deputies assigned

^

to the

staffs of the major SA regional commands
no longer had a
function, and Kruger reorganized the
deputies into Chef AW
district directors, whose territories
paralleled those of
the military district commands.
The Chef AW Organization

District Headquarters Director (Chef AW Landesf
iihrer

had

)

a small staff whose mission was to work
closely with mili-

tary recruiting and mobilization authorities
in order to

insure a continuous flow of military sport graduates
into
the Army.

A Chef AW Regional Headquarters performed the

same function at the smaller military region (Wehrgau)

level.

To facilitate speedy reorganization, Kruger suspended all

Chef AW Organization military sport courses during August
and September.

11

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk: Wehrjugend, 12 October
1934. "
.mit dem Ziel, die gesamte vormilitarische Erziehung
in eine Hand zu legen."
.

.

Ibid
BA, Nachlafl Kruger/9a, "Stellunghahme"
Bl.
1 f. A complete list of the Chef AW districts and regions can
be seen in the appendix.
1

.

,

,
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in spite of their
smooth start, differences
of

opinion between KrOger and
the Defense Ministry
developed
quickly. During discussions
held during juiy
Reichena ^
Kruger had mentioned,
apparently without contradiction
or
opposition, that he envisioned
a Chef AW Organization
budget
in the neighborhood of
approximately RM 200 million.

™

He

accordingly was chagrined when
Blomberg, in August, drew the
line on a budget of no more
than RM 120 million, a figure
later reduced to RM 80 million. 13
The Chef AW Organization
special training courses immediately
fell victim to the new
budget.
Kruger terminated cavalry, combat
engineer,
and

communications training courses at the
end of September,
closing thirty-eight schools and
camps and laying off 1376
employees 1
His chagrin over the loss of the
specialized
training camps was not shared by the
Chief of the Army Command, General von Fritsch, who had
apparently favored this
action all along. 15 Evidence
ig insufficient tQ state why
12 BA,

NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Stellungnahme"
IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk 12 October 1934.
1

,

Bl.

15;

3

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk 12 October 1934. Kruger
claimed he requested RM 120 million for Fiscal Year
1934, but
Reichswehr records indicate he asked for only RM 100 million
Both sources agree that he received ca. RM 80 million.
Ibid'
BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a, "Niederschrif t
Bl
1f.
;
,

1

.

4

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk, Miindliche Besprechung
mit Oberst v. Vietinghoff, 26 September 1934; Aktenvermerk,
25 October 1934.
1

5

Ibid., Aktenvermerk Vietinghoff, 26 September 1934.
Kruger vainly tried to see Fritsch prior to the closing of the
special training camps.

s
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Fritsch wanted to end the courses,
but he had always demonstrated a great antipathy to the
Nazi paramilitary organizations, an attitude shared by
his colleague and Chief of the
General Staff, General Beck.

Blomberg delivered an additional
blow in September
by demanding the return of all
Chef AW Organization weapons. 16
His position was legally unimpeachable;
the weapons had been
merely "loaned" to the Chef AW
Organization 1 7 Kruger nonetheless vehemently and vainly protested
.

the action of the

Army.

With some justification, he felt he
had been shabbily
treated.
He had, he told Colonel von Vietinghoff
(Reiche-

nau's deputy), purhcased the weapons with
funds from his
budget and it did not appear entirely just to
have to

turn

them over to the Army without some sort of compensation.

He

further noted that the Army had already declared most
of
these weapons unserviceable and planned to turn them over
to
the Reich Post Office and the Reich Railway Directory. 18

Vietinghoff did not answer Kruger 's objections.

Blomberg'

rationale for wanting the return of the "borrowed" weapons

ibid., Fa-90/1, letter Blomberg to Kruger, Reichsverteidigungsminister, W.A. 1140/34 g.K. L la, 14 September
1934.
17 See

Chapter VII, p. 193, and IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, 5 July 1934, Bl. 226.
1

8

°IfZG, Fa-90/2, Aktenvermerk miindliche Besprechung
mit Oberst von Vietinghoff, 21 September 1934. Kruger had
already protested on 18 September the loss of his organiza-

tion's weapons.
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is unknown, but it
appears that pressure fro,
Pritsch and
Beck to curb the Chef AW
Organization caused him to insist
that the armed forces retain
its monopoly as the nation's
sole military force in theory
as well as in practice.
At
any rate, such were the
sentiments he expressed to his

senior commanders on

9

October.

"Weapons training", he

enunciated, "of soldiers and
reserve forces remains solely
the task of the armed forces." 19
By early October, Blomberg had
finally written a
draft of the "law concerning the
membership in National
Socialist Training Associations ", 20
which summarized his
July understanding with Kruger.
He received this document
shortly after a meeting with von
Vietinghoff on 12 October,
during which the Chef AW had passionately
criticized the

apparent Army procrastination over preparing
the "military
youth law." Once again he stressed his
disastrous financial
situation, insisting that he needed at least
KM 10 million
per month in order to continue operations. 21

Ibid., Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bef ehlshaberbesprechung, 9 October 1934. "Waf f enausbildung der Soldaten
und Ersatzreservisten bleibt allein Aufgabe der Wehrmacht."
Bl. 229. Blomberg did allow Kruger to retain a few
weapons
(probably of small bore caliber) for marksmanship training.
20^
During a conference with the Reichswehr commanders
on 9 October, Blomberg told them that the "law for state
and
military training" was still in preparation, and outlined its
essential principles. IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bl.
"
229; BA, Nachlafi Kriiger/10, "Entwurf
.

.

2

1934.

IfZG, Fa-90/2,

.

.

"Aktenvermerk Wehrj ugend"

,

10

October

.
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Whatever hopes the long-awaited
draft of the law
concerning membership in Nazi
training organizations may
have awakened in Kruger, his
desire for

its speedy imple-

mentation remained unfulfilled.

Army guidelines distributed

to German military attaches on
25 October indicate that as
of that date no further progress
had been made toward im-

plementing the law. 22

0n

7

November Reichenau wrote Kruger,

informing him that a lack of funds and
a subsequent reevaluation of Kruger 's proposed "military
youth" organization dictated several changes, which,
noted
Reichenau,

23
already had the approval of Blomberg and
Hitler.

Once

the international situation would permit,
he wrote, the

Government planned to introduce compulsory military
and

Labor Service requirements

24

m

the meantime, he added,

as many young Germans as possible would serve six
months

in the Labor Service, during which they would complete

their military sport training, necessitating a merger of
some Chef AW Organization activities with the Labor Service.

Instead of Kruger becoming "Reich Leader of the Military

22 Ibid.,

Ma-241, Reichswehrministerium/Ausland, "Stichworte fur Ausfuhrungen vor den Militar-Attaches 25 October 19
,

^ J Ibid.

Letter Reichenau to Kruger, Der Chef des Wehrmachtamts, Nr. 1390/34 g.K., L IIA, 7 November 1934.
O

A

,

During his commanders conference of 9 October 1934,
Blomberg stated that he hoped a universal military service requirement would become law by 1 October 1935. See IfZG, Ed-1/1Liebmann Notizen, Bl. 231 f.
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Youth"

Reichenau instead proposed
that he be appointed
"inspector of Terrain Sport"
responsible to Blomberg for
training sport instructors
for the SA, SS CSchutsstaf f.i »
Hitler Youth, Reich Labor
Service, and the National Socialist Teachers Association.
addition, noted Reichenau,
the Defense Minister intended
to appoint an active officer
to serve as Chef AW chief
of staff and to name a committee
of representatives from
agencies responsible for sport instruction to act as a board of
governors for
,

,

.

m

the Kriiger

Organization. 25

On the issue of training with
military

weapons, the Army remained adamant:
"weapons training ...
is solely the task of the armed
forces.
Organizations other
than the armed forces do not engage
in weapons instruction.-:
This newest proposal for the Organization
Kriiger contained several important changes, all of
which militated

against both the independence and permanence
of the Chef AW
Organization. Not only did Reichenau want to remove
Krii-

ger »s organization from providing military sport
instruction

2 5 IfZG,

Fa-90/2, letter Reichenau to Kriiger, Der Chef
des Wehrmachtamts Nr. 1390/34 g.K. LIIA, 7 November 1934BA, NachlaB Kriiger/ 10, "Entwurf eines KabinetsbeschluBes
zum
Gesetz iiber die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozialis tischen
,

Erziehungsverbanden"
26

BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, "Entwurf eines KabinetsbeschluBes.
"Die Waf f enausbildung ... 1st allein Aufgabe
"
.

.

der Wehrmacht. Verbande auBerhalb der Wehrmacht betrieben
keine Waf f ennausbildung.

8

.
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directly to young men, but the
Army's plans for a board of
governors and a military officer
serving as chief of staff
to Kruger virtually eliminated
the latter 's former independence

Kruger immediately realized the
direction toward
which Reichenau's changes to their July
understanding headed:

the eventual eclipse of the Chef AW
Organization and

its transformation into a diminutive
instructor training

bureau.

27

Gathering information with which to undermine

Reichenau's arguments, the Chef AW discovered
that the budget situation was not as bleak as the Defense
Ministry
indicated.

The Reich Labor Service, he found out, had

emerged from its budget surgery in far better shape
than
had his own organization. 28 in a letter to the
Defense
Ministry, Kruger suggested three major changes to Reichenau's latest proposal:

(1)

members of the Reich Labor

Service would not conduct their own military sport program,
but instead would undergo training in special Chef AW Or-

ganization camps;

(2)

the military sport requirement for

all male Germans could only be fulfilled in Chef AW Organi-

zation camps; and

2 ^ Ibid

.

,

(3)

the Chef AW, as the official respon-

Kruger marginalia.

2

Ibid ; Amt-M, M/G-, 34 to Kruger, im Hause, 14 November 1934. The Reichsarbeitdienst asking for RM 260 million,
eventually received RM 200 million. Cf. Ba, R-43, 11/516,
RFM, Ar 1610 (34)-12I, betr. Haushaltsmittel f. RAD, 6 June
1934; RFM Ar 1610 (34) -1 4 I, 9 July 1934.
,

,
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sible for all military sport
training, would supervise all
activities related to military
sport training conducted by
the Hitler Youth, the schools,
and the Reich Labor Service.
Reichenau's reponse to Kruger's
suggestions has not
survived, but it appears that he
remained unconvinced, because there was no immediate resolution
of his and Kruger's
differences.
Instead, a meeting of all interested
parties
concerning the "military youth" law took
place on 20 November 1934. Little information pertaining
to this conference
exists, and neither its location nor its
participants are
known.

^

However, since the proposed law concerned
several

Nazi paramilitary and service organizations

(

e.g.

SA,

,

SS,

Hitler Youth, Chef AW Organization, and the Reich
Labor
Service)

and the Defense Ministry, it is probable that

representatives from all these groups attended.

While no

transcript of this conference is known to exist, the instructions for the SA representatives 30 leave no doubt that
the Chef AW Organization received full measure of the antip-

29

Nachla/3 Krtiger/10,

"Fragen zum Gesetz iiber die
Zugehorigkeit zu den Nationalsozialistischen Erziehungsverbanden bzw. zum Entwurf eines KabinetsbeschuluBes" "Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Kabinetsbeschlufles zum Gesetz iiber
die Zugehorigkeit zu den nationalsozialistischen Erziehungsverbanden".
Both these documents are undated but are attached
to Reichenau's letter of 7 November 1934 with a remark that
the material was brought to Reichenau's attention.
;

30 BA, Sam Sch/239, Fernspruch Stabschef-Oberf uhrer
Reimann am 20. 11. 193 4 (vorm.), (festgelegt nach Diktat).
The SA representatives were Gruppenf uhrer Marxer (head of SA
personnel office) and Brigadef uhrer Max Jiittner (assistant

to Lutze)
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athy which had developed
between it and the SA.
Following the R6hm Putsch,
growing hostility characterized relations between
Kruger and the new SA Chief
of
Staff, Viktor Lutze. 31
In all likelihood
burgeQnlng
antagonism originated from
the irreconciliable and
conflicting concepts each had
of the role of their
respective
organizations. Lutze, on good
terms with the Army, had no
intention of allowing Kruger
to monopolize completely

^

all

non-regular defense preparations.

The first clash came in

July when Lutze reminded
Kruger, who then was still in
the
SA, that the sole agency
for transmitting the wishes
of the
Defense Ministry to the entire
SA was the OSAF, not the

Chef AW Organization.

It was unmilitary, wrote the
SA Chief

of Staff, that a subordinate
section of the SA staff would
issue directives from the Defense
Ministry to the SA without consultation with or the approval
of the Supreme SA
Headquarters. 32 Kruger ignored Lutze and
attempted to preserve his position as the sole SA liaison
to the Defense

31

28 December 1890 to 1943. Entering the Army in
1912
Lutze saw service on all fronts during the First
received a number of decorations. Blinded in his World War and
left eve, he
was medically discharged in 1919, and entered
a business enterprise in Hannover. He joined the SA in 1923, and
became a
regional commander and deputy Gauleiter in 1925. In
1931, Lutze
became OSAF-Nord. Following the Nazi victory, he became
Police
President, then Oberprasident of Hannover until his appointment as SA Chief of Staff on 30 June 1934. He died from
injuries received in an auto wreck in 1943.
32 BDC,

Personalakt Kruger, I, Lutze to Kruger, OSAF
M/G 3806/34, 24 July 1934. A similar letter from Lutze, M/G
1066/34, of 18 July went unanswered.
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Ministry, an especially
difficult task after his
separation from the SA in August.
On 1 7 October an exasperated
Lutze wrote:
am telling you [Kriiger]
as I have already
done several months ago, for
the very last
time today, that there is no
need for an
intermediary to' transmit to me
the wishes
and requests of the Defense
Ministry.
I see
no reason why the Defense
Ministry cannot
deal directly with me. 33
I

,

While arguing in this instance from
position, Lutze nonetheless contributed

a

defensible

to the rift which

developed between the SA and the Chef
AW Organization.
In
an order published the day after
Hitler separated Kriiger 's
organization from the SA, the SA Chief of
Staff explained
to the SA that he foresaw no changes
in either his relations

with Kriiger or in the latter 's subordinate
relationship to
the OSAF. 34

Further, several senior SA leaders insisted

that Kriiger' s overweening ambition had resulted
in the
events of 30 June, an attitude hardly conducive to
insuring

Ibid

Lutze to Kriiger, OSAF 163/34, geheim, 17
October 1934.
"...telle ich Ihnen, wie ich das bereits
schon einmal vor Monaten getan habe, heute zum letzten Male
mit, da/3 es keiner Zwischenstelle bedarf, die mir Wunsche
nd Anregungen des Reichswehrministeriums iibermittelt da
Y
ich keinen Grund sehe, dafi das Reichswehrministerium direkt
mit mir verhandelt."
.

/

,

34 BA, NS-23/127,
9 August 19 34.

OSAF, Fuhrungsamt F-2, 20464,

"
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smooth relations between
the two groups. 35 " Don
t speak to
us of the Chef AW,
said Lutze. s adjutant to
"
a Chef AW Organization staff officer, "for
us, he is a red flag! "36
A further controversy errupted
over the continued
wearing of the SA uniform by
Chef AW Organization personnel
who as yet had no distinct
uniform.
Lutze, in a letter of
26 October, excoriated Kruger for
allowing his men unauthorized liberties (e^. pinned-back
coat lapels, white
leather gloves) in wearing their
uniforms.
These transgressions were deplorable, wrote the
SA Chief
.

,

of Staff,

because the public, he added, which
could not be expected
to distinguish non-existent
differences between the uniforms
of the two groups, would naturally
conclude that all who
wore the SA uniform, properly or otherwise,
belonged to the
SA.

Lutze concluded his letter with the threat
that if Chef
AW Organization men failed to conform to SA
uniform regulations, he would see to it "... that they no
longer [will]
run around in uniform. "37

More aggravating to Kruger was

35

BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, report of 26 August 1934,
conversation between Wahmann and former SA Reichschochschule
leader Heinrich Bennecke. Bennecke has reproduced this document in the appendix to his Reichswehr und Rohmputsch Anlage
,

36

BDC, Personalakt Kruger, I, unsigned, undated report
of a Chef AW staff officer (most likely Wahmann) with SA Oberfiihrer Reimann, Lutze 's adjutant.
"Sprechen Sie ja nicht bei
uns vom Chef AW, der is fur uns ein rotes Tuch!"
37 Ibid

tober

1

934.

Lutze to Kruger, OSAS BB, 4119 II/21-d, 26 Oc"...da/3 sie nicht mehr in Uniform herumlauf en
.

,

.
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the

voiding of the SA identification
papers carried by Chef
AW Organization men. This
mean action forced him to
issue
new identity cards for his
men, who in the meantime
were
harassed by police during random
security checks and who
lost their special railroad
travel discount. 38

Lutze did not restrict himself
to petty swipes at
Kriiger; Lutze 's measures
establishing SA training schools
were clearly aimed at making
Kriiger 's Chef AW Organization
appear redundant and hence a wasteful
extravagance.
In

early November the SA Chief of
Staff directed SA Groups in
western Germany to send selected students
to a new SA instructor training academy located near
Hanau.
The graduates
would, he wrote, form cadres for similar
schools which he
hoped to set up in each SA Group.
"Because these schools
will be real SA schools", he added, "special
care must be
taken in the selection of leaders" with emphasis
placed
upon their commitment to the National Socialist
movement. 39

Further measures were taken to establish sport and ideological schools for each SA Group, 40 and on 15 November Lutze

gart)

38 BA, NachlaB Kriiger/9a,
letter Landesfiihrer V
to Kriiger, Nr. 4302/34, 19 November 1 934

(Stutt-

.

on

•^BA, NS-23/127, OSAF Z, 31373, 7 November 1934
"Da
diese neuen Schulen wirkliche SA Schulen werden sollen, muB die
Auswahl die zum Lehrgang kommandierten Fiihrer besondere Sorgfalt gelegt werden." (emphasis in original) Students from the
eastern regions of Germany attended the second course
6 Jan.
1935-3 Feb. 1935). See Ibid
OSAF F, 31373/11 Ang.
30 Nov.
1 934
40
Ibid., OSAF P, 32607, 14 November 1934; NS-23/428,
OSAF F-3, 32749, 20 November 1934.
.

(

.

.

,

,
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appointed Reich Sport Commisar
von Tsham^er und Osten
to
the OSAF as sports consultant.
He received orders to
unify
SA sport instruction,
insuring its compatibility to
existent
SA ideological and terrain
sport training. 41
The abrasive Kriiger had not,
however, restricted himself to alienating the SA.
He arrogantly dismissed a request to audit his books from
Party Treasurer Fran, Xavier
Schwarz, <2 who had been specifically
designated by
to review SA finances following
the Rohm Putsch. 43 Ack-

nowledging receipt of Schwarz 's
request, Kriiger imperiously
stated that since his organization
had, at the
express

orders of the Fiihrer, been made
independent of the SA, an
examination of the books was out of the
question. 44 Schwarz,
one of the select few who enjoyed
Hitler's complete confidence and a former bureaucrat to whom
bluster and chicanery
were everyday occurrences, refused to be
cowed by
any situ-

ation.

Demanding access to Kriiger 's financial records,
he

41

Ibid., NS-23/127, OSAF F-3, 32472,
42

15

November 1934.

27 Nov.

1875- A career civil servant in the Bavarian
Civil Service, Schwarz held a number of middle-level positions
culminating in his appointment to the city council of Munich.
During the First World War he served all four years as a military official. He became NSDAP Treasurer in 1925 when Hitler
refounded the party.
43 IFZG, Fa-90/1 ,
Schwartz to Kriiger, Nr.

audit, dated 14
44

ust 1934.

letter Reichsschat zmeister der NSDAP
17761
31 July 1934. The completed
December 1934, can be seen in HA, f. 319.
,

Ibid., letter Kriiger to Schwarz, G 4296/34,

10 Aug-
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replied that according
to the interpretation of
the Fuhrer rer ng
h
laW f ° r Secur ing the Unity
o?
c^ ? and
of fi
the State
the Party (1 December
1933), according to which I am
the
plenipotentiary of the Fuhrer in all
contractual affairs of the NSDAP
all
S NSDAP
itS offi
and
ed
require my
4f
.

S^Sff^f ^ °™-tions
approval
'

.

^>

Kriiger 's response has not
survived, but an audit by the

Army, conducted one year later
and accusing Kriiger of gross
mismanagement, gives some indication as
to why he attempted
to block the Party Treasurer's
audit. 4 6

While very little evidence providing
insight into
the relationship between Chef AW
Organization

camps and the

people of the towns in which the facilities
were located
has survived, ill feelings between the two
groups existed
in at least one area.

A number of peasants in the village

of Iburg (Westphalia) complained to local
government auth-

orities that students from the Iburg Chef AW Organization
camp had trampled grazing areas and had blocked access
to

45 Ibid.,
i~

letter Schwarz to Kriiger, 6 October 1 934
"Auf die erste Durchfiihrungsverordnung des Fiihrers zum Gesetz
zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat vom 1.12.33,
wonach ich als Generalbevollmachtiger des Fiihrers in alien
vermogensrechtlichen Angelegenheiten der NSDAP gelte und...
auch alle Vertrage der NSDAP und ihrer Gliederung sowie der
Amter meiner Genehmigung bediirfen."
.

46

*"BA, Nachla/3 Kriiger/9»,

"Niederschrift"

,

passim

.

7

.

The local Re^ierungsprasident. 47

routinely

sent the complaints to the
Iburg camp commandant with
a request that he address the
problem. 48 The c
der
that he failed to see any harm
in his students using the
disputed areas for only two or
three hours daily.
He needed,
he explained, access to the
grazing areas in order to conduct his training, and he added,
he had a contract with the
community guaranteeing him this
right.
He was going to
complain to Kruger, he wrote, that
the locals were trying
to break the contract, implying
that the Chef AW would take
some retaliation against the peasants.
"After all," concluded the commandant, "according to my
arithmetic, the

_

miserable creatures
day]

[the cattle]

in which to graze. "49

still have 21 hours

[per

p er haps having second thoughts

about this intemperate letter, the commandant
dispatched a
second missive three days later, informing the
Regierungs-

prasident that he would reduce the number of students
using
the grazing area.

After congratulating himself for this

masterful solution, his anger resurfaced as he concluded

A

*~

'There is no precise English translation for this
term. The boundaries of a Regierung varied, but the area, on
the whole, was larger than a US county, and the Regierungsprasident was an appointed civil servant, responsible to
the state government.
48 BA, NS-23/1 58,

letter Regierungsprasident Osnabriick
to Chef AW Sportschule Iburg, III D3
17, 12 July 1934.
,

49

Ibid
letter Commandant SA Sportschule Iburg to
Regierungsprasident Osnabriick, Nr. 1308/34, ES 15 July 1934
"Es verbleiben den armen Vieh dann noch rechnerisch 21
Stunden zum FraB."
.

,

,

.
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that "... the complaint of
np^Anfc ... is no
the
tne peasants
argument,
but mere chicanery » 50 The
i mpe rturbable
R^er^rssident handled the situation
adroitly.
Rejecting Camp Commandant Busch's letters as
both impertinent and unsatisfactory, he prohibited Chef
AW Organization students from
using the disputed area until
1
October. Busch's threat
to write Kruger, added
the
was crass
and unnecessary, and he
explained to Busch that he had
already taken the liberty of
forwarding to Kruger
1

R^^^^

copies

of all of Busch's correspondence
with local officials. 51
This one affair is insufficient
to hazard even a
suggestion that such incidents were
characteristic of Chef

AW Organization relations with local
residents.

The only

other evidence bearing on this area,
Kruger's testimony,
which is of course self-serving, contradicts
the Iburg impression.

Nonetheless, only

a few

problems of the Iburg

type would have been needed to add many
local and regional

government officials to the growing list of Kruger's
enemies
By late 1934 this list included not only such
long-standing

rivals as Hitler Youth Leader von Schirach and Reich
Sport

Commissar von Tschammer und Osten, but the newer and poten-

letter Commandant SA Sportschule Iburg to
Regierungsprasident Osnabriick, 10 July 1934 "Mit guten Willen
liesse ich eine Losung finden, aber Beschwerden der Bauern ...
ist kein Argument, sondern Chikane!"
I^id.

,

.

5

Ibid., letter Regierungsprasident Osnabriick to SA
Sportschule Iburg, HID, Nr. 20/2, 24 July 1934.

.

tially more dangerous foes,
namely Lutze, the Reich Labor
Service, the Army Command
(Fritsch and Beck), Nazi Party
Treasurer Schwarz, and possibly a
few local government off icials
By November 1934, with opposition
to the Chef AW
Organization coming from all directions,
the first of a
series of conversations among
interested parties concerning the proposed "military youth"
law took place. 52 During
the first meeting, held on 20 November,
SA representatives

Marxer and Jiittner pointed out that the
"SA had prepared
series of its own

[sport training]

need for a second organization

a

camps which obviated the

[the Chef

AW Organization],

the existence of which serves merely to
double expenses." 53

Following this damaging observation and taking
advantage of
the lack of enthusiasm of Reichswehr officers
for entering
again the maze of paramilitary instruction, Marxer and
Jiittner proposed that a new Reichskuratorium, under
Reichs-

wehr auspices, be created; otherwise, they added, the SA
must assume complete responsibility for youth training.

Adding to the already uncomfortable atmosphere, they objected vehemently to the provision in the draft of the

52 BA,

Sam Sch/239, "Fernspruch Stabschef-Oberf uhrer
Reimann am 20. 11. 34 (vorm. See footnote 30, this chapter.
)

Ibid.
"SA bearbeitet an sich samtliche Lager, die
alle der SA unterstehen, damit nicht eine zweite Organisation
notwendig ist, durch welche erst wieder doppelte Kosten
entstehen wiirden."
,
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"military youth" law calling
for the termination of
ship in the Party and the
sa for the duration of
one's military service. 54
The reasQns

^^^^

.,

they said:

Wor-

"the movement and the state
are one, which the
Reichswehr always maintains when
it [this position] is to
their advantage. There is no
reason why the armed forces

should not mesh completely with
the National Socialist State
and stop pursuing special
interests ." 55

Apparently nothing constructive came
from this meeting.
Three days later Lutze wrote to the
Deputy of the
Fiihrer, Rudolf Hess, 56 seeking
an interview wlth Hitler
Explaining that while he (Lutze)
realized that Hitler was
free to accept the current wording
of the
_

"military youth"

54 For this
law,

see BA, NachlaB Kriiger/10, "Entwurf
eines Gesetzes uber die Zugehorigkeit zu den
nationalsoziallstischen Erziehungsverbanden " Ziff. 4.
,

55

BA, Sam Sch/239, "Fernspruch Stabschef
"
"Grunde
sind klar: Bewegung und Staat sind eins, was RW [Reichswehr]
ja immer behauptet, wenn es zu ihrem Vorteil ist.
Es ist
kein Grund vorhanden, da/3 die Wehrmacht sich nicht voll in
den nationalsozialistischen Staat einfiigt und Sonderinteressen
.

.

betreibt

56

.

11

26 April 1896-

Hess was a management trainee in Hamburg when the First World War began and he joined the 1st
Bavarian Artillery Regiment. Wounded twice, he was promoted to
Lieutenant and joined the flying corps. After the war, he became a student at the University of Munich and became active
in racist political groups, including the NSDAP in 1921.
He
formed the first SA unit at the university. While in jail with
Hitler after the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch, he became
his private secretary, a position which was elevated to Deputy
of Hitler in 1933.

law,

there were several sections
with which the SA d i sagre
ed
He insisted that the
Chef AW Organization once
again be subordinated to the SA and that
SA and SS me n be allowed
to retain their membership in
these organizations while
performing their active military
service obligations
Hess arranged for Lutze to meet
Hitler on 27 November, and
although
there is no record of their
conversation, Lutze's notes
which he prepared in advance
have survived. These confirm
that the SA Chief of Staff
either hoped to regain control
of Kriiger's organization or
to eliminate it and have the
SA
assume Kriiger's responsibilities. 58

^

Hitler appears to have made no
commitment to Lutze
and instead ordered the concerned
youth training agencies
to re-draft the "military youth"
law.
The agencies promptly
passed this task to a committee. 59 The
five page revised
"military youth" law proposal, which called
for a
cabinet

decree reorganizing and regulating military
sport training,
was apparently the work of this committee.
Compared to
Kriiger's original understanding with the Army
in July, the

final draft reflected a number of important
compromises,

57 BA,

Sam Sch/239, Lutze to Hess, 23 November 1934.

58

Ibid., Lutze's handwritten notes, "Dem Fiihrer soil
unterbreitet werden"
59

Volkischer Beobachter 4 December 19 34. According to
the newspaper, present at a meeting of 3 December were Reichskommisar Hans Frank [the former NSDAP counselor] Hitler Youth
Leader von Schirach, Reich Labor Minister Seldte, and RAD Lead
er Hierl.
,

,
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which reduced considerably
his autonomy and authority.
According to this latest
proposal, German males from
ages 19 to 21 were to be
incorporated into
the "military

Youth".

At some time during their
19th year, attendance at
a Chef AW Organization
course was mandatory, followed
by six
months Labor Service and subsequent
entry into the armed
forces. When possible, Kruger
was to maintain separate
facilities and courses for students
who were members of the
SA or SS. Additionally, special
intructor training courses
were to be conducted for Hitler Youth
leaders.
Funds for
all these courses would come from
the Defense Ministry, which
would assign an officer to serve as
Kruger 's chief of staff
and a civilian administrator to direct
the finances of the

Kruger Organization.

Kruger lost all authority over Hitler

Youth and Reich Labor Service training
activities, and
Lutze's demand that SA men be allowed to continue

their SA

membership while on active military service was rejected. 60

Neither the SA nor the Army contributed significantly
to the drafting of this proposal which never became
law.

The SA and the Reichswehr instead appear to have

undermined both the revised "military youth" proposal and the

Kruger Organization.

Lutze had manifested

his:

opposition to

the Chef AW Organization on numerous occasions, and he had

60 BA, Nachlafi Kriiger/10,

vom 11. 12 34
.

"

(KabinettsbeschluB)

"

Entwurf
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carefully directed attention
to the needless expense
of
maintaining two military sport
training organizations, his
own and Kriiger 's, a situation
whioh, he had claimed with
logic, violated the military
axiom of unity of
command.

From the side of the Defense
Ministry, enthusiasm for the
Kruger Organization had subsided
since July.
First
came

the decision that the advanced
Chef AW training courses
were no longer necessary, then
the Army Command had insisted upon the return of its
weapons. Budget discussions

between Kriiger's officials and the
Army dragged on interminably 6 1
Perhaps more to the point, Reichswehr
officials were
happy to tolerate the Kriiger
Organization so long
as the

Government graciously provided the funds for
this organization from the Reich Interior Ministry,
but they became reluctant to fund it when the money was to come

from their own

budget, as mandated by the proposed "military
youth" law.

Further, by October 1934 the Army had almost reached
the man

power level which its experts had hoped to attain by
1938,

6

62

Ibid., 9a, "Stellungnahme" , Bl 18f. The Army report
of 1935 accusing Kriiger of gross fiscal incompetence and mismanagement rings hollow. Although the Army succeeded in appoint
ing its own financial expert to the Chef AW staff only in November 1 934, Kriiger had, from the inception of his organization,
kept Army officials aware of his total expenditures and had
submitted for their inspection copies of his budget.
.

62 Rautenberg,

Wehrmacht,

I,

53-58.

Riis

tungspolitik

,

309-313; Absolon,
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an expansion which in all
probability strained the defense

budget.

Achieving its 1938 goals four
years ahead of schedule, Army officials may have
argued that money allocated for
the Chef AW Organization,
whose function no longer appeared
quite so critical now that the Army
had a surfeit
of men,

could be better spent to the
advantages of the armed forces
by the Defense Ministry itself.
Moreover, there appeared
little need for subsidizing the expensive
Chef AW Organization schools when a similar agency,
the SA, would perform
the same task at no expense to the Army.
The Army, in fact, had been leaning in this
direction
since November.

Fritsch published an order on

4

December

allowing SA and SS units to train with Army
recruit battalions.

This training, explained Fritsch, implied no peace-

time military function for the SA; however, in war
or mobilization, those SA and SS units which had undergone
military

training would serve as replacement units, forwarding men
to the front as required. 63

Even though the Army restricted

this training to men over twenty-five years of age, the im-

plication was that the Army, no longer overwhelmed by

a

flood of recruits, could spare personnel and facilities to

train non-regulars.

In other words, the Chef AW Organization

had become obsolete.

BA, Sam Sch/477, CHL TA 6008/34 g.K. T2IIIa,

cember 19 34.

4

De-
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In early December both the
Army and the SA became

openly hostile to Kriiger.
on

Blomberg sent him an angry letter

December, accusing him of harboring
anti-Reichswehr
elements within his organization,
and demanding an "investigation and thorough measures against
the guilty and any
suspicious [elements]." 64 An order from
the OSAF to the
entire SA expressed a desire for the
establishing of warm,
comradely relations with the National
Socialist Motorized
Corps (NSKK) while forbidding any contact
between SA units
and the Chef AW Organization 65 The
most insidious blow
of what Kriiger called "the incomprehensible
attitude of
6

.

the SA toward the Chef AW

.

.." 6 came

with Lutze's attempt to

have Kriiger expelled from the Party as well as
his post on

account of his alleged role in the so-called Killinger
Affair.

Killinger, 67 the Dresden SA leader and Minister-

Ibid. /421, letter Blomberg to Kriiger, RWM 1699/34
g.K. Ha, 6 December 1934. "Ich halte beschleunigte Untersuchung und durchgreif ende MaBnahmen gegen Schuldige und
irgendwie Verdachtige fur dringend erforderlich.
65 BA, NS-23/2, OSAF Ch. No.
35110, 26 November 1934;
NS-23/319, SA Gruppe Kurpfalz, 197/34 (betr. OSAF G 3410, F-2,
geh. 368), 13 December 1934.
66 BDC,

Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to Staatssek.
in der Reichskanzlei Dr. Lammers, (to be forwarded to Hitler),
Nr. 1156/35, 6 April 1935. "Die unverstandliche Einstellung
der SA gegen den Chef AW.
67 886-1
1
944

A Navy officer until 1918, he joined the
Erhardt Brigade and became the military leader of Organisation
Consul. He led the Erhardt Brigade in 1921 in Upper Silesia
and later the Wiking Bund in Saxony. Killinger joined the
NSDAP in 1927, and in 1933 became the Minister-President of
Saxony. From 1937 to 1939, he served as the German Consol in
San Francisco, then Ambassador to Rumania, where he committed
suicide
.

1

.
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President of Saxony

had been arrested and
interrogated for
alleged anti-Reichswehr activities
in connection with the
events of 30 June 1934. A NSDAP
court of honor subsequently cleared him of those charges.
Lutze later discovered
that Kruger supposedly had
master-minded Killinger' s arrest
and regretted only that the Saxon
Minister-President had
not been shot. 69 Lutze explained
these allegations to Kr( ._
,

™

ger, offering him a chance to account
for his actions. 70

Receiving no response, the SA Chief of
Staff forwarded the
material to Major (Ret.) Walter Buch, head
of the Nazi
Party Court and Tribunal.

Citing what he believed to be

Kruger 's monstrous deed against a fellow SA
Obergruppen
fuh rer and Party Comrade, Lutze indicated
that he
felt

obliged to initiate action against Kruger "... with
the
goal of
Jttazi]

[his]

removal from office and expulsion from the

Movement."

71

Since this complaint involved re-

68

See his memorandum of
sonalakt Killinger.
69 Ibid.

1

October ]934, BDC

,

Per-

letter of Obergruppenf iihrer von Jagow to
Lutze, 14 December 1934. Jagow admitted that his informant
was Gauleiter Kube (of Dresden)
,

70

Ibid., letter Lutze to Kruger, OSAF 270/34 geheim,
personlich! streng vertraulich! 20 December 1934; Personalakt
Kruger, II, Lutze to Kruger, OSAF 270/34, B/R, 8 January 1935.
7

Ibid., Personalakt Kruger, II, letter Lutze to
Erster Vorsitzender des Obersten Parteigerichts Pg. Buch,
OSAF 270/34 geh. B/R, 23 January 1935; Lutze also informed
von Killinger.
See Ibid , Lutze to von Killinger, OSAF
270/34 geh. B/R, 24 January 1935.
,

.
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opening the 30 June controversy,
Buch refused to handle the
case and sent the material
to Hess who, at Hitler's
express
order, stopped the investigation 72
As a final straw Lutze
halted lateral transfers from
the Chef AW Organization
.

,

to

the SA and ordered his personnel
office to issue discharge
certificates for all former SA men
in Kruger's employ. 73
Sometime in January 1935, on an
unknown date and for
reasons which are not clear, Hitler
decided to disband the

Chef AW Organization.

Surviving evidence indicates that

Hitler made his decision possibly as
early as
and certainly no later than 12 January,

3

January, 74

for on that date

Blomberg told his commanders that "the Kriiger
Organization
is going to disappear.
The Fiihrer has already ordered its
dissolution. "75

72 Ibid

Kriiger vainly protested the decision on

Personalakt von Killinger, Buch to Lutze,
26 January 1935; Hess to Lutze, Br/Wi, 9 May 1935.
-

i

73 BA, NS-23/428,

OSAF P-1
9 January 1935. In exceptional cases, Chef AW personnel could seek re-ins tatement
in
the SA at their former SA rank.
,

—

74 A cryptic
remark made by Reichenau to Kriiger on 31

January 1935 leaves open the possibility that Hitler may have
made a tentative decision on 3 January against the Kriiger Organization: "... er [Reichenau] habe bereits am 3. Januar Obergruppenfiihrer [Kriiger] die Willensmeinung des Fuhrers iiber den
Chef des Ausbildungswesens gesagt
" See IfZG,
Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk: Anruf des Generals v. Reichenau am 31. Januar 1935,
3:15 Uhr". A list of dates relating to the disbanding of the
Chef AW in Kruger's handwriting confirms a conversation with
Reichenau on 3 January, but provides no further insight. BA,
NachlaB Kriiger/10.
7/3
5

IfZG, Ed-1/1-2, Liebmann Notizen, Bef ehlshaberbesprechung,
12 January 1935. "Organisation Kriiger fliegt auf. Fuhrer hat
Auflosung bereits befohlen." Bl. 238.

,
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15 January after a conversation with
the Defense Minister. 7 *

If Hitler had intended for
his order to remain confidential
(it carried a secret
classification when formally issued),

he was disappointed.

Five days after Blomberg told his
gen-

erals of the imminent disbanding
of the Kriiger Organization,
top level Nazis shared the secret. 77

Hitler did not explain his reasons,
at least in writing, for disbanding the Chef AW
Organization. 78 Certainly
Kriiger did not lack either rivals
or enemies with
close ties

to Hitler.

Lutze, his most outspoken foe, clearly
had in-

dicated his opposition to Kriiger
it as a waste of money.

»s

organization, castigating

The SA Chief of Staff appears to

have painstakingly orchestrated party rivals
in their chorus
against Kriiger and successfully blocked his bid
to become
"Reich Leader of the German Military Youth", a
position

76 Nachla6 Kriiger/10,

list of dates relating to dis-

banding of the Chef AW Organization.
77 By

17 January, General Vogt,

formerly of the GVA and

now a Hitler Youth official, knew of Hitler's order. His connections with the Defense Ministry had, in the past, been close,
and it is inconceivable that he would have failed to relay this
information to his superiors who were keenly interested in the
Chef AW Organization. See IfZG, Ed-67/19, "Besprechung iiber
Fragen des dt. Jugenddienst am 17. 1. 193 5, Aktenvermerk"
signed "von Bonin" [a Colonel in Reichenau's office, who apparently leaked the news]. See also Fa-90/1, letter Johannes
v. Guenther to Chef AW Gruppenfuhrer Spaing, 28 January 1935.
78

Hitler's letter to Kriiger informing him officially
of the disbanding of his organization gives no reasons why
this faction was taken.
IfZG, Fa-90/1, letter Der Fiihrer und
Reichskanzler, Nr. 272/35 g.K. L Ila, Berlin, 24 January 1935.
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which threatened their baliwicks.

The arrogant and ideal-

istic Kruger had few friends to
intercede on his behalf;
even his former comrades in the SA
regarded him as a traitor
to the SA after the Rohm Putsch.

Moreover, from Lutze's

standpoint, the Killinger Affair could
not have exploded at
a better time.

Nonetheless, evidence tends to assign

a

greater re-

sponsibility to the Reichswehr than the SA for
the demise of
the Kruger Organization.
Enthusiasm for an independent Chef
AW had clearly waned since the events of
the 30 June. Certainly money was a factor as the Army Command,
during the
fall of 1934, constantly whittled away at Kruger's
budget.

Moreover, the desperate need in 1933 for semitrained recruits had for the most part diminished.

France had not

attacked or threatened Germany for its unilateral violations
of the Versailles Treaty, and the Army, in 1934, had already

reached its 1938 expansion plan goals, the next stage of

which called for re-introducing conscription.

It appears

that the Defense Ministry had no idea when Hitler planned
to re-introduce a universal military service requirement,

but such a move was expected no later than October 1935. 79
It is unlikely that the Chef AW Organization would have

survived for any length of time once the draft had been reinstated, and Army officers may have urged disbanding the

/y Cf.

Blomberg's remakrs of
Manstein, Soldatenleben 187.

9

October, footnote 25;

1
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Kruger Organization in order to
point out the need for a
draft.

Rumors current in Berlin, 80 to
which Kruger apparent
ly subscribed, 81 blamed the
Reichswehr for undermining Kruger' s autonomy. 82 One former
Chef AW Organization member
claimed that the Army had detailed
Lt. Colonel Erwin Rommel
(the later Field Marshall) as Chef
AW Organization Chief of
Staff, but that his work was sabotaged
by Kruger »s staff
director, Wahmann.
Rommel, according to this source, then
recommended to Hitler the abolition of the
Kruger Organization. 83

80

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Kruger »s handwritten notes of a conversation with Blomberg, 24 January 1935. See also
Reichenau's
KrUger/ ibid " Fa ~90/1 , Aktenvermark, 31 Jan-

uar^l^S

^

8

Ibid
Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk,
hannes von Guenther to Spaing.
-

i

31

January; letter Jo-

82

Ibid., Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk, 31 January, with Reichenau; letter Johannes v. Guenther to Chef AW Gruppenf uhrer
Spaing, 28 January 1935. Guenther stated that these rumors
were current in November 1934. See also Zgs. 44, Gaertner,
Bl. 6. Lutze's adjutant told Wahmann that the Reichswehr
planned to replace Kruger with a general as soon as Kruger
had set up the Chef AW Organization. BDC, Personalakt Kruger,
I, Oberf uhrer Reimann Comments.
83

Major (Ret.) Huwe, a Chef AW staff officer, claimed
that Hitler ordered the Army to assign a young officer decorated with the Pour le Merite for combat heroism as Chef AW
chief of staff. Rommel, writes Huwe, received this assignment.
Since the Youth Law proposal of 11 December 1935 had not progressed beyond the committee stage, Kruger, zealously retaining his diminishing independence, may have refused to accept
Rommel as his chief of staff. While this action would represent
a volte face from Kruger' s position of January 1934, he now
had to contend with the Reichswehr as a threat.
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Greater credence can be given to
the thesis that the
Army presented Kriiger, in late
December
1

934 or early Ja nu-

ary 1935, with a series of
conditions which, if accepted,
would have effectively destroyed his
autonomy. Even the lmplementation of the proposed "military
youth" law
of

11

De-

cember, which called for a military
officer to become Chef
AW Organization chief of staff,
curtailed Kriiger's autonomy.
The Rommel appointment could have been
one of the Army's

conditions for allowing Kriiger's organization
to continue.
In the event that he might not accept
restrictions on
his

autonomy, the Army Command could then blame
him for his own
demise, knowing that the SA would assume his
training tasks.

Both Reichenau and Kriiger allude to this thesis,

84

and Krii-

ger certainly appears to have felt that Reichenau
had used

him poorly.

In a stormy session with Blomberg on the morn-

ing of the 24th of January, Kriiger told the Defense
Minister

that he no longer wished to work with Reichenau.

"I do

not

have the impression," he added, "that General von Reichenau,
in the last

[few]

weeks has been completely honest

dealings] with me."

berg,

[in

his

"That is preposterous," sputtered Blom-

"on account of two very different reasons.

cause it is not in keeping

[with Reichenau]

84 Said

,

First, be-

and second, be-

Reichenau to Krtfger,
"Der Chef AW hatte es in
der Hand gehabt, den Dingen einen anderen Ausgang zu geben."
IfZG, Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk Anruf des Generals v. Reichenau,
,

31.1.

1935.
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cause it is false. "85

The Defense Minister

^

accede to Kriiger's request and
assigned Ministerial Advisor
Dr. Packel of the General
Army Office to assist in dismantling the Chef AW Organization. 86
In summation, it appears that
Hitler,

following the

recommendation of the Army which was
seconded by Lutze,
ordered the Chef AW Organization
disbanded in early January.
Kriiger's organization had outlived
its usefulness by the

winter of 1934.

The Army, along with all other government

agencies, had in late 1934 to face a
general constriction
of funds and the RM 80 million allocated
to Kruger for 1935
was an immense sum that the Army apparently
decided it could
spend more profitably elsewhere. Moreover, by
transferring
his duties to the SA, the Reichswehr retained,
without cost,
the same benefits.

In addition to the Army, the Nazi Party

agencies interested in pursuing military sport activities
(the SA, SS, Hitler Youth, and Reich Labor Service)

in all

likelihood subjected Hitler to a litany of complaints against
Kruger.

These agencies hoped to eliminate

a

dangerous rival

and to accrue whatever money that might become available

85

IfZG, Fa-90/2, Kriiger's hand-written notes, conversation with Blomberg, 24.1. 35.
"Kr [iiger] 'Ich habe nicht den
Eindruck gewonnen, dafl Gen. von Reichenau in den letzten Woche
ehrlich loyal mit mir zusammen gearbeitet hat!' v. Bl [omberg]
'So geht das nicht, aus zweierlei Griinden.
Erstens, weil es
nicht zutrifft, und zweitens, weil es nicht wahr ist. "
1

86

Ibid., Fa-90/1, Aktenvermerk

Besprechung mit den
Februar 1935; CHL 103/35 g.K. II

Chef des Truppenamts ... 4.
Ang.
Berlin, 7 February 1935.
,

:
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should his organization be disbanded.

Finally, Kriiger's

abrasiveness left him without friends or
protectors when
they were most needed.

^

CHAPTER

XI

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

During the spring of

19 35,

Kriiger met on numerous

occasions with General Beck and Colonel Fromm
(of the
Army's General Office) to discuss arrangements

for the

dismantling of Kriiger

1

s

organization.

Its facilities

and equipment were transferred for the most part to the
Army, with other Government and Party agencies receiving

what remained.

Kriiger encountered numerous difficulties

in attempting to find employment for the former members

of his Chef AW Organization.

Overcoming considerable re-

sistance on the part of the Army Command, the Chef AW

persuaded reluctant military officials to allow his men
to enlist in the Army training battalions under extremely

favorable circumstances.

Chef AW Organization employees

with no prior military service were, for example, sent to
special training courses for several weeks, then assigned
to Army training units as instructors.

These men received

accelerated promotion to non-commissioned officer ranks.

^IfZG, Fa-90/1, " Aktenvermerk Besprechung mit dem
Chef des Truppenamts Generalleutnant Beck als Vertreter des
Chefs der Heeresleitung ... am 4. Februar 1935."
:

2
8

BA-MA, WKVII/408-1, CHL 400/35 g.K. Allg. E, II,

February 1935.
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Ex-Chef AW Organization leaders
who could meet officer
candidate standards likewise
received instruction in
special courses and were then
commissioned in the reserve
forces with a regular appointment
following after a year
of probationary service. 3
Nonetheless, the Army did not
need all of Kriiger 's former employees,
and ill-feelings
developed between Fromm and Kriiger,
who insisted that the
Army could have accepted more of his
4
men.

As Kriiger gradually dismantled his
organization,
its functions were taken over by other
Nazi agencies.

Hitler transferred responsibility for
pre-military training in part to the Hitler Youth 5 and in part
to the SA.

It took over the awarding of the SA Sport
Badge.

Lutze

appointed former Reichskuratorium executive President von

Neufville to direct the newly-created training section of
the OSAF.

3

The Sport Badge fell under his purview.

Ibid

.

,

6

CHL 8C4/35 PA (A), 30 March 1935.

4

IfZG, Fa-90/1, "Aktenvermerk, 4 Februar 1935"; BA,
NachlaB Kriiger/10, letter Kriiger to Blomberg, 8 February
1935; letter Kriiger to Staatssekretar Lammers, 9 February
1935; letter Kriiger to Blomberg, 11 February 1 935; 9a, letter
Kriiger to Fromm, Chef AW Nrs.,346 and 34 7, v.E., 11 February
1935; Kriiger to Lammers, Chef AW Ch/G 386/35, 26 February
1925 sic ; letter Kriiger to Lammers, Chef AW 51 3/35, 26 March
1935; letter Kriiger to Lammers, Ch/G 759/35, 17 May 1 935.
[

]

5 See

Chapter VI, passim
of Gerhard Rempel's MS on the
Hitler Youth. This is a revised draft of his dissertation, "The
Misguided Generation: Hitler Youth and SS, 1933-1939", University of Wisconsin, 1971.
6 IfZG,

.

,

Fa-107/2, Stif tungsurkunde der SA Sportabzeichen,
15 February 1935; BA, NS-23/128, OSAF 13174, 16 March 1935;
OSAF F, 15654, 28 March 1935; OSAF 26909 to RFSS, NSKK, RJF
PO, DLV, and RAD, 24 May 1935; Sam Sch/414, OSAF Ausb.Abt.A,
11/32281
6 June 1935.
,

"
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Owing to a lack of evidence,
it is not possible to
state exactly the fate of most
Chef AW Organization personnel.
The Chef AW Organization was
officially disbanded on
the 1st of July 1935.7 According
to Kriiger,
only 4930 of

his men had found positions when
the Organization officially
disbanded, and a further 6051 men were
still looking for em-

ployment at that time.
VII

8

if the figures of Military District

(the only one for which evidence is
available)

can be

considered representative, most of Kriiger 's men
who had
found employment by the time the Organization
was officially

disbanded did so in the ranks of the Army.

9

The SS, in

spite of a ban on recruiting, accepted some former Chef
AW
men, many of whom rose to the highest SS grades. 10

Other

Nazi Party organizations proved less receptive, although
even Lutze accepted back a few former SA men, but at their

previous SA rank, which was generally lower than that held
in the Chef AW Organization.

11

7 BDC,

Personalakt Kriiger, letter Kriiger to Reichskriegsminister, 21 June 1935.
8 BA,

vom

31

.

Mai

NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Stand der Unterbringung
1

935.

9 BA-MA,

WKVII/4082-1 WKVII 508/35 g. Ib/N, 14 February 1935; WKVII Ha to lib, 23 February 935; WKVII 1956/
35 g.K. lib, Az, 12 lib Ch.AW, 29 March 1935; WKVII 1968/35,
Az. 12 lib g.K. /Chef AW, 1 April 1935.
,

1

l0 For example, Kriiger himself, and General der WaffenSS Felix Steiner and General der Waffen-SS Gottlob Berger.
11

BA, NachlaB Kruger/9a, letter Kriiger to Hitler, Ch/
OSAF P, Nr. 13113,
G/ 472/35, 14 March 1935; IfZG, Fa-90/1
18 June 1935.
,
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The final chapter of Kruger's
relationship with the

Defense Ministry ended in

a

victory for Kriiger.

Col. Fromm

prepared a report (at whose instigation is
not clear) condemning him for allowing gross irregularities

in the admin-

istration of Chef AW financial matters.

Most of the problems

to which Fromm pointed concerned unsigned
agreements and

leases with local communities in which Chef AW camps
were
located.

In some cases, stated Army bureaucrats, the ab-

sence of a lease allowed the town to claim Reich property,

while in other cases towns were left holding the bill for
projects initiated by Kruger's organization.

Where leases

had been signed, noted the author of the report, long-term

agreements were the rule, and the Reich was now faced with
the prospects of paying enormous sums for property for which
it had no use

.

2

Kriiger was permitted to make a rebuttal, and in a

thirty-three page document submitted to Hitler on the 10th
of October, he refuted the Army's claims, one by one.

He

acknowledged that many agreements and leases had not been
signed, explaining that the need for a piece of property

often meant that he had had to take over and use certain
facilities or areas before the legal paper work could be
completed.

These anomalies would have been rectified, he

NachlaB Kruger/9a, "Niederschrif t uber den Chef
Rk. 6754, 25 September 1935.
des Ausbildungswesens"
12 BA,

,

"
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said, had his organization not been
suddenly disbanded.

same excuse applied to the long-term leases.

The

Not knowing

that his organization was to have a short
existence, he

stated that he had attempted to negotiate the
best possible
terms for the Reich, and that implied long-term
13
leases.

Hitler read both reports and accepted Kriiger' s version,
fully exonerating him.

The Fiihrer told Himmler that "... the

Icontracts and leases] would have been quite proper had the

Organization of the Chef AW continued

[to

exist]." 14

Blomberg and Reichenau ended their close relationship
in 1935 with the transfer of Reichenau to Bavaria to command

the Bavarian Military District.

Both officers subsequently

became Field Marshals, but Blomberg had his career cut short
in

when it was discovered that his new wife had starred

19 38

in pornographic films.

He survived the war to die in Allied

captivity at Nurnberg in 1946.

Reichenau successfully com-

manded armies in Poland, France, and Russia, where he died
of natural causes in 1942.

The emnity between Kriiger and Lutze lasted until the
latter'

s

death in

1

943

.

Kriiger never forgave Lutze for his

role in bringing about the dismantling of the Chef AW OrganiIn February

zation.

1

943, Kriiger discovered that Lutze had

Ibid., "Stellungnahme zur Niederschrif t iiber den

Chefs des Ausbildungswesens
14

.

"

10

October 1935.

BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, RFSS, Tgb. Nr. AR/1 525 Geh.,
Himmler to SS Personalbiiro Nach Vortrag beim Fiihrer, 18.10.
1935, 31 October 1935. "... die [Vortrage] wohl richtig gewesen
waren wenn die Organisation des Chefs A.W. weiter bestanden
hatte.
,
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vacationed in a resort area in Poland
reserved for survivors
of the Stalingrad disaster, a faux
pas which Kriiger hastily
passed on to Himmler. He asked Himmler,
apparently with
some relish, to initiate action to have
Lutze removed from
his post.

Himmler duly passed on Kriiger »s request to

Bormann, but Lutze died of injuries incurred
in an automo-

bile accident in May

19 43

before any official action was

taken
Kriiger himself returned to the SS which he had
left

in April 1931.

The Army offered him the opportunity to

enter active service, although in exactly what capacity or
at what grade cannot be determined.
clined,

The former Chef AW de-

accepting instead an appointment as SS Obergrup -

penfiihrer

inence

1
.

7

He never really attained the position of em-

he had held as Chef AW and was shunted about from

one relatively menial SS position to another.

During the

war he served as the Senior SS Officer and Police Leader in

15 IfZG, Ma 290, HSSPF-Ost
[Kriiger]
923/43, 23 February 1943, Az. Kr/F 1.
1

6

to RFSS Himmler,

BDC, Personalakt Kriiger,

letter Kriiger to Chef des
Herrespersonalamts Generalmajor v. Schwendler, Ch. 284/35,
February 1935. The content of the letter merely indicates
1
that the Army offered Kriiger some position on the 25th of
January. One of Kriiger s staff officers, Major (Ret.) Huwe,
claimed that the Army extended a brigadier's commission to
Kriiger who declined it, stating that he would only accept a
commission as a major general. See IfZG, Zgs 1709, Huwe,
Bl. 9.
1

.

1

7

BDC, Personalakt Kriiger, letter Hitler to Kriiger,
7 February 1935.

8

8
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the General Government in occupied
Poland, a position which
he disliked intensely.
Only in the last years of the war
was his request to be transferred to
the Waffen-SS granted.
He disappeared in action in Austria during
the last month

of the war.

1

Any assessment of the military sport movement
necessarily falls into two parts: a military evaluation
and

political one.

a

While the circumstances giving birth to the

military sport movement were both political and military,
namely the Versailles Treaty and the turbulent first years
of the Weimar Republic, the Defense Ministry conceived and

developed military sport in 1924 as
problem.

a

solution to a military

Only much later, in 1930, following the resurgence

of political extremism, did the political potential of the

military sport program become apparent and attractive.

Even

Hitler, who certainly did not underestimate the indoctrina-

tional value inherent in military sport training, stressed
first and foremost its military value.

Yet efforts to judge objectively the contribution of

military sport training to Germany's overall defense posture
run into difficulties owing to a lack of evidence.

Bombing

raids in the Second World War appear to have claimed most

Army records concerning its role in military sport, and the
files of the majority of private organizations involved in

1

Ibid

.

,

II, passim
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the project have likewise disappeared.

Evidence in the fo rm

of statistics and contemporary evaluations is,
for the most

part, not available. 19

Military sport graduates as such

also never faced that ultimate standard against
which military efficiency is measured, war.

On the other hand, the

fact that war did not occur except at Germany's bidding in
1939 tends to suggest that at the very least military sport

may have had a deterent value, itself perhaps a sufficient

justification for the program.

Moreover, the continued

interest in military sport for over

a

decade by the Army

Command indicates that leading military figures thought
highly of the program.
In addition to the immediate military benefits aris-

ing from the military sport program, the Defense Ministry

regarded its attendant advantages as equally important.
Most Army officers remained convinced that future wars would
require mass armies, perhaps not as gigantic as those of the

First World War, but certainly large enough to require conscription to fill their ranks.

With all aspects of military

conscription forbidden by the Versailles Treaty, military
leaders looked upon military sport as a means of circumvent-

1

9

The only contemporary evidence available concerning
the quality of Chef AW training is found in Kruger' s report
Kruger wrote: "Es liegen eine Fulle vor Urteilungen
to Hitler.
hoher und hochster Kommandostellen der damaligen Reichswehr
vor, daB es dem Chef AW gelungen ist, eine Rekrutenbildung
zu leisten, wie sie das Heer benotigte." in BA, NachlaB KrtiIt is unlikely that Kruger
32.
ger/9a, Stellungnahme" Bl
would tell anything but the truth in a matter so easily veri,

fied.

.

.
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ing the letter of the law.

Military sport records provided

local government and military authorities
with some idea,
however vague, of the names and numbers of
young men who
had had some fashion of military training. In
the absence
of any administrative machinery for conscription,
organizations and groups with military sport programs could
be called

upon in the event of a national emergency to provide
the

names of their members
But perhaps of even greater importance to the armed

forces than preparing membership lists or conducting mili-

tary instruction, organizations which encouraged military

sport training promoted, in effect, the concept that every

citizen owed some service to his country.

It was precisely

this belief which the Defense Ministry had to nurture in

order to facilitate the re-enactment of universal military
service laws as soon as political conditions would permit.

To what extent military sport activities contributed to the
creation of a climate amenable to re-introducing conscription
must remain an unanswered question owing to a lack of quan-

tifiable evidence.

Judging, however, from the size of the

military sport movement, as well as the growing interest in
voluntary labor service, the efforts of the Army Command to
keep alive the concept of citizenship and service would ap-

pear to have reaped not inconsiderable dividends.
At the same time, the involvement with military sport

organizations implied per force an entanglement with politi-
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cal parties and interest groups, adding
a dimension to military sport into which the Army stepped
with the greatest re-

luctance.

This political facet had its origins partially
in

the partisan nature of many of the
organizations which pursued military sport and partially in the dream
of General

Groener that a military sport program could help to
undermine the growing inroads made by National Socialism
in the
ranks of the nation's youth.
In following its military sport objectives, the Army

Command could not avoid contact with political organizations.
German schools and universities did not offer team or individual sports in their curricula, nor did they sponsor inter-

scholastic or inter-collegiate sport activities.

Sport clubs,

youth organizations, veteran's groups, and political associations filled this vacuum.

In its efforts to interest as many

people as possible in military sport, the Defense Ministry
could not escape working with private associations, many of

which pursued political goals.
Groener and Schleicher sought to keep the contact with

partisan organizations to a minimum.

Their method was to

restrict military sport training to individuals instead of

allowing private organizations as

a

whole to participate.

In other words, members of either Nazi or Socialist para-

military organizations could enroll in military sport instruction, not as SA or Reichsbanner men, but simply as German citizens.

The Army hoped that its military sport students

.
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would be capable of setting aside political differences
in
the interest of national defense.

Overt forms of political

expression were expressly forbidden and the Army preferred
to work with non-partisan associations, a preference that

sometimes gave way in practice.
In short,

the policy followed by the Army Command

consisted of welcoming the rank and file of the paramilitary
organizations, provided that they refrained from partisan

political practices and submitted to the guidance of military authorities.

This policy purposely presented extremist

factions and movements which claimed that their party line

transcended patriotism with an awkward dilemma.

Endorsing

or participating in the Army sponsored military sport pro-

gram meant a humiliating surrender to the Army on its terms.
On the other hand, a steadfast adherence to ideological

purity was likely to result in the apostasy and defection
of members unable to shed completely their remaining bourgeois

values

Caught in a dilemma from which they could not emerge
in all likelihood without some losses, the extremist political parties responded predictably.

The Communists, who in

any case were not asked to participate, denounced Groener's

program as a means of spreading militarism to the as yet
untainted working classes, while the Nazis claimed to take
no interest in defending a rotten and corrupt political system.

In practice the Nazis responded favorably to military

sport, but Hitler attempted to keep the
participation of
his men to a minimum, fearing that their loyalty
could be

undermined.

Unfortunately, supposedly responsible politi-

cal parties offered no encouragement to the
Government and

the Socialists even attempted to prevent their supporters

from enrolling in the Army program.

For their failure to

support the military sport program the Socialists must bear
a

heavy share of responsibility for the failure of the Re-

public to capture the loyalty of its youth.
The habitual suspicion with which most Socialists

viewed the military as well as the outright opposition from
pacifist elements within the party encouraged the Party
leaders as well as the rank and file to dismiss the military
sport program as just one more means by which the Army

planned to launch a counter-revolution to overthrow the Republic.

The ideologues of the Party objected not to mili-

tary sport itself, which their own paramilitary organization

practiced, but at the participation of the Army Command in
such activities, which they claimed led to a renewal of ties

between the Army and the ultra-nationalist organizations.
This charge was not an outright prevarication, for

available evidence indicates that more conservative than
liberal groups participated in the military sport program.
On the other hand, it ignores the role that their own propa-

ganda and pacifist rhetoric played in creating this situation

Many young workers grew up listening to a steady diatribe
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which characterized all officers as reactionary
militarists
who planned to enslave the working classes of Germany

in the

service of finance capitalism and Prussian Junkerdom.

As a

result, most working class youths evidenced little
enthusiasm

for the project and were all too ready to dismiss it.

More

conservative and nationalist-oriented youths accordingly
took the place of the Socialists in the program, reinforcing
the Socialist claim that it was one-sided.

Although the Army Command can be absolved of the accusation that it sought the participation of only conservative organizations in its military sport project, General

Groener cannot.

His military background and subsequent ca-

reer in the Republic left him with an aversion for the

Socialists which he never overcame.

As long as he remained

Defense Minister the Army seems to have made no serious efforts to have reached a modus vivendi with the Socialists

concerning the military sport project.

Instead of trying

to overcome the hostility between himself and the Socialists,

Groener instead directed his efforts at trying to undermine
the Nazis, winning over what he considered their better ele-

ments, the rank and file of the SA.

General Groener'

s

successor, General Schleicher, can-

not be accused of a blind reliance on the political right,

but his deviousness and public abandonment of his mentor had
left him personna non grata in most circles.

The withdrawal

of the Socialists from the Reichskuratorium destroyed his
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chances for forging a united front against
political extremism which led to his isolation and
resignation. The General
deserved better treatment, for it was he who
had made the
first step toward a rapprochement between
the SPD and the

Defense Ministry.
The collapse of the Schleicher Government ushered
in

Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists who wasted no
time
in establishing a one-party state.

The illusion that the

Army could remain above politics slowly evaporated as the

Hitler Regime grew in popularity and strength.

With Hitler

interested in expanding the Army, the military sport project
took on an extra importance.

Both the Army and the SA grasp-

ed at once the political implications of the military sport

project.

It became an important pawn in the larger struggle

between the two forces for the mantle of national defense
leadership in the National Socialist state.

The demands of

the SA for a greater role in military planning, of which gain

ing control of the military sport program was the first step,

could not be ignored with impunity.

Hitler's ties to the SA

were closer than any loyalties he had to the Army.

The Army,

however, could not spare the instructors for the military

sport program.
ed:

The inevitable compromise was a length reach-

the SA was to run the program under the aegis of the Army

This arrangement provided the Army with a means of

achieving its immediate goal, military expansion, while at
the same time it gave the Defense Ministry intelligence of

.

SA affairs and an opportunity to exert
influence within the
SA.
Reichenau appears to have hoped that his
connections
with the Kriiger Organization would allow him
the opportunity
to manipulate factions within the SA in
the hopes of neu-

tralizing its radical elements whose interests threatened
to prove inimical to those of the Army, society,
and the

nation
The pursuit of such a policy would seem to render
the armed forces culpable of collaboration with National

Socialism and guilty of opportunism, manifested by completely abandoning the policy first enunciated by Seeckt, namely

that the Army stood above partisan politics.

The charge of collaboration with the Nazi Regime can
be readily dismissed.

In a one-party state, in which the

state and the one political party are theoretically united,
and in which party institutions merge with government in-

stitutions
vice)

,

(

e.g

.

,

SS, Chef AW Organization,

Reich Labor Ser-

collaboration becomes a meaningless term.

Mere

existence itself under these conditions means collaboration.
The accusation of opportunism implies that Army leaders, in order to win support for military expansion, reck-

lessly abandoned their previous principle of political im-

partiality and embraced National Socialism which in turn

promised to support the expansion program.

The answer to

this charge involves an explanation of former policies, an

analysis of motivation, and a definition of self-interest.

In the first place, efforts to eliminate
or at least
to reduce the clauses of the Versailles
Treaty restricting

military expansion had begun as soon as the Treaty
was
signed.

Moreover, it was the Papen Government which had

initiated the steps, three months prior to Hitler's coming
to power, to begin expanding the army.

it can also be argued

that military expansion was not necessarily inimical
to the

state and that it did not solely benefit the armed forces.
It provided jobs, reduced unemployment, and stimulated the

economy.

The history of the relationship between Hitler and

his generals in the years immediately prior to the Second

World War refutes the argument that they had favored expansion in order to go to war.
The question of whether the intrusion of the Defense

Ministry into the affairs of a political organization, the
SA, was motivated by considerations of survival, or a desire

to root out radical elements before they could influence Hit-

ler, or for immediate military interests connected to the

military sport program must remain unanswered.

The principle

figures are dead and they left behind a surprisingly small
and inconclusive amount of documentary material.

Evidence does suggest, however, that the Defense Minister and his assistant followed the broad outlines of the

policy laid down by their predecessors, namely that in resolving its military problems (manpower)

,

the Army should

not surrender any of its autonomy to any political entity
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other than the state.

In other words, the Army wanted

soldiers whose loyalty to the country transcended
political
loyalties.

While this policy was no longer entirely feas-

ible in the National Socialist state, Reichenau and
Blomberg
felt that it was necessary to isolate and neutralize that

political extremism emanating from the SA, a major source of
Army recruits, which might weaken the loyalty of the armed
forces.

Whether or not this interpretation of Army interests

in the long run constituted a marked deviation from the policy

followed by the Defense Ministers and Army Commanders during
the Weimar Republic, the reader will have to decide.
It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the

Army's policy from 193 3 to 1935.

All that can be stated as

fact is that Rohm and his radical coterie were eliminated,

albeit drastically.

To what extent the Army motivated Hit-

ler's actions has never been, nor probably can be, determined.

Moreover, the Army was not the sole agency which wanted to
reduce Rohm's power; there were others who feared and loathed him, and his vision of a Spartan-like state was hardly at-

tractive

.

What is perhaps significant is that the Army retreated
to its former political isolation following the elimination
of Rohm and the dismantling of the Chef AW Organization.

It

is no coincidence that official interest and support for the

military sport program declined as the expectation of the reintroduction of conscription arose.

A draft, to a certain
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extent, obviated the need for military
sport training, and
the resources available to the armed
forces in 1935 did not
permit both a massive military sport training
program and
the conscription of hundreds of thousands
of young men. Yet
the military sport program had done its
work well: the Army

had reached its projected 1938 size in late
1934, an expansion that might neither have been possible nor
have unfolded so smoothly without the existence of recruits
whose
basic military training lay behind them, for the most part,

when they entered military service.
In retrospect, what emerges from the evidence is an

unpleasant picture of lost opportunity.

The Army did not

lead the Nazis by the hand into the Government; if anything,

leading military officials struggled for several years to
develop and implement a program aimed at reducing the political base of the Nazis.

The SA military sport program was not

a revolutionary National Socialist policy, but merely the

National Socialist continuation of the youth training policy
of the Weimar Republic and the Army, albeit with Nazi modi-

fication and amplification.

One is struck by the vacilla-

tion, lethargy, indecisiveness , and the absence of any sense

of urgency in the councils of the Weimar Republic in contrast
to the resolute and strong-willed attitude of the National

Socialists.

Therein perhaps lies the tragedy of the military

sport program.

Judging from the success of the Nazi ideo-

logical indoctrination of Germany's youth following 1933, one
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can only wonder what might have happened
had Groener and

Schleicher succeeded in establishing the military
sport
program in 1930. Putting aside conjecture,

however, the

historian can only attempt to relate and explain
what hap
pened.
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Appendix A.

List of Chef AW Schools and Camps

This list was prepared for the purpose of enabling
former Chef AW Organization members to document
their claims
for unemployment compensation.
It was intended to be inclusive, but for some unknown reason, the 9 naval sport
schools are not included.
The organization into 9 Lander
paralleling the Wehrkreise reflects the Organization at~~its
height in January 19 35.
,

Source:

Sam Sch/421 Anlage
of President der
Reichsanstalt fur Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, III, 7408/252, 30 December 1935.
BA,

1

,

Wehrkreisverwaltung
Landesfiihrer

I

Konigsberg

Bereichf iihrer

Konigsberg

SchieBschule
Nachrichtenschule
Pionierlager
Fiihrerlager

A

-

I.

Schule

Pillkallen
Metgethen
Tapiau
Schmolainen
Gudwallen

Bereichf iihrer Allenstein
Fiihrerschule

Gelandesportschule
A - Schule

Bereichf iihrer
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Passenheim
Lyck
Ublick

Elbing

Marienburg
Riesenburg I
Pr. Holland

-

III
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Wehrkreisverwaltung
Landesfiihrer II

II.

Stettin.

Bereichfuhrer Stettin

Pionierlager
Nachrichtenschule
Fiihrerschule

Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Greifenberg
Warsow
Rothenklempenow
Belgard I
Nest
Belgard II
Anklam I - II
Lubmin

Bereichfuhrer Schwerin

Gelandesportlager
Stammschule
Fiihrerschule

A
A
A
A

-

Schule
Schule
Schule
Schule

Neustrelitz
Neustrelitz
Burg Stargard
Bad Kleinen
Meyenburg
Sternberg
Serrahn

Bereichfuhrer Hamburg-Stadt
Fiihrerschule

A

-

Schule

Malente
Molln I

-

III

Bereichfuhrer Hamburg-Land
Reitschule
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule

Elmshorn
Eutin
Schleswig
Neumiinster

Middelburg
Leek
Dan.Nienhof
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Wehrkreisverwaltung

Landesfuhrer III

III

Berlin

Bereichf tihrer Berlin

Lehrabteilung
Reichsnachrichtenschule
Reichschunde- und Brief taubenSchule
ReichsschieBschule
Reichssanitatsschule
Reichsf ahrschule
Reichsschule f Weltanschauung
Pionierpark
.

Ftihrerschule

Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
SS - Schule

Kladow
Berlin-Lichtenberg
i

Sperenberg
Velten
Berlin
Ruhleben
Neubabelsberg
Oranienburg
Harnekop
Biesenthal
Belzig
Wriezen I - II
Wolzig
Hohenelse
Pieskow
Sanssouci
Pyritz

Bereichftihrer Frankfurt a/0

Pionier lager
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

.

Christians tadt
Rehnitz
Sorau I - III
Frankfurt a/0

Bereichftihrer Magdeburg,
Re it schule
Ftihrerschule

A
A
A
A
A

-

Schule
Schule
Schule
Schule
Schule
Sportschule
SS
Schule
A

Gardelegen
Altengrabow
Letzlingen
Dornburg
Wernigerode
Golpa
Sandersleben
Graf enhainichen
Sandersleben
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Wehrkreisverwaltung IV,
Landesfuhrer IV Dresden
Bereichfuhrer Dresden

Nachrichtenschule
SchieBschule
Fuhrerschule
Fuhrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Dresden
Erdmannsdorf
Struppen
Stenz
Freiberg I und II
Zeithain I und II
Oberschona

Bereichfuhrer Leipzig

Pionierlager
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule

Leisnig
Wermsdorf
Altenburg
Neusorge
Hainichen
Rochlitz I und II
Pretzsch
Borna I und II
Leisnig

Bereichfuhrer Weimar

Nachrichtenschule
Reitschule
Fuhrerschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule

Jena- Lichtenhain
Gotha
Sondershausen
Geilsdorf
Arnstadt
Eisfeld
Ranis
Greiz
Wasungen
Waltershausen
Tannich
Mihla
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Wehrkreisverwaltung

Landesfiihrer V

V.

Stuttgart

Bereichfiihrer Stuttgart

Nachrichtenschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Pionierlager
A - Schule

Cannstatt
Goppingen I und II
Eningen
Kapf enburg
Adelsheim
Neckarsulm
Reutlingen

Bereichfiihrer Ulm

SchieBschule
Fiihrerschule

A
A
A
A

-

Schule
Schule
Schule
Schule

Heidenheim
Hechingen
Deggingen I und II
Unterbohringen
Immendingen I und II
Schadenweilerhof

Bereichfiihrer Karlsruhe

A

Schule
A
Schule
A
Schule
A
Schule
Gelandesportschule
-

Lahr I
Larh II
Kaisers lautern
Landau
Achern I und II

.
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Wehrkreisverwaltung VI,
Landesfuhrer VI Munster
Bereichfuhrer Munster

Pionierlager
Nachrichtenschule
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule

Hoxter
Lippstadt
Munster
Detmold
Meschede
Musen
Detmold
Borghorst
Beverungen
Lette
Altenvoerde
Klafeld

Bereichfuhrer Bremen
Reitschule
Reitschule
Reitschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Leer
Stade
Hoya
Aurich
Iburg
Stade
Nordholz

Bereichfuhrer Koln
Reitschule
Reiterf uherlehrgang
Schule f Leibeslibungen
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule
.

Krefeld
Krefeld
Linnich
Velen
Morsbach
Bergneustadt
Freudenberg I und II
Wildbergerhutte
Jtilich

Eveking
Wahn
Viktorshohe

337

Wehrkreisverwaltung VII.
Landesfiihrer

VII Miinchen

Bereichfiihrer Munchen

Nachrichtenschule
Schule f. Weltanschauung
SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule
A - Schule

Steinhoring
Kempfenhausen
Lechf eld
Hohenkammer
Memmingen I und II
Seeon
Niedernf els
Lauf en
Murnau I - ill
Mittenwald

Bereichfiihrer Regensburg

Pionierlager
Fiihrerschule

A
A
A

-

Schule
Schule
Schule

Deggendorf
Erbendorf
Landau
Sulzbach
Zwiesel

Bereichfiihrer Niirnberg

Reitschule
Fiihrerschule

A
A
A
A

- Schule
- Schule
- Schule
- Schule

SS- Sportschule
A - Schule

Ellingen
Altdorf
Ingolstadt
Eichstatt I
Fiirth I

Lauf
Fiirth II

Rothenburg

-

Ill
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Wehrkreisverwaltung VIII
Landesfiihrer VIII

Breslau

Bereichfiihrer Breslau

Nachrichtenschule
SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Wills chkau

Striegau
Wohlau
Lams dor f I und II
Cosel
Dambritsch
Sylsterwitz
Reichenbach

Bereichfiihrer Liegnitz

A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesportschule
Gelandesportschule

Schonau
Boberstein
Ullersdorf
Bunzlau
Warmbrunn

I

und II
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Wehrkreisverwaltung IX,

Landesfuhrer IX Kassel.
Bereichfiihrer Hannover

SchieBschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesport lager
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule

Peine
Bevern I und II
Einbeck I und II
Uelzen
Scheuen
Achterberg
Wolterdingen
Wolfenbuttel
Hakensblittel

Wennigsen
Levershausen

Bereichfiihrer Hessen
Fiihrerschule

A

Schule
A
Schule
A
Schule
Gelandesportlager
SS- Sportschule
A - Schule
A - Schule
A - Schule
-

Altenburg
Hanau I - III
Friedberg I und II
Arolsen
Schwarzenborn
Corbach
Neuhof
Rieneck
Schlitz

Bereichfiihrer Koblenz

A - Schule
A - Schule
Gelandesport schule
Gelandesportschule

Kiez I und II
Babenhausen I - III
Traben-Trarbach
Bad Schwalbach

.
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I.

Unpublished Archival Collections

A

«

Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv
1.

,

Munchen (BHStA)

Allgemeines Staatsarchiv (BHStA,

Signature MI

I)

(Innenministerium)

MI 71940
MI 72449

Signature MK (Kultusministerium)
13828; Forderung der Leibesiibungen/Gelandesportschulen,
1932-33.

13832; Turnen und Sport: Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung.
13847; Bayerische Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Leibesiibungen, Bd. IV, 1931-33.
13864; Gelandesportschulen

— Gauschule

Henfenfeld.

1386 8; Korperliche Ertiichtigung der Jugend: Volkssportschule, Kurse fur Leibesiibungen und Klein-

kaliberschieBen
13874; Volksertuchtigung: 1929-1933.
Oberstleutnant a.D., Leiter.

Horl, August,

Signature MF (Finanzministerium)
67303; Gelandesportschule, Bd. I,
2.

1932-23.

Geheimes Staatsarchiv (BHStA, II)

Bund Bayern und Reich, 2/3, 2/4, 2/5, and
3.

Kreigsarchiv (BHStA, IV)

Bestand

Stahlhelm

54;

Wehrsport.

78;

Bundesamt Verfiigungen,

B.

Berlin Document Center

1

,

Material from the Personalakten of:
Bennecke, Heinrich
Croneiss, Theodor
Daleuge, Kurt
Epp, Franz Ritter von

Grolmann, Wilhelm von

Helldorff, Wolf Graf von
Horauf, Franz Ritter von

Killinger, Manfred von
Kruger, Friedrich-Wilhelm
Kuhme, Kurt

Lutze, Viktor

Schulenburg, Friedrich Graf von der
Spaing, Heinz

Steiner, Felix

Tschammer und Osten, Hans von

933.

Berlin (BDC)

,

.
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C.

Bundesarchiv

Koblenz

,

(BA)

R-36; Deutscher Gemeindetag
R-36/2013; Akten betr. Reichskuratorium fiir Jugendertuchtigung, Zeitungsausschnitte, 1932-35.
R-43; Reichskanzlei

R-43, 1/1472; Kabinettsprotokolle

1/1/35-31/3/35.

,

R-43, 11/143; Zustandigkeitsf ragen

1933-42.

,

R-43, 11/516; Akten betr. Arbeitsdienst , 30/1/33-30/9/34.

R-43, Jugendertiichtigung,

18/10/30-31/12/35.

R-43, 11/828; Reichskanzlei Akten betr. Stahlhelm, Bund
der Frontsoldaten.

I

R-4 3, 11/1292; Mobilmachung 1933-35.

R-53; Stellvertreter des Kanzlers

R-53/191; SA, 1933-34.
NS-10; Adjutantur des Fiihrers

NS-10/77; Schriftwechsel mit der NSDAP angegliederten
Verbanden, vor allem organisatorische Fragen und Personalfragen, Befehle, Einladungen und Bittschrif ten betr. A-Z
1933-34.
NS-12; Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund (NSLB)

NS-12/1313; Correspondence of E. LinB, Reichsref erent
Gelandesport in der NSLB Reichsleitung

fiir

NS-23; Akten der Obersten SA-Fiihrung

NS-23/1; Befehle, Anordnungen, OSAF

,

1933-34.

NS-23/2; Befehle, Anordnungen, OSAF, 1934.
NS-23/1 23; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 1.1.3130.6.32.

NS-23/1 24; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 1.7.3218.4.33.
NS-23/1 25; Verfiigungen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung, 19.4.3315.9.33.

_

17

3
3

34

26; VerfiigUngen der Obersten SA-Fiihrung,

~2
31

Y1^''

16.9.33

VerfUgungen der Obersten SA-Fuhrung, 18.3.34

NS-23/128; Verfugungen des Obersten SA-Fuhrung,
1.1.35-

NS-23/157; Allgemeines Personalamt, 1932-1933.
NS-23/158; Allgemeines Personalamt, 1933-1934.
NS -23/3 10; Fuhrer Tagung, 1938.

NS-23/319; Ausbildungsamt 1934.
NS-23/414; Verhaltnis AW zur Partei und zum Staat.

NS-23/428; Befehle der Obersten SA-Fuhrung, 1934.

Sammlung Schumacher (abbreviated "Sam Sch")
Sam Sch/239; Hitler jugend

Sam Sch/262; Reichsarbeitsdienst
Sam Sch/271; Stahlhelm.
Sam Sch/ 2 7 9; NS Studentenbund.

Sam Sch/ 40 4; Oberste SA-Fuhrung.
Sam Sch/405; SA -Marine, Motor, Nachrichten, Pionier,
Sondereinheiten.

Sam Sch/409; SA-Schulen.

Sam Sch/414; SA, Allgemeines A-N.
Sam Sch/415; SA, Allgemeines, 0-Z
Sam Sch/421; Chef AW.
Sam Sch/477; Ausbildungswesen der SS.

NachlaB Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger

(NL Kriiger)

.

.
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D

*

Bundesmil itararchiv

,

Freiburg i.B.

(BA-MA)

Many of these files have three file numbers:
the new
Bundesmilitararchiv signature, RW (Reichswehr) or
RH (Reichsheer); the old EAR number, such as W01
-5/107; and the original
file number and title, for example, OKW
888.
To facilitate
identification, old and new signatures, when known,
will be

1

.

OKW-Reichswehrministerium

RW 6/66 (W01-5/107); "Reichswehrministerium,
Geheimakten
uber NSDAP, Zwischenf alle mit der SA, Januar 19 33-30
Juni 1934". (OKW 878)
RW 6/67 (W01-5/108); "Geheim Akten iiber NSDAP, Zwischenfalle, 1.7.34-4.35". (OKW 858)

RW 6/65 (W01-5/1 12)
"Partei Organisationen der SS, SA,
HJ und Wehrmacht, Juli 1935-Juni 1938". (OKW 863)
;

RW 6/71 (W01-5/106); "Wehrpolitisches Amt der NSADP"
§0KW 9 57)
RW 6/56

(W01-5/1 56)

"Akten Reichswehrministerium-Wehrmachtsabteilung iiber Ic Besprechungen Januar 19 35April 1938". (OKW 888)
;

,

r

RW 6/46 (W01-5/160)
"Wichtige politische Verfugungen
des Reichswehrministers und Befehlhabers der Wehrmacht"
;

.

2.

Chef der Heeresleitung

RH-1/12 (H 24/5); "Adjutant Chef HL; Geheimakten fur
Chef der Heeresleitung."
H-1/319b; "Spitzengliederung der Wehrmacht".

RW-6/158 (H-35/29); "Vortrage Dr Goebbels und andere".
RH-15/49 (II H/139); "Haushaltsmittel fur Neuauf stellung,
Ausbildung, u.a.".
RH-15/8 (II H/153, teil 2.); Schriftwechsel uber den Aufbau des Heeres, 18.12.33-29.3.34".
II H/228;

"Neues Friedensheer

,

anlg.

'32".

m ~\ 2/ l~,lt, (I1
4

3j\/ 32

H / 292 >'

"Ausbildung-Kurzausbildung,

•

RH-8/896 (Wi I F5/498); Reichswehr support for
the
Reichskuratorium fur Jugendertiichtigung
3

.

Wehrkreis

RH-37/2265 (WK IV/89);. "RH II (4.12.33-15,2.34) IV AK"

RH-53-7/1178 (WK VII/182); "Planstudie A XVII, Grenzschutz"
RH-46/89 (WK VII/732);
herres, 1933".

"Ausbildung auBerhalb des Reichs-

RH-46/90 (WK VII/734) ; "Ssmmelakt Kurzausbildung; Ausbildung auBerhalf des Reichsheeres".
RH-46/97 (WKVII/741); "Grenzschutzarbeiten 11/31-5/34,
Pionier Abteilung 7".
RH-46/99 (WK VI 1/74 3)
SA -Reichswehr cooperation on mobilization; Auflosung of the Chef AW.
;

RH-46/107 (WK VII/759); "Politisches und Spionage 1933".
RH-46/361

(WK VII/983);

SA.

RH-39/285 (WK VII/1242); Reports from 7th Kraftf ahrabteilung on its participation in the events of 30 June 1934.
RH-26-7/744 (WK VII/1 295)
bande"

;

"Zusammenarbeit mit Wehrver-

RH-26-7/377 (WK VII/1342); SA-Reichswehr cooperation.
WK VII/1 451; SA-Reichswehr cooperation after 30 June 1934.
RH 26-7/294
1933-35"

(WK VII/1 451);

"Ausbildung auBerhalb des Heeres

"Ausbildung auBerhalb des
Reichsheeres, SA-Sportlagern"

RH 26-7/362

(WK VII/1453);

RH 26-7/300 (WK VII/1484); " Innenpoli tische Angelegenheiten, besondere Vorkommnisse Organisation".
,

RH 26-7/295

(WK VII/1 51 7);

RH 26-7/397 (WK VII/1 61

2)';

expansion of Reichswehr.
Rohmputsch in WK VII.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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RH 46/97
RH 37/308

(WK VII/1741);

"Landesschut z Arbeiten"

(WK VII/2188);

"Ausbildung aufierhalb des
Reichsheeres, 1933-34".

RH 53-7/1085

(WK VII/4082-1

RH 53-7/1086

(WK

)

Auflosung of the Chef AW.

;

VII/4082-2);

"Erganzungsplane 1934-1937".

RH 57/9

(H-04-1/7); Landespolizei Inspektion Siidwest,
"Aktionen gegen die SA-Rohm Revolte, Juni-Juli 1934".

RH 57/50 (H-04-1/47); Landespolizei Inspektion Siidwest,
"Beschlagnahmte Waff en, Munition und Gerat der SA
und P.O "
.

4.

Beck, Ludwig

Nachlasse

Generalobers t

Bredow, Ferdinand von

Groener, Wilhelm

(N-28)

Generalmajor (N-97)

Generalleutnant (N-46)

Hammers tein-Equord, Kurt Freiherr von
Heye, Wilhelm

Generaloberst (N-26)

Generaloberst (N-18).

Schleicher, Kurt von
Seeckt, Hans von

Generalder Infanterie (N-42).

Generaloberst (N-24 7)

Stiilpnagel, Joachim von

General der Infanterie (N-5)

E. Gordon Papers

.

Amherst, MA.

,

Testimony of Reichsinnenminister a.D. Wilhelm Sollman
Questionnaires, ex-Reichswehr officers,, for the period
1919-1926

Letters from former Reichswehr Officers, for the period
1927-1935
F. Hauptarchiv der NSDAP

Microfilm Collection
Folio numbers

,

Hoover Institution

(HA)
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83

Stennes Putsch.

305

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

306

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

307

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

308

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

311

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

312

SA Reichsfiihrerschule

315

anti-SA material.

316

SA regional material.

317

Polizei Direktion Munchen, 1931 Prosecution of SA.

319

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

322

SA,

323

SA, Sturm 33.

324

SA,

325

Stennes Putsch.

326

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

327

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

328

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

329

SS material.

330

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1368

Stennes Putsch.

1547

Polizei Direktion Munchen, SA der NSDAP files.

1549

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1550

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1551

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1552

Oberste SA Fiihrung/ SA Conferences.

1931, dissatisfaction with Reichsleitung

1934 paragraph 175

(homosexuality) proceedings.

mm

.

.

.

.

.
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1553

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1554

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1565

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1608

anti-Rohm letters.

1870

NSKK

1871

Prussian Police reports on SA

1872

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1873

Oberste SA Fiihrung.

1874

Polizei Direktion MQnchen, SA der NSDAP files

875

Polizei Direktion Munchen, SA der NSDAP files

1876

Polizei Direktion Munchen, SA der NSDAP files

1877

Polizei Direktion Miinchen, SA der NSDAP files

1878

Polizei Direktion Miinchen/ SA der NSDAP files

879

Polizei Direktion Miinchen, SA der NSDAP files

1

1

G

.

,

1931.

Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale
Geschiedenis Amsterdam (IISG)
,

NachlaB Grzesinski
G 1520
G 1524
G 1514

H.

Institut fur Zeitgeschichte

,

Munchen (IfZG)

Sd-1; Liebmann, Curt, General der Infanterie a.D., "Aufzeichnungen General der Infanterie a.D. Curt Liebmann,
1922-1959"

Ed-33; Unterof f iziere Miiller und Eckardt to Hauptmann
Hoefle on pre-military training of the SA, 17/6/33.

Ed-67/19; Siemensarchiv, "Deutscher Jungendienst"
F-56; Weckmann, Kurt, General a.D., "Zusammenarbeit mit
25.4.1952.
der SA in Grenzschutzf ragen"
,

349

F-86; Diktat Dr. Wilhelm Abegg.
Fa-2; Vols, Hans, "Geschichte der SA
von den Anfangen bis
zur Gegenwart." Berlin, 1934.

Fa-34;

letter Hauptmann Hoefle to Ernst Rohm,
12.6.1934.
Fa-88/337; HJ Rundschreiben, 1932, on
"Wehrsport"
Fa- 90/1 -2; Chef des Ausbildungswesens
der SA.

Fa-105; Kriiger-Alvensleben letter;
Jagow-Rohm-Kriiger
letter, 1932.

Fa-107/1; Oberste SA-Fuhrung, 1923-45.
Fa-108; SA/Oberste SA-Fuhrung,

1928-35.

Fa-115; Richtlinienentwiirf e der obersten SA-Fuhrung und
Korrespondenz, 1933-34.

Ma-87; "Aktenstiicke aus der Reichskanzlei"
January 1933.
Ma-88; "Protokolle des Reichskabinetts"
January 19 33.

,

2

,

June

1

932-

June 1932-

Ma- 131; NSDAP/SA.
Ma-241; Reichswehrministerium, "Stichworte fur Ausfiihrungen
vor den Militar-Attaches " 2 5 Oktober 1934; Korrespondenz
zwischen Reichswehrministerium und Bay. Staatsministerium
des Innern.
,

Ma-260; Reichswehrministerium study on Reich Youth Ministry,
18

March 1933.

Ma-290; SS reports on Lutze, 1935-1943.
Ma-528; NSDStB records.
Ma-537; misc. NSDAP records.

Ma-619; General Karl Haushofer papers.
Bockmann, Walter von, General der Infanterie a.D.

Zgs.

t1;

Zgs.

37; Foertsch,

Zgs.

39;

Fretter-Pico, Maximillian, General der Artillerie a.D

Zgs.

44;
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